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PREFACE

It was hard for the five co-authors to agree on a title for this book. It was
not so much a disagreement among the members of our research group as it
was a difficulty in coming up with a succinct title to convey the many aspects
of the book and the study reported in it.
While this book is indeed an in-depth study of the effectiveness of two jobsaving strategies used to reverse the shutdown of supermarkets in Philadelphia,
we believe it is much more, too. It compares worker buyouts and QWL (quality
of worklife) programs two phenomena of great interest over the 1970s and
'80s to the public, the mass media, and officials in business, labor, and govern
ment. It is a study that should prove interesting and useful to researchers in
economics and other social sciences, to practitioners of management-labor rela
tions, and to policymakers.
In the book, we attempt to break new ground both theoretically and em
pirically in the study of employee ownership and worker participation. Chapters
1 and 2 present a synthesis of previous research on these topics in order to
develop a theoretical framework. We hypothesize and attempt to demonstrate
in chapters 5, 6, and 7, in concrete terms, how employee ownership and worker
participation are linked with economic outcomes for both workers and organiza
tions. We link workers' attitudes to their firms' economic performance as we
look at both the individual and organizational effects of innovative structures
and operational practices.
This study adds to a small but growing body of literature showing the im
portance of ownership and participation for organizational performance. In
fact, a very recent study by the United States General Accounting Office, which
was released after the main text of this book was written, found that: "Those
ESOP (employee stock ownership plan) firms in which nonmanagerial
employees have a role in making corporate decisions through work groups
or committees showed more improvement in our measure of productivity than
firms without such participation" (USGAO 1987, p. 3).
Though we wanted to reflect the multiple focuses of the study in the title,
we eventually settled on the primary theme of job-saving strategies. Not only
was job-saving the initial and overwhelming motivation of the workers, union
leaders, consultants, and managers who dealt with the shutdown supermarkets
and the innovative structures, but it is also a significant social, economic, and
policy issue of our time.
How can our society and economy deal with the pervasive restructuring and
dislocation which affects so many workers? That question loomed very large
in the early 1980s when the events recounted and analyzed in this book took

place. In Philadelphia, the scene of the O&O worker buyouts and the creation
of Super Fresh with its programs of worker involvement in decisions and prof
its, the late '70s and early '80s brought month after month of shutdowns,
layoffs, and job loss.
Was it just a short-term crisis? The acuteness of the problem in 1982, when
the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. (A&P) announced the closing of its
Philadelphia stores, was highlighted by the context of a deep national economic
recession. Labor force statistics, however, showed a long-term pattern of
dislocation and change, especially in the manufacturing sector where an average
net reduction of 1,000 jobs a month had taken place over a 10-year period.
Even now in the late 1980s, with the Philadelphia economy relatively robust
and the unemployment rate lower, corporate restructuring and interregional
and international competition continually threaten the jobs of those in former
ly well-established industries. The question of dislocation and unemployment
may not get so much mass media attention as it once did, but it has not gone
away. In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed a bill, which President Reagan op
posed but did not veto, calling for prenotifiation to workers and communities
by firms considering shutdowns or large layoffs.
Regardless of which political party is in power, a major issue in coming
years will be how to prepare for the economy of the future. We hope that a
major thrust of the emerging debate will be how to better use our human
resources. We must ask: What kinds of management skills and structures will
be suited to maintaining prosperity and productivity? What role will workers
and their union representatives have in maintaining workplace conditions and
enhancing the fair distribution of income and wealth? How will we ensure that
basic democratic principles do not get lost in the drive for efficiency and
profitability?
These questions are not restricted to the context of job-saving, but cover
a whole range of management, labor, and economic development themes, even
in the context of economic expansion. In the few years since their initiation,
both innovations reported in this book have been expanded to other organiza
tions. Two original O&Os, which were worker buyouts, have now spawned
experience with four other O&O supermarkets, as described briefly in chapter
4. The Super Fresh experiment started in Philadelphia has now spread too.
At the 1987 A&P shareholders meeting, chairman James Woods praised Super
Fresh as a model for the entire retail grocery chain. The model has been ex
tended company wide to 243 stores (Palley 1987).
The stories of the O&O and Super Fresh supermarkets, humble and limited
as they might be, help in the emerging discussion of the issues. Other pieces
of evidence are being gathered in studies of the results of alternative forms
of work organization (Rosow 1986), of the role of unions in raising producVI

tivity and fighting mismanagement (Freeman and Medoff 1984; LeRoy 1987),
and of the changing global context of American industrial relations and the
importance of worker participation to industrial change (Kochan 1985).
Together, these studies share the view that labor-management cooperation is
indeed required for the future economy, but they warn of the dangers of un
balanced and nonreciprocated acts of cooperation. Power sharing between labor
and management is called for, but is much more easily advocated than
accomplished.
This study was also, significantly, an interdisciplinary one. In the field of
employee ownership and worker participation, such an approach is often ad
vocated but rarely put into practice. Dialogue among behavioral scientists and
economists is often difficult, owing to differing definitions of theoretical
"modeling," differing methods, differing approaches to statistical methods
and differing degrees of reliance on them, and differing standards of proof.
For example, economists often seem to favor systems of equations based on
variables that can be measured with high degrees of reliability and accuracy.
On the other hand, behavioral scientists, looking for patterns of behaviors and
social interactions, often construct models for heuristic as contrasted with
predictive purposes. Behavioral scientists look at measures of structures and
behaviors as desirable, but are willing to accept the messiness of human percep
tions, attitudes, and self-reports, with all of their potential error, bias, and
unreliability. Even among social scientists, differences in theoretical orienta
tions and methods between, say, anthropologists and psychologists may in
hibit cross-fertilization of thinking and research.
These obstacles may have been minimized in this study because, like the
worker/owners we studied, we can together in this group in part through in
terpersonal linkages. That is, some of us were drawn in because of mutual
friendships, acquaintanceships, and prior experience with each other in other
types of activities. Working together strengthened these bonds and developed
them in other directions as well. For instance, several of us became more ac
tive in our faculty union together, partly as a result of informal discussions
at our research group meetings.
Nevertheless, we still had to struggle to understand each other and to in
tegrate our perspectives. The reader will have to judge how well we accomplish
ed a kind of synthesis.
To study a set of workplaces based on democratic principles, we set up a
democratic research group. That way we experienced both the agonies and
the ecstasies our research subjects told us about. For us, speed was sacrificed,
but the multidisciplinary effort we made was profitable and productive. Some
of the time we had to struggle and fight about our philosophies, our methods,
and most particularly, our differing abilities to work towards a common
deadline.
vii

Most of the time, however, we enjoyed the challenge of working with peo
ple bringing different perspectives to bear on a complex problem. We had
researchers trained and practicing as social psychologists, industrial relations
specialists, urban anthropologists, and labor economists. At the time we began,
three of us were nontenured (one in a nontenure-track position) and two tenured.
Our group was composed of four females and one male. Differing personality
traits and quirks entered into the mixture. It was not possible for us to rely
on common habits, professional jargons, traditional role relationships, or hierar
chical ranks for guidance in making decisions.
Though it was a group job throughout, we each took on special areas of
responsibility. Art Hochner took primary responsibility for writing chapters
1,2, and 8, and for integating the final product. Cherry Granrose had primary
responsibility for the analysis of data from the workers' survey and for writing
chapters 3 and 6. Judy Goode supervised the interviewing of the workers,
analyzed the interviews and wrote chapter 5. Elaine Simon also worked on
the interviews, put together the codebook which was invaluable for analyzing
those interviews, and was primarily responsible for writing chapter 4. Eileen
Appelbaum took primary responsibility for the analysis of data from the shop
stewards and store managers, as well as data obtained at the corporate level,
and for writing chapter 7.
After the initial drafts of chapters were submitted to the group, comments
and criticisms were forthcoming, and members of the group participated in
rewriting each other's chapters for later drafts. In the end, the book was the
product of the entire group, with both the benefits and costs of group work.
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Using Worker Participation and
Buyouts to Save Jobs

I had been at Food Fair in 1979 when it closed, then
joined as part-time at A&R I saw the writing on the wall
as far as chains were concerned. a former A&P worker.
It was a tough period . . . you didn't know what the heck
was happening before the lay-off, it was a bad time. Peo
ple were bumping all over the place. Still, it was a big
shock. January 31 and all of a sudden you're out of a job.
There's nothing. At the time most everyone was gone
other than high seniority people over 14 years. I don't
think it really dawned on them that they were going to
lose their jobs. We were in a store that was doing well,
and didn't think it would close. a former A&P worker.
I closed three stores, kept bumping around. It was very,
very sad, a lot of tears. It had been a very closeknit store,
like a family. a former A&P worker.
It wouldn't make any difference if I never got the $5,000
back. Just the experience was worth it. Here, you have a
chance at possibly making some money, but also to have
some control over your destiny. a worker/owner.
In late February 1982, during a national recession, the Great At
lantic & Pacific Tea Company (A&P) announced, as required in its
local union contract, that it was closing its 29 remaining Philadelphia
supermarkets in 20 days (see table 1.1 for chronology). A&P had
been closing Philadelphia area supermarkets gradually over the pre
ceding decade, but closings had accelerated in the last months and
the announcement of a complete shutdown of A&P's Philadelphia
operations meant that suddenly 2,000 people would be thrown out of
work.
1
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One of the affected unions, local 1357 of the United Food and
Commercial Workers (UFCW), was primed to respond. Less than a
week after A&P announced the final store closings 20 days away, the
union made a buyout proposal that eventually led to the establish
ment of the O&O stores. The union originally proposed that A&P
workers-to-be-laid-off purchase 21 of the closed stores. News got
around among the A&P workers that there was an alternative to un
employment or looking for another job, and meetings about the buy
out plan began at the union hall. About 600 union members showed
up for the initial meetings. Each potential worker/owner would have
to contribute $5,000 and a $200 downpayment would hold a place.
The union's credit union would make arrangements for loans. News
paper accounts reported that about 600 workers signed pledges
worth $3 million within the next three weeks.

New Relationships in the Workplace
During the past decade, a great deal of public attention has been
paid to worker buyouts. To save their jobs, workers have contem
plated or launched into buyouts of firms threatened with shutdowns.
These firms range in size from the large 7,000-worker integrated
National Steel Mill in Wen-ton, West Virginia to the two small A&P
supermarkets in the Philadelphia area converted to O&O supermar
kets with about 50 workers each. Worker buyouts have occurred in a
variety of industries in addition to steel and supermarkets, including
furniture, machine tools, frozen foods, mining, shoes, trucking,
printing, meat packing, taxicabs, railroads, garments, and wood
products. According to the records of the National Center for Em
ployee Ownership (NCEO), about 60 firms threatened with shut
down or massive layoffs have been bought by their employees since
1975. Moreover, it appears that about 90 percent of these bought-out
firms have survived thus far.
Employee ownership and worker cooperatives have a tradition
stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century. Workers in recent
years have rediscovered employee ownership in the midst of crisis
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and found for themselves a new way to work. Furthermore, the cur
rent rediscovery has been occurring not only in the United States,
but in most western industrial nations (Jones and Svejnar 1982).
The worker buyout is one path taken in the search for ways to
change relationships between workers and their workplaces. Cur
rently, various means of including workers in the ownership and con
trol of work organizations are being explored. The most widespread
forms are employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and quality of
worklife (QWL) programs.
Quality of worklife is a vague term that means many things to
many people. The kinds of activities it includes often take many
other names too, such as "employee involvement."
[QWL] is used interchangeably with "humanization of
work," "work reform," "work redesign," and "work
improvement." It is too frequently used loosely to charac
terize almost any joint [labor-management] program that
requires a committee, but it ought to be confined to joint
ventures that in the first instance aim at satisfying work
ers' desires or needs for restructuring of the workplace.
This restructuring should allow greater participation in
decisionmaking on the job, constructive interaction with
one's fellows, and opportunity for personal development
and self-realization.
. . . All things considered, perhaps a sound enough
guide to what QWL means is provided in a definition in
cluded in a news report of an international conference that
ended in Toronto in early September 1981: "many forms
of new work organizations . . . involving workers in
shop-floor decisions through problem-solving commit
tees" (Siegel and Weinberg 1982, 140-142).
The General Accounting Office estimates that about 4,800 firms
have ESOPs with various degrees of ownership in each (USGAO
1986). A New York Stock Exchange study conducted in 1982 found
that 14 percent of firms employing 500 or more people had quality
circles, 13 percent had employee suggestion systems, 11 percent had
employee task forces, 8 percent had profit sharing plans, and 8 per
cent had labor-management committees. Overall, "one fourth [of
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corporations with 500 or more employees] have at least made a start
toward the less-adversarial environment associated with QWL"
(Freund and Epstein 1984, p. 129).
This trend toward experimentation has emerged for a number of
loosely connected reasons. Structural changes in the economy have
put pressure on manufacturing industries, on unions, and on the
Frost Belt. The process of change has been exacerbated by corporate
strategies that promote deindustrialization, by conglomerate merg
ers, and by intensified foreign competition. Economic stagnation,
deep and frequent recessions, and a recovery that left elevated un
employment rates resulted in severe economic dislocation that is,
massive layoffs and worsened structural unemployment.
At the same time, there have been institutional and cultural
changes affecting workplaces. The quality of working life has be
come a concern, not only of white-collar workers, but also of bluecollar employees. Participation by workers in decisionmaking has
been lauded as a keystone of the Japanese economic achievement, as
well as a necessary element for reversing declining labor productiv
ity. Union-management relations have staggered from management
hostility, union concessions, and union membership decline to unionmanagement cooperation. In this confusing context, some workers
have sought to take their job security into their own hands.
There are smaller numbers of worker buyouts compared to other
forms of employee ownership and worker participation. Despite this,
the drama of saving jobs, the mystery of rescuing seemingly failing
firms, and the paradox of workers taking managerial responsibilities
in worker buyouts have combined to fascinate both the popular and
theoretical imagination. Aside from emotional appeal, however,
worker buyouts seem to be more full-fledged attempts to implement
employee ownership and worker participation. Observers of ESOPs
often criticize them for giving workers mere paper ownership with
out control (Slott, 1985a, 1985b). Meanwhile, critics of QWL pro
grams distrust so-called participation without a genuine
redistribution of power (Parker 1985). In theory, worker buyouts
possess the potential to release workers' energies and to reforge the
organization on a more effective and more egalitarian basis.
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Creation of Innovative Structures in Philadelphia Supermarkets

The buyout proposal and other union efforts spurred lengthy
union-management negotiations between A&P and local 1357, which
continued through the spring of 1982. In May, the UFCW and A&P
agreed to a landmark contract which would save many jobs through
the creation of two innovative business structures. First of all, two
stores would be sold to groups of employees, who would indepen
dently own and operate them as employee-owned businesses. The
second innovation was Super Fresh, a new subsidiary of A&P, which
would reopen many of the remaining stores. Super Fresh would in
corporate new methods of management, a quality of worklife pro
gram to provide employee participation in decisionmaking, and a
revenue-based bonus plan as an incentive for workers. A&P prom
ised to open 20 Super Fresh stores eventually and to give preference
to former A&P workers in hiring. In exchange, the UFCW agreed to
wage cuts of 20 percent and concessions on some benefits.
Even though announcement of plans for the employee-owned
stores preceded the announcement of the Super Fresh plan, Super
Fresh stores opened first. The first Super Fresh store opened in July
1982. Super Fresh engaged consultants from the Busch Center at the
Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania to establish the
first QWL programs and to conduct the training of "associates" and
"store directors" (the new terms for workers and store managers,
respectively). Super Fresh stores were set up with a decentralized
philosophy, so that the store director would have more autonomy
than under A&P.
The information meetings on the worker buyout plan were held for
a time, while union-A&P negotiations dragged on. After May, how
ever, most workers dropped out of the buyout scheme, expecting to
be recalled at Super Fresh.
The remaining prospective worker/owners met over the summer
for planning and research. The first O&O store opened with 24
worker/owners in Roslyn, Pennsylvania, a northwestern suburb of
Philadelphia, on October 13, 1982 about seven months after the
A&P shutdown announcement. The second O&O store, with 17
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(later reduced to 14) worker/owners, opened the following month in
the far northeast section of Philadelphia, in a neighborhood called
Parkwood Manor. Each O&O store established bylaws calling for
substantial worker/owner control over a hired store manager.
This case of worker buyout, in contrast to many that have been
reported in the news media, occurred in an urban context where a
shutdown did not threaten the sole employment opportunity in town
for displaced workers. The A&P workers found themselves out of a
job at a time when the economy was slumping and employers all
over the country were calling for union concessions. Even though
these workers had slim prospects of finding a job with another su
permarket chain, former A&P employees did have two options they
could take to keep supermarket jobs. Eventually, 38 became worker/
owners in the two O&O supermarkets. Over 1,500 of the displaced
A&P workers became Super Fresh employees.
As a result of the March 1982 shutdown, 29 A&P stores were
actually closed. Twenty-six of these eventually became Super Fresh
stores; two became O&O stores; and one was closed permanently
because of structural flaws in the foundation.
The Super Fresh chain was later to convert all remaining A&P
stores in southeastern Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, and north
ern Delaware to the new subsidiary. Many were changed over by the
end of 1982, and by mid-1983 there were over 50 Super Fresh stores
in the region. These stores had been minimally affected by the shut
down threat in 1982 and were represented by other UFCW union

____________Table 1.1 Chronology_________
Feb. 1982
A&P announcement of closings.
March 1982
UFCW proposes employee buyouts and holds meet
ings to get pledges from workers.
May 1982
A&P/UFCW agreement to sell two stores to work
ers, reopen most others as Super Fresh.
July 1982
First Super Fresh openings.
October 1982 First O&O store opens.
November 1982 Second O&O store opens._____________
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locals not actively seeking QWL or employee ownership and not en
thusiastic about the agreement between local 1357 and A&P, to say
the least. QWL training was not instituted as early nor was training
conducted as fully as in the stores in Philadelphia, which had been
involved in the shutdown. These employees had thus not participated
in the discussions about employee ownership and QWL conducted by
UFCW 1357 at the time of the shutdown.

The Study
Despite increasing openness by workers to the idea of buyouts and
some apparent survivability of bought-out firms, little is actually
known about the effectiveness of buyouts. That is, though jobs are
saved, how do worker buyouts compare with other job saving meth
ods? Do they generate new jobs or merely slow the onset of unem
ployment? Do they open up new sources of organizational efficiency
or survive through employee subsidies and painful sacrifices? Do
they redistribute power in meaningful ways? Do they substitute one
set of worries for another, financial risk for job insecurity?
This book looks at how worker buyouts function and how success
fully they meet the goals of saving jobs and increasing worker con
trol. It studies the two O&O supermarkets created from former A&P
stores in Philadelphia in 1982 and compares the effectiveness of
these buyouts to another method of job-saving labor-management
concessions which included productivity bonuses and a QWL pro
gram in the Super Fresh stores. Since both of these situations
emerged from the same labor negotiations between A&P and locals
56 and 1357 of the UFCW, the setting provides a natural field com
parison and contrast. It allows for clear and controlled explorations
of employee ownership and worker participation.
The research began when the shutdown was announced and
UFCW local 1357 proposed worker buyouts. Members of a study
group at Temple University investigating plant closings and job loss
contacted UFCW locals 1357 (retail clerks) and 56 (meatcutters),
A&P, and the consultants working with them and asked to study this
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experience. The research group conducting the overall study was
multidisciplinary, drawn from the fields of industrial relations, orga
nizational behavior, psychology, sociology, anthropology, urban stud
ies, political science, and economics. The group drew upon many
perspectives and methodologies in conducting the study. There were
three major data collection phases, as shown in table 1.2.
This book covers results from Phases II and III. It is divided into
eight chapters. First, here in chapter 1, we place worker buyouts in
the context of employee ownership and worker participation, theoret
ically, historically, and practically. In chapter 2, we present a theo
retical framework of the organizational processes involved in
employee-owned firms and the expected outcomes for organizations
and individual workers. The framework will attempt to explain in
theory how worker buyouts function and how they affect the organi
zations' operations and the individuals in them. Chapter 3 presents
the research design and methods of data collection used, namely
semistructured interviews and systematic questionnaire surveys. In
chapter 4, the formal structures of the O&O and Super Fresh stores
are described. Chapter 5 reports data primarily from interviews con
cerning the personal experiences of the workers and the informal so
cial structures of the stores. Chapters 6 and 7 present quantitative
tests of hypotheses derived from theoretical framework. Worker-level
perceptions, attitudes, and economic outcomes are included in Chap
ter 6. Store-level functioning and outcomes are examined in chapter
____________Table 1.2 Research Phases____________
July 1982
Phase I: Worker survey.
Summer 1983
Phase Ha: Interviews with O&O worker owners.
Fall 1983
Phase lib: Interviews with former A&P workers
at two Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia.
Fall 1984
Phase He: Interviews with former A&P workers
in two Super Fresh stores outside Philadelphia.
Fall 1984
Phase Ilia: Survey of workers interviewed in
Phase II.
Winter to Summer 1985 Phase Illb: Shop steward and store manager
surveys.
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7. The final chapter, 8, draws conclusions and translates them into
policy-relevant recommendations for future research and practice.

Varieties of Participative Firms and Buyouts
To understand the importance of the recent wave of worker buy
outs, it is necessary to put them in historical, practical, and theoret
ical focus. Where do these 60 or so firms fit? In particular, why
study the case of the O&O Supermarkets? These buyouts are less
well known than larger ones, such as Weirton Steel, South Bend
Lathe, or Rath Packing. Moreover, the O&O stores are in a retail
industry as contrasted with the more familiar and "typical" manu
facturing buyout. However, the O&O case allows for the investiga
tion of concerns of practitioners and theorists accumulated over the
past decade which emphasize not only employee ownership but also
worker control. Furthermore, the unique setting of the O&O case
provides an unusually rich example of employee ownership and
worker participation.
There are many types of employee ownership. The generic term,
employee ownership, is used to refer to most forms of ownership by
jobholders in a company, both workers and managers. Employee
ownership is usually associated with the ESOP, only one of the many
forms and hybrids that employee-owned firms take. The diversity of
types is often highly confusing.
Two researchers have offered typologies of employee-owned firms
in attempts to clarify the important similarities and differences
among them. One typology depends primarily on the three legal
forms in which employee ownership is found: ESOPs, direct em
ployee ownership, and worker cooperatives (Toscano 1983b). The
ESOP is defined in the tax code as a type of employee benefit pro
gram which invests in its own company's stock and which is eligible
for certain tax breaks. There are ESOPs with tiny amounts of stock
in the company, such as at AT&T and Mobil, others with sub
stantial stock, such as Eastern Airlines, still others with majority
ownership, such as Rath, and a few with 100 percent ownership,
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such as Weirton Steel. ESOPs are often an indirect form of owner
ship for workers because stocks are held in trust through an Em
ployee Stock Ownership Trust (ESOT) which may or may not be
controlled by nonsupervisory employees. Some of these ESOPs re
sulted from buyouts, but most did not. Worker buyouts number only
about 1 percent of the estimated number of ESOPs.
Direct ownership is share ownership by workers without the legal
and tax standing of an ESOP and without the indirect ownership de
vice of the ESOT. Worker cooperatives, the oldest form of employee
ownership, tend to involve equal share ownership and equal voice in
management for all members or owners of the firm. The O&O stores
were set up as worker cooperatives, but while all owners are work
ers, not all workers are owners.
Each of the three forms has legal and operational advantages and
disadvantages. Moreover, they each include so many variations that
they often may not be operationally distinguishable. For instance,
there are so-called democratic or cooperative ESOPs, which resem
ble worker cooperatives in the distribution of ownership and control.
A second typology of employee-owned firms, developed in
England, distinguishes employee-owned firms on the basis of the
reasons for their origins (Cornforth 1983): (1) cooperatives
"endowed" by the original capitalist owners, (2) worker buyouts,
(3) defensive (job-saving) cooperatives, (4) alternatives (i.e.,
counter-cultural) cooperatives, and (5) job creation cooperatives us
ing government money to combat high unemployment. Because this
typology was derived in England, it ignores ESOPs, which form a
large group here, but were virtually absent in the U.K. in the early
1980s.
More important, though reasons for establishment may be classi
fiable, firms in a particular category do not inevitably have similar
characteristics or objectives. As Blasi and Whyte (1981) have
pointed out, while job-saving worker buyouts in the 1970s and 1980s
are similar in origin, they differ in key characteristics and behaviors.
In the 1970s buyouts, unions were either hostile or passive and
rarely was management structure changed. In contrast, in 1980s buy-
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outs, unions took initiatives to shape the terms, and workers have
sought and obtained more say in the firms' day to day operations.
While legal forms and origins are important, they tend to reflect
historical and legal trends and do not clarify how different organiza
tions function. A more precise typology is necessary.
For theoretical and practical importance there seem to be two
main dimensions. These are (1) the amount of employee ownership in
the firm and (2) the degree of worker participation in decisions
about policies and day to day management. These dimensions are
complex and not easily reducible to quantitative scales. Amount of
employee ownership should take into account not only the percentage
of equity owned by employees, but also the distribution of shares
among owners, the dispersion of shares among employees, and the
percent of equity owned by managers compared to that owned by
nonsupervisory employees (Conte, Tannenbaum and McCulloch
1981). Likewise, degree of worker participation is actually multidi
mensional, involving the degree of worker influence, the range of
decisions influenced, the extent of participation among workers,
whether participation is direct or representative, and other aspects
(Dachler and Wilpert 1978).
Some rough subdivision of these dimensions does allow us to
make meaningful distinctions among categories of employee-owned
and worker-participative firms. The following table (1.3) splits
amount of employee ownership into three segments: no employee
ownership, minority employee ownership (employees own less than
50 percent of the shares), and majority employee ownership (more
than 50 percent of the workers own more than 50 percent of the
shares). The other main dimension is dichotomized into low worker
participation and high worker participation. High worker participa
tion involves such things as (a) restructured hierarchy and control
systems, changed role of supervisors, worker input to decisions; (b)
worker representatives on the board of directors and/or on the ESOT,
worker voting rights on shares; and (c) union involvement in collec
tively bargaining for the ownership and/or participation plans, pro
moting the plan, and seeking a changed role for workers and/or the
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union. Low worker participation means workers and unions have not
been involved in these issues. Table 1.3 illustrates this typology.
Though some of these categories are self-explanatory, others are
not. The first two categories involve garden-variety capitalist firms
and are included here for contrast with forms of employee owner
ship. (1) Conventional firms, probably the largest category, includes
those with no employee ownership and minimal worker participa
tion. (2) Firms with QWL or other participatory programs, but with
no employee ownership belong to an apparently growing group.
Some well-known examples include Ford Motor with its El (Em
ployee Involvement) programs developed in cooperation with the
United Auto Workers (UAW), General Foods with its Topeka pet
food plant, and, one of the subjects of this study, Super Fresh Food
Markets.
The remaining four categories comprise the forms usually lumped
indiscriminately together and called employee ownership. (3) Most
ESOPs involve a minority of company equity and minimal worker
participation. According to a survey by Marsh and McAllister (1981)
of ESOPs of at least three years of age, only 13 percent held greater
than 50 percent of company stock, the average ESOP holding being
28 percent. Moreover, the survey found that 69 percent of ESOPs
granted no voting rights on the stock plan participants, and that
more than one-half of ESOP companies report no effects of the
ESOP on worker-management communications, cooperation among
employees, or employee suggestions. Furthermore, the chief motives
Table 1.3 Typology of Employee Ownership and Worker Participation
________________Amount of employee ownership______
____________None______Minority_____Majority
(2) QWL and
(4) Concessionary (6) Worker co-ops
High
participation
buy-ins
and worker
Degree of
programs
buyouts
worker
participation Low (1) Conventional (3) Most ESOPs (5) Employee/
firms
manager
buyouts
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for adoption of ESOPs were, in rank order, providing an employee
benefit, increasing productivity, and taking advantage of available
tax breaks. (4) Concessionary buy-ins form a relatively small cate
gory, though an important one, and are particularly a product of the
1981-83 recession and its aftermath. Companies in which workers
and unions have given wage concessions in return for company stock
and, in some cases, seats on the board of directors include Pan
American Airways (including the Airline Pilots Association, known
as ALPA), Eastern Airlines (including a number of unions, such as
International Association of Machinists [IAM], ALPA, and others),
Chrysler (with UAW), and Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail)
(including a number of railway unions). This category, the subject
of heated debate in labor circles (e.g., Metzgar 1984; Compa and
Baicich 1984a, 1984b; Barber and Banks 1984) has never been
identified as a special subtype of employee ownership, though it is
neither a typical ESOP nor a full-fledged buyout.
The final two categories, (5) the employee/manager buyout and
(6) the worker buyout have also not been distinguished before. In
this study, the term employee/manager buyout implies majority em
ployee ownership with conventional management control. Such firms
include those turned over by idealistic owners ("endowed coopera
tives' ' from Cornforth 1983) and those bought by both managers and
workers, with stock distribution weighted toward higher-paid man
agement employees. Often these employee/manager buyouts are
structured as ESOPs, but almost always control of the stock is in the
hands of the manager group and/or the financiers of the deal, and the
typically hierarchical authority structure of the firm is unchanged.
Employee/manager buyouts tend to conform to what Blasi and
Whyte (1981) called "1970s buyouts." They include such firms as
South Bend Lathe (with the cooperation of a United Steelworkers
local union), Bates Fabrics, and Dan River Textiles.
In contrast is category (6), worker cooperatives and worker buy
outs. These firms involve both majority employee ownership and
high levels of participation in decisions by management, workers,
and/or unions. Older cooperatives include the plywood firms of the
Pacific northwest (Berman 1967). Relatively new worker coopera-
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tives include numerous countercultural organizations (RothschildWhitt 1979). The buyouts tend to be of the "1980s variety" (Blasi
and Whyte 1981) with union involvement and attempts at restructur
ing the hierarchy. The O&O supermarkets, the main focus of this
study, fit into this final category.
In sum, the six categories outline different types of firms with
differing qualities based on the amount of employee ownership and
worker participation they contain. We expect that the goals they set,
the methods they use, the problems they face, the solutions they de
vise, and the effectiveness which results may differ fundamentally
from one category to the next. For instance, the expectations of
workers concerning their input to decisions may depend on the de
gree of employee ownership, such that levels of input adequate in a
QWL program may be frustrating to those in worker buyouts. Simi
larly, motivation and productivity gains in ESOPs may be related
more to stock prices than they would be in worker cooperatives
where independence from managerial control may be more impor
tant.
The focus of this study, worker buyouts, has broad significance,
despite its narrow focus on few firms. Worker buyouts are one of the
most theoretically interesting forms of participation. Workers and
unions seem to have noticed limitations of previous cases which in
cluded less ownership and participation, and recent establishment of
concessionary buy-ins shows the tendency to mix ownership with
participation. Future buyouts and buy-ins may continue these pat
terns. Along with our focus on worker buyouts, we compare the
O&O stores to Super Fresh Stores, some of which have implemented
QWL. Thus, we can compare employee ownership with participation
to participation alone. This enables us to see more clearly the rela
tive effectiveness of worker buyouts.

Past and Recent History of Employee Ownership
The various forms of employee ownership have had a long history
in the United States dating back to the 1790s in the case of worker
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cooperatives and to the 1920s in the case of ESOPs. Employee own
ership did not always enjoy as much notice or as much success as in
the last few decades. In fact, this history has often been used to
criticize employee ownership. Lessons can be learned from past ex
perience on the importance of cooperatives and ESOPs within past
labor-capital wars, on employee ownership's feasibility and viability
in the present, and on its likely place in the future. The prevailing
wisdom, according to critics, claims that:
(1) worker cooperatives failed as an anticapitalist labor
strategy;
(2) worker cooperatives are doomed to sink as socialist
islands in the capitalist sea or as anarchic and undis
ciplined, hence inefficient, businesses;
(3) ESOPs are historic manifestations of management
hostility to unions;
(4) employee ownership is a sidetrack from either conven
tional collective bargaining or from "Theory Z" type
corporate human relations policies;
(5) at best, worker buyouts are moderators of structural
economic dislocation, and at worst, they are a stick of
financial burden attached to a paper carrot of stock
ownership.
Without denying the validity of criticisms of many aspects of past
performance and practice, it is possible to see recent experience with
employee ownership as a break from the past. While some motives
for establishing worker cooperatives and ESOPs have remained con
stant, the ideological, economic, institutional, and legal environ
ments have shifted. Thus, employee ownership need not be heavily
tarred with the brush of past failure and past criticism.
Two separate streams (at times, trickles) of development of
worker cooperatives and of ESOPs have been joined at the contem
porary wave of employee ownership. They had quite different ori
gins: worker cooperatives in the early labor movement of the midnineteenth century; ESOPs in the antiunion welfare capitalism of the
1920s.
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Worker Cooperatives

Since the 1830s, workers have formed cooperatives during strikes,
lockouts, and depressions. Some histories trace them back to the
1790s (Jones 1984; Curl 1980). Early cooperatives were also part of
"alternative" or socialist movements, including those stimulated by
the thoughts of men like Robert Owen and Horace Greeley and by
Communitarian settlements like Brook Farm. By the 1860s, they had
become an integral part of the platform of the short-lived National
Labor Union (NLU) led by William Sylvis. Sylvis and the NLU
helped found a number of worker cooperatives, but these soon began
to fail or be dominated by a few worker/shareholders or outsiders.
Subsequent labor organizations, such as the Knights of Labor
(KOL), continued to promote cooperatives as the solution to indus
trial conflict between labor and capital. In fact, Jones (1984) credits
the KOL with establishing about 200 worker cooperatives in the
1880s at the height of that union's influence. The next large wave
took place in the 1930s, when unemployed workers formed "selfhelp" cooperatives during the Great Depression.
As the American Federation of Labor (AFL) gained hegemony
over the U.S. labor movement in the late nineteenth century, how
ever, its leaders turned toward collective bargaining through business
unionism and disdained worker cooperatives as impractical. Worker
cooperatives became dissociated from the labor movement. Further
more, as observers and theorists of the labor movement emerged in
middle-class intellectual circles, critiques of worker cooperatives
and defense of collective bargaining buttressed the AFL's case. John
Commons in the U.S. (Derber 1970) and Sidney and Beatrice Webb
(1920), Fabian Socialists in Great Britain, discredited worker coop
eratives as inevitably unstable forms of organization, and as inferior
to collective bargaining in promoting equality of power between la
bor and capital.
Were the labor officials and intellectuals correct in their pessi
mism? The verdict on worker cooperatives by subsequent observers
has frequently been just as negative (Shirom 1972). Generally,
worker cooperatives have been found to be difficult to organize,

Using Worker Participation and Buyouts to Save Jobs

17

undercapitalized, concentrated in craft industries and/or those
threatened by structural and technological changes, handicapped by
weak management and weak commitment to cooperative ideals, be
set by hostility from business and labor, and short-lived (Aldrich and
Stern 1983). However, recent studies by Jones (1984) have shown the
record of worker cooperatives not to be "as overwhelmingly bleak
as some critics contend" (p. 51). Worker cooperatives with the most
cooperative features (i.e., equal share ownership, work requirements
for members, and participation in decisionmaking) have had the best
success in viability, longevity, and integrity of democratic gover
nance structure, Jones finds.
Nevertheless, worker cooperatives have never been more than a
marginal economic force. Currently, some of them are important in a
few industries, for example, high grade plywood manufacture in the
Pacific northwest or refuse collection in the San Francisco Bay area
(Perry 1978). However, for the largest number of currently existing
cooperatives, those formed out of the social upheavals of the 1960s
and 1970s, economic marginality is a fact. Jackall and Grain (1984)
estimate that in 1980 approximately 1,000 small worker cooperatives
existed. The origins of these firms seem to be motivated mainly by
opposition to corporate America and a desire to create alternative
institutions. Most operate in the service sector, food production, dis
tribution, and sales, with very few in manufacturing, primarily in
printing and publishing. These cooperatives are small, with about 10
members on average and about $200,000 in sales per year. Their
worker/owners are young, educated, white, and low-paid. Indeed,
until the recent wave of interest in employee/manager and worker
buyouts, even sympathetic observers of worker cooperatives deemed
them anachronistic, idealistic, and/or marginal.

Employee Stock Ownership Plans
At about the same time the labor movement cut its ties with the
employee ownership movement, capitalists and managers became in
terested in stock ownership for workers. In the 1870s, Abram
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Hewitt, then congressman and later mayor of New York City, advo
cated worker stock ownership and profit sharing as the solution to
industrial evils (Derber 1970). In fact, Patard (1982) traces the roots
of the idea back to the 1840s. However, it was not until the postWorld War I period that employee stock ownership flourished,
through employer-initiated savings plans, stock purchase options,
profit sharing, and employee benefit plans. Patard describes the em
ployee stock ownership movement of the 1920s as bigger in propor
tion to the number of shares outstanding than the contemporary
ESOP movement in 1980. Employee stock ownership was often pro
moted by management in connection with employer-dominated com
pany unions. Unionists and leftists denounced these plans as unionbusting, co-optation devices, giving workers big financial risks
without any genuine participation in decisions. The stock market
crash of 1929 destroyed and discredited this movement. Subsequent
stock ownership plans tended to be limited to highly-paid executives.
In the 1950s, a visionary investment banker, Louis Kelso, took up
the banner of employee stock ownership in the Capitalist Manifesto
(Kelso and Adler 1958) and in his Two Factor Theory (Kelso and
Hetter 1967). Despite sharp critiques of his theories by eminent
economists, Kelso was persistent in promoting his views. His efforts
and those of his students, associates, and converts to his ideas have
created the contemporary ESOP movement. Kelso's pragmatic thrust
has been to take advantage of features in the Internal Revenue Code
that allow qualified employee benefit trusts to borrow money to buy
the employer's stocks or other securities. Kelso hailed ESOPs as an
instrument of corporate finance, of hostile takeover prevention, of
wealth redistribution, of productivity improvement, and a number of
other boons to capitalists, workers and the economy in general.
ESOPs have been enhanced by virtually every federal tax change
since the early 1970s. 1 The Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 drew in
creased attention to the tax benefits to corporations of establishing
ESOPs. Kelso's chief convert in Congress and the most powerful and
active proponent of ESOPs has been Senator Russell Long (D., La.),
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son of Louisiana's late populist governor, Huey Long. Sen. Long
was the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee in the 1970s and
was the committee's ranking Democrat until his retirement in 1986.
Under ESOPs employers establish ESOTs for their employees to
give or sell stock in their own company as a benefit, somewhat sim
ilar to a pension fund. Tax breaks to the employer issue from this
transaction; for instance, social security tax is not paid on contribu
tions to the trust, employer contributions are tax deductible, and a
tax credit might be claimed as well. Employees get a tax-exempt
benefit and receive vested stock when they leave the firm. The
ESOT can borrow money to purchase stock and use the employer's
contribution to pay off the loan. The ESOP particularly attracts
employers because of its usefulness to: (a) raise investment capital;
(b) pass a company on to employees; and (c) provide a special type
of pension plan, exempt from several important ERISA protections.
However, for workers the ESOP is generally not seen as a suitable
substitute for a fully protected pension plan.
Business journals emphasize the advantage to management of al
lowing employee ownership: quick capital formation, tax breaks,
avoidance of pension fund obligations, union avoidance, improved
worker motivation and discipline, etc. Fears of management manip
ulation of ESOPs and of lack of worker control over stock voting
rights have led many unionists to be very wary of employee owner
ship.
While then: primary appeal has been to employers, ESOPs have
sometimes been used to effect employee/manager and worker buy
outs. The first such employee/manager buyout using an ESOP for job
saving occurred at South Bend Lathe in 1975. Despite the predomi
nance of management control, ESOPs have been used by some
unions to gain a say in management decisions through concessionary
buy-ins. In fact, the rise of the ESOP seems to have revived the idea
of spreading stock ownership or making workers into capitalists.
Ironically, the rise of the ESOP may have helped to resuscitate labor
movement interest in employee ownership. In addition, the worker
cooperative movement has been transformed by lessons learned in
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employee/manager buyouts those which granted little control to
workers or unions.

Current Environment of Employee Ownership
The growth of interest in employee ownership has been stimulated
by other factors in addition to legislative benevolence to ESOPs. So
cietal changes over the last few decades also motivate the study and
practice of employee ownership. These changes reflect popular ide
ology, the economy, legislative approaches to current problems, and
institutional rearrangements.
Ideology
Ideological currents in politics, business, and interpersonal rela
tions in the western industrial nations may be said to have contrib
uted to a desire for powersharing. Sandwiched in with movements
such as decentralization and accountability in government and selfdetermination through feminism, since the early 1970s there has
been a drive for greater worker participation in decisionmaking. The
Lordstown strike and the book Work in America (1973) led to calls
for job enrichment and the humanization of work. The rising aware
ness of foreign competition has given long tenures on the best seller
list to books advocating forms of corporate powersharing, such as
Theory Z (Ouchi 1981) and In Search of Excellence (Peters and Wa
terman 1982). Academic interest in powersharing at work has also
been stirred by examination of socialist alternatives to Soviet bureau
cratic centralism, most notably by the Yugoslav system of selfmanaged enterprises. The Solidarity union in Poland renewed this
interest through placing self-management high on its now-repressed
agenda of societal change. Although it has been considered quite
radical at times, the concern for powersharing has pushed into many
areas of the mainstream and lends legitimacy to forms of worker
participation and ownership. Even the wave of conservative ideology
resulting in the Reagan presidency stressed self-help and entrepreneurship, which have been used to justify employee ownership.
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Economics
Economic changes, particularly structural ones, have given the
greatest impetus to both worker participation and employee owner
ship. Several forces have combined to shut down many workplaces,
to force millions to the unemployment lines, and to change the
power balance between labor and capital. The conglomerate merger
movement from the late 1960s to the present, together with corpo
rate disinvestment policies, and deindustrialization closed factories,
offices, and stores that had become unprofitable or not profitable
enough for corporate financial analysts (Bluestone and Harrison
1982). Population migration to the Sun Belt, the shift of employment
from manufacturing to so-called postindustrial sectors, and a rapid
series of recessions compounded the economic dislocation. Business
sought solutions for its decline in competitiveness and productivity,
taking advantage of unions' political and economic weaknesses.
Management initiated QWL and participative programs and bar
gained for labor concessions.
Many workers faced with these pressures and the loss of job secu
rity had to come up with new coping responses. Some accepted con
cessionary buy-ins, while some others engaged in employee/manager
and worker buyouts.

International Developments
Workers in other countries pursued similar paths as well. In West
ern Europe, interest in employee ownership as an answer to reces
sion and unemployment grew. Employee-owned companies more
than doubled in number in both Great Britain and France between
1975 and 1983. In 1983, the Wales Trade Unions Congress (TUC)
made employee ownership an integral part of its overall strategy for
Welsh economic recovery. In Italy, the number of employee-owned
firms topped 18,000 by 1981, ranging in size from tiny firms to
those employing thousands of workers. Most of these firms belong to
cooperative leagues affiliated with the major trade union federations.
Increasing numbers of worker cooperatives have arisen in Holland,
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Belgium, and Denmark, too. Finally, Spain boasts a rapidly growing
employee-owned sector, including the famed Mondragon coopera
tives of the Basque country, employing over 18,000 in more than 85
employee-owned firms. The Mondragon cooperatives are extremely
well-integrated, featuring their own central bank, a technical univer
sity, and the largest manufacturer/exporter of household appliances
in Spain (EEC 1981).
Employee ownership took on an entirely new meaning in Sweden
and Denmark during the 1970s and 1980s. The Social Democratic
parties of those nations proposed a series of plans for "economic
democracy," in which ownership of private sector firms would, over
a few decades, pass over to union and/or worker control through ac
cumulated employer contributions to "wage-earner funds." Al
though these proposals were stalled and watered down in the
Scandinavian parliaments, this idea of employee ownership is part of
a much larger tendency in northern European countries toward
worker participation and co-determination.

Legislation
The movement towards expanded employee ownership in the U.S.
has also gained momentum from a variety of legislative initiatives.
Aside from the various changes in the tax code over the years that
favor the formation of ESOPs, attempts to aid communities dis
tressed by unemployment, shutdowns, and poverty have increased
awareness of the opportunities for employee ownership. For in
stance, legislation was introduced in a number of states, several cit
ies (including Philadelphia), and Congress over the past decade to
mitigate the impact of plant closings. Though these bills primarily
focused on prenotification of layoffs and shutdowns, most also in
cluded provisions to encourage employee/manager and worker buy
outs. Arguments used by advocates of plant closing legislation often
emphasized that a minimum of six months prenotification was nec
essary if a buyout was even to be contemplated.
On another front, Congress established in 1979 a National Con
sumer Cooperative Bank, which can reserve up to 10 percent of its

Using Worker Participation and Buyouts to Save Jobs

23

funds to aid worker cooperatives, employee/manager and worker
buyouts, and even ESOPs. The Economic Development Administra
tion (EDA), the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), among other agencies, have
been involved in assisting employee-owned firms, particularly
through buyouts. Their involvement stems from either broad inter
pretations of their legal mandates or explicit mandates to work with
employee-owned firms. Innumerable state and local initiatives and
agencies have directed attention, money, and other aid to employee
ownership. Recently, Massachusetts passed a new worker coopera
tive statute that aids in the formation of democratically-owned and
operated businesses.
In Pennsylvania, an Employee Ownership Assistance Program was
established by a state statute in June 1984. The act provided for a
fund of $15 million to be used over a three-year period: (a) $1 mil
lion per year was set aside for technical assistance and professional
services, including the funding of feasibility studies. It was initially
set up as a "forgivable" loan program, but this later became a grant
program with the requirement that 10 percent of the grant be
matched by some other source, (b) $4 million per year was devoted
to a revolving loan fund for debt financing (or for "gap" equity
loans while worker/owner investors came up with their own personal
contributions).2

Support Networks
The establishment of a developing network of support organiza
tions to advance, encourage, and aid employee ownership demon
strates an important institutional shift from the past. The legislation
passed in Massachusetts was drafted by staffers of the Industrial Co
operative Association (ICA) of Somerville, Massachusetts. The ICA
is one of a growing number of institutions that have sprung up in the
past decade to support the employee ownership movement. In the
past, employee-owned firms often operated in total isolation. Now,
organizations such as ICA, the Philadelphia Association for Cooper
ative Enterprise (PACE),3 the O&O Investment Fund, and the North
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Carolina Center for Community Self-Help give several types of tech
nical and financial assistance to worker cooperatives, buyouts, and
new start-ups. Educational and advocacy organizations like the Na
tional Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO), the Employee Stock
Ownership Association, and the Association for Workplace Democ
racy (AWD) encourage, conduct, and publish research, disseminate
information, and even lobby the government (in the case of the
ESOP Association) to promote employee ownership.
Furthermore, in colleges and universities, ongoing research, edu
cation, and training have led to established centers of expertise on
employee ownership at such places as Cornell University, Boston
College, the University of Michigan, Brigham Young University,
Stanford University, Guilford College, and Temple University,
among others. While the support network is growing, it is still quite
loose. Thus far, no superstructure has been able to knit together the
diverse, disparate, and dispersed set of employee-owned firms.

Considerations in Establishing Worker Buyouts
Despite a few cases that have achieved major media attention, ac
tual experience with worker buyouts is limited. As stated earlier,
about 60 firms have undergone employee/manager or worker buy
outs, and most have survived. Yet no one knows in how many cases
buyouts were contemplated but never started or were proposed but
never consummated. Many potentially interested participants may
have been deterred by lack of knowledge, by fears, by lack of lead
ership, or by discovering that their dreams could not be transformed
into workable plans. It may be useful here to briefly outline some
issues respecting the forms, feasibility, and union-management rela
tions of worker and employee/manager buyouts in order to under
stand some of the stumbling blocks.
There are two main legal forms, the worker cooperative and the
ESOP. In a traditional worker cooperative, each member invests an
equal amount of money, which forms the basis of the firm's capital.
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In traditional cooperatives, a major problem can be that as the value
of the company rises, the value of individual shares rises, too. After
a while, success can be a golden handcuff. If share values rise too
high for potential new members to afford, this may lead to hiring of
nonowning workers or selling out to a larger, capitalist firm. These
problems occurred in the San Francisco Bay scavenger firms and
also in the plywood cooperatives of the Pacific northwest. However,
recently ICA and PACE developed a new model of worker coopera
tives based on the experience of the Mondragon cooperatives in
Spain. ICA's model of worker cooperatives gets around this problem
by drastically lowering the cost to be a member (to about $100).
Members have equal voting rights, and they share in the profits. But
the members' profit shares are distributed, not in the form of stock,
but to what are called "internal savings accounts," which operate
like internal pension funds.
The ESOP form provides a clear model of employee ownership
that gives substantial incentives to employers for agreeing to a buy
out. Probably the major advantage of the ESOP, especially when
compared to the typical cooperative, is its flexibility. This flexibility
involves several important issues: who buys stock; the distribution of
ownership; the degree of overall employee ownership; financing; and
the rights and privileges of ownership. However, the flexibility re
flects vagueness and also leaves the ESOP form open to manipula
tion. The popularity of the ESOP in buyouts, particularly in what
we call employee/manager buyouts, leaves unionists skeptical of its
advantages.
There has been a trend, as workers and unions gain experience, to
combine many of the advantages of the two main forms of employee
ownership into a hybrid form. Olson (1982) calls these cooperative
ESOPs. These hybrids take the major feature of worker cooperatives,
commitment to democratic control, and join it to the major feature of
ESOPs, flexibility in financing and taxation. Creatively structured
cooperative ESOPs have been initiated at Rath Packing, HyattClark, and Atlas Chain. These worker buyouts provide for worker
control over management through democratically structured, onemember-ohe-vote ESOPs. The cooperative ESOP owes its genesis to
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the active involvement of local unions, which fought to protect
worker interests and to avoid serious pitfalls of previous efforts, such
as South Bend Lathe, which the worker/owners struck in 1980, and
Vermont Asbestos Group, where worker/owners> disgruntled over
lack of worker input into decisions, sold a controlling interest to a
businessman. However, it has proven difficult to convert firms to this
new form because of problems in sustaining cooperative involvement
by workers and managers in struggling firms.
In general, would we expect employee ownership to be a feasible
path to save jobs? Or, as some critics claim, are plant closure buy
outs examples of "lemon capitalism" for workers? If the corporate
owner cannot make it, why should anyone expect the worker/owners,
lacking entrepreneurial experience and expertise, to revive dead
firms? Questions about the viability of employee/owned firms worry
even those predisposed to favor them.
The "lemon capitalism" argument implies that plant closings are
caused by the inescapable, invisible hand of market forces. That is,
competition, technological change, population shifts, educational ex
pansion, cultural upheaval, and other such seemingly impersonal
forces cause the closure. And if workers buy it out to save jobs, they
are just swimming against the tide.
This is the conventional wisdom of yesteryear, which has been
overturned by observation of companies closing profitable plants
(Bluestone and Harrison 1982; Whyte 1984). Such was the case of
the O&O supermarkets in Philadelphia. A&P threatened to shut
down all its stores in the region (and many others in other regions) to
satisfy its corporate goals, not because each store was unprofitable.
Furthermore, there are numerous plants threatened with shutdown
that could in theory be profitable if some of their operating proce
dures were changed instead of closing them.
Not every plant closing is an appropriate target for employee own
ership, however. Successful buyouts have several characteristics:
good timing, planning, adequate resources, technical assistance, and
organization, as well as luck (Stern and Hammer 1978). The key
element is an objective feasibility study, or as Woodworth (1982a)
puts it, "a cold, hard look at the facts." Virtually all of the success-
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ful employee/manager and worker buyouts involved one or more fea
sibility studies.
In addition to these elements, successful worker and employee/
manager buyouts have good sources of finance, a governance struc
ture involving workers, competent management, and increasingly,
union support. Adequate financing is crucial, for many failures of
employee-owned firms, particularly in the nineteenth century, have
been traced to undercapitalization. The governance structure may as
sume greater operational importance only after the buyout is estab
lished.
Managerial expertise can be a problem, but is not an inevitable
one. Most researchers agree that managerial expertise is crucial, and
sometimes it is hard to recruit or keep. However, as Long (1978a)
reported, managers in one employee/manager buyout were more
likely to cite advantages than disadvantages for themselves. Advan
tages included greater worker input in decisions, greater worker in
terest in doing a good job, and better cooperation between workers
and managers. Disadvantages for managers included workers overrat
ing their importance and demanding too much say, loss of manage
rial authority, and managers needing to work harder and perform
better under employee ownership. As Bellas (1972) noted in a study
of worker cooperatives: "The manager must be an educator and a
motivator, knowing full well that his autonomy will diminish as he
increases the capability of his employees.''
Unions have been skeptical about employee ownership. Some
commentators see no role for unions once workers are owners. How
ever, others believe the role of the union will be preserved and made
easier through reduced labor-management conflict. In practice, the
impact on collective bargaining is mixed, but there is still a signifi
cant and necessary role for the union at employee-owned companies
(Sockell 1982; Stern and O'Brien 1977; Hochner 1983a, 1983b).
Where unions take leading roles to facilitate the buyout, they often
push for participative changes in management and organizational
culture. This may require them to take on new roles and question
some traditional values, as well as to learn how to run and finance
businesses. These new roles require education.
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Employee Ownership's Role in Policy

The potential uses of employee ownership are many, according to
its advocates. Overall, there is much to be found in employee own
ership for those of all political stripes. While the implications of our
particular findings for policy will be elaborated in the final chapter,
a brief general picture of some potential goals for worker buyouts
can be given here.
Three overall sets of goals can be identified in increasing order of
scope (or grandiosity). First, worker buyouts can be used to save
jobs threatened by structural unemployment and by corporate strate
gic shifts. As Bradley and Gelb (1983) point out, one of the main
thrusts of buyouts has been to moderate the velocity of economic
change and decline of certain industries. Buyouts not only help
workers avoid the pain of job loss, but also have other ameliorative
functions. Communities can be spared sudden ruptures in their social
and economic fabric and can encourage buyouts as a way to preserve
other local business and the taxbase.
Second, from broader perspective, buyouts and employee owner
ship may support a strategy of economic decentralization. Employee
ownership and ESOPs have been perceived as tools for achieving a
number of political and social goals, such as (1) spreading ownership
in the face of increased economic concentration of power (e.g., U.S.
Joint Economic Committee 1975); (2) shifting responsibility for deal
ing with economic dislocation to private initiatives; (3) providing al
ternatives to government welfare policies and nationalization
strategies; (4) opening up options for the development and preserva
tion of a strong small business sector; and (5) leading to some type
of radical restructuring and democratizing of the economy, i.e., eco
nomic democracy.
Finally, buyouts and employee ownership appeal to those inter
ested in expanding the economy and providing it with new engines
of growth. As Louis Kelso asserts, opening up ownership may in
crease the number of sources of capital. Furthermore, if employee
ownership indeed is a key motivational tool, it may be useful for
elevating general productivity.
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So far, we have attempted to introduce the issues relevant to jobsaving through worker buyouts and to discuss even more briefly the
role of QWL programs. In the following chapters, the story of the
particular job-saving attempts, the issues in evaluating the success of
the innovations, the methods we used to conduct our research, and
our research results are treated much more thoroughly. First, in
chapter 2 we present a theoretical framework for evaluating em
ployee ownership and worker participation as job-saving strategies.

NOTES
1. Very recent and up-to-date summaries of this legislative history and references to the actual
changes in the tax code, including the Tax Reform Act of 1986, can be found in Rosen (1987)
and BNA (1987).
2. In 1987, the funding for technical assistance and professional services was reduced to
$1/2 million per year, and the revolving loan fund received no allocation because the larger
amounts of funding had not been used much in the previous three years. Some observers be
lieve that the Pennsylvania Employee Ownership Assistance Program was not marketed aggres
sively by the state government.
3. PACE worked on developing the initial legislation and the guidelines for the Pennsylvania
Employee Ownership Assistance Program.

Worker Participation, Employee
Ownership, and Job-Saving Efforts
A Theoretical Framework for
Gauging Effectiveness

How do we judge the effectiveness of worker buyouts and labormanagement cooperation to save jobs? On the simplest level, we
want to know how many jobs were saved and whether or not the
bought-out firms are viable and profitable. In fact, these concerns
seem to be the basis for claims that worker buyouts are a proven
job-saving method. One can point to numbers cited by the U.S. Sen
ate Select Committee on Small Business (1980) that between 50,000
and 100,000 jobs were saved through employee ownership during the
1970s. "As a job creation program alone, employee ownership
would compare very favorably to government funded public works
jobs" (p. 18). Similarly, one can point to the fact that of approxi
mately 60 buyouts during that time period, about 90 percent have
apparently succeeded (Whyte et al. 1983).
There may have been factors other than employee ownership that
contributed to the successes, however. The fortunes of the Vermont
Asbestos Group, for example, rose soon after the buyout by workers
from the GAP Corporation in the mid-1970s because of sudden
shifts in the worldwide asbestos market. Similarly, some observers
point to the failures of some prominent buyouts, such as at Rath
Packing, as evidence that employee ownership does not work. How
ever, to what degree did employee ownership contribute to the fail
ure? Close observers and participants (Redmon, Mueller, and
Daniels 1985), believe, in fact, that the seeds of Rath's failure were
planted long before the buyout, and that jobs were saved, though
only for four or five years.
31

32

Worker Participation, Employee Ownership, and Job-Saving Efforts

To look at effectiveness, we have to ask: how does employee own
ership work? Specifically, we need to look at the operations of
worker buyouts, which we defined in the previous chapter's typology
as combining employee ownership with worker participation. It
seems that the operations of worker buyouts would work differently
from the other employee ownership types.
While a number of researchers and observers of employee owner
ship have theorized about its nature and what makes it effective,
none have differentiated clearly among the types. Thus, some insist
that worker participation is a necessary ingredient for success in
employee-owned firms (Whyte et al. 1983). Some others argue that
the effectiveness of employe ownership depends much more on the
value and size of ownership stakes than on worker participation
(Rosen, Klein, and Young 1985). Still others claim that worker par
ticipation does not need employee ownership in order to be fully
effective (Bernstein 1976). Each position has its share of supportive
evidence. However, the positions may be based on evaluation of dif
ferent types of employee ownership.
According to our typology, different organizational features may
contribute to organizational effectiveness in each of the types. In
conventional employee-owned firms, most ESOPs (category 3), the
degree of worker participation is minimal and the amount of em
ployee ownership is minor. In these firms, the value and size of em
ployee owners' shares may be most relevant in motivating employees
to effective performance (Rosen, Klein, and Young 1985). In em
ployee/manager buyouts, those with majority employee ownership
but minimal worker participation (category 5), ownership stakes may
lead to high expectations of worker control, which may not be ful
filled (Whyte et al. 1983). In firms with QWL-type participation
programs and in those with concessionary buy-ins by workers (cate
gories 2 and 4) worker participation is predominant over ownership
stakes. Thus, changes in the social and decisional structure of the
firm may be necessary for effective performance (Bernstein 1976).
To answer the question of how effective are employee ownership
and worker participation, we have to look at the features that go into
a worker buyout or into a participative organization and how they
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function. Based on a review of theoretical and empirical literature on
employee ownership and worker participation, we have developed a
theoretical framework to look at the worker buyout. Despite general
interest in them, there is relatively little written from a systematic
perspective about what we call worker buyouts, (or even about QWL
programs), so we have relied on writings about a variety of related
topics. The literature reviewed is culled from many nooks and cran
nies in several disciplines. It is hoped that this method will increase
the relevance of our framework for other combinations of employee
ownership and worker participation. In fact, the theoretical frame
work was devised to take into account comparisons of worker buy
outs, such as the O&O supermarkets, to job-saving through joint
labor-management concessions, which was the case with Super Fresh
supermarkets.

Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework comprises three parts: (1) the ingredi
ents that led to or existed at the time of the worker buyout, termed
here Basic Input Features; (2) the functioning of the firm, specifi
cally aspects having to do with employee ownership and worker par
ticipation, termed here Organizational Processes; and (3) how
effective the firm is, termed here Outcomes. With these three parts,
we can look at the processes and features that contribute to the ef
fectiveness of the worker buyout as a job-saving strategy.

Basic Input Features of Worker Buyouts
A number of sources seem to agree that for buyouts whether em
ployee/manager or worker buyouts to take place, several key ingre
dients are necessary. These ingredients involve characteristics of the
actual and potential worker/owners, of the organization they work in
and acquire, and of the environment in which the firm operates.
These ingredients would also presumably be important for the func
tioning of organizations in which worker participation takes place.
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Worker Characteristics
Usually in the initial stages of buyouts, the decision to go ahead
depends on the motivations, willingness, and resources of a group of
workers. These workers may be motivated by pragmatic job-saving
desires, by desires for a piece of the "American dream," i.e., entrepreneurship, by desires for a more participative workplace, or by a
combination of some or all of these (Granrose and Hochner 1985;
Hochner and Granrose 1985). These motivations may color the ex
pectations workers have for their buyout. Other observers point to
the importance of workers' willingness and resources (Bradley and
Gelb 1983; Oliver 1984; Cosyns and Loveridge 1981). That is, a
self-selection process is at work. Not all workers affected by an im
pending shutdown, not even all of those interested in the idea of a
buyout, will participate in a buyout attempt. Those who do partici
pate need to be not only willing, but also able, because in most
cases workers either have to pay directly or to sacrifice something,
such as a portion of future wages or a pension plan, to get ownership
stakes.
Worker characteristics influence both organizational processes and
outcomes for workers. For instance, workers inclined toward partic
ipation may help increase the participativeness of an organization,
and workers' gains or losses from the buyout will depend partly on
the degree of hardship the buyout imposes on their resources.
Organization Type
The way the buyout or the participation programs is legally and
organizationally structured, its organization type, tends to determine
how decisionmaking will be handled, who will have which legiti
mate rights, and what opportunities there will be for workers to par
ticipate. The structure will affect the type of internal processes that
will be expected and that will occur. As the Industrial Democracy in
Europe International Research Group (IDE 1981) puts it, legal par
ticipative structure tends to lead to actual participative practice. If
laws or by-laws governing the firm's operations mandate equal own
ership stakes and democratic forms of management, as in worker
cooperatives, the firm is more likely to be run participatively. If

Worker Participation, Employee Ownership, and Job-Saving Efforts

35

those laws or rules tend to mandate distribution of shares to employ
ees according to then: incomes and say nothing about management
procedures, as in most ESOPs, the firm is more likely to be run in a
conventional hierarchical way. With respect to participative struc
tures, some organizational theorists hold the position that to be ef
fective, participation has to be a key organizing principle and must
be thoroughly integrated into the organization at all levels to be truly
effective (Hochner 1978).
Role of Consultants and Unions
A number of observers (Stern and Hammer 1978; Parzen, Squire,
and Kieschnick 1982) describe the importance of a number of other
features and conditions surrounding buyout attempts. Buyouts need
legal, technical, and financial help, supportive (or nonhostile) union
attitudes, cooperation from the current owner of the plant, and an
assessment of the feasibility of profitable operation, based on past
and projected performance in the firm's markets. Similarly, partici
pative programs such as QWL need well-rounded support from all
levels of management and from the union (Zager and Rosow 1982).
However, Parker (1985) expresses the fear that even strong union
support for QWL programs can backfire and undermine the union
itself.
The role of consultants and unions is an important determinant of
feasibility, of sources of finance, and of actual participativeness. For
instance, in the Weirton Steel buyout, consultants from Wall Street
financial firms and conventional ESOP lawyers insisted on a fairly
conventional ESOP structure with limited worker input to manage
ment decisions for a number of years. In another case, at Atlas
Chain, the union and the consultants agreed that a very democratic
ESOP structure was possible and desirable. In both cases the struc
tures recommended by the outside experts were adopted.
Even the lack of support by experts and unions, among others, can
be a strong influence on the success or failure of employee-owned
firms. Studies by Aldrich and Stern (1983) and Jones (1984) con
clude that the persistent economic marginality of employee-owned
firms over the past century-and-a-half in the U.S. is linked to the
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attitudes and actions of potential support institutions. Moral, finan
cial, political, and institutional opposition from such groups as law
makers, labor unions, bankers, and educators contributed to a hostile
environment for employee-owned businesses to grow in. Studies by
Blasi, Mehrling, and Whyte (1983, 1984) demonstrate the impor
tance of this environmental opposition by contrasting American ex
perience with that in other countries, notably Israel's kibbutzim,
Spain's Mondragon cooperative sector, and Yugoslavia's workermanaged economy. In these other countries, worker-owned and
-managed firms have been supported by a number of popular customs
and social institutions as well as by government support or neu
trality.
Business Environment
The business environment involves the context within which the
job saving effort takes place. Sociological and historical studies have
identified several factors conditioning the formation and success of
employee-owned firms. For instance, socioeconomic forces, such as
business cycles, structural industrial change, and structural unem
ployment have been said to induce workers to form employee-owned
firms, through buyouts or formation of new worker cooperatives
(Jones 1984; Shirom 1972).
The relation of the worker buyout to other firms, such as suppliers
of essentials and competitors, can also be crucial to its success or
failure. The degree of competition among firms in the product and
labor markets in which the bought-out firm will operate determines
such things as potential market share, pricing policies, and profit
margins. For instance, Russell (1985) points out that the viability of
the worker-owned refuse collection companies of the San Francisco
Bay area is enhanced by the near-total monopoly granted them to
collect residential refuse by the cities they serve.
Similarly, the availability of debt capital for the buyout will be
important if the capital requirements of the firm outstrip the re
sources of the workers contributing. Several observers have pointed
to the hostility of banks and also of shutting-down employers as a
key factor in failures of worker-owned business in American history
(Jones 1984).
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Furthermore, many commentators have pointed to the shortcircuiting of worker participation in cooperatives and participative experi
ments by the exigencies of the marketplace (Parker 1985). Worker
cooperatives are said to "degenerate," i.e., fail outright or fail as
democratic cooperatives, because they are isolated islands in the
capitalist sea (Clarke 1984). Even in conventional organizations, cri
ses brought on by turbulent environments may lead to increased cen
tralization of power in the hands of managers and elites (Mintzberg
1979). Thus, the environment may impact internal processes and de
cisions of the organization. Moreover, the environment including
such conditions as economic boom or recession, expanding or de
pressed markets, and relations to external institutions, all of which
affect firms of any type may directly impact outcomes for job sav
ing efforts.

Organizational Characteristics
The final basic input feature of worker buyouts and participative
programs to be taken into consideration is the organization's charac
teristics. This feature reflects the past history and present capacities
of the plant to be bought out or restructured. These factors plus pro
jections of the future, based on assumptions about how the firm will
operate, comprise important aspects of a market feasibility study.
Often, consultants play a large role in evaluating this factor. Some
times they may recommend against a potential buyout. Or they may
recommend key changes in the firm, such as downsizing the work
force or even, in one case, moving to a nonunion plant (Hochner
1983b). In addition, the past fortunes of a firm may partly determine
the decisions that will be made in the future and how well the firm
can do. For instance, Hyatt-Clark Industries was troubled during its
life as a worker buyout by the decline of its basic product market,
wheel bearings for rear-wheel drive vehicles. In fact, this problem
led GM to consider a plant shutdown and brought about the worker
buyout in the first place. Similarly, Rath Packing was forced to do
something about its declining product quality and declining market
ing efforts.
Furthermore, cultural practices and customs in firms have been
said to contribute to or detract from the development of employee
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ownership. Sometimes, successful employee ownership has been fos
tered by ethnic enclaves, such as at the Norwegian-American ply
wood cooperatives of Oregon and Washington, the Italian-American
scavenger firms of San Francisco, and the Russian-American taxi co
operatives of Los Angeles (Russell 1985). Conversely, the American
traditions of individualism and mobility may contribute to the small
number of employee-owned start-up firms (Blasi, Mehrling, and
Whyte 1983, 1984).

Organizational Processes
The basic input features are essentially "givens" at the time of or
prior to the job-saving attempt. Once operations begin, organiza
tional processes start to play a role. In many firms, these would
include purchasing and marketing efforts, among others. Here, how
ever, the emphasis is on organizational processes and practices re
lated to the participative and employee-owned nature of worker
buyouts. These processes include the governance of organizational
decisionmaking (participativeness) and specific managerial decisions
made concerning the deployment of resources (organizational func
tioning and labor strategy).
Our view of organizational processes distinguishes this theoretical
framework from those of many other students of employee owner
ship. We see these processes playing a vital role in translating plans
into actions. A number of other frameworks that have appeared in
the literature tend to confuse process with outcome, though it is ad
mittedly true that sometimes in organizational change strategies the
institutionalization of the process is a primary desired outcome
(Kanter 1983). For instance, workplace democratization is the out
come Bernstein's (1976) theory was established to explain.
On the one hand, to establish what is unique about the worker
buyout as a job-saving method, it is important to show in which op
erating aspects worker buyouts differ from conventional firms or
from labor-management cooperative efforts. However, to convince
interested parties that worker buyouts are or are not effective ways to
save jobs, it is necessary to show more than that employee owner-
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ship and worker participation change attitudes and behavior in the
firm and that the buyout operates under some different principles
than the conventional firm. Theory and research must both (a) dem
onstrate the results for workers and the organization of doing things
by means of a buyout and (b) account for the sources of these results.
Participativeness
Participativeness and its effects on individual and organizational
performance have received much attention in the literature on worker
participation and employee ownership. Social psychologists have
tended to look at the advantages of participation as a means of im
proving attitudes, communication, and organizational effectiveness
(Likert 1961; Tannenbaum 1966).
However, we are also concerned about the impact of participativeness on organizations. Some, but very few, studies have focused on
the mediatory role of participation on organizational outcomes. A
report of a study of the economic performance of employee-owned
firms stated, "Participation is the key" (NCEO 1986).
In our terminology, participation refers to actions of individuals,
while participativeness is an organizational process reflected by per
ceptions, structures, and practices. Increased individual participation
may lead to certain outcomes for the organization as well as for in
dividuals, such as greater effort and less downtime through absentee
ism. However, these outcomes may be more properly seen,
according to our framework, as either additional aspects of organi
zational processes or by-products of outcomes such as profit, in
come, and job security. Increased organizational participativeness,
on the other hand, is related to overall organizational functioning,
such as decisions concerning the deployment of resources. Both
types of organizational processes affect individual and organizational
outcomes which result from organizational effectiveness.
Worker participation is often defined by a variety of terms, such
as involvement, influence, control, or power, which tend to be am
biguous. However, Bernstein (1976) identifies three key dimensions
of participation, which we include in our term participativeness:
(1) the degree of influence exerted;
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(2) the range of issues over which influence occurs; and
(3) the organizational level at which influence occurs.
Dachler and Wilpert (1978) add the dimension of form, i.e., whether
participation is formal or informal and whether it is direct or thor
ough representatives. In general, the more of each of Bernstein's
three dimensions an organization has, the more participative it is.
Participativeness is theorized to affect processes and outcomes at
several organizational levels. At the level of the individual worker,
theorists hypothesize that participation reduces alienation, while en
riching job design and increasing effort, productivity, commitment to
organizational goals, self-esteem, and mental health (Argyris 1957;
Blumberg 1968; Conte 1982; Long 1978b; Nightingale 1982; Rhodes
and Steers 1981; Tannenbaum et al. 1974). Moreover, labor costs re
lated to absenteeism and turnover are hypothesized to decrease.
Furthermore, participativeness affects the group and overall orga
nizational levels. Participation is linked to greater teamwork, group
cohesion, self-policing behavior, information flow between hierar
chical levels, less need of direct supervision, reduction of hierarchi
cal power distinctions (while expanding the total amount of power
and influence available), fewer adversarial conflicts, and more adaptiveness and flexibility (Bradley 1980; Lammers 1967; Tannenbaum
1968, 1983).
These hypotheses about the positive effects of participation are not
accepted by all. Perrow, for one, likens the participative model to a
"boy scout creed for organizations" (1982, p. 125). A number of
conditions, contingencies, and contradictions are said to diminish
the effectiveness of participation. For individual workers, participa
tion may require increased education as well as a need for influence
(Singer 1974; Vroom 1959). Strauss (1963) questions the impact that
unattainably high expectations for participation have on its effective
ness. The type of technology used and the design of jobs also may be
seen as a limit on the ability to spread participation. Furthermore,
some argue that democratic decisionmaking is slower and less effi
cient by increasing "transaction costs" (Williamson 1975). Finally,
some commentators point out that the effects of participation (and,
we extrapolate, participativeness) are tempered by the nature of the
organization's external environment (Mintzberg 1979).
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Whether employee-owned firms are indeed participative is a mat
ter of some debate and cannot be taken for granted. However, studies
of long-established employee-owned firms, such as the plywood co
operatives and the San Francisco Scavengers, find high levels of participativeness. Relative to managers, line workers in these firms tend
to have high degrees of influence in both informal and formal ways
over both shop floor and strategic decisions (Greenberg 1980, 1984;
Russell, Hochner, and Perry 1979). In some recent buyouts, rela
tively high levels of participativeness were found i.e., voting rights
on stock or high worker influence relative to managers (Conte, Tannenbaum, and McCulloch 1981; Long 1978b). However, in some
other buyouts, which we would call employee/manager buyouts (see
chapter 1), workers' influence had either not increased or had actu
ally diminished since the takeover (Long 1982; Hammer and Stern
1980).
The evidence on the impact of participation on workers and orga
nizations fills volumes and defies clear summary. However, general
reviews (e.g., Locke and Schweiger 1979) conclude that participa
tion tends to have positive effects on job attitudes and mildly posi
tive or neutral impacts on performance. A comprehensive review by
Strauss (1982) of worker participation studies in a variety of coun
tries and organizational forms concludes its success depends on the
criteria chosen by the observer. Nevertheless, Strauss notes that the
evidence on economic impacts is "somewhat spotty" (p. 244).
Organizational Functioning and Labor Strategy
Our theoretical framework posits that participativeness is impor
tant primarily to the degree that it has effects on Organizational
Functioning and Labor Strategy, That is, to have an impact on most
organizational and worker outcomes (e.g., profits, income), organi
zational democracy must have an effect on management decisions on
deployment of resources.
However, the role of resource deployment and ways of allocating
labor has hardly received much explicit attention in prior literature.
In this framework, we hope to help correct this deficiency. Most of
the attention paid to the types of decisions made in employee-owned
and -managed firms has been by economists. Sometimes social psy-
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chological issues have been looked at concerning the relation of par
ticipation to organizational functioning. A few researchers (e.g.,
Conte 1982) try to bridge the gaps among the potential links of em
ployee ownership and worker participation to performance. Often,
the literature has the following deficiencies.
(1) Worker attitudes, such as job satisfaction or commitment, be
come a dead end. That is, they either are the outcome to be derived
or are merely assumed to be related to other, ultimate outcomes,
such as job security, income, productivity, and profit.
For instance, Long (1978) developed a framework for looking at
the effects of employee ownership in a buyout. However, both the
framework and the empirical research he reports devote most atten
tion to worker attitudes and tend to neglect the link even to behav
iors like absenteeism. Rosen, Klein, and Young (1985) similarly
analyzed the causes of job attitudes in employee-owned firms, with
little analysis of their link to performance.
(2) Worker attitudes are related to weak measures of organizational
performance such as absenteeism, rather than directly to productivity
and profit.
Both the models presented by Conte (1982) and by Rhodes and
Steers (1981) tie in worker ownership and participation to individual
worker behaviors, but do not go much further to discuss the relation
ship of these and other features of employee-owned firms to overall
performance. Even when researchers try to establish the notion that
worker ownership indirectly affects performance through the social
system of the firm (Tannenbaum 1983), they focus on individual per
formance, rather than that of the overall organization.
(3) Organizational features special to employee-owned and -man
aged firms, such as increased participativeness, nonhierarchical
authority structures, and reduced job specializations, are identified
but are not connected to comparative organizational performance.
Rothschild-Whitt (1979) does a fine job of dissecting the differing
arrangements of organizational structures and practices between
collective-democratic firms and bureaucratic ones. But her theoreti-
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cal framework does not explain what difference the different struc
tures make in comparative performance, save on what goals are
important to each. Similarly, Nightingale (1982) presents a theoreti
cal model emphasizing that the congruence of organizational values,
structures, processes, and outcomes in participative firms makes
them a qualitatively different type of organization from conventional
bureaucracy. However, the outcomes he discusses never get beyond
worker attitudes.
(4) Assumptions are made about how participation affects entrepre
neurial and managerial decisions in the firm without a clear under
standing of the true costs and benefits of democratic, participative
management practice. This problem occurs most often in the eco
nomics literature on employee-owned and -managed firms.
For instance, economic theory assumes a model of motivation in
which individuals maximize their individual gains. Thus, worker/
owners are assumed to be maximizing their own individual gains,
rather than the gains of the entire group based on majority rule.
(5) In fact, the focus of most literature on employee ownership and
worker participation, whether from an economic or a social psycho
logical perspective tends to be the individual, rather than the group
or the organization, where attention should more often be directed.
However, recently a few studies have been directed toward the issue
of organizational processes and organizational outcomes (Katz 1985;
NCEO 1986).
Many positions exist on the issue of what kind of managerial de
cisions are made in employee-owned firms. In fact, early observers,
such as Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1920) believed that the quality of
managerial decisionmaking in employee-owned firms was seriously
handicapped by an inability to recruit competent managers and by
the impossibility of managing a group of owners.
The economics literature on labor-managed firms originates with
the assumption that employee-owned and participative firms, in con
trast to their "capitalist twins" whose main goal is profit maximiza
tion, tend to maximize income per worker (Ward 1958; Meade 1972;
Vanek 1970). Economists then derive a number of characteristic en-
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trepreneurial and managerial decisions that would seem to flow from
the initial assumption. For instance, worker/owners would be ex
pected to pay themselves high wages now, rather than invest for the
future. Similarly, they would tend to try to reduce the number of
worker/owners when profits were being made rather than to increase
the number as one might expect. That is, they would rather increase
their own relative shares than to have more worker/owners with
whom to share the profits.
Other economists challenge this pessimism (Ellerman 1982;
McCain 1982, Sertel 1982). Some argue that employee-owned and
participative firms have operational advantages over conventional
ones, such as: (a) an ability to tap human resources, i.e., teamwork,
consensus, commitment, involvement, and communication; (b) less
need for supervision; and (c) reduced labor costs and increased pro
ductivity (Conte 1982; Levin 1984). Pryor (1983), in a review of
theoretical literature, concludes that the original assumption of in
come maximization per worker as the firm's objective function is
easily modified, which changes all subsequent derivations and pre
dictions of behavior.
As Batstone (1982) asserts, such a starting point assumes that
employee-owned firms are democracies of small capitalists, rather
than collectives of solidaristic workers with other objectives, such as
collective income maximization, worker satisfaction, group mainte
nance, or even "the reduction, if not the eradication, of the role of
the conventional capitalist or shareholder" (p. 100). Moreover, the
objectives of potential and actual worker/owners may be a complex
mixture of pragmatism (saving jobs), entrepreneurial values (for
ownership and profits), as well as collective values (worker partici
pation in decisions), as pointed out in our earlier studies of the
workers involved in the Philadelphia-area A&P shutdown of 1982.
(Granrose and Hochner 1985; Hochner and Granrose 1985). Such
mixed motives may have great effects on managerial decisions.
Our theoretical framework emphasizes that participative processes
should make worker buyouts do things differently from conventional
firms and the other types identified in chapter 1 (Batstone 1982;
Jones 1984; Levin 1984; Nightingale 1982; Rothschild-Whitt 1979;
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Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann 1984). Organizations with more
participative forms of employee ownership are hypothesized to:
use less supervision,
give more responsibility to workers,
increase communication of information to all levels,
reduce internal wage differentials,
employ job rotation and job redesign,
invest less in capital and more in workers through wages and
training,
hire higher quality labor, i.e., be less inclined to save on labor
costs by hiring low-paid, part-time, unskilled workers,
get higher effort levels and less downtime from their workforces,
rely more on work method innovations, though less on techno
logical modernization, and
have a lower level of adversarial conflict, e.g., strikes and griev
ances.
The evidence for these hypotheses comes from a variety of sources
concerning employee-owned and -managed firms. What evidence
there is tends to support the hypotheses, though there are some con
tradictory findings. In studying the plywood cooperatives, Greenberg
(1984) found considerably less use of supervision than in conven
tional firms. In fact, he reported that when an employee-owned firm
was bought out by a conventional firm, one of the first things the
new owners did "was to quadruple the number of line managers and
foremen" (p. 193). Similarly, Nightingale (1982), who compared 10
participative firms some of which were employee-owned with 10
conventional firms, found that workers perceived significantly fewer
bureaucratic rules, less supervision, more opportunities to take ini
tiative, and less hierarchy in the participative firms. On the other
hand, neither studies by Hochner (1978) on the scavenger coopera
tives nor by Long (1978a, 1978b) on an employer/manager buyout at
a trucking company found that work groups were more cohesive. Yet
international studies by Tannenbaum et al. (1974) had found that the
opinions of the work group tended to be more important to workers
than the opinions of supervisors in organizations with greater worker
participation, such as the Israeli kibbutzim.
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Nightingale also reports increased communication at the rank-andfile level in his sample of participative firms. However, again neither
Hochner (1978) nor Long (1978a, 1978b) found more communica
tion between management and workers or greater information flow.
Perhaps these findings on communication reflect the already simple
and flat hierarchies of refuse collection and trucking firms. This may
have implications for the current study of supermarkets, which have
similarly simple and flat hierarchies.
Concerning wage differentials there is little direct evidence for
American firms with worker ownership and participation. The scav
enger cooperatives historically had a policy of equal wages for all
worker owners, but began to abandon that policy in the 1960s to
keep and attract managerial talent (Perry 1978; Russell 1985). We
are not aware of other reports of wage policies in employee and
worker buyouts. However, the example of the Mondragon system in
Spain's Basque region, where a ratio of 4.5:1 from the highest-paid
to the lowest-paid has been established, has received wide attention.
In the U.S., where wages are a matter of union-management negoti
ation in unionized firms, wage policies in employee-owned firms
may vary more widely. If employee-owned and -managed firms do
hire more skilled labor, than wages for worker/owners may be at the
top of the pay scale. Considering that researchers on employee own
ership often tend to be concerned about such benefits to workers as
job satisfaction, it is somewhat odd that wages have been relatively
neglected.
There is also evidence that organizational resource deployment in
worker-owned and -managed firms is more flexible than in conven
tional firms. For instance, Nightingale (1982) reports that in partic
ipative firms, a number of job design features have been altered,
such as the amount of task variety, of autonomy, of required interac
tion with others, and the number of conflicting demands. It may be
that job design itself is not altered outright by participativeness, but
that a reduction of the kind of detailed job specialization that is of
ten found in conventional bureaucracies takes place by more workers
being aware of the requirements of other workers' jobs, either
through cross-training or job rotation. Moreover, it is possible that
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the participative process itself, while changing nothing directly about
a worker's job tasks, adds new tasks associated with discussions at
meetings, for instance. The degree of actual job redesign may be a
function of organizational characteristics, such as the prior amount
of specialization and hierarchy.
A recent study by Tannenbaum et al. (1984) found that while
employee-owned firms were less technologically adaptive than con
ventional firms (in their adoption of new technology), they tended to
have a higher rate of survival during the recession of the early
1980s, probably because of greater flexibility and adaptiveness in
their use of human resources. In fact, Berman (1967) reports that the
plywood cooperatives adjusted worker/owners' wages downward to
cope with business downturns, rather than lay off workers as is typ
ical in conventional plywood mills.
Concerning effort and downtime, the evidence is mixed. On the
one hand, most studies find that commitment of workers to organi
zational goals is more positive in employee-owned and/or participa
tive firms. Worker participation, in fact, seems more strongly related
to commitment than does ownership in the scavenger companies and
in the employee/manager buyout of a trucking company (Hochner
1978; Long 1978b). The importance of participation seems to ex
plain the findings of Kruse (1984), who measured employee job at
titudes in two employee/manager buyouts that had little provision for
worker participation and found few improvements after the buyouts.
It is hypothesized that increased commitment would be related to
lowered absenteeism and turnover. However, a study by Rhodes and
Steers (1981) of the plywood cooperatives found that, though per
ceived commitment was higher than in conventional plywood mills,
absenteeism did not differ significantly. Hammer, Landau, and Stern
(1981) studied patterns of absenteeism following an employee/man
ager buyout. They found that while overall absenteeism did not de
cline, the reasons for absenteeism shifted. This is, voluntary
absenteeism (not legitimately excusable for illness, death in family,
etc.) increased. Perhaps, the commitment of workers to this firm led
to a felt need to follow its rules. A more straightforward link of
worker participation and absenteeism was found by Katz, Kochan,
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and Weber (1985). They found that absenteeism was significantly
negatively related to worker participation in suggestion programs
and to worker involvement in QWL programs.
Nevertheless, the mixed relationships of commitment to perfor
mance measures such as absenteeism suggest that performance in
employee-owned and -managed firms may be only slightly affected
by changes in worker attitudes. Our framework suggests that absen
teeism rates are only one part of organizational functioning that is
affected by participation and ownership. Organizational performance
may be more generally related to larger changes in resource deploy
ment.
The final aspect of organizational functioning and labor strategy
to be considered here involves adversarial conflict. Again, the evi
dence is mixed. Much was made in the media about the irony of
worker/owners striking their own company when in 1980 there was a
strike at South Bend Lathe, which had undergone an employee/man
ager buyout in 1973. Furthermore, labor-management conflict at
Rath Packing (a worker buyout in 1980 which filed for bankruptcy in
1984) and at Hyatt-Clark Industries (a worker buyout in 1981 which
has been reported to be seeking an external buyer) seems to have
been a continual problem. Even some empirical studies, as opposed
to media accounts, give little apparent support for our hypothesis.
Sockell (1981) studied aspects of labor-management relations at sev
eral employee/manager buyouts. She found that labor relations nei
ther worsened nor improved based on incidence of strikes and
grievances.
All of the cases cited in the media, however, were cases in which
what conflict did occur was about the withholding of decision in
volvement from workers by management. Furthermore, the cases
studied by Sockell tended to be ones in which there was little worker
participation, i.e., the union did not get involved with the buyout,
preferring to be a passive observer, and there were few if any provi
sions for worker input into everyday managerial decisions.
In fact, evidence from organizations with substantial amounts of
worker participation indicates the positive side of participation for
labor-management relations and conflict. In a historical study of
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worker cooperatives and employee-owned firms from the 1840s to
the 1970s, Jones (1984) reports that strikes have tended to occur infirms with high numbers of nonowning workers, i.e., in which not
all workers participate in ownership and, presumably, in decisionmaking. Katz (1985) reports that in QWL programs at General Mo
tors from 1977-80, even limited worker involvement can be causally
linked by statistical methods to lower grievance and discipline rates
and smoother collective bargaining. Moreover, worker participation
has been successful in Europe, particularly West Germany and Yu
goslavia, in toning down adversarial labor relations (Strauss 1982).
It may be that worker participation and employee ownership do
not merely reduce conflict, but actually change its nature. That is,
some types of conflict, such as those concerning strategic direction
of the firm and allocation of resources, may be brought to the sur
face more readily in employee-owned and -managed firms. Accord
ing to the 12-nation study of industrial democracy in Europe (IDE
1981), frequency of conflicts is positively correlated with the power
of participatory bodies representing workers directly or indirectly.
This should not be surprising, for increased information flow and
the involvement of more people in decisionmaking, such as in ma
trix organizational structures adopted by many conventional firms
over the past 20 or so years, tends to surface conflicts and to require
that employees have greater tolerance for ambiguity and learn to
practice diplomacy (Mintzberg 1979). However, as Strauss (1982)
points out in his review of literature on worker participation, while
participation may slow down the decisionmaking process, it seems to
make implementation smoother.

Outcomes for Organizations and Workers
The final part of our theoretical framework involves the outcomes
of worker ownership and participation in a worker buyout. We posit
that the performance of the firm (organizational outcomes), such as
viability, productivity, and profitability, are influenced by organi
zational functioning and labor strategy, as well as by the business
environment and organizational characteristics. Furthermore, the
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performance of the organization will directly influence what the
workers get out of the buyout experience (worker outcomes). That
is, worker income, job security, job and life satisfaction, and family
well-being are all results which are evaluated based on how well the
firm does. However, worker outcomes may also be independently af
fected by organizational resource deployment, i.e., by what wage
rates are set, by aspects of job design, and by other conditions of
work. Similarly, the degree of participativeness may affect workers'
evaluation of tradeoffs, if any, between job satisfaction and eco
nomic outcomes. Finally, workers' outcomes are influenced by their
motivations, their resources, and the expectations they have about
what their results should be. This part of our theoretical framework
is perhaps the most difficult to support, because so little direct evi
dence on worker buyouts has been collected.
Organizational Outcomes
Prior evidence for these hypotheses, particularly concerning eco
nomic results, which is a major concern in our study of the effective
ness of worker buyouts, is mixed and scarce. For instance, Jones
(1984) has studied the historical record of over 750 American worker
cooperatives and employee-owned firms from the 1840s to the 1970s
to examine their viability and efficiency. He found that worker coop
eratives were often viable (i.e., able to survive more than 10 years),
that they tended to do more poorly as they aged, and that efficiency
was highly variable. Viability and performance were better in firms
with "the most cooperative features" (1984 p: 52). These are firms
adhering most closely with the following features: (a) restriction of
ownership to those working in the firm; (b) control and management
on a one-owner, one-vote basis; and (c) distribution of profits based
on labor contributed, rather than on capital.
Tannenbaum and his colleagues have done two broad studies of
large samples of employee-owned firms in business in the 1970s and
1980s to look at aspects of economic functioning (Conte, Tannen
baum, and McCulloch 1981; Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann
1984). However, the two studies came up with contradictory results,
even though then" samples of firms overlapped considerably. The
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first study looked at 98 employee-owned firms including ESOPs,
employee/manager and worker buyouts, and long-established worker
cooperatives. The second study expanded the sample of employeeowned firms to 200. Neither sample appears to be representative of
the population of such firms, but at this time they are the only data
bases containing significant amounts of information about economic
results. Conte, Tannenbaum, and McCulloch (1981) found the 98
employee-owned firms to be more profitable than a matched set of
conventional firms. Moreover, the percent of equity owned by work
ers was the highest and only significant predictor of profitability in a
regression analysis. However, Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann
(1984) did not replicate the earlier study's findings. The 200
employee-owned firms studied did not score higher either on a ratio
of profit-to-sales or on growth over a five-year period. Moreover,
this time there was a small negative correlation of percent of equity
owned by workers to growth. Despite these neutral findings,
employee-owned firms did have a higher rate of survival between
1976 and 1982, a turbulent period in the overall economy. From
these studies, the effect of employee ownership on economic results
is unclear. Nevertheless, employee ownership appears to have at
least neutral if not positive effects, and may give added strength to a
firm in adverse times.
Another study of growth in employee-owned firms concerned the
number of jobs created (Rosen and Klein 1983), finding that em
ployee-owned firms created three times as many jobs as the typical
firms in their industries. However, employee-owned firms that pass
on stock voting rights to employees (rather than exercising these
rights through trustees) did not show quite the superiority over con
ventional firms in employment growth. Rosen and Klein imply that
this means that democracy in the firm leads to slower growth. Stock
voting rights are a very small part of worker participation, however.
Moreover, alternative explanations are possible, e.g., that fastgrowing firms are more likely to adopt ESOPs as an employee ben
efit program and that those firms passing on voting rights may have
tended to be in trouble even before employee ownership.
In fact, the research findings of Rosen and Klein, which came out
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of a study for the National Center for Employee Ownership, were
contradicted by a subsequent study by NCEO (1986). As mentioned
earlier, this study found that worker participation in employeeowned companies "is the key." Compared to a matched sample of
164 conventional companies, a sample of 30 employee-owned firms
not only performed better, but job-level worker participation was the
explanatory factor most consistently significant in predicting eco
nomic success i.e., job growth, sales growth, and growth in the
ratio of sales-per-employee.
Few in-depth studies of the economic results of particular
employee-owned firms have been conducted. Long (1977) found ev
idence of increased quality after an employee/manager buyout at a
trucking company in Canada. A few studies looked at results in the
plywood cooperatives. Berman (1967) found productivity 30 percent
higher than in conventional plywood mills. Bellas (1972) confirmed
Berman's findings and extended them. Taking a complex measure of
worker participativeness in the firm, Bellas found it to be the highest
and only significant correlate of performance, defined by change in
the value of an ownership share.
The relationship of participativeness to economic results, which
was raised in Bellas' study, has rarely been looked at in employee
ownership studies. However, a few studies of QWL and labormanagement cooperative programs show positive impacts of the
programs on performance. Macy (1979) conducted a longitudinal as
sessment of the Bolivar QWL project in Tennessee. He found worker
participation associated with increased job security, job safety, and
productivity. Schuster (1984) conducted a study of several forms of
labor-management cooperation at a variety of firms. He found that
both employment and productivity either increased or remained the
same for the majority of cases in his sample. More recently, Katz
(1985) analyzed the impact of QWL programs at GM between 1977
and 1980 and reported that they had a slight positive impact on mea
sures of quality and labor productivity, with an even larger indirect
effect on these outcomes through their effect on industrial conflict.
Worker Outcomes
Economic outcomes for workers involved in worker buyouts have
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been rarely if ever studied. Some evidence from other employeeowned and -managed firms does exist, however. Jones (1984) con
cludes that over the 140-odd years of experience with worker
ownership in the U.S., workers in firms with the most cooperative
features (equal ownership, democratic management, and profit shar
ing based on labor contribution) tended to make higher incomes than
workers in other employee-owned firms. Similarly, Berman (1967)
found that worker/owners' wages at the plywood cooperatives were
21 percent higher than the industry average. Similarly, Russell,
Hochner, and Perry (1979) found that the income of worker/owners
at the San Francisco scavenger companies in 1976 was approximately
50 percent higher than income of refuse collectors at comparable pri
vate firms or municipal departments in the same region. Both the
plywood cooperatives and the scavenger firms tend also to conform
to Jones' definition of firms having cooperative features.
The potential for diminished economic well-being for workers in
buyouts does exist, nevertheless. For instance, the workers at South
Bend Lathe gave up their pension plan to gain ownership through an
ESOP. Similarly, workers at Weirton Steel, Rath Packing, and HyattClark Industries took wage concessions, agreed to or had imposed
on them dismantlement of their pension plan, and/or waived sever
ance benefits. The workers at the O&O stores examined in this study
took a pay cut to achieve their buyouts, as did their fellow former
A&P co-workers as part of the deal to create Super Fresh with its
QWL program.
In some of these cases, however, the initial cuts or concessions
may have been a kind of investment which may or may not pay a
return. The present study is an evaluation of such costs and benefits
to workers of the O&O buyouts compared to workers taking the Su
per Fresh route to save their jobs.
Other types of worker outcomes, such as job satisfaction and men
tal health, have received some attention in the literature on employee
ownership and worker buyouts. Tannenbaum (1983) sums up the re
search results as being reasonably consistent with the hypothesis that
ownership is a source of satisfaction at work. However, the studies
he cites sometimes found a negative effect on the job satisfaction of
managers.
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Studies measuring mental health are about as close as anyone has
gotten to looking at life satisfaction for worker/owners. The findings
do not indicate a simple positive effect of employee ownership and
worker participation. Nightingale (1982), for instance, found a sig
nificantly higher level of overall mental health and a lower level of
alienation at the rank-and-file level in his sample of participative
firms. However, in studying the San Francisco scavenger firms,
Hochner (1978) found lower levels of perceived powerlessness
among worker/owners, while Russell, Hochner, and Perry (1979) re
ported them complaining of a greater incidence of nervous tension,
worry, and anxiety compared to other refuse collectors. In retro
spect, such mixed findings are not surprising, since increased power
also leads to increased responsibility.

Summary of the Theoretical Framework
Organizational and worker outcomes in worker buyouts are highly
variable. To understand the sources of this variation, it is necessary
to look at several factors at once. Assuming that the outcomes result
directly from employee ownership and worker participation misses
the real story behind the ways that worker buyouts and labormanagement cooperative efforts are put together and function over
time. Our framework emphasizes that outcomes result from organi
zational processes, which in turn result from basic input features.
This framework does not imply that employee ownership and
worker participation are either the cure-all for ailing firms or the
villains if and when the firm fails, just as managerial practice is not
necessarily the cause of good or bad performance in organizations.
For instance, the worker buyout at Rath Packing led to a substantial
effort to change the organizational culture from management autoc
racy and labor adverarialism to participative labor-management co
operation at several levels (Whyte et al. 1983). Nevertheless, the
firm is in bankruptcy today. Such a case serves as a reminder that
employee ownership and worker participation may not be as effec
tive as theory would have it, or more likely, that they are not always
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potent enough to overcome the effects of the business environment
and organizational characteristics.
The following set of equations sums up the diagram shown as fig
ure 2-1:
Participativeness = f (worker characteristics, organization type,
role of consultants and unions);
Organizational functioning and labor strategy = f (participativeness, business environment, organizational characteristics);
Organizational outcomes = f (organizational functioning and labor
strategy, business environment, organizational characteristics);
and
Worker outcomes = f (organizational outcomes, worker character
istics, participativeness, organizational functioning and labor
strategy).
In the case under examination here, as we shall see in chapter 3,
several aspects of this framework will require modification. For in
stance, because the business environment facing the O&O buyouts
and the Super Fresh stores at the time of the A&P shutdown was
basically the same, and because the stores being studied still operate
under very much the same regional and local market conditions, this
basic input feature is considered as a constant. Furthermore, some
aspects of the business environment, such as the availability of cap
ital, may indeed differ for the O&O buyouts compared to Super
Fresh (still wholly owned by A&P). Yet these differences may be too
difficult to measure, and thus, impossible to factor in.
Similarly, many of the constructs, as indicated by the contents of
the boxes in figure 2-1, are complex and multidimensional. Thus,
this framework and the quasi-equations above do not match the pre
cise equations used in analyzing the data we collected. While we
quantify as many relationships as possible, a great deal of qualitative
data is needed for clarification. In the next chapter, the actual meth
ods used to test the theoretical framework are described. The chapter
following that describes the complexities of the A&P shutdown and
the circumstances and actions leading to the O&O buyouts and the
creation of Super Fresh.

Figure 2.1
Theoretical Framework of Employee Ownership and Worker Participation
Basic Input Features
Worker characteristics
—Demographics
—Skills
—Resources
—Motivation
Organization type
—Worker ownership
—Participative mgt.
—Traditional mgt.
Role of consultants and unions
—Supportiveness
—Extent of training
—Degree of conflict
Business environment
—Competitiveness
—Creditor favorableness
—Customer favorableness
Org. characteristics
—Size
—Product market
—Sales Volume (pre-buyout)

Org. Processes

Org. Participativeness
—Worker attitudes to involvement
—Degree of control
—Range of issues
—Extent of participation
Org. functioning & labor strategy
—Supervision
—Capital investment
—Wage differentials
—Skill mix
—Job function changes
—Effort by workers
—Training costs
—Innovation

Outcomes
Worker economic outcomes
—Wage rates
—Adequacy of income
—Profit/bonus share
—Job security
—Family sacrifices

Org. economic outcomes
—Productivity
—Profit
—Labor costs

Research Design and Methods
In previous chapters we introduced the 1982 Philadelphia A&P
shutdown and subsequent job-saving efforts through worker buyouts
and labor-management cooperation (see chapter 4 for further detail),
and presented a theoretical framework for looking at their compara
tive effectiveness. This chapter deals with research issues emerging
from the theoretical framework set forth in chapter 2. The issues
include finding a situation to study, selecting a sample, operationalizing constructs, conducting measurements, and testing hypotheses.
We describe the research strategy followed and the methods by
which we gathered our data. We also present an overview of the
research project, discuss the objectives of our research design, re
view general methodological issues, and report our procedures in
collecting data.
We begin with a description of the three major phases of the lon
gitudinal research project:

Phase I: First Worker Survey
With financial support from the unions, the A&P, Super Fresh,
and Temple University, the research group sent a mail survey ques
tionnaire during the summer of 1982 to members of locals 56 and
1357 employed by A&P. This survey focused on perceptions of the
workers' former and current situation as well as opinions about the
opportunity to become worker/owners or to have a QWL program.
The findings of this phase are not reported here. For details, see
Hochner & Granrose (1985) and Granrose & Hochner (1985). This
survey was important because it began a long research relationship
and yielded information about worker expectations for the new situ57
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ations. The data were helpful in formulating subsequent research in
struments and interpreting data collected after the new stores had
opened.

Phase II: Semistructured Interviews
During the summer of 1983, one year after the initial survey, em
ployee/owners in two O&O stores agreed to participate in individual
interviews. This phase of the project was guided by a developing
theoretical framework, which eventually evolved into the one pre
sented in chapter 2. The primary focus, however, was on organiza
tional processes and individual motivations. The interviews asked
employees their reasons for becoming owners, their views on how it
was working out, and the utility of their training. The interviews
were partially supported by a grant from Temple University. Also,
one member of the team, Cindy Coker, was supported by the Ford
Foundation to evaluate the training the owners had received from
PACE and Grey Areas, two consulting groups (see chapter 4). She
helped coordinate the two research efforts into a single interview
format and gained cooperation from the worker/owners.
By the fall of 1983, further support from the Samuel S. Pels Fund
enabled us to conduct a similar set of interviews with former A&P
workers from two Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia. In these stores,
workers and managers had undergone extensive formal training in
operation of a QWL program to increase employee participation in
decisionmaking. The aim of these interviews was to provide a data
set for comparison with the O&O workers and stores. They focused
on worker experiences in the new setting and the new QWL system
of worker participation in the organizations. This group of workers
was asked why they had not chosen to become worker owners and
what conditions were like in Super Fresh after training in QWL.
In the fall of 1984, support from the Upjohn Institute enabled us
to conduct similar interviews with former A&P workers in two Su
per Fresh stores outside Philadelphia. These stores had been mini
mally affected by the shutdown threat in 1982 and were represented
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by union locals (UFCW 27 and 56) not actively seeking QWL or
employee ownership. QWL training was not instituted as early in
these stores as it had been in the other stores in which interviews
took place. These employees had not participated in the discussion
about employee ownership and QWL conducted by UFCW 1357 at
the time of the shutdown.

Phase III: Structured Questionnaire Surveys of Workers,
Shop Stewards and Store Managers
The Upjohn Institute funding also enabled the focus of the project
to be extended more explicitly to economic issues for individuals and
stores. During the fall of 1984, a written questionnaire asking about
current conditions in the stores and personal financial welfare was
given to every Super Fresh employee and O&O worker/owner who
had been interviewed. Similar questionnaires were sent to shop stew
ards representing these six stores and the other 19 Super Fresh stores
in Super Fresh's Philadelphia zone.
Managers from every O&O and Super Fresh store whose workers
or shop stewards had contributed data, also filled out a written ques
tionnaire about the store as a whole. Data on the stores' financial
condition were obtained from the Super Fresh corporate headquar
ters, from the O&O store boards, and from available published
sources.

Study Objectives
The research design was guided by two major objectives: to doc
ument an important and unique case in which worker buyouts and
labor-management concessions were used to save jobs; and to exam
ine and test the proposed theoretical framework in order to compare
the effectiveness of the two innovations for workers and their stores
(see chapter 2).
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Longitudinal Documentation
The first major goal was to document longitudinally the conse
quences and the remedies established in this particular plant shut
down situation. By following this experience from the initial
announcement, valuable new information on the process of adjusting
to a shutdown could be gained. Another related goal was to explore
in depth employee ownership in retail stores rather than in the man
ufacturing setting typical of past cases reported in the literature.
Since buyouts in the trade and service sectors may occur more often
in the future if employee ownership becomes more popular, this in
formation could prove valuable. Furthermore, this worker buyout
occurred in an urban context where a shutdown did not threaten the
sole employment opportunity for displaced workers, in contrast to
the typically studied buyout. Given these conditions, we believed it
would be desirable for social policy to clarify whether and under
what circumstances worker buyouts might be a beneficial alternative
to job loss.

Theory Testing
A second, equally important objective was to study the linkages
suggested by the theoretical framework presented in chapter 2. We
aimed primarily to evaluate the influence of the basic input features
on internal organizational processes and the influence of organi
zational processes on outcomes for individuals and organizations.
Specifically, we wanted to compare (1) the efficacy of saving
jobs through worker buyouts and labor-management concessions,
and (2) how different organizational processes, namely employee
ownership and worker participation, affect outcomes.
Comparative Efficacy of Saving Jobs Through Different Methods
As stated at the outset of chapter 2, to many observers the efficacy
of job-saving may be judged only by the number of jobs saved. How
ever, in this study the research design aimed to determine the type
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and level of economic outcomes occurring for both individuals and
organizations. Economic objectives were broadly defined to include
job and life satisfaction, as well as income and employment goals,
i.e., both subjective and objective welfare. Economic outcomes were
singled out because financial benefits are often advocated as the pri
mary reason for undertaking a buyout. A broad definition of "eco
nomic" was adopted because there was concern not only for whether
or not jobs were saved, but also what kinds of jobs and at what cost
to other aspects of an employee's life.
This study addresses another issue not usually considered in pre
vious research, namely, the issue of relative effectiveness. Unless re
sults are compared to other alternatives these workers might have
had, it would be difficult to interpret the economic consequences of
an employee buyout. The comparison of the O&O stores to the Su
per Fresh stores enables us to determine the comparative ability of
worker buyouts and QWL to provide jobs, income, well-being, and
store profits.
Processes and Outcomes of Employee Ownership
and Worker Participation
The theoretical framework presented in chapter 2 differentiates
employee ownership from employee participation. First of all, em
ployee ownership and labor-management cooperation, as organiza
tional types, operate within contexts that involve many factors:
worker characteristics, consultants and unions, business environment
and particular organizational characteristics. Second, the framework
specifies that it is necessary to establish that worker buyouts and
joint labor-management programs do indeed involve worker partici
pation operationally. Third, the framework posits organizational
functioning and labor strategy as a theoretical construct separate
from participativeness and as a key input into organizational
outcomes. Operationalizing organizational functioning and labor
strategy is a key task in studies of worker participation in decisionmaking. Fourth, the framework hypothesizes that organizational and
individual outcomes are influenced by a number of factors and re
quire consideration of several sources of variation.
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General Methodological Issues
Three major difficulties, which were considerations in the design
and execution of this study, are inherent in studying employee own
ership and worker participation. The first is the problem of defining
and operationalizing important theoretical constructs. The second is
taking into account the influence of contextual factors on the key
variables in comparing employee-owned and participatory firms
with more conventional ones. A third problem concerns who is a
better source of information about the key variables in the theoretical
framework: workers, managers, or union representatives?
Definition and Operationalization of Key Theoretical Constructs
Several of the boxes in our theoretical framework (chapter 2) in
volve difficult-to-define, multidimensional concepts having to do
with ownership, participation, organizational functioning and labor
strategy, worker motivations, effectiveness, and productivity.
Of particular importance are the nature and distribution of owner
ship and participation, which are covered in our constructs of orga
nizational type and participativeness. Because we restricted our
study to the worker buyout, which is a particular form of employee
ownership, and to Super Fresh, which involves a particular form of
cooperative labor-management agreement, the issue of organizational
type is clearly defined here.
However, there are some major controversies in the study of
worker participation, influence, power, and control, all of which
contribute to the construct of participativeness (IDE 1981). First,
there is a lack of agreement among researchers about definitions of
the various terms. Similarly, there are inherent problems quantifying
"soft" concepts such as participativeness. Second are potential
problems of methodological errors and bias, such as the possible
qualitative difference in participativeness between worker buyouts
and forms of labor-management cooperation (e.g., through QWL
programs). Another potential methodological problem occurs in the
variety of approaches to the study of power and dimensions of par-
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ticipativeness. Walton (1970), in surveying the research on commu
nity power structures, found that choice of methods was significantly
related to consequent results. For instance, the reputational method
(asking respondents who has power) tends to find pyramidal struc
tures, while the decisional method (analyzing the decision process)
tends to find factional or coalitional structures.
To deal with the definition of participativeness, we follow the
multidimensional definition given by Bernstein (1976), which in
cludes (a) the degree of influence, (b) the range of issues involved,
and (c) the organizational level where influence occurs. Measure
ment of these dimensions, using operationalizations developed by
Hochner (1978), IDE (1981), and Tannenbaum et al. (1974), also
gives us the ability to compare our results with those of other related
studies.
To deal with method problems, our research strategy involved
what Jick (1979) calls "triangulation," i.e., using different method
ologies to study the same phenomenon. Both qualitative, semistructured interviews and quantitative structured surveys were conducted
with workers in the various stores chosen for intensive study. This
enabled us to get a better handle on measuring and evaluating inter
nal processes in the organizations. The qualitative worker interview
results are reported in chapter 5, while the quantitative worker sur
vey results are reported in chapter 7. Integrating and reconciling
these results, where different, is one of the tasks of the concluding
chapter (8).
Other theoretical constructs, such as worker motivation (part of
worker characteristics), organizational functioning and labor strat
egy, and worker outcomes, involve some of the same difficulties as
participativeness. They are all hard to define, operationalize, and
measure. Where possible, we chose measures derived from previous
literature. Also, the use of triangulation permitted us to get two per
spectives on the impact of these variables.
Effectiveness and other aspects of outcomes were also difficult to
define. As noted above, a broad definition of worker economic out
comes was adopted because of our concern not only with the number
of jobs saved, but also with what kinds of jobs and at what cost to
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other aspects of an employee's life. Thus, we looked at objective
outcomes—whether the jobs are full time or part time and the
amount of job income received—and at subjective outcomes—the
degree of sacrifice imposed on workers by the shutdown and subse
quent events and their satisfaction with their jobs, lives, and eco
nomic results.
Effectiveness at the organizational level is another important mat
ter. A number of researchers on employee ownership and worker par
ticipation comment that conventional measures of profits may have
limited applicability because cooperatives do not always keep their
books and account for profits the same way conventional firms do.
For instance, Thomas and Logan (1982), in their study of the Span
ish Mondragon cooperatives, advocate measures of performance such
as value added. According to Berman (1967), ownership leads to
stability of employment, a primary outcome for both individuals
and firms. (In this study, we were able to use comparable mea
sures of profits from both worker-owned and conventional firms. See
chapter 7.)
In theory, the objectives of employee-owned and participatory
firms may differ from those of conventional firms. Instead of singleminded pursuit of profit, the objectives of employee-owned and par
ticipatory firms may be multiple: profit, employment security, high
and steady worker income, and desirable work hours. In this study,
we took a multidimensional approach to organizational outcomes.
More detail on this approach will be forthcoming in chapter 7.

The Influence of Contextual Factors
In addition to employee ownership and worker participation, the
literature discussed in chapter 2 strongly suggests the importance of
certain contextual variables and organizational characteristics in de
termining worker and store outcomes. Control of the context is im
portant for determination of the extent to which results can be
generalized. That is, it will enable us to incorporate or rule out the
particular context (depending on the degree to which contextual and
organizational factors interact), suggest the circumstances under
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which other worker buyouts might have similar effects, and help in
dicate what can or cannot be done to enhance or promote successful
buyouts. Levin (1982) favors an experimental analogy of control:
"cooperative or labor-managed and traditional capitalist forms of
organization would represent experimental treatments applied to
productive enterprises to see which provides higher productivity"
(p. 53). To approximate such experimental conditions, a study of
employee-owned and participatory firms would be expected to find a
sample which would hold constant the companies' resources, nature
of the products, market prices, and external environments, including
geographical area. Furthermore, it would be necessary to randomly
assign employees to experimental treatments.
In reality, the experimental analogy is a false one. Firms are not
created by some invisible experimental hand, allowing comparisons
on only one key variable at a time, say employee ownership versus
conventional ownership, while holding all other sources of variation
constant. Instead, firms are formed for a variety of reasons at a va
riety of times. Historical forces and personal preferences predomi
nate in determining which firms get developed, when they get
started, what stages they go through, and who gets in what firms.
There is no random assignment for either workers or firms.
Levin considers this may be a serious problem "if LMFs [labormanaged firms] are found predominantly among enterprises that are
purchased by their workers as a last resort to maintain employment,
after the capitalist owners have decided to terminate production and
close the firms. That is, if LMFs are typically a product of worker
takeovers of failing capitalist firms, a comparison of productivity
will hardly be valid" (p. 54).
However, instead of bemoaning the imperfect actual conditions un
der which tests of hypotheses must take place, it is more useful to
identify ways in which fair tests of employee ownership and worker
participation can take place. Hochner (1978) provides a few key cri
teria for these fair tests: (1) comprehensive and multidimensional
theories of participation and (2) selection of appropriate cases to
study, which involve meaningful motivations for worker partici
pation.
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First, it is possible to use a comprehensive theoretical model of
employee ownership and participation and a measurement model that
is inclusive of background factors. Then at least contextual factors
will be taken into account. This is part of the approach in this study.
Second, various sampling strategies can be adopted. Many previ
ous studies have tried to control contextual variations through sam
pling. Some studies tried to maximize control over contextual
variables, including business environment and organizational charac
teristics, by matching a sample of employee-owned firms in a vari
ety of industries with a sample of conventional firms in the same
industries, sometimes also using such criteria as size of workforce
and type of technology (Nightingale 1982; Conte, Tannenbaum, and
McCulloch 1981; Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann 1984; Rosen
and Klein 1983). Other researchers have tried to control for industry
by sampling firms with employee ownership and conventional firms
within one industry, one region, and with similar work methods
(Rhodes and Steers 1981; Greenberg 1980; Berman 1967; Bellas
1972; Russell, Hochner, and Perry 1979). Neither of these strategies,
however, can rule out variations in worker characteristics. Even
when workers in employee-owned and conventional firms do similar
jobs and have the same basic qualifications, there may be selfselection at work. Though it is not possible to rule out self-selection
through an experimental design, this factor needs to be incorporated
in research designs.
The establishment of the worker buyout O&Os and the Super
Fresh stores simultaneously makes this situation seem to be a type of
naturally occurring field quasi-experiment (Campbell and Stanley
1963). A&P workers and stores were threatened with shutdown. The
workers were reemployed and stores reopened through two organiza
tional innovations. Therefore, this situation seems to control for
many industry and background factors.
Even here, however, a precise experimental control analogy is
faulty. While industry is held constant, plant differences may be sig
nificant. For instance, the actual openings of the different stores did
not occur at the same time, but rather took place over a period of
time stretching from mid-1982 to late 1983. Some A&P stores that
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received the Super Fresh treatment either had not actually been
threatened in the original shutdown announcement or were only
closed briefly to allow for conversion. Moreover, the potential
worker/owners had to choose sites for buyouts from a list presented
to them by A&P corporate staff, so it is likely that A&P kept the best
sites for itself; and not all A&P stores were reopened as Super Fresh.
Furthermore, the worker/owners do not have many of the resources
of the big chain, though they have affiliated their stores with a
quasi-chain, IGA (Independent Grocers' Association), which pro
vides them with some coordinated advertising, short-term financ
ing, purchasing, and warehousing.
Similarly, worker background in this situation may not be wellcontrolled either. As reported in chapter 4, though the workers in the
different settings do have a common previous employer, they se
lected which option they would go to. In chapters 5 and 6, the im
portance of self-selection becomes clear when we discuss the
differences between the O&O and Super Fresh workers. Some A&P
workers were never explicitly threatened with job loss and lost only a
few weeks work during the conversion process. In addition, not all
former A&P workers were called back to work at Super Fresh. Nor
did they all have a chance to participate in the planning of the
worker buyouts, particularly if they were members of union locals
either unreceptive or hostile to the idea.
In the unique setting of the current study, we were able to adopt a
variation of the single-industry sampling strategy. We concentrated
on one industry, but in addition, the workers in both the O&O and
Super Fresh stores originally came from the same pool of A&P
workers and got sorted into the new structures at approximately the
same time. Furthermore, most of the firms in the sample were
threatened with shutdown at the same time, and then reopened.
Thus, this sample provided unique opportunities for comparisons of
workers and of firms. In this context, we could control for industry,
geographical area, and to some degree, the length of time the inno
vation has been established. To control or take into account other
sources of contextual variation, where possible, we examined some
worker self-selection factors (such as worker motivations to choose
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either O&O or Super Fresh), and some differences in organizational
characteristics, such as preshutdown profitability, resources, and lo
cal external environment.

Whose Perspective in Data Collection?
Complex and controversial topics such as employee ownership and
worker participation, tend to entail disagreement among theorists
about how to operationalize theoretical constructs (IDE 1981). In
particular, with respect to participativeness, various arguments are
made that the perceptions of either workers, managers, or objective
observers are more valid representations of reality. Contrarily, par
ticipativeness is sometimes defined by legal or constitutional ar
rangements in the firms (IDE 1981; Jones 1984). In this study,
similar contentions could be made over organizational functioning
and labor strategy. How do we validly measure difficult constructs?
To some extent, it is possible to hedge this question in research
design by using multiple methods and multiple measures of each
construct. For instance, in this study, by using both qualitative and
quantitative methods, we were able to compare workers'
spontaneously-expressed cognitive categories with a priori theoreti
cal constructs and measurements.
However, there is a larger question here. Are organizational pro
cesses best seen from the workers' perspective, or that of managers,
or through some other means? In theory, this may be unresolvable.
Nevertheless, we had to come up with an answer in this study, be
cause we focused on both workers and their stores. Where possible,
we measured perceptions of organizational processes from three
sources—workers, store managers, and union shop stewards. Be
cause we asked workers about their experiences and their outcomes
in the stores, we decided to ask them about processes. Likewise,
because we asked store managers about store outcomes, we decided
to ask about processes as well. However, because we were limited in
our budget and because we were unsure that store managers and
workers would see things similarly, we asked shop stewards, as pos
sible proxies for workers' perceptions. In part, we were interested in
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differences in perceptions among organizational levels. However, to
strengthen our confidence in our measures, it was necessary not only
to test these differences, but to construct measurement scales using
items that all organizational levels agreed hung together.
Nevertheless, the major reason we were concerned about differing
perspectives had to do with the limits of our sample. Only two
employee-owned stores were established through worker buyouts.
That fact limited the sample that could be used for comparison with
the new worker/owners, despite the fact that the Super Fresh stores,
with their QWL programs, eventually numbered over 55 and em
ployed several thousand workers.
The small number of cases necessitated modifications in the the
oretical framework, to apply this framework to the actual setting.
This test was split into two levels of analysis: one for individual
worker perceptions of processes and outcomes and one for store-level
processes and outcomes. At each level, a specific research design
was selected that would compare workers for stores in three situa
tions: (1) employee ownership with worker participation (the O&O
stores), (2) conventional ownership in which QWL had been fully
implemented (QWL Super Fresh stores), and (3) conventional own
ership in which QWL had been less fully implemented (non-QWL
Super Fresh stores).

Sampling Procedures
The Worker Sample
To study worker outcomes, attitudes, and perceptions in depth, a
sample of workers from six stores was chosen. Perceptions of orga
nizational processes and reports of individual worker economic out
comes could be studied intensively in the six stores selected for
comparison. We chose this approach because (a) we wanted to fol
low up former A&P workers in the new setting; (b) we wanted to
know how QWL worked; and (c) most important, we wanted to
know how these workers and their situations compared with the

70

Research Design and Methods

O&Os. Because only two O&O stores had been started, two stores
of each type were selected for the in-depth look at workers. Limited
resources led us to limit the number of comparison cases and of
workers. Consequently, we tried to match the Super Fresh stores
with the O&Os, but as explained below, the matching was rather
imperfect.
In the O&Os, every available worker/owner was included in the
sample. Within each Super Fresh store, subjects were selected from
a list of all former A&P employees provided by management. After
stratification for department, department head status, and sex, selec
tion was randomly made by the research team. In the two Super
Fresh stores outside Philadelphia, the number of former A&P work
ers was sufficiently small that almost all of them were interviewed.
The sample of workers was chosen to be representative of former
A&P workers, not of all workers in the stores, because the major
focus of this study was on job-saving. Not all of the workers in the
O&O stores are worker/owners; several are hired workers. But these
hired workers tend not to be former A&P workers, whereas the
worker/owners are. Similarly, in the Super Fresh stores, there are
workers who we ruled out of eligibility for selection to the sample
because they had not been former A&P workers.

The Store Sample
For testing hypotheses concerning store-level processes and out
comes, a six-store sample would be inadequate. It would be impos
sible to answer questions about the economic consequences to stores
on the basis of such a small sample. It was necessary, therefore, to
gather store-level data from a larger number—to put the six stores
studied intensively into a broader context and to enable some infer
ences concerning the relationship of store organizational processes to
store economic outcomes. Store-level data were collected from 19
other Super Fresh stores in Philadelphia itself, as well as from the
six stores at which worker interviews took place. For store-level
measurement of the role of consultants and unions, organizational
environment, store functioning and labor strategy, operational char-

Table 3.1 Data Collection Summary
O&O
Shop
worker/
Store
stewards
owners
managers
Personal Interviews
Number Contacted
Number Responding
Number of Stores
Date Data Collected
Survey Questionnaire
Number Contacted
Numbej Responding
Number of Stores
Date Data Collected

QWL Super
Fresh
workers

Non-QWL
Super Fresh
workers

—
—
—

—
—
—

39
31
2
9/83-3/84

41
41
2
3/84-1/85

59
58
2
3/84-1/85

25
25
25
1/85

48
47
25
1/85

39
27
2
2/85

41
36
2
2/85

59
53
2
10/84-1/85
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acteristics, and organizational economic outcomes, a survey of store
managers was conducted.
Shop stewards as proxies for workers.
Though we needed to measure the worker perspective on the key
variables of participativeness and store functioning, financial limita
tions prohibited contacting every worker in these stores. Instead, two
shop stewards for each of the additional 19 stores as well as the six
original ones—one representing retail clerks from local 1357 or
from local 27 and the other representing meatcutters from local
56—completed a structured written questionnaire about their store,
including information on the extent of QWL implementation and on
participation in decisionmaking. Shop stewards were chosen as prox
ies to represent the perceptions of workers in their stores of overall
store participation and functioning.
How good a proxy were the shop stewards' responses for workers'
responses in the larger sample of stores? (See appendix for table.)
After we categorized Super Fresh stores as being either QWL or
non-QWL stores (see below), we compared the mean levels of shop
steward characteristics, participativeness, and perceived store func
tioning variables reported by workers in the two stores in that cate
gory studied in depth.
Overall, the shop stewards' responses showed few if any signifi
cant differences from workers in their category. First, shop stewards
were no different from workers in worker characteristics. Second,
combining both categories, shop stewards' responses tended to fall
roughly intermediate between the responses of full-time and parttime workers on all measures, though on some variables they dif
fered from either full-time or part-time workers. Third, for the QWL
Super Fresh stores, shop stewards seemed to be quite representative
of both full-time and part-time workers. Fourth, for the larger
sample of non-QWL Super Fresh stores (n = 8), shop stewards did
perceive less worker influence in daily and intermediate decisionmaking, and less learning from their training session compared to
workers in the two non-QWL stores studied in depth. This last find
ing, however, may be a function of the special nature of the
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stores selected for in-depth study, as discussed below.
It would have been desirable to interview and survey workers in a
larger number of stores, but given financial and time constraints, it
was not possible. It may have been possible to survey a larger group
of workers in a larger number of stores by skipping the intensive
interviewing, but that would have eliminated the triangulation of
methods so desirable and so necessary for studying worker motiva
tions and structures of participation and decisionmaking, as noted
above.

Selection of stores for in-depth study
The Super Fresh stores studied in depth were selected jointly by
the research team and Super Fresh corporate management. In select
ing the initial two stores to study (expected to fit the label "QWL
Super Fresh"), the research team requested that they be matched
with the O&Os on the basis of size, location, and business volume.
However, Super Fresh management strongly recommended two par
ticular stores, which turned out to be larger than the O&Os and lo
cated in urban neighborhoods with higher density. This did not
match the less urban setting of the O&Os. These two Super Fresh
stores were part of the initial group of stores receiving QWL train
ing. They were accepted by the research team because they were
expected to be representative of stores in which QWL had been im
plemented and because they were stores represented by UFCW local
1357, which had been the original party to the innovative Super
Fresh labor agreement.
The other two Super Fresh stores in this sample (expected to fit
the label "non-QWL Super Fresh") were also selected jointly by the
research team and Super Fresh management. We wanted stores most
closely resembling, operationally, A&Ps before the shutdown and
conversion. In addition to similar matching criteria, a particular con
cern was to select stores outside the jurisdiction of local 1357, which
had initiated the worker buyouts, negotiated the QWL program and
worker bonuses with Super Fresh, and was involved in extensive
training programs likely to change workers' opinions to be less rep
resentative of the old A&P. Though the agreement between Super
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Fresh and local 1357 became a pattern for contracts between the
company and other UFCW locals in the area, the other locals were
not enthusiastic about the agreement. The two Super Fresh stores
chosen for the sample were south of Philadelphia, and the workers
were represented by UFCW locals 27 and 56. They were supposed to
have implemented a QWL program, but this had been initiated later
than in Philadelphia, involved less extensive training, less union sup
port, and the workers in these two stores had not faced a permanent
shutdown in 1982. For these reasons we expected a low level of
QWL implementation in these stores.
As a check on the degree to which stores had really implemented
QWL, we also gathered data on the extent to which QWL was
known and practiced in these stores. We had expected that our orig
inal sampling categories of QWL and non-QWL would be filled
through taking two stores in Super Fresh's Philadelphia zone (where
QWL was originally proposed and implemented) and two stores out
side that zone (where QWL was formally implemented later, if at
all). More details on the establishment of both the O&O workerowned stores and the Super Fresh chain and its QWL program will
be found in chapter 4.
Reclassification of stores to sampling categories
Data from our interviews, as reported in chapter 5, and the an
swers to some questions on the worker surveys, concerning the de
gree of QWL implementation in the stores led us to question our
original assumptions. One store in the Philadelphia zone and one
store outside had actually fully implemented QWL and the two other
Super Fresh stores (one in Philadelphia and one outside) had either
done an incomplete implementation or had not followed up the ini
tial training. Thus, we reclassified the Super Fresh stores in the sam
ple used in our in-depth study on the basis of the degree of actual
implementation. Moreover, the stores in the larger sample were clas
sified according to these new criteria, too.
Sampling biases in store samples.
A number of sampling biases need to be discussed to help inter
pret our findings. As mentioned above, despite our efforts to select
four Super Fresh stores for the in-depth part of the study that would
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be matched with the O&O stores on the basis of size, location, and
business volume, Super Fresh management recommended four par
ticular stores.
To check on how representative these stores were, we compared
the store-level data collected from managers and shop stewards at (a)
the two QWL stores from the sample studied in depth with stores in
the larger sample of 19 which we classified as QWL stores (n= 11)
and (b) the two non-QWL stores from the in-depth study with nonQWL stores from the larger sample (n = 8). Specific findings of this
analysis (see table in appendix for detail) revealed the two QWL
stores studied in depth were larger in square footage, sales revenue,
and payroll; had been more profitable in the year before the A&P
shutdown; had significantly more worker influence, overall and in
certain decisions; and had instituted more training programs for
workers. There were fewer differences between the two non-QWL
stores studied in depth and the others. For instance, the non-QWL
stores did not differ in participativeness. Nevertheless, they did have
significantly higher payroll costs, sales, current (1983) profits, more
worker training programs, and higher worker bonuses than the nonQWL stores in the larger sample. In addition, it appears that the
non-QWL stores in the larger sample have about the same levels of
participativeness on many variables as do the QWL stores.
Overall, it seems that Super Fresh management chose "star"
stores for us in the in-depth part of the study for comparison with
the O&O stores. This may significantly bias the comparisons we
make. However, if we find that workers in the O&O stores differ
from those in the Super Fresh stores in ways predicted by the theo
retical framework, we can be rather certain about confirmation of
our hypotheses.

Procedures Used in the Collection of Data
Worker Interviews
This method asked respondents to describe current and recollected
situations in depth, providing an insider's view of personal motives,

76

Research Design and Methods

informal social networks, informal systems of communication, and
store operations. The semistructured worker interviews consisted of
approximately one-and-one-half hours of conversation focused on:
Reasons for their choice of this work situation;
The nature of their former and current jobs;
Decisionmaking and supervisory practices in the store;
Social networks at the stores;
Career history and aspirations; and
Household circumstances.
The interviews were usually conducted in a back office at the
store or in a nearby restaurant. The setting was reasonably private,
but sometimes hot, cold, or noisy because of the loading and unload
ing of food going on in other parts of the back of the store. Most
Super Fresh employees were given time off from work to be inter
viewed. The O&O employee/owners were paid $10 from Ford Foun
dation funds for coming in early or staying late in order to be
interviewed. Interviews were conducted by the research team or by
graduate anthropology students trained in the collection of ethno
graphic material.
Interviewers took notes in space provided on the interview ques
tionnaires, and taped the conversation. 1 After the interview was
completed, the interviewers refined their notes based on the tapes.
Each completed interview protocol was then coded by three anthro
pologists. In coding the O&O interviews, the primary objective was
to develop categories which fit the cognitive categories of the em
ployees. If information in response to one question was elicited as an
aside in a later question, the information was coded in both places.
Construction of the Super Fresh interviews benefited from the ex
perience gained interviewing O&O employee/owners. Some ques
tions were simplified and others made more specific or more
structured, using the coding categories developed after the O&O in
terviews. Coding of the Super Fresh interviews conformed as much
as possible to that of the O&O employees, but if different ideas were
being expressed, preference was given to capturing the ideas of the
employees rather than forcing responses into O&O-determined cate
gories. A copy of the questionnaire used for each group is located in
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the appendix. The coding scheme will be discussed in conjunction
with the explanation of the interview findings in chapter 5.
Worker Survey
Whereas the interviews occurred over a long time span in different
stores, the survey gathered data from all employees concerning ap
proximately the same time period. The questionnaires, which could
be filled out in about a half hour, contained precoded questions on:
Job experience;
Training, particularly in the new setting;
Perceptions of the amount and type of participation in
decisionmaking;
Perceptions of store functioning under QWL or worker
ownership;
Personal values;
Aspects of job and life satisfaction;
Household situation; and (for Super Fresh workers) the
QWL system and worker's knowledge of it.
Some questions were selected or adapted from prior instruments,
such as the survey administered in Phase I of the research project,
Tannenbaum (1968), IDE (1981), and the Michigan Quality of Work
Survey (Quinn and Staines 1977). Others were written specifically
for this study using ideas gained from the completed interviews or
from the theoretical constructs needed for model testing. All ques
tions were structured or provided with precoded categories for re
sponse except the group of questions on the Super Fresh
questionnaire that asked employees to define QWL and to describe
its implementation in the store. A copy of this questionnaire is lo
cated in the appendix.
The questionnaires were distributed directly by interviewers in the
last two stores studied. In other stores, questionnaires were delivered
to workers at the stores by members of the research team or our
assistants. A cover letter assured the employees of confidentiality
and reinforced the message that the data were being returned to the
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Temple research team, not to their store or union. They returned
completed questionnaires by sealing them in provided envelopes and
dropping them in a box in the store. Those employees who did not
return their questionnaires immediately were contacted by phone if
needed and personal follow-up was continued until a response or a
refusal was received. After the completed questionnaires were re
ceived, a research team member assigned code numbers, checked
them for completeness, and coded the QWL questions. Data was
then keypunched directly from the questionnaire.

Shop Steward Survey
Since all stores but the O&Os were represented by two unions,
one for retail clerks and one for meatcutters, both shop stewards in
each store were surveyed, partly to make sure there would be at least
one response from each store. 2 The survey of shop stewards was
distributed and returned by mail, since these stores were widely dis
persed geographically. Names and addresses were provided by Super
Fresh management. The questions on the shop steward survey were
identical to those in the employees' written questionnaire except that
in some questions the steward was directed to respond based on her
or his perception of the workers' general situation in their store
rather than her or his own particular situation or belief. Specifically,
the shop steward was asked about:
Personal background (similar to worker survey job ex
perience);
Participation (questions similar to worker survey but
asking about all workers, not just this individual); and
Training (again, concerning the whole store not just this
individual).
A copy of this questionnaire is located in the appendix.
If responses to this survey were not received immediately, a
follow-up postcard was sent. Telephone reminders were then used to
encourage stragglers to return their questionnaires. Because the sam
ple size was small, a response was needed from virtually all in the
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sample. If the data were not returned by mail after several phone
calls, the responses were collected by telephone interview. All ques
tions were preceded and were punched directly from the question
naire.
Shop stewards from both the retail clerks local and the meatcutters
local in the store were surveyed. However, we actually used the re
sponses of the retail clerks steward, unless we were not able to ob
tain his or her response from a particular store. In those cases
(n = 4), we used the responses of the meatcutters steward. These
meatcutters stewards' responses did not differ significantly from
those of the retail clerk stewards used. Retail clerks rather than
meatcutters stewards were our first choice because of the greater
support of the new Super Fresh arrangements by the main retail
clerks local (1357).

Store Manager Survey
Similar to the shop stewards survey, store managers' (called store
directors at Super Fresh) questionnaires were sent and returned by
mail. The questionnaire covered:
Characteristics of the store;
Participation in decisionmaking (similar to shop steward
questions, but covering all levels in the store—man
ager, department heads, and workers;
Methods being used in the organizational innovations;
Store financial information, including strategy for tough
times; and
Amount of consulting and training programs received,
plus what workers have learned.

In all cases, we had to collect store financial data which (1) were
available from the stores and corporate management and (2) were
comparable to the data we were getting from the other sources. In
most cases, store managers were reluctant to provide the detailed
economic data requested. For the Super Fresh stores, financial infor
mation was then obtained from Super Fresh corporate headquarters.
At one of the O&O stores, the manager filled out most of the
questionnaire, but wouldn't divulge financial information. The board
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of directors and the worker/owners as a whole also refused to release
the information, though they had been cooperative up to then. For
that one store, we had to use information from key informants cross
checked with published data about the industry and about the stores.
We have every reason to believe that it reliably represents figures
comparable to those obtained for the other stores.
Table 3.2
______Sources of Measures of Theoretical Constructs______
Variable or construct_______Sources of data__________
I. Basic input features
Worker interviews and survey.
Worker characteristics
Sampling (also shop steward and
Store type
manager survey).
Role of consultants & unions Store manager survey.
Sampling or manager survey.
Business environment
Store manager, corporate archives,
Store characteristics
and published sources.
II. Organizational processes
Worker, shop steward, and manager
Participativeness
survey, and worker interviews.
Worker, shop steward, and manager
Store functioning and
survey, and worker interviews.
labor strategy
III. Outcomes
Worker survey and interviews.
Worker level
Manager survey and corporate
Store Level
archives.

Limitations of the Study Design
There were several possible limitations which need to be taken
into account when results of this study are interpreted. The small
number of stores and workers increases the probability that particu
lar cases are not representative of stores in general. Of course, it
would also have been better to have had more than two employeeowned stores, but having at least two alerted the research team to
possible store idiosyncracies.
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Concerning individual data, self-report data were used, although
several sources were used for many of the key variables. Self-report
data always are subject to bias due to the difficulty people have in
objectively perceiving their world and reporting it honestly to others.
It also would have been desirable to obtain data from all of the
workers involved, instead of using the proxy measurement of key
informant shop stewards used for testing the store-level analysis.
However, the shop steward data, as reported above, appear to be
representative, based on the six stores studied in depth.
Conducting the store-level analysis on a sample of just 25 stores
means that few variables can be used in quantitative tests. Thus, less
detail is available than can be used in the analysis of the individual
level. However, the qualitative information collected in semistructured interviews should help in interpreting both the worker-level and
the store-level analyses.
Controlling for industry, region, and organizational type meant
that some generalizability was sacrificed. By carefully documenting
the circumstances of this buyout, the nature of jobs, and the defini
tion of constructs in ways comparable to other studies, however, it is
possible to determine when the findings of this research project can
realistically be applied to other settings.
Despite the uniqueness of the setting, our sample may be repre
sentative of employee buyouts, even if not representative of the su
permarket industry. The O&O worker buyouts tend to share several
characteristics of previous employee buyouts (Whyte et al. 1983).
(1) Profitable units were closed by the parent company, so economic
viability was possible. (2) Management delayed notification of a
shutdown, though the union had anticipated it. (3) Plant management
practices could be improved and several strategies for improvement
were available. (4) Financial, managerial, and organizing leadership
were available to the potential worker/owners through the union and
consultants. (5) Complex financial arrangements, including both se
cured bank notes and individual capital investment, were needed to
fund the buyout. (6) The degree of participation in decisionmaking
to accompany ownership was identified as a crucial issue affecting
economic viability of the firm.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, we reviewed the overall research project, our ob
jectives in the current phase, and our strategy and procedures in col
lecting data. Overall, the setting provided a unique opportunity to
compare job saving in worker buyouts to labor-management cooper
ation and to test theoretically meaningful hypotheses. Our research
design was developed to focus on both worker- and store-level pro
cesses and outcomes.
In the next chapter (4), we go into detail on the context which
led to the establishment of the O&O and Super Fresh stores and the
formal implementation of the worker buyouts and the labormanagement cooperative programs. The following chapters present
the findings of our qualitative and quantitative explorations of the
hypotheses suggested by our theoretical framework.

NOTES
1. The employees were assured that the tapes would only be heard by the interviewers or
senior researchers. They were also assured that identification of their individual responses
would not be revealed to anyone at the store, the company, or the union. If someone objected
to being taped, their wishes were honored.
2. The meatcutters local did not want to get involved in the worker buyout, so the meat work
ers in the O&Os were made part of the retail clerks local.

Context of the Closings and
Implementation of Alternatives

A&P took down its last few red and white logos in the Philadel
phia area in 1982. In their place, two new logos appeared on the
fronts of some former A&P stores. O&O stores had a crisp blue and
white logo with the name in classic lettering. Super Fresh raised a
green and white sign to convey freshness. About all the general pub
lic saw was the exchange of signs. The public held (and still holds)
many misconceptions about what happened to A&P and what kind of
business structures characterize the new Super Fresh and O&O
stores. This chapter describes what lay behind the series of events
leading up to the establishment of the stores bearing those new
logos. The first half of the chapter explores the national, industrial,
and corporate context of the 1982 A&P closings in Philadelphia and
the response of the local union. The rest of the chapter explains each
of the two alternatives that emerged in the attempt to save supermar
ket workers' jobs: the O&O and Super Fresh stores. The second part
of the chapter focuses on the formal labor agreement, training pro
grams, and organizational structures that were planned and on the
actual developments (planned and unplanned) occurring in the imple
mentation of the two alternatives.
Using the terms of our theoretical framework, this chapter con
tains primarily descriptive information about most of the basic input
features. The contextual description of the economy and the com
pany is important background information on the business environ
ment in which both job-saving attempts occurred. Similarly, the
description of A&P corporate decisions and actions provides a gen
eral understanding of the organizational characteristics and past his
tory that those creating new organizational forms had to contend
83
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with. The details of the actual store types are thoroughly rendered,
including some sense of the differences between plan and realization.
The roles played by consultant and union support are at the heart of
the story of the establishment of the job-saving alternatives told in
this chapter. The story of the implementation of the types gives some
basic indications of how the organizational processes are expected to
work, but that part of our framework will be examined in depth in
chapters 5-7. Likewise, there is no discussion of the characteristics
of the workers, which will be dealt with in those later chapters.
In a more basic sense, this chapter should enable the reader to
understand events from the point of view of the various categories of
insiders. What contributed to A&P management's decision to close
its Philadelphia stores, gradually over a number of years, and then
all at once in 1982? What did the A&P workers experience in the
years and especially the months before the final announcement of
store closings? Why did the union offer to buy and operate a number
of stores as worker-owned? What were the motivations of A&P and
workers' to go the route of Super Fresh? What were former A&P
workers' expectations of each setting and what preparation did they
have? The next chapter takes up the reality of implementation of the
new businesses.
As stated earlier, a strength of this study is that the structure of
the situation we describe has some of the qualities of an experimen
tal research design. Nevertheless, the reader should keep in mind
that the development of the businesses was not exactly parallel. This
chapter also discusses the circumstances of development that account
for these differences. For example, the amount and timing of training
for working out the store structures differed for the two store types
and training occurred not only before the stores opened but after
stores started up. These differences in training affected how the
stores evolved and led to a redefinition in this study of store types
among Super Fresh stores based on amount and quality of on-the-job
experience with QWL.
The Economy
Early 1982 was a period of deep recession in the economy as a
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whole. The national unemployment rate reached 8.8 percent in Feb
ruary, the month A&P announced the impending shutdown of its
Philadelphia stores. Unemployment climbed steadily through the
year, going up to 10.8 percent in November, when both O&O stores
had opened. In this context, unions were negotiating relatively un
precedented contracts, agreeing to wage cuts and other concessions.
Major contracts (covering at least 1,000 workers) negotiated in the
first quarter of 1982 provided for first-year wage increases of 3.0
percent on average, compared to 9.0 percent for contracts negotiated
in the fourth quarter of 1981 (Ruben 1983). The situation faced by
the Philadelphia A&P workforce was in many respects duplicated
throughout the country.

The Food Retailing Industry
The cyclical problem of plant closings and unemployment brought
on in the recession exacerbated economic dislocation that structural
shifts had been causing for several years. That is, industries under
going profound changes in consumer demand, in technology, in plant
location, and in competitive pressures, such as automobiles and
steel, were among the hardest hit and accounted for much of the
increase in unemployment.
Structural and strategic changes were occurring in other industries
as well, however, even in relatively stable ones such as food retail
ing. Increasing suburbanization, sophisticated marketing strategies,
and changes in cash register and warehouse technologies led food
retailers to sharpen their competitive edges. A key management cop
ing strategy in this environment has been to cut costs, particularly
labor costs.
For workers in food retailing, this effort, by the late 1970s,
had yielded mixed results. The automated check-out
counter, with its scanners and pre-coded inventories, had
reduced the need for labor. Product specialists in meats,
vegetables, fruits and dairy had already been deskilled.
Only meatcutters, as Braverman (1974, p. 371) notes,
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"retain any semblance of skill, and none requires any gen
eral knowledge of retail trade." (Blim 1985).
The deskilling process also led to the bifurcation of the food retail
ing labor force (Doeringer and Piore 1971).
. . . [E]ach supermarket giant developed, in effect, its
own internal labor market, through which the maintenance
of the full-time, labor core of the organization was subsi
dized by a segment of the firm's labor force that best was
characterized as less-well-paid, part-time, young and sub
ject to high turnover (Blim 1985).
This trend was to be a key reason for problems A&P encountered as
it shut down stores around the country in an attempt to remain com
petitive. Ironically, shutdowns led to the retention of a unionized,
"full-time labor core" who bumped less senior workers. This meant
higher, rather than lower, labor costs. However, the Philadelphia
shutdown enabled A&P to leapfrog over its competitors, to introduce
an even more fully developed version of the bifurcated internal labor
market, as we shall see below.

A&P Corporate Context
There has been much speculation on the reasons for A&P's de
cline from the largest and most successful supermarket chain to one
of the most troubled (Hartley 1983; Steiner 1982; "A&Ps Busy
Boss"; Barmash 1982). Partly, massive store closings can be attrib
uted to general trends in the industry toward fewer, bigger stores and
increased competition. Yet, there is no shortage of internal reasons
cited for A&P's long slide into financial difficulties. The history of
A&P provides a key to understanding the decision to close the Phil
adelphia region.
A&P's biggest enemy may have been its history of success. By
1930, A&P had been in business for over 70 years, having pioneered
the retail cash and carry food market chain structure (Dirlam 1971).
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A&P was the biggest chain, with 19,422 stores in 1930 and sales of
a billion dollars (Hartley 1983).
Although A&P had established stores across the country, manage
ment remained centralized until the 1920s when the company insti
tuted a regional management structure. Even then, real power
remained centralized. Founded by George Huntington Hartford in
1859, management remained in the family until George Jr. died in
1957. Until 1974, leadership of the company was elected from in
side.
By the 1930s, A&P was a smug and complacent company, making
it slow to respond to changes in the industry, in the geographical
distribution of the population, and in the public's food buying pref
erences. The first challenge A&P failed to meet was the supermar
ket. The average size of a 1930 food market was only about 500600 square feet and weekly sales about $500-$600. Michael
Cullen's "King Kullen" chain, started in 1930, initially had stores
of at least 6,400 square feet, with a weekly sales volume of $12,500
(Dirlam 1977). These stores could offer lower prices during the de
pression and offered free parking at a time when the car was becom
ing increasingly important. A&P was slow to follow the trend. The
average A&P store in the 1960s was 14,000 square feet, compared
with an average of 20,000 square feet in the other major chains
(Hartley 1983).
After World War II, when the flight to suburbia was at its height,
A&P failed to make adjustments. By the time A&P began moving
out to the suburbs, the best locations were already taken by other
chains. Further, A&P did not modernize its remaining stores, leaving
them dimly lit, shabby, and small.
A&P was slow to pick up on new merchandising trends also, such
as carrying nonfood items and trading stamps. Furthermore, A&P
held on to the idea of selling its own brands, made in expensive
food-processing plants, and failed to engage in mergers during the
two periods of intense merger activity in the industry—between 1920
and 1930 and between 1949 and 1964. By the late 1960s, A&P found
it had an image problem (Hartley 1983; Steiner 1982; Barmash 1982).
A&P had become known for its dingy, poorly maintained stores,
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poor customer service and stodgy, old-fashioned management styles.
A&P Corporate Strategy: 1970s
In 1974, for the first time since the depression, A&P had a net
loss—of $157 million. Although profits had been declining for sev
eral years, this devastating loss led the company to recruit Jonathan
Scott as chairman and chief executive, the first outsider to head the
company. He made strategic cuts in A&P's operations, eliminating
unprofitable stores and food-processing units.
Reductions in the number of stores a chain operated was a general
trend in the industry, and had accelerated during the last decade as
companies moved toward bigger and bigger stores. When Scott en
tered the scene in 1974, there were 3,680 A&P stores and 125,000
employees. By 1980, there were only 1,542 stores and 63,000 em
ployees. Scott also discontinued 36 food-processing plants (Steiner
1982; Barmash 1982).
After the devastating 1974 losses, the company made a slight
comeback and actually had a modest profit of $18.7 million in 1976.
Even though A&P continued to cut back stores and employees, the
losses started again. In 1978, despite a record high in sales, A&P
suffered a net loss of $52.2 million, and fell to the number three spot
behind Kroger. Losses for 1979 matched the earlier high of $157
million. That same year, Tenglemann, a family-controlled Germanbased retail group with extensive food market holdings bought a con
trolling share of A&P stock of 42 percent ("A&P Looks Like
Tenglemann's Vietnam"; Steiner 1982). Scott resigned in 1980.
Several analysts see the critical flaw as Scott's decision to close
individual stores rather than entire regions ("A&P Looks Like Ten
glemann's Vietnam" Barmash 1982; Hartley 1983). Savings realized
by closing an unprofitable store were cancelled out by maintaining
the overhead costs of distribution within a region (Hartley 1983, p.
137). This strategy not only failed to reduce costs, but also "drove
up overhead and turned profitable stores into losers" ("A&P Looks
Like Tenglemann's Vietnam"). Even with fewer stores, A&P be
came weaker (Steiner 1982).
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Most merchandising decisions still were not sensitive to regional
tastes and preferences. Scott left the highly centralized and top-heavy
corporate structure unchanged, again failing to reduce overhead
costs. Continued high overhead costs prevented investments in mod
ernizing and building stores.
The cutbacks had caused labor problems as well. First of all, the
drastic reduction in the number of employees meant that the remain
ing employees tended to be the oldest, highest-seniority, and highestpaid workers. Wage costs and workers' length of service were twice
as high at A&P as at any of its competitors (Barmash 1982; Ackoff,
Broholm, and Snow 1984; "Local Unions ..."). Job histories of
former A&P workers document a high frequency of transferring
from store to store in the last few years, as senior workers
"bumped" (i.e., displaced through contractual seniority provisions)
less senior employees as stores were shut and positions cut. These
transfers often entailed a loss of job status, loss of hours, or concern
that it was only a matter of time before the job would be lost alto
gether. In addition, each time stores were closed A&P was forced to
engage in local labor contract renegotiations, further weakening em
ployee morale (Hartley 1983).
A&P Corporate Strategy: 1980s

Very few of the early observers of Tengelmann's purchase saw the
wisdom in it, as exemplified by the title of one article, "A&P looks
like Tengelmann's Vietnam." Hoping to restore A&P's health,
Tengelmann replaced Scott with James Wood, who had been CEO at
Grand Union, the country's second oldest chain. Wood, unlike his
predecessor, consciously followed a strategy to reduce overhead
costs, calling it a "revitalization" program (Barmash 1982), by clos
ing entire regions rather than individual stores. When Wood came
on, there were only 1,542 stores still open. He continued to cut the
number of stores, but at a slower rate. However, during one sixmonth period in 1982, A&P announced 400 store closings (Ruben
1983). In addition, on April 1, 1982, A&P closed its huge foodprocessing plant at Horseheads, New York "Local Unions ...").
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Wood also made significant cuts in central management. In his
first year, he eliminated 100 of the 550 jobs at A&P headquarters in
Montvale, New Jersey (Steiner 1982). He began a program to re
structure procedures that would give store managers more responsi
bility, thereby reducing the need for central management. In 1982,
the company reported a quarterly profit for the first time in two
years.
To reduce labor costs, Wood began a campaign to get union con
cessions in various regions. Wood also intended to reopen or pur
chase new stores after the earlier round of closings in order to
"dilute the number of senior employees" ("Local Unions ...").
In New York City, A&P halted store closures after union locals
agreed to introduce an early-retirement program. At this point, the
Super Fresh model had not yet been proposed and analysts were not
sanguine about the possibility of A&P being able to extract other
union concessions in New York after years of A&P layoffs ("Local
Unions ..."). However, during 1982, wage concessions were given
by a 300-member UFCW local to A&P in Norfolk, Virginia and by a
1,700-member UFCW local in Baltimore. Also, 13,000 UFCW
workers took a wage freeze at A&P and two other grocery chains in
Detroit (Ruben 1983).
To counteract A&P's image problems, Wood hoped to re-establish
a competitive identity. For one thing, he wanted to focus on service,
widening the range of products and emphasizing fresh produce and
meats. Wood also intended to modernize existing stores and begin a
building campaign, but the company did not bounce back quickly
enough for him to direct resources to such a program. Although
Wood was able to cut losses drastically, he continued the policy of
shutdowns in his first years as chairman.

The 1982 Philadelphia A&P Shutdown
The phase-out of 79 stores in the Philadelphia region clearly re
flects the implementation of Wood's regional strategy. From 1979 to
1981, A&P's share of supermarket sales in the Philadelphia metro
politan area dropped from 17 percent to 6 percent, while the number
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of stores was more than cut in half (Supermarket News 1981, 1983).
From employees' and customers' points of view, the rationale for
closing the entire Philadelphia region was not clear. Although A&P
had been closing stores in Philadelphia for years, the stores that had
been disappearing during the 1970s were generally among the oldest
and least profitable. In this new round of regional cutting, however,
employees and customers saw that store profitability and a good
competitive edge made no difference. A&P was vague about its mo
tives, insisting that the decision was based on the profitability of
stores and the competitive nature of the Philadelphia market. The
behavior of A&P corporate decisionmakers made little sense to em
ployees, who had a difficult time believing A&P would really close
stores they knew to be viable.
Many employees attributed the moves to management incompe
tence. In a study comparing management practices at A&P and other
food retailers in the Philadelphia area, Nicholson (1985) came to the
conclusion that "A&P was a poorly managed corporation ... at ev
ery level." Its chief competitors, both large national chains and in
dependent, locally-owned, "had never experienced many of these
problems [that A&P had]" (Nicholson 1985, pp. 147-148). Other
companies were found to be more flexible and modern than A&P.
In late February 1982, when A&P announced they would close the
remaining Philadelphia stores by March 20, there were only 11 stores
still open in the city and 8 in the near suburbs. These were among
the 29 to go. Warehouses in the area were also slated for closure.
About one week later, in an inexplicable reversal, A&P announced
that it would keep 6 of the 29 stores open, 3 of which were in Phil
adelphia and the remaining 3 in the surrounding Pennsylvania and
New Jersey suburbs. Wendell Young, President of UFCW local
1357, immediately accused A&P of closing some of its better stores
and keeping open some with a particularly low overhead and lower
payroll costs: "Everyone that they're closing is a good store"
(Schaffer 1982a). According to one chronicler of this event, James
Wood actually admitted that high wages were a factor in closing
stores, but the strategy also was clearly in line with his idea that it
was important to save overhead costs by closing an entire region.
Young suspected that A&P decided to keep a few stores open to save
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itself from having to meet pension obligations to employees (Lin
1982).

The Local Economic Situation
This shutdown of a major retail food chain in the Philadelphia area
was just one in a long line of business closings that had been occur
ring at a high rate over the previous decade. In the national context
of three recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s and a structural eco
nomic shift from basic manufacturing towards service industries,
Philadelphia fared poorly. During the 1970s, Philadelphia lost em
ployment in every sector but services, and its gain in services was
not as strong as the rest of the nation's. The biggest losses were in
manufacturing jobs, about 150,000 jobs lost from 1970-80, and that
sector lost another 30,000 jobs during the 1982-83 recession (BLS
1982). Even finance and insurance jobs were lost in the Philadelphia
metropolitan area during the early 1980s recession. Both the city and
the suburbs lost about 20 percent of the jobs in wholesale and retail
trade over the decade from 1970 to 1980. Two department stores,
two large discount department store chains, and two major food
chains closed their operations in Philadelphia. Altogether, 10 major
retailers left Philadelphia, accounting for a loss of 10,000 retail jobs
(Steiner 1982; Moberg 1982).
Several recent shutdowns weighed on workers in the Philadelphia
area in early 1982. For instance, the venerable Bulletin newspaper,
once the nation's largest daily in circulation, shut its doors in Janu
ary 1982, despite its unions having agreed to concessions in negoti
ations the previous fall. Similarly, the Philadelphia Journal, a fairly
new paper concentrating on sports, stopped publishing early in the
year.

The Union Context
The Philadelphia area's weak economy and A&P's continuing de
cline confronted the leadership of UFCW local 1357 when they
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learned of A&P's 1982 closing announcement. By various calcula
tions, this closing would mean a loss of membership of at least
2,000 to a local union that had undergone other recent losses and
threats of losses.
According to some sources, the union had lost 5,000 members
since 1976, but through aggressive organization of new employers
the membership had been kept fairly stable at 12,000 for the four or
five years prior to A&P's closing announcement in March 1982
(Steiner 1982; "Local Unions . . . "). Local 1357 had been strug
gling to keep up its membership over the years, and the loss of more
than 2,000 jobs from A&P was significant, not only in numbers, but
also in the nature of the members being lost. The A&P loss "repre
sents a severe blow to the union. . . . Food-store members have the
highest salaries in the local and contribute the highest member dues"
(Hochner and Bennett 1982). About a year before, the governor of
Pennsylvania had proposed privatization of the state liquor store sys
tem, which would have meant the loss of another major portion of
local 1357's membership.
The current president of local 1357, Wendell Young, was first
elected in 1963 at the age of 22. As a student at St. Joseph's College
working part time in supermarkets, he saw the way companies ex
ploited the lowest-paid, unorganized clerks. He sought the presi
dency and immediately led a strike against Food Fair, a now-defunct
Philadelphia grocery chain that was opening new stores with non
union workers (Clark and Guben 1983).
Young characterizes his tenure in office as filled with examples of
last minute announcements of store or chain closings. He notes that
the usual few hours or even few days notice was insufficient for him
to mount a meaningful response in light of the length of time regular
negotiations took. He had been feeling frustrated and helpless to re
ally do anything (Young 1984).
Young had begun working on the closing long before A&P made
their February 1982 announcement. Although the threatened state li
quor store closing never materialized, the continuing A&P store
closings prompted Young to keep up his exploration for ways that
the union could save jobs, and to consult with individuals from var-
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ious points of view. These included Jay Guben, a successful entre
preneur in the restaurant business who had recently been working as
a consultant to business for start-ups, and PACE (Philadelphia Asso
ciation for Cooperative Enterprise), a local group with expertise in
worker-owned business headed by Sherman Kreiner and Andrew La
mas. When the November 1981 round of A&P store closings began,
information was leaked to Young that A&P's ultimate intention was
to shut down all the Philadelphia area stores (Clark and Guben
1983). The union hired a food industry consultant to do preliminary
feasibility studies on A&P stores. In January 1982, Guben contracted
with PACE to enter into partnership to assist worker buyouts of sev
eral former A&P markets. l
During this period of consultation, Young was exploring other op
tions, as well. He consulted the Busch Center of the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania, which advocated a quality
of worklife program that restructured management. In the interest of
saving jobs, he also went to other food store chains trying to interest
them in buying some of the stores (Schaffer 1982b).
The Negotiation
On March 2, a few days after A&P gave the 20-day notice re
quired in the union contract that it was closing its remaining Phila
delphia stores, the union made a bid to purchase 21 of the to-beabandoned stores. Immediately, local 1357 president Young held a
meeting to explain to A&P-employed union members the idea of sav
ing jobs through worker ownership. He announced that to buy in,
each potential worker/owner would have to contribute $5,000, and
asked for pledges of $200 to hold a place. Young told attendees that
they would be able to make arrangements with the union's credit
union to borrow the $5,000. By mid-March, orientation sessions be
gan for the 500-600 workers who were interested in pledging. Jay
and Merry Guben and Sherman Kreiner and Andrew Lamas of
PACE jointly developed these planning and information sessions,
with PACE concentrating on the cooperative structure and the Gubens focusing on business management topics.
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By the time the stores actually shut down on March 20, A&P had
still not responded to the buyout bid. Nevertheless, meeting and
planning for the worker-owned stores proceeded. The reason for the
delay was that Tengelmann, the West German parent company, had
raised questions about the wisdom of moving out of the Philadelphia
region (Kreiner and Lamas 1983). Perhaps domestic A&P manage
ment saw an opportunity to extract wage concessions as well. During
March and April, A&P and UFCW locals 1357 (representing clerks)
and 56 (representing meatcutters) began a round of talks. The
unions, particularly local 1357, wanted to obtain options for workers
to buy some stores and to get the right of first refusal to buy other
stores A&P might decide to close in the future. A&P wanted wage
and benefit concessions in exchange for restructured management
and a reopened form of A&P.
At the end of April, slightly more than a month after 500-600 had
pledged to become worker/owners and begun attending training ses
sions, the union announced an agreement with A&P, which provided
for reopening stores as Super Fresh and granting options to former
A&P workers to purchase up to four of the stores. A&P took the
lead in establishing the Super Fresh identity, rehiring managers and
workers, and beginning to design the quality of worklife program in
cooperation with the Busch Center. The first Super Fresh stores ac
tually opened in July 1982. Some former A&P workers were called
back to begin working at Super Fresh, even while still attending
worker/owner training meetings. Two stores were bought later that
year by those still interested in worker ownership, and were opened
under the O&O name in October and November.

Union-Management Concessions
In both O&O and Super Fresh, workers made concessions to save
jobs. First, total compensation was cut in a number of ways. Both
sets of workers lost about 20 percent of their hourly wage, although
the meatcutters lost somewhat less. A clerk, for example, went from
about $10 to $8 an hour (Whyte 1983). The starting wage for new
hires, particularly in the unskilled "utility clerk" category, dropped
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to the federal minimum wage, $3.35 per hour. Overtime pay would
begin after 10 hours per day instead of after eight as it had at A&R
The Sunday overtime rate was reduced from double to time-and-ahalf, and the Saturday night overtime rate went from time-and-a-half
to straight time. Workers in both settings gave up vacation time;
senior employees entitled to four weeks of vacation lost three weeks
for the first year of the contract. They also lost personal days and
one holiday (Steiner 1982).
In many ways, these changes added up to
a permanent two-tiered wage system, whereby new hires
receive lower wages and fewer benefits for work equiva
lent to that performed by higher-paid existing employees. . . (Bureau of National Affairs 1985a; 1985b). New
hires, depending on the job title, at one-half to threequarters of the already reduced hourly rate of old A&P
employees. In a word, new hires could never catch up
with old hands, despite the fact that old A&P employees
would only catch up to their prior hourly wage in the third
year of the contract. (Blim 1985)
Third, the old A&P internal labor market was dismantled and re
assembled. Concessions on seniority and staffing were sold as paths
to flexibility and competitive efficiency. Super Fresh workers got
single-store seniority, i.e., they could no longer transfer their senior
ity across stores. Essentially, this reduced A&P's high wage problem
caused by senior workers bumping into other Super Fresh stores. Se
niority was also lost in long-term layoffs. Moreover, because A&P
chose to reopen fewer stores than it had closed, it effectively won the
right to selectively call back old A&P employees (Blim 1985).
Fourth, work rule changes to save on labor costs, particularly on
the assignment of hours, were instituted. Night crew workers were
no longer promised two consecutive nights off. To workers, the most
important changes may have been those with respect to the assign
ment of full-time jobs. The contract limited full-time jobs to 60 per
cent of the total number of jobs, determined on a store-by-store
basis. In practice, most of the senior former A&P workers have had
to settle for part-time jobs. Further, minimum hours of part-timers
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were cut in the interest of maintaining a low labor rate, i.e., the ratio
of labor costs-to-revenues.
Together, these changes reinforce the tendency in service indus
tries in general and in the grocery industry in particular toward bi
furcation of the labor force into a small higher-paid, established, and
protected senior component and a larger lower-paid, newer, and in
secure junior component (Blim 1985). In 1984, for instance, twotiered wage settlements were included in 35 percent of all airline
contracts, 32 percent of contracts in the wholesale/retail sector, and
17 percent of agreements in both nonmanufacturing industries and
motorized transportation (Salpukis 1985). In the food industry in
1984, three-fourths of the 400,000 members of the United Food and
Commercial Workers were employed under two-tiered contracts
(Ross 1985).
Two further contract provisions were presented as management
concessions: a revenue-based bonus fund and a quality of worklife
program. The bonus was envisioned as both a way for workers to
gain back some of what they had given up in wages and as an incen
tive to keep labor costs low. It was to work as follows: Each store
that kept its yearly labor costs below 10 percent of gross sales would
receive at least 1 percent of the store's gross sales to be put into a
fund. For every fraction of a percent store labor costs exceed 10 per
cent, the 1 percent bonus would be reduced by a fraction. For every
fraction of a percent under 10 percent, the 1 percent bonus would be
increased by a fraction. Part of the fund was to be an investment
pool for workers to draw from in case they wanted to buy out any
Super Fresh stores to close in the future. The other part was to be
apportioned among employees within the particular stores according
to the number of hours each worked in the course of the year and
awarded annually.
The QWL program was to "provide a mutual basis for problemsolving." It was to be a joint labor-management set of arrangements
to cooperate on methods and financial issues. Management was to be
more flexible than in the past, with more autonomy given to store
managers than under the traditionally centralized A&P system. Pro
vision was made for involvement of managers, employees, and union
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representatives at the store and corporate levels. More information
on the QWL arrangements will come later in this chapter.
How did these contract provisions compare with conditions at
other markets? First, if Super Fresh kept wage costs below 10 per
cent of sales, they would be reducing by one-third the 15 percent
labor cost A&P had before the shutdown. This would bring them
below the industry average of 12 percent (Steiner 1982; "Worker
Ownership . . . "). Competitors have complained that the conces
sions gave Super Fresh an unfair advantage—a 20 percent lower
wage than most of their competitors (Diamond 1983).
The lowered wage rate for Super Fresh has prompted other super
markets in the area to try to extract similar concessions, although
without restructuring management and increasing worker participa
tion in decisionmaking as at Super Fresh. However, Nicholson
(1985) makes a point that reinforces the conclusion reached earlier,
namely, that A&P has been slow in adapting to change,
[M]any of the changes in management attributed to the
Super Fresh QWL Program had been implemented at
Acme [a major rival chain, also organized by UFCW Lo
cal 1357] through more traditional methods (p. 147).
[The effects of earlier Acme corporate decisions] are sim
ilar to those created by Super Fresh's redesign. These
were reductions in the number of managers and manage
ment levels, decision making was pushed to lower levels
of management, and an emphasis is placed on increased
training and exchange of information between manage
ment levels (p. 149).

Continuing Efforts on the O&O Buyouts
Those A&P workers who wanted to stay in the O&O process after
the establishment of Super Fresh had to come up with their $200
cash by the end of June and demonstrate that they could produce the
remaining $4,800 by the first week in July. Local 1357 offered to
lend them the money from the local's credit union. By this point,
after Super Fresh stores opened, the number of prospective owners
had dwindled to about 40.
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Based on the feasibility studies done early in 1982, the Roslyn
and Parkwood stores were highly rated among those the consultants
recommended for bids. Recognizing the Roslyn store as having been
very successful in the past, A&P offered two other stores at no cost
in exchange for retaining the Roslyn store. The worker/owners-to-be
at the Roslyn store rejected the offer.
The Parkwood store was, in fact, a second choice for the worker/
owners-to-be. Another store had been chosen, but physical problems
with the foundation were discovered at the site. The group then de
cided to bid on the Parkwood store, which slowed their progress in
starting up and actually opening their venture.
In the meantime, the union and consultants had been investigating
various avenues for financing. They approached two national level
financing sources required by law to consider worker cooperatives,
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the National Cooper
ative Bank (NCB). The NCB did not even go as far as to entertain a
proposal. The SBA turned down an initial proposal for a 90 percent
loan guarantee, but allowed submission of a revised proposal at the
urging of Senator John Heinz (R) of Pennsylvania. The SBA's ap
proval enabled the stores to get loans from Continental Bank in Phil
adelphia (Whyte 1983). The bank loans were not fully approved until
after both stores actually began operating. The stores opened in the
fall of 1982, Roslyn in mid-October and Parkwood a month later.
How did the owners match themselves up with stores? According
to our interviews with them, the selection process was not complex.
Their choice was primarily a matter of two factors—residential
proximity and a judgment about what type of "personality" was best
suited to each of the stores. Each of the owners had moved from one
A&P store to another during A&P's last years, so they knew how
stores differed, and they developed preferences for particular ones.
Though both stores are about the same distance from the center of
the city in driving time, Parkwood is in the more urban Far North
east section of Philadelphia, whereas the Roslyn store is located well
outside the city limits. Immediately surrounding both stores are
working class communities, but there are key differences in their
locations. Roslyn itself is circled by several more affluent suburbs.
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Parkwood draws mainly on the low-to-moderate income areas
around it, including some public low-income housing, and local resi
dents employed in nearby manufacturing industries. Residential
structures near Parkwood are dominated by attached rows or apart
ment complexes of high density. The more uniformly single-family
residential area surrounding Roslyn is dotted with commercial strips
and malls. Chapter 5 will further discuss the ways in which social
ties and former co-worker relations influenced recruiting for each
store.

The Formal O&O Model
The banner across the front of the Roslyn O&O store reads, "We
own it, We operate it, We care." This slogan describes the structure
of the O&O supermarkets. As worker-owned cooperative businesses,
the O&O markets are set up on the principle that each owner who
has made the $5,000 investment has one share and one vote. Each
member has equal participation in decisionmaking for the corpora
tion. Profits are distributed based on "labor participation," that is,
hours worked as a percentage of the total hours worked during a
given period of time. Thus, when owners leave the cooperative for
any reason, they are entitled to the return of their initial membership
fee plus interest, and any profits allocated, minus losses (Kreiner and
Lamas 1983). Their ownership share, however, would revert back to
the cooperative, since the share is linked to the role of worker and
not considered transferable or saleable (Clark and Guben 1983).
Participants in the O&O training program developed the by-laws
jointly (so they were the same for both stores initially). The by-laws
cover five areas of operations—corporate structure, membership,
roles and responsibilities, profit allocation and distribution, and by
law amendments or changes. Membership essentially is defined as
those who hold shares and work for the corporation. The store man
ager is not supposed to be a member of the cooperative, but is sup
posed to be hired from outside by the Board of Directors.
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The entire membership is obligated to elect the Board of Direc
tors annually. Reelection and rotation of board members has oc
curred in both stores more than once and more often than at annual
intervals. The by-laws originally called for nine board members, al
though the Parkwood store lowered this number to five. (Parkwood
dropped four slots because, with only 14 members, a nine-member
board was considered too unwieldy).
The by-laws lay out the policies for authority and decisionmaking
that define the roles of the manager, Board of Directors, and general
membership. The scheme, referred to as the "Time Line, Money
Line, and Member Line," provides criteria for evaluating decisions
that determine what level in the organization—manager, Board or
membership—has authority for any decision. The criteria include
the immediacy of the decision, amount of money the decision would
commit, and how many people would be affected by the decision
(Whyte 1984). Those decisions involving amounts of money under
$3,000, affecting fewer than seven members, or a daily time frame
can be made by the store manager alone. Decisions concerning ex
penditures ranging from $3,000 to $10,000, affecting up to half of
the members, or having a time frame of one to three years rest with
the Board of Directors. Decisions involving over $10,000, affecting
more than half the membership, or having a time frame of over three
years are decided by the entire membership.
Members conduct business through meetings that occur regularly.
The Board of Directors meets at least once a month or more fre
quently for specific issues as needed. In general, the board is respon
sible for setting goals and determining policies, overseeing the
manager, and controlling finances. General meetings of the entire
membership occur approximately once a month, although the by
laws require only one annual meeting. A member other than the
Board president presides over the general membership meetings.
Since the entire membership must vote on issues of wide impact,
such as changing the Board of Directors or hiring and firing poli
cies, these meetings are also called on an as-needed basis. Members
can refer to an agenda posted before the store meetings and suggest
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additional agenda items for discussions. The membership has called
for emergency or single-issue meetings on several occasions.
The by-laws detail the method of profit allocation to members and
the corporation, policies for carrying out meetings and other proce
dures, and rules for changing the corporate structure. Changes in the
by-laws have not been extensive and general operating procedures
have evolved as the members gained experience in actually running
the stores. The most significant change is that both stores currently
have managers from within the ranks of the membership, for reasons
which will be discussed later.

Implementation of the O&O Structure and Philosophy
The developers of training had no ready-made models or materials
from which to prepare former A&P workers for operating workerowned supermarkets. Devising the approach as they went along, the
planners used three kinds of training settings. First, large orientation/
news/announcement sessions were held periodically during the first
two months, when the O&O idea was presented. Second, a series of
substantive introductory sessions took place. Finally, the group
formed into functional committees which met for the remainder of
the training sessions. Union president Wendell Young convened the
large meetings, but Sherman Kreiner and Andrew Lamas of PACE,
with Jay and Merry Guben, created the training content, sometimes
incrementally and disjointedly.
Training began as soon as the bid on the 21 stores was made. First,
local 1357 called a large meeting. The consultants and union staffers
explained the idea of O&O and recruited participants. PACE and the
Gubens ran introductory sessions, repeated and scheduled at conve
nient times for interested former A&P employees, starting in the
first week after the initial bid was made. These sessions were de
voted to two topics, cooperative business structure and general busi
ness planning.
In the weeks that followed, Kreiner and the Gubens invited other
consultants to involve the group in actively solving hypothetical co
operative business problems. At the introductory sessions, consult-
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ants from the Wharton School's Management and Behavioral Sci
ences Center encouraged participants to analyze problems
encountered in their old jobs and to devise new systems.
Finally, the trainers divided the large group into functional com
mittees for the remainder of the training period. The committees in
cluded the following:
By-laws and legal structure—to address self-management and
worker co-operative law;
Governance—to allocate decisionmaking authority among the
management, board of directors, and general assembly of
worker/owners;
Union role and personnel policies—to discuss work rules, define
the workers' relationship with the union, and outline the griev
ance procedure;
Worker selection and part-timers—to define the workers' roles
and store staffing needs;
Umbrella association—to determine the feasibility of linking the
stores in an association and to consider supplier affiliation;
Management selection—concerning store management, e.g., re
cruitment, selection criteria, training;
Financing and business planning—to acquire funding for start-up
and to develop specific business plans for individual stores; and
Worker education—to put out a workers' newsletter, and to as
sume administrative duties such as public relations, organizing
and scheduling meetings, etc.
In addition, one member from each committee was elected to a
steering committee, which met weekly to coordinate information
across committees. Participants gave the steering committee author
ity to make decisions for the group prior to the stores' start-up
(PACE News 1982).
Although 500 people had originally expressed interest in the
worker-ownership scheme in March 1982, as meetings progressed
through April there were about 125 regular meeting attendees
(Kreiner personal communication). A&P had still not responded to
the bid so Kreiner's expectation was that there could be as many as
17 stores (the number was reduced from the original 21).
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To accommodate the prospective worker/owners, meeting sched
ules were flexible, and most trainees came to the union hall for
meetings two or three times a week. Individuals selected which com
mittees they wanted to work on. They could participate in more than
one committee and several switched committees during the training
period. In later months, each store group formed a start-up commit
tee for tasks necessary for getting the stores open (PACE News 1982).
The functional committee meetings began in late April and contin
ued for seven to eight months until the stores opened in the fall.
The attrition in the O&O group requires some further comment.
The situation for the laid-off A&P workers in the spring and summer
of 1982 was one of uncertainty and exploring possibilities. By the
time the stores were identified and bids made, there were only 38
still involved.
Interviews with O&O owners revealed that few had made a com
mitment to worker-ownership right in the beginning. Many of them
saw O&O as only one strategy to find work. A few continued to
attend the meetings because of basic interest and time on their
hands. Despite pledging in March, no cash changed hands until the
end of June when the $200 pledge came due. The 500 early
"pledgers" had not been financially committed. It seems plausible
that many saw O&O as an "iron in the fire," but were attracted to
Super Fresh, which suddenly materialized in late April. Further
more, fewer worker/owner slots than originally anticipated were
available. A&P's decision to reopen stores meant that no more than
four stores would open as worker cooperatives. Many continued to
attend O&O meetings anyway. They had no way of knowing whether
they would actually be called to work at Super Fresh.
The fact that Super Fresh became a reality before O&O likely in
fluenced workers' decisionmaking. The first Super Fresh store
opened in July 1982, while the first O&O opening was not until fall.
With job security foremost in their minds, and despite their negative
view of A&P, dropouts probably doubted the O&O stores would ever
open. Nevertheless, 38 met the $5,000 financial commitment and
divided themselves up among the two stores, which were slated for
bids by early June.
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Differences Between the O&O Stores
Despite their legal and structural similarities, the development of
the two O&O stores differed. As mentioned earlier, the Parkwood
store had delays in opening. First, Parkwood became an alternative
only when problems were found with another choice. Second, this
switch affected the momentum of the group. Third, the delay in get
ting loan approval left members in a vulnerable financial position for
the several months. The process went more smoothly at the Roslyn
O&O store.
The stores also differed in basic physical characteristics. There is a
significant size difference: 23,000 square feet and 24 owners for the
Roslyn store compared to 13,500 square feet and 14 owners for Parkwood. Roslyn is a free-standing store on a heavily travelled suburban
road. Two other supermarkets, each about two miles away, compete
with the Roslyn O&O, since customers tend to shop within a threeto four-mile radius of home (Dirlam 1977). Parkwood, on the other
hand, shares space with a variety of stores and a movie theater in an
urban shopping center at a busy intersection. When it originally
opened, there were no other supermarkets close by, but four stores
later opened. Parkwood's location within the shopping center attracts
shoppers who make small quantity purchases. Both stores changed
then- hours several times in adapting to the competition.
The two stores also had different experiences with their managers.
The by-laws required experienced nonowner managers. One of the
functional committees set up the hiring criteria, recruited, and nar
rowed the field of candidates. The committee members interviewed
two finalists and tape recorded the interviews for the other owners.
Both stores hired experienced former supermarket managers.
Only a few weeks after he started, the Roslyn manager had a
heart attack. Once he returned, he and the Roslyn owners worked
well together. He remained in the position until 1985 when he
bought a food store of his own. The former assistant-manager, an
owner, took over as manager. Seeing him as too much a product of
the supermarket chains and not in tune with what they wanted for
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the store, the owner/workers came to believe they could run the store
better themselves. After almost a year of operation, they let him go
and appointed the president of their board as manager. He has held
both positions since then.
A Third O&O Store
The Parkwood owners purchased an additional store (not a former
A&P), located nearby in the small New Jersey town of Lambertville,
near Trenton. The purchase came because of uncertainty whether the
Parkwood O&O store would prove successful. Ironically, after the
Lambertville purchase, Parkwood's performance improved. The 14
Parkwood owners are divided between the two stores, so fewer own
ers work in each of these stores than at the Roslyn O&O store.
Relationship Between the O&O Stores
No formal relationship exists between the Roslyn and Parkwood
O&O stores; the proposed umbrella association to link the stores for
mutual benefit was never formed. Both use IGA as their supplier.
Occasionally, events and obligations bring owners together to repre
sent the first worker-owned and -operated supermarkets.
The Formal Super Fresh Model
Super Fresh is a wholly-owned subsidiary of A&P. Major differ
ences from its parent company, include: (1) a participatory manage
ment program(QWL); (2) a sales-based bonus plan; (3) an obligation
to give workers the right of first refusal on buying any store to be
closed; and (4) a single-store seniority system which restricts work
ers' mobility to a single store and eliminates the store-to-store
"bumping."
Another unique structure established by the union at the time of
the Super Fresh agreement was a fund for providing seed money for
future worker-owned businesses. This fund, called the O&O Invest
ment Fund, was to be financed by a percentage of the bonuses of
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Super Fresh employees, and was intended to support the right-offirst-refusal clause in the Super Fresh agreement.
The new management structure adopted by Super Fresh was in
tended to increase worker participation in corporate decisionmaking,
thereby increasing job satisfaction and productivity. Busch Center of
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania served as con
sultants in the design of their QWL program.
The consultants worked with a 30-member design team represent
ing A&P/Super Fresh management, union staff, and full-time and
part-time hourly employees (Steiner 1982; Ackoff 1984). Using the
Busch Center's "Interactive Planning" method, the work of the
team resulted in a design for the participation structure as described
in the booklet, "Quality of Work Life for United Food and Commer
cial Workers Local 56 and Local 1357 with Super Fresh Food
Markets."
Essentially, the approach sets up entities called "planning
boards" for all levels or units of the corporation. The lowest level or
smallest unit is the department, and the next levels are the store,
region, and corporation. The exact content of decisions and concerns
was not specified, although general guidelines for organizational
strategies, policies and procedures were provided. The booklet de
scribes planning boards as policy making bodies, rather than "merely
advisory committees," and it includes the proviso that "executive
decisions will be left to respective managers." The booklet states
that planning boards should meet regularly, but does not specify a
schedule or minimum number of meetings.
Department planning boards include associates2 within a depart
ment and the department manager. The store-level planning board
consists of the store director, assistant directors, department man
agers, representatives of the Super Fresh president, two union repre
sentatives, and employees elected from each store department.
The corporate planning board consists of the Super Fresh presi
dent, the store directors, a representative associate from each super
market selected by the store planning board, Super Fresh marketing
directors, representatives from corporate support services units, the
presidents of the union locals, representatives from A&P, and possi-
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bly outside shareholders. The regional planning boards are subunits
of the corporate planning board for particular geographical units.
The original design called for regional boards when enough stores
began operating. Each regional board includes only those assigned to
a particular region in addition to someone from Super Fresh corpo
rate headquarters.
As the QWL handbook states, "Decision-making will be made at
the lowest possible level where participation will be reflected by au
thority and responsibility." Participants at each level, then, set pol
icy only for concerns that can be handled at that level or below,
although they are encouraged to have input or make suggestions to
higher levels.
The autonomy of each Super Fresh store is encouraged through a
system of financing which incorporates sales incentives. The Super
Fresh corporation receives all store sales minus direct costs. Super
Fresh pays all indirect costs of corporate level services. Funds for
business development at each store, however, are set aside as a per
centage of each store's financial contribution to the Super Fresh cor
poration. All profits go to A&P, although Super Fresh can negotiate
with A&P for reinvestment funds to use for expansion and renova
tion. Each store director has flexibility in pricing and product mix
according to a four-category system, and although most inventory
comes from A&P warehouses, individual store directors are allowed
to use local vendors as well. In this way they are encouraged to try
to tailor merchandise to customer tastes. Management also has an
incentive fund, based on sales, employee satisfaction and the amount
of financial contribution to Super Fresh.
As explained earlier, employee bonuses are tied to the stores' sales
and labor costs. Employees get an annual bonus based on the hours
they work, how well the store does, and the labor costs at that store.
Each store has its own sales and labor cost incentives, and the bo
nuses vary across stores.

The O&O Investment Fund
UFCW local 1357 president Wendell Young conceived of the O&O
Investment Fund as a mechanism to supplement financing of addi-
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tional worker-owned businesses. The Fund was incorporated, had a
director and Board of Directors. Young, who is generally recognized
as the "architect" of the fund idea, sat on the 18-member board
(Lin 1983). The Board included academics, business people, elected
officials, and representatives from the two O&O supermarkets. Jay
Guben, also president of a consulting firm called Grey Areas, served
as acting director of the Fund until the spring of 1985, when PACE
assumed the management role. The Investment Fund also established
working committees which brought in others from the community to
address specific issues related to business development and research.
Support for the Investment Fund was originally to come from a
portion of Super Fresh employee bonuses. Under the Super Fresh
agreement, the corporation was to contribute the amount employees
pledged from their bonuses to a union-controlled "incentive and in
vestment fund." The union would transfer the money to the O&O
Investment Fund (Lin 1983). Initially, the employees were expected
to pledge 60 percent of their bonus amounts to the Fund. The Fund
directors assumed that the potential for becoming worker/owners
would serve as the incentive for employees to pledge a portion of
their bonus money. The first contributions to the fund would be
made in the summer of 1983 after the first Super Fresh stores had
been open for one year. The Fund's directors expected that the fund
could receive as much as $750,000 in its first year, which they be
lieved could leverage as much as $2.5 million through grants, invest
ments or loan guarantees (Schaffer 1983).
These assumptions soon proved mistaken. First, UFCW local 56,
the meatcutters, and Super Fresh employees represented by other
union locals also opted out. In a May 1983 referendum, local 1357
workers voted to contribute 35 percent of their bonuses to the fund.
However, a few months later when the bonuses came due, the retail
clerks of local 1357 began to reconsider. Eventually, the contribu
tions to the O&O Investment Fund were made voluntary and limited
to 15 percent of any individual's bonus. Almost no one ended up
contributing. (Schaffer 1983; Lin 1983).
Without the anticipated revenue, the O&O Investment Fund found
itself with a large deficit. The Fund's director had already hired staff
and committed money to such projects as an inner-city neighborhood
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convenience store, also to be called O&O, to be staffed by laid-off
former A&P workers and community residents. Some months later,
when the Fund's management was taken over by PACE, it was trans
formed from "a job-security insurance policy" for Super Fresh
workers, as local 1357 President Young had termed it, into a conduit
for royalties on the O&O logo which were to be paid by any new
stores or business operating under employee ownership and con
nected to the O&O concept. As of mid-1987, three local supermar
kets (none previously owned by A&P) had been converted to O&O
stores and were paying a sort of franchise fee into the O&O Fund.
How does one interpret the workers' vote of no confidence in the
Fund? When Super Fresh opened, the attrition from the original
group of 500 interested in O&O suggested that most had seen O&O
merely as one possible alternative. This view is even borne out in
interviews with O&O workers, where half indicated that they had not
initially been committed to O&O, or had seen it as a hedge against
no job at all. Those offered positions with Super Fresh faced a
choice between a familiar, low-risk option and a novel, high-risk op
tion. Most chose the former. For the same reasons, Super Fresh
workers had little incentive to give up the bonus that could help
make up for lost income for an O&O Investment Fund set up to give
them a buy-out option at a future time. The current success of the
Super Fresh stores had reduced their concern about needing such an
option in the future.
Furthermore, workers' negative view of the union transferred to
the Fund, which was perceived as a creation of the union. Despite
the fact that the union was instrumental in saving their jobs, many
workers distrusted it and did not see it as concentrating on their best
interests.
The Right of First Refusal
One feature of the Super Fresh agreement of which the union and
PACE were particularly proud was the right-of-first-refusal clause.
The clause gave employees 90 days to purchase a store slated for
closing. PACE and the union saw the right-of-first-refusal agreement
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as a way to afford workers a degree of job security. As Steiner points
out, "even if Super Fresh employees decide not to operate a store,
they have the right to buy it and immediately re-sell it to the owner
of their choice" (Steiner 1982, p. 23).

Expansion of the Super Fresh Corporation
The Super Fresh corporation has opened new stores at a very fast
rate—well beyond its original promise to reopen 20 stores. By the
end of 1982, Super Fresh had opened 30 markets employing 1500
workers (Kreiner & Lamas 1983). By the beginning of July 1983,
there were 51 stores reopened or converted from A&P in the Phila
delphia, South Jersey, and Delaware areas. Super Fresh was in fifth
place among food retailers in sales and market share in the region.
UFCW local 1357 represents the workers in 27 of these stores
(Schaffer 1983) with the remainder represented by locals in New Jer
sey, Southern Pennsylvania, and Delaware. By mid-1985, there were
59 Super Fresh stores open in the three states, and Super Fresh had
climbed to third place among the five giants in Philadelphia food
retailing in market share and sales.

QWL Training and Implementation
To implement QWL in a particular store, Super Fresh employees
were urged to undergo some training. The initial training, under the
Busch Center, was done with two stores with an eye to refining the
approach there. Then Busch would work with half of the store direc
tors, followed by the workers in their stores, and the upper ranks of
management. However, since A&P hurried to open stores in the
summer of 1982, most of the stores were opened without staff re
ceiving QWL training.
Training consisted of an orientation to the QWL structure. The
Busch Center did not actually conduct training sessions until Novem
ber 1982, four months after the first stores opened (Steiner 1982).
Most stores opened and operated as conventionally-managed super
markets for some period of time.
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The Busch Center's contract expired in January 1983. Several
months later, consultants established an in-house training capability.
According to Nicholson (1985), "half the employees in a store were
brought together for training in among other things, problem solving
and team building" (p. 80). They were also encouraged to develop a
plan for how QWL would work in their store. Super Fresh's QWL
program was designed to adapt to situations in specific stores. Train
ing focused on the process of QWL rather than on the content of
meetings or even what, beyond a few basics, constituted a good
quality of worklife. After a store underwent training, the trainers (ei
ther the consultants or later Super Fresh's in-house staff) encouraged
planning boards to meet. Meeting frequency and content were not
specified and varied widely across the stores, as we will see in chap
ter 5. Training in QWL, however, continued to lag behind the store
openings. The A&P stores converted later in the region waited the
longest time before receiving it.
Implications of the Super Fresh Labor Agreement
As Nicholson (1985) and Blim (1985) have shown, several features
of the Super Fresh arrangements have potentially greatest signifi
cance for the operation of the stores. These conditions, which are in
line with A&P chairman James Wood's goals of reducing labor costs
while providing more service include: (1) the wage and benefit re
ductions, (2) the two-tiered wage structure, (3) the elimination of
almost all full-time employment, (only department head or assistant
manager positions are full time), (4) the use of high-turnover, lowwage, part-time employees, (5) selectivity in rehiring former A&P
employees, and (6) the bonus plan.
The bonus plan, in many ways, can have unintended conse
quences, in combination with other elements of the cost reduction
strategy. For one thing, "the responsibility for the major source of
conflict between the corporation and its employees, that is, keeping
the labor-rate low, has been transferred to the hourly employees
themselves" (Nicholson 1985, p. 177). Similar to a piece-rate pay
plan, the bonus could pit worker against worker, although with a
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different twist. It would seem to be in the interest of workers to
reduce the hours of highly-paid workers, in order to keep the labor
rate low, insofar as they can influence that. For the union, that may
mean that the traditional source of strength, the senior workers, are
in disfavor with other workers. For the senior workers, it is a catch22, in that the more work they do, the lower the bonus to be shared
among workers in the store. Nicholson (1985) notes, "some [assis
tant directors and department managers] recognize that instead of
fostering cooperation, as it may have been intended, the [bonus] sets
employees against each other" (p. 182). The further discussion in
chapter 5 indicates that the workers themselves are well aware of
these implications.

Conclusions
The O&O and Super Fresh attempts at job-saving occurred in an
extremely turbulent economic environment. The immediate backdrop
was the recession, but there were structural changes taking place in
Philadelphia's economy and in the grocery industry, and radical
changes in A&P corporate strategy. A&P had once been the proud
leader, but had fallen behind the other firms in the industry and was
trying to revamp itself through downsizing and a tough negotiating
stance with labor.
In this setting, UFCW local 1357 had prepared for a fight and
developed an unusual strategy promoting ownership and management
by workers. A&P returned to the bargaining table with an innovative
extension of its developing marketing and labor strategies. A land
mark agreement was fashioned through the creation of Super Fresh.
Two worker buyouts did take place, while the bulk of the stores and
jobs threatened with closure were converted to Super Fresh.
The labor agreement, particularly at Super Fresh, involved signif
icant labor concessions—a wage cut, two-tiered wages, and revised
seniority rules—together with management restructuring through
QWL and productivity sharing through a bonus plan. It was a bitter
pill for workers, but 2,000 jobs were saved, and management prac
tices would be reformed.
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Worker/owners at O&O stores seemed to be getting several things
in return for their sacrifices that Super Fresh workers were not: cap
ital investments, autonomy on the job, self-determined training, and
democratic decisionmaking at all levels. Super Fresh workers, by
contrast, received externally-designed and-run training (if they re
ceived training at all), and the contradictory implications of the com
bination of QWL and bonus programs with A&P's part-timer labor
strategy.
At least formally, then, the implementation of the store types
manifested the advantages and disadvantages of each. Worker/owners
had risks to face and had to learn quickly how to succeed in busi
ness, but they had complete involvement in the processes and out
comes of work. Super Fresh workers had saved their jobs and
received some involvement in decisions and profits, but their in
volvement was constrained and limited, chiefly owing to formal im
pediments.

NOTES
1. Around this time, Wendell Young attended a conference at the National Center for Em
ployee Ownership that included Russell Long on ESOPs and Sherman Kreiner giving an ori
entation about co-ops. According to Kreiner, Young concluded that the cooperative structure
was definitely the way he wanted to go.
2. Store managers at Super Fresh are directors; employees are associates.

The Implementation Process
Chapter 4 described the setting in which two workplace innova
tions were conceived and implemented from the top down. The the
ory of both innovations was that the exchange of wage and benefit
cuts—on the one hand for economic incentives (bonus or profitshares) and more worker influence on how work is done on the other
hand—would lead to effective workplaces. Those who designed the
changes expected that, through increased participation, the workers
would achieve more autonomy over their working conditions, the hi
erarchy of power would decrease, all levels would be brought closer
together, and everyone would be provided with a role in decisionmaking. The range of issues subject to worker control varied con
siderably between the two store-types; it was all-inclusive in the
worker-owned stores and limited in Super Fresh.
In the initial process of formal change, consultants for the union
undertook the training of future O&O workers, while others helped
A&P to train workers for QWL. This chapter will look at the major
facets of the actual process of implementation of the innovations in
each of six intensively studied stores, as described by the workers.
First, neither in the O&O stores nor in the individual Super Fresh
stores was there random selection of workers. The very ways in
which workers were recruited affected store social processes. Sec
ond, the implementation of the new forms of participation was af
fected by variations in the commitment of leaders and consistency of
follow-through. Third, our analysis involves the unanticipated and
unintended informal social processes which significantly influenced
the establishment of worker ownership and QWL. Some of these in
formal processes can be traced to the continuation of former chainwide patterns of power relationships. Others can be related to the
continuity of specific ties of loyalty to former bosses and co-workers
115
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in each store. Still others can be tied to the morale problems in
stores, which were affected by contradictions in the contract, by the
social composition of the stores and by crisis events that occurred.

Iii-Person Interviews
The information on which this analysis is based comes from the
intensive, face-to-face interviews with workers in the six stores most
thoroughly investigated. These included two worker-owned O&O
stores and four Super Fresh stores with different degrees of partici
pation. The interview schedule included both open-ended questions
and rating scales. The interviews took one to two hours and con
sisted of five topical areas: (1) career histories; (2) responses to the
threatened store closing (perceptions of options and actions); (3) in
formation about families (composition, economic situation, leisure
and lifestyle); (4) descriptions and evaluations of participation in the
stores; and (5) hopes and expectation for the future.
We tape-recorded the interviews, transcribed them, and prepared a
codebook to best reflect differences in responses. Interviews were
coded and then analyzed for frequencies and correlations.
We used the material from the personal interviews in three impor
tant ways. First, knowledge gleaned from the interviews led to the
ultimate grouping of the four Super Fresh stores closely studied as
QWL and non-QWL. Our initial assumption that earlier establish
ment of the program and greater local union support would increase
the degree of QWL implementation was not accurate. After we
looked directly at the informal process of implementation in the
stores, we regrouped the stores as QWL and non-QWL according to
the degree of active QWL which had been actually implemented.
These regroupings agreed with each shop steward's assessment of
the strength of QWL in each store.
Second, to develop the self-administered survey, we used the ways
in which workers described the innovation and characterized the
workplace, their life goals, etc. Our new, in-depth understanding of
the way workers thought about their jobs, careers and life goals
helped us construct the shorter, more structured instrument used to
test the worker outcomes model (chapter 6).
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In this chapter, we describe how informal social processes affected
the implementation of the innovation. Of particular importance is
the role played by the persistence of old roles, expectations and
power relationships and their influence on the way each of the new
stores was assembled. This provides insight about the way "worker
characteristics" (gender, age, skills, and experience) relate to each
other. Chainwide patterns of social organization reveal that access to
power, knowledge and opportunity is not randomly distributed to all
departments and positions.
In addition to chainwide patterns, critical store-specific social pro
cesses affected the development of participativeness and, in turn,
store and worker outcomes. The process of store formation (the way
new store members were recruited) differed between Super Fresh and
O&O stores. The degree to which former co-workers were kept to
gether, and the degree to which recruitment brought in workers from
key or marginal sectors of former stores, experienced and inexperi
enced people, and those who were better off or worse off in the new
store all affected the store's social process. Managerial experience
and style affected each store as well. Finally, each store underwent a
unique series of special events and crises which helped to solidify or
rupture the experiments with participation. These social patterns
help to explain some of the outcomes more formally measured in
chapters 6 and 7. One finding relevant to the model-testing in those
chapters was that in Super Fresh stores, having a full-time job was
almost always identical with department head status. Moreover, these
full-time elites were the major "winners" in the innovation, those
who did not lose position or hours in the transition.

Chainwide Patterns
Informal Social Organization of Supermarkets:
Differential Power and Knowledge
To understand how the former social system has persisted, it is
important to look at customary practices developed over the years
in the supermarket industry. In spite of formal administrative rules,
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supermarkets, like all workplaces, have developed informal social
structures of roles, opportunities, and power which are shared
throughout the industry, and in which supermarket employees have
spent their work lives. These real but informal systems were not con
sidered by the innovators, who concentrated on changing the official,
formal structures of work. The informal patterns provide crucial in
sights about what happened.
Supermarkets are, in general, organized into several different so
cial units which vary in opportunities for learning skills, for moving
up, for working in teams and for acquiring knowledge about the
store as a whole. Formally, the store consists of departments based
on the specific product handled, (e.g., meat, produce, etc.). Each
department has a "head" or manager who reports to the local chain
of command: the assistant managers and the manager. 1 While the
formal organization chart treats all departments as equal, there are
significant informal differences between them in power and access to
information.
The core of the store is the grocery department, whose head is the
grocery manager. The grocery manager controls all products but
meat, deli and produce. Within groceries, one person—called a
manager but with no other employees—is responsible for frozen
food and one is responsible for dairy. These two junior managers and
the "receiver" who deals with vendors and handles incoming orders
are not equal to department heads. However, their guaranteed fulltime work and their opportunities for learning business skills (re
ferred to as "paper-work," such as inventory, ordering, etc.) make
them important positions in the industry's vertical career ladders.
These positions are held by men, who, along with the grocery man
ager and top store hierarchy, spend time together in the office and
are in constant communication about store business. The grocery de
partment is also the administrative home of the night crew, the so
cially isolated stock clerks who work the night shift when shelves
are stocked.
The "back of the store"—the second major component—consists
of the meat room and deli, which are physically contiguous and so
cially intertwined. The job of a meat cutter is skilled, and access is
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controlled through an apprentice system. Meat cutters—most of
whom work full time—tend to belong to a different union local than
the retail clerks. The meat wrappers and deli clerks are females, who
also belong to this local. Although meat wrapping is a dead-end job,
it provides better wages and hours than other "women's" jobs. Con
sequently, access to meat wrapping positions is also controlled, not
by formal apprenticeships, but through informal social connections.
Because of their physical separation from the rest of the store, and
because meat is a major source of store profit, meat room workers
think of themselves as the elites of the store and develop extreme
internal solidarity. Joking relationships and close camaraderie—
"one big happy family"—prevail. Trust and loyalty are evident in
meat room/deli relationships.
The third component, the produce department, is small and simi
lar to the meat department in being physically separate within the
store, in requiring very specialized skills, in having a unique set of
vendors and specialists, in having problems related to display, fresh
ness and spoilage. However, produce has less "clout" than the meat
room. Produce further suffers from being a department with high
inventory "shrinkage" due to perishability and customer foraging.
The fourth major component of the store is the "front end" or
cashier stations. The front end is a female world of dead-end jobs
characterized by part-time hours, competition for favored schedules
and fragmented worktime with no opportunity for peer interactions
(e.g., cashiers work few hours a week, rarely the same from week to
week and take breaks individually). Their interaction is with custom
ers and not with each other.
Women comprise more than half of the store personnel, but be
cause they are primarily part-time workers, they comprise much less
than half the payroll. The only routes upward for front-end women
are opportunities as front-end manager and in the office (book
keeping, head cashier, etc.). Like the female meat wrappers, women
in the office become loyal and trusted sidekicks to the store manage
ment and inner circle of grocery leaders. Women in the office repri
mand cashiers about till shortages, which can lead to suspension and
other penalties. They are also involved in scheduling cashiers, a task
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with a lot of pressure due to the competition for "gravy" hours, as
good schedules are called. Several women talked with our interview
ers about turning down positions in the office. Some said that they
would "miss the customers." Others talked about "the pressure"
and several said they would have accepted these tasks if office jobs
provided opportunity for advancement. However, the most a woman
can achieve in the office is the role of loyal assistant to the male
workers.
In summary, the store consists of four major parts: groceries, the
back (meat/deli), produce, and the front end. One informant talked
about his store as "three separate stores." The grocery department
contains vertical career opportunities for men, meat is limited in re
cruitment by an apprentice system, and the front end is a dead-end
for women in the workforce. The only positions for women outside
the front end are in subordinate positions in the meat room, deli and
office.

Worker Characteristics: Type of Workers and Types of Careers

Traditional career patterns in the former A&P supermarkets ex
hibit a strong internal labor market. Except for meat cutters, almost
everyone enters the job at the same level with no skills or experi
ence. Subsequent career trajectories are very different, however. The
following patterns are drawn from the 140 career histories collected.
All of the workers came from working-class backgrounds, with 60
percent of their parents in blue-collar work, 30 percent in low-level
white-collar jobs, 5 percent in farming/mining and 5 percent in small
business.
Sixty percent of the current workers were brought into their
present jobs by relatives, friends or neighbors who worked in the
local store. Of the 40 percent remaining, half got their jobs by walk
ing into their local store. Only 20 percent were hired through a more
formal process (application to central office, response to advertise
ment).
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Sixty-seven percent began their supermarket careers at age 14-20
(high school or college years). Almost all of the remaining third are
women who entered their jobs upon returning to work after childbearing or childrearing. Most men had no other work experience
except for the military, while women did have experience in other
kinds of work. For everyone who entered before the last decade, the
supermarket industry was seen as very secure. This was the period
of rapid post-war expansion. Over and over, workers stated that gro
ceries was a good industry since "people had to eat," and one
worker said "it was steady, like a government job." Sixty-six per
cent of the workers did not initially plan to make a career in the
market.
It is likely that many who entered this workforce to earn money
during school years eventually left. Our workers are those who re
mained because of perceived advantages. Many spoke of the advan
tages of the hourly wage rate in the industry and the security
advantages compared to other comparable jobs; but for men, the op
portunities to move through vertical career ladders were also appar
ent. While women remained part time, men tended to move to full
time within one or two years. Women in the front end frequently told
of watching 16-year-olds move into the grocery department after sev
eral months, when they would have gladly taken the vacancy. One
male explanation for this is that grocery clerks need to move large
heavy cartons of stock. Young men are quickly put "on the floor"
(groceries) where they begin to learn "the business." One woman
told of feeling humiliated when a 16-year-old with several months
experience was given the keys (the right to open and close the store)
when several women with over 10 years experience were present.
Knowledge about vendors and "paperwork" (inventory, ordering,
etc.) was available through a variety of both formal and informal
positions. Because stores are open more than 40 hours a week, there
was an elaborate system of "back-up" personnel needed for times
when an incumbent was not there. The managers and assistant man
agers were backed by a "third man," not formally recognized in title
or pay, but able to learn how to run the store and gain the trust of
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the leadership. The dairy and frozen food managers, the receiver,
and the night crew boss were in similar positions for acquiring both
knowledge and trust. Moreover, someone has to back-up the dairy
and frozen food managers when they are not present.
People used to position themselves in these strategic spots to learn
about the business and to develop ties with managers and external
chain supervisors (itinerant regional supervisors specialized in gro
ceries, meat, deli, produce, etc.). They used these ties to scout op
portunities for moving up in other stores. When the chain was ex
panding to the suburbs in the 1960s and early 1970s, many positions
became available with each new store. More recently, opportunities
have only come about as a result of retirement, resignation and sick
leave. The strategy has been to engineer a transfer to a store where
such a vacancy is expected to open, and then back-up the departing
person. Currying favor with managers or external supervisors has
been important because such ties could help to locate an opportunity
and accomplish the transfer. One way to curry favor has been
through working a stint on the night crew, which is hard to staff
with reliable people, or to be willing to come in on short notice to
fill in for absentees or to work weekends. The careers of successful
men used to depend on a vertical series of planned transfers. These
led to well-dispersed positive reputations within the corporation and
the union. It was important to be identified as an up-and-coming
worker. While these patterns based on interstore mobility can help to
explain how the new stores recruited their workers (see below), they
are no longer relevant in either the O&O or Super Fresh stores.
Movement from store to store did not always mean upward mobil
ity. In recent years, movement was triggered by the frequent closings
and the "bumping" rights of more senior workers. Several patterns
of rapid demotion developed as senior department heads displaced
regular full-time meat wrappers and so on. Those at the bottom were
laid off.
In this section, we focus on career patterns before the major chain
problems began. Even in better times, there were patterns of down
ward movement. Male employees who entered the industry at 18 or
20 were rapidly moved up in the first decade. When they became
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department managers, they could either choose to move to corporate
management (product supervisors, warehouse jobs, etc.) or stay in
the union and become assistant managers. Another common goal
was to use the business knowledge acquired in the chain to buy their
own store. This was most frequent among butchers and those with
high-level grocery positions.
Store managers were out of the collective bargaining unit and had
constrained discretionary power. Product supervisors from the re
gional office dealt directly with department heads. Decisions on or
dering and displays came directly from headquarters. Managers
handled predominantly personnel matters: schedules, transfers, etc.
As a result, managing was not always desirable as a career choice.
Since there was no room for all male workers at the top, many
were stabilized at lower level while others experienced patterns of
demotion. While transfers to achieve better positions were voluntary
and often initiated by the worker himself, other transfers were chaininitiated. They often involved inconvenient locations, tough manag
ers and were intended to encourage workers to leave.
Transfers were thus used to punish male workers who had "bad
reputations." Men who had risen to department head but were
strong-willed and often in conflict with managers, were subject to
demotions, loss of hours and frequent transfers. Some report being
transferred to "punishment" stores with autocratic managers who
would "bring them down." Women who ran into trouble were also
transferred to inconvenient stores as punishment. Several of our in
terviewees had protected themselves through the union, however.
They had frequently grieved transfers and were soon left alone.
In addition, there were many older workers nearing age 50 and
their 30-year retirement option. Those whose careers had leveled off
during their prime years when competition was strong were often
seen as "dead wood." They were moved around in order to
"protect" jobs for the manager's preferred workers.
Except for some office jobs, only female department heads (deli,
front end) were full time. Even these jobs were not frequently given
to women. Meat wrappers, while given more hours than cashiers,
were rarely full time. A very few women with specific skills as

124

The Implementation Process

bookkeepers or meat wrappers had made some vertical moves as
new stores opened with positions available, but most moves for
women were horizontal. Their moves were made to accommodate
domestic needs, such as residential moves or new hours to fit with
children's activities. 2
Other A&P workers had extremely stable careers, spending years
and sometimes decades in the same job and store. This pattern was
more common for women, but also characterized the careers of sev
eral men. Individuals who had spent over 20 years in the industry
but had stayed at the same level in hours and position at one or two
stores were common. These steady jobs required a manager's protec
tion, especially during the troubles of the past decade when workers
were bumped from store to store on the basis of seniority. A man
ager could protect a job by transferring less favored workers with
more seniority to a reasonably high-level position at an inconvenient
store where they were likely to resign, or by securing a bumping for
a favored worker to a "good" store with a paternalistic manager.
People with this kind of career used family metaphors to describe
their workplace. When asked to describe their ambitions in the
former store, they overwhelmingly reported that they just wanted to
do the best job they could and to make their store the best store.
Women were especially likely to state this as their ambition. These
workers strongly valued the stability and regularity of their former
jobs. They missed their former stores and were less satisfied with
their new situation.
In the new setting, they continued to look to their store leaders as
patrons, thus ignoring the new potential for active selfdetermination. They also continued to state a desire to work hard
and promote the store welfare as their major ambition. While this
view could be interpreted as a result of the new emphasis on team
work, it is really a continuation of their former goals.
One career pattern we expected to find more frequently than we
did involves using the supermarket job as a part-time supplement to
a full-time job. This is clearly what the Super Fresh corporation
wants most workers to do today. Corporate leaders talk about their
jobs as not being intended as primary sources of household incomes.
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The first Super Fresh president, Gerry Good, stated several times
that, "This is not a welfare system. Workers should not expect to
support a family with a supermarket job." However, such a supple
mental income strategy only occurred for 12 percent of the male
workforce interviewed. In these cases, primary jobs included teach
ing, firefighting, the construction trades and working in familyowned businesses.
In summary, there are several career patterns, to which gender and
age are very significant, which formerly predominated in the indus
try: (1) The vertical career, which is only available to men and is
pursued by those who place themselves in positions to acquire busi
ness skills and important patrons as sources of power in order to
move up the informal and formal ladders. (2) Horizontal "pun
ishment" transfers, used before the chain's economic decline of the
last decade, for "mavericks" who argued with managers or for older
workers perceived as "dead wood." (3) Convenience moves, partic
ularly by women, after a change of residence or family schedule. (4)
Little movement between stores, a pattern more common for women,
who developed strategies of loyalty to assure the protection of a
manager, but which applies to men as well. (5) Part-time careers to
supplement another full-time job. While today the industry managers
see this as the preferred pattern, it rarely occurred in the past.
The union, managers and chain supervisors shared significant in
formation about workers. The chain was and continues to be a rela
tively closed system. Workers brought spouses and children in.
Union staff and current Super Fresh leaders often came up the ranks
together. The former A&P workforce of 2,000 was a small commu
nity where people knew each other personally, by face or by name. It
was easy to get information about most people through one's per
sonal network of contacts in the chain. Reputations outside the store
were very important in explaining decisions about participation in
the O&O stores. They also help to explain the "call-back" process
used by Super Fresh. The order of recall, the quality of store, the
position level and the hours for individuals depended on their repu
tation and clout in the A&P community.
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Household Economic Vulnerability: The Importance of
Age Cohorts
The interviews also revealed differences between the experiences
of different age and gender cohorts. Not only were gender and age
significantly related to career trajectory (skills, knowledge, power),
but also to economic vulnerability (the degree to which one's house
hold was dependent on the supermarket income). These factors af
fected the responses of workers to the A&P shutdown, to recall at
Super Fresh, and to new opportunities at O&O.
Most of those entering the supermarket during the difficult past 10
years were 20-30 years old. Most of those younger workers who
were successful in keeping jobs were related to old-time supermarket
workers. Many were not married, lived at home and considered their
income as mostly disposable—for hobbies and recreational ac
tivities.
Men aged 30-50 tended to be family men with children at home;
they had often achieved vertical careers before the decline. This
group had been given the leadership roles in all the new stores. They
can be categorized in terms of economic vulnerability: those with
working wives and those with homemaker wives. Of those with
working wives, a small number had spouses with full-time, middlelevel jobs (owning small shops, selling real estate, teaching, nurs
ing); the others had wives with pink-collar, clerical jobs. The most
common spouse's job was as a fellow supermarket worker. These
secondary sources of income made a difference in the adjustments
workers made to the changes in O&O and Super Fresh stores. The
men with working spouses were less concerned about the risks of
O&O or part-time hours at Super Fresh, since their income was not
as vital to the household.
The men over 50 with fewer dependents at home were all thinking
of retirement and perhaps second careers. With a pension plan which
took effect after 30 years, many were counting the years to this tran
sition. They were less interested in their current work situation than
in the future.

The Implementation Process

127

Women's age cohorts had different economic needs than men's.
While women from 18-22 were, like young men, unmarried and liv
ing at home, women in their later 20s were likely to have children.
Women aged 23-50 were in the family-rearing stage of the life cy
cle; many were divorced single mothers. Another large group of
women had husbands who were disabled or laid off. Their incomes
were also more than supplementary to the household. For both these
groups, full-time hours and career mobility were seen as necessary
but unattainable. Many of these women wanted full-time jobs and
some expressed interest in vertical careers. Thus, while chain policy
was based on the assumption that women were willing part-time
workers providing supplemental income, this was not true for almost
half of the women interviewed.
Women over 50 needed to work to a later age to be eligible for
pensions, since they had entered the workforce later or had inter
rupted their careers. While they had no child dependents, many of
these women were widowed, single, or had husbands who were disadvantageously retired, laid off or disabled.
In sum, young entrants to this workforce (women under 22 and
men under 30) had experienced hard times but were economically
independent. Men from 30-50 had family responsibilities, but many
had working wives to supplement income. They were often in a
much better position than the large number of women (23-50) whose
income was central to their household. Women over 50 were also in
less advantageous positions regarding the achievement of timely and
adequate retirement income.

Store-Specific Social Processes
For both the O&O and Super Fresh stores, each local workplace
underwent a unique process of social formation. The transitions to
worker ownership and to QWL were molded and somewhat trans
formed in each store through differences in recruitment of new work
ers and in the perpetuation of old relationships, roles and power.
These informal social processes greatly affected the degree to which
change occurred in each of the six store settings. Important factors
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included the degree to which former co-workers were recruited to a
store, the social composition (in terms of gender, age cohorts, de
partment of origin and career trajectory and economic vulnerability),
the manager or leader's style and the critical turning points and
events. These in turn seem to have affected the degree to which par
ticipative structures were used and the degree to which they were
effective.
Choosing Worker Ownership or QWL
As we saw in chapter 4, more than 600 workers signed pledges for
worker-owned stores, but less than one-tenth remained after the Su
per Fresh openings were announced. This group eventually was re
duced to 40 as individuals dropped out. How were those who stayed
with the O&O different from the rest?
When we asked people to state their reasons for choosing O&O,
their responses fell into the following patterns. Most workers chose
O&O stores because they did not like or trust A&P. Some waited to
be called back to Super Fresh and then examined both concrete op
tions. Others decided right away to avoid A&P. Many voiced the
view that they had watched the chain make contradictory and capri
cious decisions over the years as a result of centralized decisionmaking. They felt they could do a better job.
Job security was the most frequently expressed concern. O&O
workers did not trust A&P to stick with the Super Fresh innovation
or to succeed. Full-time hours and control over one's schedule and
position were also an area of concern. Workers knew their reputa
tions and could evaluate whether their chances for full-time hours or
a "living wage" were good at Super Fresh and acted accordingly.
This was especially important to women and to the "mavericks"
who had lost their influence and position at A&P and had blemished
reputations. People who saw the system of patronage as capricious
and distasteful wanted to avoid it.
While avoiding A&P was more frequently stated as a reason, a
few expressed positive reasons for choosing O&O. The most fre
quently stated specific reason was a desire to be an entrepreneur, to
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own one's own business. This is not surprising since it had long been
a career goal for many in the industry. Others talked less specifically
about a desire for a life change, a "challenge," "something new,"
indicating the willingness for risk or adventure. Almost no one spe
cifically mentioned worker ownership or democratic worker partici
pation as a motive, but two workers did mention being attracted to
the "O&O concept." Changes were mostly discussed in personal
terms—"I would be working for myself," "I might make more
money," etc. Goals emphasized were higher income, the purchase of
more stores and fewer owners sharing the profits.
The dominant reason expressed by Super Fresh workers for not
choosing worker ownership was the social complexity of collective
decisionmaking: "getting stuck with people you don't know or
like." Several said they had thought about going into business for
themselves, "but if I did it I would do it right—buy my own store."
Others talked about going in with former co-workers on their own as
better than having this change controlled by outsiders.
Turning from what workers said about their reasons to questions
of demographic/career differences between the two groups, we see
clear patterns which underscore the stated explanations:
(1) People who chose O&O stores formed their stores in such a way
as to minimize the risks of "too many bosses" and "getting
stuck" with undesirables. In one store, more than half of the
workers were experienced males aged 30-50 who had worked
with each other before as elites in former stores. This mutually
known or vouched-for group became the core of the store. In the
other store, several dyads or triads of friends/former co-work
ers, and even pairs of relatives (parent-child, brothers-in-law,
uncle-nephew) opted for the new experiment together. Thus
former ties and loyalties mitigated against the concern about col
laborating with strangers of unknown capability.
(2) The O&O stores, compared to Super Fresh, contained a signifi
cant proportion of "mavericks" with histories of conflict with
former managers or union grieving. They also contained the
most outspoken women, several of whom were primary bread
winners. Both of these groups needed full-time work and as-
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sessed their opportunities at Super Fresh negatively. The women
achieved full-time hours at O&O, but the opportunities for new
leadership for women have still been limited.
(3) Each O&O store contained a majority of those who had been in
dominant grocery and meat positions where they had acquired
significant business knowledge. None of the Super Fresh stores
contained as large a proportion of such experienced, knowledge
able and confident workers.
(4) Several workers chose O&O to spread the risk in households that
had had two A&P pay checks. While the spouse or parent with
the greatest opportunity at Super Fresh stayed with the chain,
the other family member chose O&O.

Formation of the O&O Stores
The following section will describe similarities and differences
between the two O&O stores (A and B) in the process of formation
and their resulting social composition. This will be followed by dis
cussion of the formation of Super Fresh stores (C,D,E,F). Discus
sion of implementation and resulting practice of participation in the
stores will also follow.
Store A
One cannot overemphasize the importance of both social ties and
the particular store selected in the process of formulation of the
O&O store. In the smaller store, Store A, the role played by a
closely knit group of nine former co-workers was critical to the
workers' decisions to participate. Here, the store involved in the
buyout changed over the course of the summer when the desired
store was found to have a weak foundation and another store was
substituted. The commitment within the group was very strong,
however. Although a few people left the group (four left in the sum
mer and one right after the store opened), this turned out to be an
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advantage since the substitute store did not have the volume to carry
as many members as the first one.
In Store A, half of the members (seven) were males ages 32-45.
All of them had known each other before, most having worked to
gether in one recent store. All these men had occupied key positions
before as department heads, or other positions which provided oper
ational knowledge. They all considered one man as the primary
leader. He had taken the lead in recruiting them and keeping them
together. While all of these men had families, they also all had wives
who worked. None of them was extremely vulnerable economically.
They had also all had another option, having been called back to
Super Fresh. The core group recruited one woman and one young
male from their former store to join them.
The remaining five members were women and older males who
were not former co-workers. Four of these five workers chose O&O
because it was their only chance for full-time work. Older workers
and women were less likely to be given full-time work by Super
Fresh. The fifth had been offered full-time work, but was one of the
few whose primary motivation was the concept of worker ownership.
The store was thus constructed around a core of former coworkers. As one member of the group said, the leader "wanted a
stacked deck." Only one individual in the store was economically
vulnerable as the sole support of a family. All of the other workers
either had no dependents or had working spouses.
Members of the core group in this store often referred to each
other as "my partners." There were several negative remarks made
about the idea of a cooperative. One person said, "I don't like the
co-op idea. Everyone is not equal. Some are satisfied with less."
Other comments were, "I'm not into the concept; I had friends
here" and "This is not the wave of the future; there are too many
personalities."
Store A workers distanced themselves from the O&O consultants
early in the experience. First, they shunned media attention and the
talk-show obligations which the other store accepted. They tended to
use their supplier, IGA, as the primary source of information about
planning (ordering, inventory control, scheduling labor efficiently,
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etc.) and development. Several people said they would rather be
called IGA than O&O. This was in contrast to Store B, which had a
major confrontation with IGA over the lack of prominence given to
the O&O logo in their newspaper advertisements.
The purchase of a second store by the Store A corporation (ac
complished in 1984) was planned from the beginning. The men in
the core group often talked about buying more stores to be run by
part-time labor (as opposed to the goal of having all workers be
owners).
All of this underscores the view that this store was formed by a
group of successful, former co-workers who had acquired business
skills through their vertical careers. They were more attracted to the
entrepreneurial possibilities of the new stores than to the cooperative
movement. While three members (including the leader) specifically
spoke about the idea of worker ownership at length, this was un
usual.

Store B

The larger O&O store has been more committed to the "concept"
from the beginning. For this store, location was extremely important
for three-fourths of those interviewed. Over and over, people said
that this was a first-rate store (potentially) and that they would have
dropped out if other stores had been assigned. Social ties also made
a difference. Only 3 out of the 25 did not know any new co-workers.
There were three pairs of very close friendships, and three pairs of
relatives: a mother and son, an uncle and nephew and two brothersin-law, as well as several people who had worked together or with
close friends or relatives of each other in the past. Several workers
had been co-workers of as many as five to six others before. Some
workers reported being specifically recruited by former co-workers
as stores were forming and specific skills were needed. Some re
ported being close friends of the fathers of two of the younger male
owners and of the husband of one of the female owners. There was
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much testimony to the importance of these ties in terms of continu
ing attendance at meetings and participation in committees during
the summer prior to opening. New friendships were based on mutual
acquaintance.
This store contained 13 core males (34-46), with 9 experienced in
jobs which provided skills and knowledge, 4 young men (20-30), 6
women and two men in their late 50s. Almost all of these workers
had been called back to Super Fresh, but not necessarily for fulltime positions. Only two workers had not had the Super Fresh
option.
Of the young men, all had parents in the business. None were
economically vulnerable. Most were single, one a newly wed with a
working wife. Of the women, three were single parents. The other
three had income-earning husbands. For all the younger men and the
women, positions had improved in the new store because of their
full-time hours.
Two owners in this store were part-timers for whom this was a
moonlighting job. One had always been an active board member.
The other was an older male worker who expected to work at the
store full-time when he retired from his other job.
Most of the core males were doing the same job in the new store
that they had done before: assistant manager, grocery manager, fro
zen food manager, night crew boss, receiver, etc. A few had to learn
new jobs because of duplication (a former night crew boss became a
bookkeeper). We had expected that assignments to positrons would
have been a major source of conflict in the formation of these stores.
In Store B, there had been one problematic placement which was
later resolved, but after some initial reorganizations, everyone
seemed pleased with his or her role. (In Store A, only a few noncore
members expressed dissatisfaction.) They were pleased because jobs
were defined flexibly and could be redesigned if necessary. There
were possibilities of cross-training and job shifts. Once-coveted de
partment headships were less in demand because of the decrease in
hierarchy, the tendency to share work across job categories, and the
flattened wage hierarchy.
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While all the core males in Store A had working wives, threequarters of the men in Store B had wives who did not work at all.
Adding the three single-parent women, a substantial number of own
ers in this store were completely dependent on this one income. This
group of males had tended to work more than one job before, and
many had been forced to give up or cut back on their moonlighting
because of the time involved in the new store.
Several owners were concerned about a lack of "chain of com
mand" or lax supervision in the stores. They were concerned that
there was too much equality and no clear authority. This theme came
out in the discussion of a decision made by the manager to extend
store hours on two nights/week. Members were evenly divided be
tween those who felt the manager needed to have authority over such
issues and those who thought it should have been brought to the
membership for a vote.
Store B was more complex than Store A in size, composition and
ideology. It was more tied to the worker ownership movement and
the consultants representing the movement. The tie between this
store and the movement can be seen in the conflict over IGA adver
tisement policy. The store "faced down IGA" in a conflict between
the O&O and IGA logos in the newspaper ads. This decision was
seen by many to be a turning point in the store's independence and
ability to control its own situation. It also signified the importance
given to the O&O concept. The fight was led by those who identi
fied with the movement. At other times, however, the leaders have
been unable to secure sufficient votes to commit store resources to
the movement (to help in training for new O&O stores, to open up
membership roles, to make the logo accessible to new stores).

Summary
Several common features obtain for both stores. First, as one in
formant stated, "The stores are a combination of both the most se
cure [people who were experienced and confident in their ability to
do better than A&P] and the most insecure [those not called back]."
The "most secure" were the core-age males who comprised half
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of each store's membership. They had substantial former experience
with key positions in the stores. They also had substantial direct ties
of loyalty to each other or indirect ties through relatives and mutual
friends.
The least secure were those who, because of age and gender, were
less likely to get full-time work or even call-backs to Super Fresh.
These included five young men who were only offered part-time
work, four older workers (only one of whom was called back) and
ten women.
For many of the women, the new structure offered not only a rare
opportunity for full-time work, but a chance to break down barriers
to leadership roles in the store. Of all the women in O&O stores, 60
percent cited new and expanded roles for women as a major attrac
tion of the innovation. One stated, "I wanted a career, not a job."
One of these women left her store shortly after the interviews be
cause of perceived male dominance and inadequate opportunities for
women. Two significantly changed roles: one became a major mem
ber of the board, and the other broke a gender barrier to become a
member of the night crew with a 10 percent increase in pay and
hours compatible with parental roles. The old barrier was based on
the assumption that women could not manage heavy stock boxes.
Three others also experienced cross-training to broaden their skills in
other departments and overall store operations.
Forty percent of the women wanted to continue their traditional
roles. Several had turned down opportunities for promotion. One
woman said, "Let the fellows be department heads. ... I have other
work at home." Most of these women cited full-time hours as their
reason for choosing O&O. One was strongly recruited by former coworkers and said that she "couldn't let the guys down."
There was an unusual number of "mavericks" in both stores.
These are people who describe themselves as "outspoken," as al
ways knowing they had more ability and ingenuity than the people
they worked for. Of the 14 people in one store, 5 described them
selves in this way. Of the 25 in the second store 9 described them
selves in this way. There was little, if any, such self-description
among those who worked in Super Fresh.

136

The Implementation Process

When asked about recommending an O&O store to a friend, over
and over people stressed the contingent importance of looking at
who the co-participants are and the potential of the location. While
everyone recognizes that not all people are superworkers, it is im
portant to make sure of the ratio of those who work hard and carry
their burden to those who "just bought a job."
Participation in the O&O Stores
The major differences in informal organization between the O&O
stores are related to the size of the group, the social processes of
formation and the external forces which influenced success (see
chapter 4 for a discussion of the differences in experiences with bank
loans, store selection, local competition, type of community, etc.).
The stores seemed more concerned about how they were perceived
by external institutions—banks, vendors and customers—than about
their role in the worker ownership movement. This was true of both
stores, but especially of Store A. Many comments made by infor
mants indicated that they wanted to appear like competent, knowl
edgeable businessmen to the outside groups which exerted so much
influence on their success. They talked about behaving appropriately
and fitting in with the "business world" as being very important.
This led to situations which required minimizing their ties to the
consultants and the movement. It is possible that more of the work
ers will become interested in the worker ownership movement again
in the future if a critical mass of worker-owned stores and support
ing institutions develop.
For the O&O stores, unlike Super Fresh, there is no question
about whether a system of worker participation in decisionmaking
was developed, because such a system must develop if the stores are
to operate. Chapter 4 outlines the specifics of governance in the
stores contained in the corporate by-laws. Briefly, workers as owners
each have equal votes as store members. Monthly store meetings ex
ist to inform members of lower level decisions allowed to managers
or board discretion. At these meetings, higher level decisions re-

The Implementator! Process

137

served for maximum participation are also made. A board, elected
periodically by the owners, meets bi-weekly and a manager, hired by
the owners, oversees day-to-day operations and is responsible to the
board and membership.
Formal training occurred only during the summer before the stores
opened. There was no formal, follow-up training after the stores
opened except that Store B briefly hired a consultant on its own (see
below). The summer training described in chapter 4 involved several
special task committees which reported to a steering committee.
Committees concentrated on both operational start-up issues (work
assignment, business skills) and on governance issues (e.g. by-laws,
rights, hiring a manager, the role of the board, etc.). Very few
worker/owners remembered much about their own committee assign
ment, the range of committees and the work of other committees.
Most stated that they learned almost everything on their own after
the stores opened.
Knowing about the former power and authority structures in A&P
workplaces, there are several ways of evaluating the degree to which
the O&O stores have followed the innovative blueprints. First, re
garding the formal structures: To what degree are the formal gover
nance systems in place and operating? To what degree have informal
systems of communication replaced them? What is the relationship
between the hired manager and his worker bosses?
Second, regarding cooperative management practices: Where does
the store fall on a continuum from totally shared decisionmaking to
centralized authority? Is power being gradually distributed through
rotation of board membership or gradually centralized through a
strong leader or a stable board which does not change? Is there an
increasing gap between the board and the members? To what degree
are all members participating and knowledgeable about issues facing
the stores?
Finally, regarding informal social systems: To what degree does
the role played by former co-worker ties affect the structure of the
decisionmaking in the store? Do former ties of friendship and loyalty
lead to cliques and factions and preferential behavior?
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The Issues

Both stores have been faced with a considerable number of impor
tant issues, many of them externally controlled. Store A was faced
with an initially poor profit margin, several crises involving new
stores opening within their market area leading to the readjusting of
operating hours, a major decision to buy a new store, a decision to
terminate the manager's contract, as well as continuous capital in
vestment and personnel decisions. Store B also adjusted its hours to
changing local competition, dealt with the illness of its manager and
president and eventually the resignation of both. Moreover, this
store, the legal owner of the O&O logo, was involved in many votes
about the sale of the logo and participation in the training of a work
force for new O&O stores, in addition to on-going capital investment
and personnel decisions. While the Super Fresh stores can operate
without QWL, the worker-owned stores require a structure for par
ticipation.
The small size of Store A has led to a tendency for informal pro
cesses to operate more than formal structures. In describing the for
mation of Store A, the presence of a strong leader with a loyal
following from a former store was indicated. Conflict with the hired
manager resulted in his departure, and the store leader, who was al
ready board president, took over the manager's position as well. He
has been described fondly by one colleague as "an emperor" who
rules with "tough love." In spite of this, he expressed commitment
to the concept of a worker-owned cooperative in his interview and
subsequent talks.
Regular board meetings occurred, although store meetings were
less regular and often replaced by informal one-on-one consultation
with every member. The store has maintained an elected board, al
though its membership has been relatively static from the first and
has been almost all male. The manager/board president has struggled
to tone down his style and to produce consensus decisions. He has
made an effort to restrict the tendency of some of his close friends to
by-pass democratic decisionmaking.
The purchase of a second store by the worker/owners of Store B
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probably contributed to the persistence of shared power. The logis
tics of staffing and operating two geographically dispersed stores
was difficult enough to require cooperation, teamwork and flexibil
ity in the division of labor. There have been many role conflicts
among the personnel in the home store and between the two stores,
but with every resolution of conflict the team has survived another
crisis. The size of this store also makes a difference. With slightly
more than half the membership of Store B, and with two stores to
run, there are few workers who have not taken a turn at a position of
responsibility. The majority of store members are board members or
department heads.
Store B has taken great pains to implement the formal structure of
worker ownership. The elected board has convened frequently and
storewide members (owners) meetings held monthly. Board elections
take place at specified intervals and there have also been special
elections. (Shortly after the stores opened, special elections were
held to reduce the unwieldy size of the board initially designated in
the by-laws.) The composition of the board has tended to narrow
over time to include the traditional inner circle.
In the beginning, Store B members were disappointed by the way
storewide meetings were run. People talked about unimportant is
sues. Conflicts arose in the meetings. The meetings were seen as
endless and without closure on issues. A consultant was hired to
train the group in collective decisionmaking. He taught them how to
construct an agenda, limit discussion and other procedures to enable
them to deal with issues effectively. Most of the workers considered
this to be a major turning point in store governance.
The manager in Store B was viewed as having developed a satis
factory relationship in a complex situation. He handled role conflicts
with good grace and a sense of humor. He left in the third year to
buy a store of his own, however, and was replaced by an experienced
grocery department leader.
Store B has also seen power consolidate into the hands of a few.
Starting out with a hired manager, an assistant manager (who was
president of the board) and a meat manager (who was vice-president
of the board), the store went through a period when the manager was
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hospitalized and the president of the board took over. Then, the pres
ident left the corporation in the second year (after the interviewing)
and was succeeded as president by the vice-president (meat man
ager).
To the leaders of the store (the former and current board presi
dents), the concepts of participation and consensus were very impor
tant. One said, "it is harder to be l/2s owner than a solo owner
because you have to use reason and effort to make a decision—but
it's a better decision." Another said, "I think 25 people have more
collective knowledge than one person. If I didn't think so, I would
quit." (He, like the leader in the other store, sees himself as chang
ing from a self-centered, impatient person to a tolerant, patient
leader.)
The potential for a gap between active and less active members
exists in Store B because of its larger size in relation to the limited
number of headships and board positions. That such a division exists
is reflected in comments by both leaders (who complain about nonparticipation) and some members (who complain about board cliquishness). Part of this problem has been addressed by deliberate
rotation of board positions. As in Store A, however, there are several
people who have been on the board continuously and there is a ten
dency for department head status and board membership to con
verge. In this store, women have served on the board, but except for
one woman who has been on the board from the beginning, women
seem to rotate on and off more frequently.

Summary
The two stores differ in both size and in the significance of former
co-worker ties in the store's composition. Size and former friendship
ties affected the degree to which formal structures of communication
were replaced by informal social processes. Size also affected the
degree to which people had access to information and leadership po
sitions. The larger store had the greatest gap between the board and
less active members as time went on. In both stores, former ties
declined in importance to participation and governance as time
elapsed and major problems needed to be solved.
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Leaders and workers in both stores continue to be concerned about
participation, either in attendance at meetings or in awareness and
knowledge of issues. About one-third of the workers are seen as nonparticipating by their colleagues. They are said to have "just bought
their jobs," to "put time in and walk away" leaving decisions to the
others. Many workers report that they only go to meetings when the
issues "affect my pocketbook."
Participation and leadership follow an expected pattern if one con
siders department head status and department membership. The
presidents of both boards are meat room managers. In both stores,
the meat room and deli workers are supportive and loyal to the lead
ership. They evoke the "team" and "family" metaphors so often
used in talking about the meat room. The front end and produce
departments and the night crew are significantly distanced from the
leadership core in both knowledge and attitude.
There has been little role change in the O&O stores, since the
leadership has come directly from those who had vertical careers at
A&P and who had worked in departments with the greatest access to
business skills. With few exceptions women's roles remain quite tra
ditional. Women are under represented on the boards and still serve
as "loyal side-kicks" in the meat room, or on the front end. They
have also lost their former office bookkeeping jobs to young males
in the new stores, since the bookkeeping functions are seen as more
critical in the autonomous store corporation. However, the ability to
flexibly redesign jobs and provide a storewide view of issues through
meetings and cross-training have allowed women access to new skills
and information.
Formation of the Super Fresh Stores
Contradictions in the Contract
The formal features of the Super Fresh contract led to several pol
icies which discouraged active participation in QWL. These features
have been described in chapter 4. In the following discussion we
describe how each feature acted as an impediment to QWL.
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First, tying the bonus to labor costs created an incentive for man
agers to hire few full-time workers, decrease the hours of part-timers
whenever there was a wage rate increase, and replace former A&P
workers with newcomers paid at a lower rate. Many workers were
well aware of the direct relationship between the bonus and their
continuing loss of income and, thus, were hostile to QWL. They saw
it as a meaningless feature in comparison to their declining wages.
A schism between part-time and full-time workers developed as a
result. Full-time workers felt secure while part-timers worried about
further erosion of the number of hours worked. Several workers in
one store believed there was a formal policy to reduce everyone to
12 hours per week. Conflicts over hours and schedules prevented the
emergence of feelings of equality between department heads (most of
the full-timers) and other workers.
Part-time workers have not been kept informed. While meetings
were part of clock-time (paid for) in the earliest days of QWL in
stores C and E, they are no longer part of compensated work-time at
these stores and were never paid for at stores D and F. Part-timers
have not been willing to attend meetings scheduled on their time off.
Second, the contract also generated a developing hostility between
former A&P workers and new workers. New workers were to be
paid less than former A&P workers during the first years of the con
tract. By the end of the contract this gap would be closed. Thus
there was initially an incentive to give more hours to new, lowerwage workers. Where this occurred, it was deeply resented. In addi
tion, former A&P workers felt entitled to some "reparations" for
the concessions they made after years of loyalty. They resented the
fact that newcomers also received the bonus and that wage-rates
were to be equalized. One worker said, "Why should they get the
hours when I gave the company 14 good years." Another said, "I
thought the bonus was only for us, to make up what we lost."
Third, the contract encouraged high turnover, i.e., replacing
former A&P workers with newcomers and replacing experienced
newcomers with novice newcomers entering at minimum wage. In
one store with an older, more female workforce of former A&P
workers, many informants felt that there was a conscious attempt to
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encourage resignations. The better-off workers sometimes revealed
their awareness of their competition with other long-term workers
for the bonus and their vested interest in turnover. One worker com
mented favorably on the resignation of another: "There goes another
one-percenter."
Fourth, morale problems developed around the loss of former ben
efits. The single most resented "give-back" among the workers was
the vacation time. Many of them had developed lifestyles (camping,
trailers at the beach, etc.) which were based on their former vacations
of four-five weeks accumulated after many years. Of all the conces
sions, this one will probably continue to dampen morale for the
longest time.
A fifth feature of the new contract which has led to dissatisfaction
and lowered morale was the single-store seniority system. Seniority
is now based on the individual stores rather than on service in the
chain. Transfers are no longer part of the game. This is good for
those who preferred the "store as family" model, but it impedes the
upward mobility allowed for by the transfer system. Single-store se
niority was based on the assumption that teamwork would best be
fostered by stability within the stores. It also enabled Super Fresh to
surmount the barriers to profitability engendered by a high-seniority
labor force with layoff/transfer protection. Some of the young, am
bitious men saw this as a loss of opportunity; women who had
wanted more hours or full-time jobs also realized that without trans
fers they would be limited. However, those who thought the
new chain's success would lead to new store openings retained the
hope of moving up in the system.

Staffing the QWL Super Fresh Stores
On the surface, there appeared to be a chainwide policy for staff
ing. While stores were to be staffed by a 3:1 ratio of former A&P
workers to new hires, this appears to have been only a chainwide
average. In fact, there was considerable latitude in the staffing strat
egies used in different stores. The four stores in our sample varied
considerably.
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Variables which made a difference in staffing policy were the
knowledge and clout of the manager, the position of the store in the
chronological sequencing of openings, and how the process of call
backs was managed. Some callbacks were formal, based on a list of
former workers and their positions. Others were informal (managers
and union leaders responded to pressure by relatives, workers, pa
trons and calls by former workers themselves). It was possible for a
manager to reconstruct a store largely with former loyal co-workers.
While many workers actively worked at being called back, others
were totally passive and waited for calls and letters.
The strategy for staffing led to the perpetuation of an already co
hesive and mutually-known workforce or to the creation of a new
social group. Such differences could affect the social process in de
veloping QWL.
In addition, the following dimensions of store composition are
important because of their implications for store functioning and
morale:
(1) ratio of former A&P workers to new hires;
(2) inequality among former A&P workers in terms of hours;
(3) inequality between former A&P or new workers in terms of
hours;
(4) number of former A&P workers doing better, the same or
worse in the new stores in terms of hours and position.
Initially, Stores C & E were grouped together as experiencing
early QWL training in an enthusiastic union context while D & F
were grouped as experiencing late QWL training in a less supportive
union context. However, preliminary qualitative analysis revealed
that Stores C & D had more in common in consistent implementa
tion of QWL. C & D had actively practiced QWL while E & F had
been less consistent. Thus, in all further analysis, C & D will be
treated as QWL stores while E & F will be grouped as non-QWL
stores.

Store C
Store C did unusually well in calling back former workers. Sev
enty percent of the recalled workers had experience in the same store
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with the same manager. Former workers the manager preferred to
exclude or who were unavailable were replaced by workers with
good reputations in the chain. Since this was one of the first stores,
he had "first pick" and was able to assure most of his former work
ers of good positions. His workers reported little anxiety over the
transition. Not one worker interviewed had considered the O&O op
tion. The store was dominated by 52 former A&P workers who out
numbered the 32 new hires. In each department, oldtimers
outnumbered the new.
This manager provided more full-time jobs for former workers
than any other. In most stores, only department heads are full time,
amounting to about 12 full-time slots. Here, several other jobs in
each department were full time so that there were 20 full-time jobs.
The manager also made certain that all former workers had more
hours than new hires. Under the new system, this kind of staffing
was discouraged by the need to keep wage costs down. However, the
sales volume and profit in this store permitted the manager to use his
formerly successful paternalistic strategy of taking care of "his
workers'' in return for loyalty and productivity.
Unlike any other store, there were no disgruntled women in the
front end at Store C. The manager had called back mostly elite
males and staffed the problematic front end largely with new hires.
He thus avoided a typical source of disaffection. The women who
were called back trusted the manager to take care of them. Only a
few people made negative comments or indicated a desire to leave.
These included some men, new to the store, who worked in the more
socially isolated departments. They simply did not like the neighbor
hood. The others had common reasons to leave—the need for fulltime work or the desire to retire.
Most of the former workers in this store had been called back to
positions which were the same (in hours and level) or better than
before. Very few had lost anything. Three of the 20-year-old males
had achieved rapid advancement to better positions and were very
optimistic about the future. Those on the store planning board had a
wealth of experience in leadership roles. Store C had the largest
number of college degrees in any one store. Moreover, most workers
in this store were not economically vulnerable. All the leadership
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males had wives with good jobs and several had one or more busi
ness investments on the side. None of the women were primary
breadwinners. This was also a young store. The leadership group
was 35-45 years old. There were more workers 20-30 years old
than in other stores and fewer workers over 45. In many ways, this
store resembled the O&O stores in composition. Skilled elite males
dominated and there were few unhappy women and older workers.
Most workers were "winners," with new positions equal to or better
than before. The men were not interested in worker ownership
because many of them were already involved in entrepreneurial ac
tivities outside of the industry.
Store D
Store D resembled Store C in that the manager was strongly com
mitted to assembling a team when he called back workers. Sixty per
cent had worked for him before but, in contrast to Store C, many had
not worked together or in this particular store. The others were se
lected by reputation. His "inner circle" or grocery management
team consisted of several people for whom this was a significant and
rapid promotion. They were enthusiastic and loyal. Many workers,
even those in the front end, reported high morale.
Unlike Store C, Store D was opened late in the process and relied
on a workforce of mostly new hires (31 former A&P to 86 new). The
staff was dominated by newcomers, but newcomers did not have
more hours than former A&P workers. The meat department had
more former A&P workers and the grocery department was evenly
split reflecting the benefits of experience for both departments. Un
like Store C, there were few full-time workers except for department
heads. Several men in the 30-45 age group had achieved significant
improvement in position, however. There were also a few who lost
hours and position (mostly women), but the majority of workers had
stayed at the same level in terms of position and hours.
Workers in this store had greater economic vulnerability than
those in C, especially the women. Store D was divided into a group
of successful men and a group of vulnerable women. Thirty-three
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percent of the former A&P workers were women supporting fami
lies. Half of them had been forced to work second jobs since their
Super Fresh callback. Like Store C, there were few older workers
(10 percent). All of them had lost position or hours and talked about
the chain's age discrimination.
In this store, the idea of QWL and the manager's consistent prac
tice of it created strong feelings of optimism for the future, but, of
course, less chance for mobility due to single-store seniority. Four
workers (two men and two women) who were already full time
wanted management posts. All of them saw their possibilities limited
in the new system without transfers. They hoped that the expansion
of the chain would lead to new stores and new opportunities.
While there was less actual loss of full-time status and decrease in
part-time hours than in stores E and F, the 17 percent who com
plained about lowered income link the loss of their work hours to the
"new system" which they saw encouraging shrinking hours and
high turnover.
Both Stores C & D called back workers with an eye to picking
those with good reputations and assembling teams of former coworkers. They tended to place people in positions which were better
or at least even with their former ones. They maximized callbacks
from high-skill departments and former store leaders and minimized
callbacks of those likely to be disaffected: front-end women and
older workers. Finally, they avoided any appearance of preferential
treatment to new workers in regard to the quantity of hours or qual
ity of schedules. These processes of formation in turn led to differ
ences in the informal political and social organization of the store
and the morale of the workers which indirectly affected the imple
mentation and success of QWL.

Implementation of QWL in QWL Stores
In looking at the QWL process, there are questions about the de
gree of implementation which must be investigated. First, regarding
the formal structure: have there been QWL meetings? If so, at which
levels—store planning board and/or departmental? Second, regard-
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ing the centralization or dispersion of decisionmaking: If there have
been meetings, how widely disseminated has been the knowledge of
them? How broad has been the attendance? How much exposure has
there been to QWL meetings outside the store (regional and corpo
rate planning boards)? Third, regarding the substance of QWL:
What has been covered at QWL meetings? Have they been viewed
as serving all the intended functions or just a few?

Store C
Store C had a strong commitment to QWL on all counts. First, the
planning board participants (inner circle) were enthusiastic. Second,
everyone in the store knew what QWL was and meetings did take
place regularly. Moreover, many of the workers had worked "on this
team" before and several stated, that, with this manager, "we al
ways had QWL."
In addition to QWL, this store held formal social events outside
the store to maintain solidarity and morale, including holiday par
ties, softball games and trips.
Store C was open for two months before QWL training began. It
was one of the first three stores to be trained by the original consult
ants. Each department received separate training in a workshop. In
addition, the store planning board was also trained together as a
group.
All the workers were aware of a functioning QWL program with
monthly department meetings. Those not on the store board were
vague about the frequency of store meetings, but they knew they
occurred. They talked about QWL as promoting teamwork and co
operation, getting along better, allowing input and suggestions, plac
ing job security in their own hands, sharing knowledge and
decisions.
In spite of this positive reporting, half the workers reported not
going to meetings. One reason for this was that meetings were no
longer counted as paid worktime, and many workers chose not to
attend on their own time. Overall, 65 percent of the workers in this
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store viewed QWL positively. Of these, 25 percent thought that
QWL made a difference to their jobs, while 40 percent were positive
but vague about the contribution of QWL. The other 35 percent were
disappointed or hostile. For the most part, QWL was an unimportant
feature to those workers who described themselves as ambitious
(looking for advancement) or those few who were disgruntled about
their hours and position.

Store D
Store D was trained late through a union local which was less
supportive of the innovation. This store also has other mechanisms
to maintain solidarity, such as an active "sunshine committee" to
organize trips and parties and a projected newsletter.
The store planning board met every other week while department
heads met every Thursday for a sales meeting. Thus, there are two
store-level meetings clearly dividing QWL from operations. There
was very little confusion or vagueness among the workers who knew
about QWL. (This store had the highest uniformity of knowledge
about how QWL operated.) The planning board was also making a
strong attempt to involve regular workers in their meetings by invit
ing four different store members (not regular board members) to each
meeting. As a result, more regular clerks and cashiers had actually
been involved. On the other hand, there were no individual depart
ment meetings.
Forty-five percent of the workers, including the leadership, were
quite enthusiastic about QWL, emphasizing teamwork and commu
nication aspects. Several wanted to work harder to involve more
workers, however. Twenty percent of the regular workers were not
clear or certain about what QWL was or how it worked. Another 35
percent were knowledgeable but disappointed in it, just as in Store
C. They saw no increased control, no difference, and complained
about "all talk and no action," and the need to pay workers to at
tend. One worker was very hostile, calling QWL "a joke." This
worker had been initially very enthusiastic about workers gaining
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equality and control. The more satisfied workers were those who had
been invited to meetings.

Staffing the Non-QWL Super Fresh Stores
Store E
Like Store C, Store E was also a high volume store staffed early
when a large pool of workers was available, but this store was com
posed of fewer former co-workers who had worked with the manager
in the past (only four or 20 percent). More workers were passive
callbacks to this store. There was a less desirable ratio of former
A&P workers to new hires (36 former to 47 new) than in Store C but
a better ratio than in the later-opening Stores D & F. There were also
fewer full-time slots than in C. The front end was dominated by new
hires, but there was parity in all other departments except meat
(which, because of the .skill/union factor, was always dominated by
former A&P workers).
This less-experienced manager had not been in the position to call
back proteges, but had staffed his store predominantly with young
workers (20-30 years old) from families with ties to and clout in
the chain. His staffing seems to have been influenced by input from
workers' relatives and from corporate and union leaders. Half of the
workers came from families having parents, siblings or spouses who
brought them in and pressured for their recall. Unlike QWL Stores C
& D, few workers bettered their position in the new store. Fifty per
cent reported a loss in hours and position. For some, the new posi
tion presented significant demotion from former elite posts. Workers
viewed this as age discrimination. The new position represented a
promotion for only 25 percent of the former workers. The remaining
25 percent of the workers reported continuity and stability in posi
tion and hours. This group included those for whom the supermarket
job was a second job or provided supplementary income.
Former A&P workers did receive preference in hours. All of the
new cashiers worked 18 hours or less, while all former A&P workers
had at least 18 hours and half had more. This favored treatment was
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true for all other departments as well. Many were still extremely
disgruntled, however, by a steady pattern of loss in hours. Most have
had their hours cut since they began to work at this store, some by
half. Several have seen a pattern of cutbacks with every contractual
hourly rate rise, while others believed there was a chain goal of cut
ting all part-timers to 12 hours.
Even those who were well-connected in the chain or who knew
the manager before became disgruntled and fatalistic. The cutbacks
had the effect of leading to turnover of one-seventh of our initial
group of interviewees in Store E in one year. Although the former
A&P component of this store was composed of young workers with
few dependents, one young man in his 20s reported the cancellation
of his marriage plans. Moreover, for the eight workers over 32 with
dependents, the cutbacks have had a severe impact.
Store F
Store F was also managed by a relatively new manager. Most of
his recalls were formal (from a list) and passive (workers did not
actively seek placement). There were 33 former A&P workers and
50 new hires. Former workers were in the majority in the office, the
meat room and the grocery department. Cashiers, deli clerks and
produce clerks were predominantly newcomers. Moreover, unlike any
of the other stores, all newcomers in the front end had more hours of
work than former A&P workers, creating a serious morale problem.
This store reflected most strongly the results of a system that re
wards hiring more new workers at lower rates of pay.
Store F was also skewed in sex and age. We saw that morale prob
lems heavily involve women and older workers. Almost two-thirds of
the former A&P workers in Store F were women and almost all of
them were 55 or older. Like Store E, 50 percent of the workers in
Store F had lost significantly in the changeover. Losses included
movement from full to part time, loss of part-time hours, moves
back to night work and loss of managerial positions. For 35 percent,
there was no loss or gain, however many of these individuals had
been in one store for over 10 years and reported a sense of loss in
terms of the family-like atmosphere of the former store.
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All of the 15 percent who gained in the new store moved into
managerial positions. This store had more inexperienced department
heads than the others and lacked the core of former achievers found
in leadership positions in the other stores.
While many of those who lost in Store E were single young per
sons without dependents, here many of the "losers" depended on the
job for most of their income. Thus, many of the problems in this
store can be related to its social composition, which was in turn con
strained by the nature of the remaining pool of former A&P workers
available.
The process of composing stores E & F involved less control over
the callback process. This could be related to a lack of managerial
experience which led to less knowledge about the pool of former
workers, vulnerability to pressure from the chain, a greater depen
dence on the formal list of names, and in the case of F, a reduced
pool of laid off workers from which to choose. Stores were com
posed of workers with fewer skills and less experience. For the most
part, the former A&P workers in these stores experienced lowered
status and salaries and were disadvantaged in relation to new work
ers. These characteristics in turn affected both morale and the ability
to implement QWL successfully.
Failure of QWL Implementation in the Non-QWL Stores
Store E, like Store C, was one of the first to receive lengthy train
ing in QWL involving every worker. However, the store planning
board went through retraining again a year later under the new con
sultant team since they were regarded as not having implemented the
plan. The store then reported weekly meetings of the planning
board, but fewer regular department meetings. The front end and of
fice did meet as a department, however, to air gripes about schedul
ing and pressure on cashiers. This was the only store to deal with the
front-end problem in this way. It was unusual to see the front end
participating to this degree. Produce, meat and deli met infrequently
and the isolated night crew rarely attended their meetings.
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Since the store was beginning to reimplement QWL, members of
its planning board were the most enthusiastic workers. They talked
of increased involvement and motivation, more departmental auton
omy, etc. One, who took the corporate point of view, blamed the
failure of QWL on the workers' failure to distinguish between QWL
issues and contract issues (hours, wage rates). Others in leadership
positions could identify with the workers and noted that QWL would
never work until workers were paid to attend meetings or given more
hours and better schedules.
Of the workers, 20 percent (mostly those on the store planning
board) reported positive results from QWL ("we are equal to man
agement," atmosphere is "open," attitudes are better); 50 percent
liked the idea but felt it was not operating (no follow-through); 30
percent were disappointed (no change at all, all talk no action, petty
beefs dealt with but nothing important).
Store F was least satisfied with QWL. Here, even the department
heads recognized that QWL had broken down. There were no plan
ning board meetings in four months prior to our interviews and, as
one commented, "the team concept is going under." The leaders
saw that one reason for this was the cleavage between former work
ers with few hours and new hires with more hours. Another reason
given was the understaffing resulting from the new system of tying
bonuses to labor costs. One department head reported that there were
also conflicts between departments and, thus, the store had split into
three parts. He wondered why the chain had bothered with all the
QWL training.
Thirty-three percent of the regular workers in Store F had never
heard of QWL or the meetings. Another third knew that meetings
took place, but did not know about QWL or the purpose of meet
ings. One-third knew what QWL was, but reported it to be broken
down. Several said that QWL was for the bosses. Very few could
describe the goals of QWL specifically. The clearest statement was
that QWL meant "not putting people down."
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Summary
It is obvious that QWL has not completely achieved the goals of
the formal training in any of the stores. The most that can be said is
that members of the planning boards feel they have more "rights" or
"say" in how the store works. In one store, (F), few workers have
heard of QWL. In Store D, there has been the greatest attempt to
implement the formal process of QWL and to reach out to incorpo
rate all the workers. Difficulties with contract issues (hours, sched
ules, etc.) interfere with a totally positive view of QWL, and
workers recognize that these issues are more important to them than
the potential rewards of QWL. In Store C, we find both formal im
plementation of QWL and a long history of "informal QWL" (con
sultation, discussion, etc.) while in Store E we find less
implementation and a real interference due to hour cuts and schedul
ing difficulties. Whether QWL "works" is clearly a result of two
factors: (1) leadership's consistency in running meetings and practic
ing QWL as they were trained to do; and (2) the degree to which
workers' losses of income, position, etc. interfere with their percep
tion of QWL as meaningful. In all these aspects, Stores C & D are
similar to each other and unlike Stores E & F.

Understanding QWL in Super Fresh
The most successful aspect of QWL is not its functioning within
each store but the automony the stores have gained from centralized
chain decisionmaking. No longer do all stocking decisions, display
decisions and the like come from the top down. Store leadership has
gained latitude to stock for local neighborhood needs, to buy pro
duce from small, individual vendors, and to develop innovations in
procedures, which later may be approved as chainwide policy. No
longer do specialized product supervisors from the central office
control the business operations of each department. Stores are ex
pected to work as teams and their successful work innovations are
reported and discussed at regional and corporate planning board
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meetings. It is at these above-store levels that there has been the most
success.
Elite members of store planning boards (department heads and
shop stewards) have been able to participate and to see the change
most clearly. If they had been to a regional or corporate planning
board meeting, they felt the change even more. Even at the top,
however, there has been a persistence of old structure. Female de
partment heads were few and they were not always part of the inner
circle. For example, in one store, the front-end manager was the
only department head not asked to consider promotion when an as
sistant directorship became vacant. When she approached the direc
tor, he seemed surprised at her interest.
In addition to the participative successes at levels above the store,
QWL has involved some symbolic changes which are supposed to
reinforce the idea of equality, democracy and participation. Status
names have been changed so that workers are called "associates"
and managers are called "directors," but the new nomenclature has
not actually been adopted thoroughly in any store. Workers are still
called workers, and in one store all nondepartment heads reported
that the term "associate" refers only to members of the store plan
ning board (department heads).
The flattened hierarchy at corporate headquarters is also a mani
festation of the notion that there is less distance between the top and
bottom and that access to the top is open. Both the first and second
corporate presidents have made themselves accessible at training ses
sions and planning board meetings. They have also been visiting the
stores. Many workers commented on the fact that the president is
"down at our level," and accessible. They have been impressed by
such store visits.
One of the problems is that QWL has overlapped two other broad
domains—store operations and contractual issues. Much time and at
tention have been given to trying to separate QWL from these other
domains. "Operations" refers to business details of running a store:
keeping records of inventory, payroll costs and, most important,
sales volume and profits. In addition, stores must deal with general
promotional issues—new products, displays, advertising, etc. Con-
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tractual issues include the formal aspects of the contract: how the
bonus is calculated, how labor costs are targeted, etc. Even those
questions left up to store directors' discretion, such as how to dis
tribute hours among workers, as well as the qualitative issues of who
gets good hours, who gets weekends and evenings, are defined as
contract issues because there is an awareness that these are manage
ment rights, not subject to worker input.
In some stores, store-level meetings have been divided into two
parts. The operations part has involved providing information on
how the departments have been doing and how the store as a whole
has been doing. Innovative suggestions about policies (promotions,
customer relations) and work procedures have also been sought.
Thus, this has incorporated two aspects of QWL—information shar
ing and worker input on policy and procedures. Unfortunately, many
stores have not defined information sharing and innovation as part of
QWL and have excluded these elements from formal meetings.
The QWL part of the meeting largely has involved reducing social
conflict and increasing team solidarity. At the very least, QWL has
been seen as an opportunity to gripe and be listened to. At best,
these sessions have been seen as problemsolving sessions, attempt
ing to deal with such issues as how to train the steady influx of
newcomers, how to control absenteeism and turnover, how to de
crease the suspensions and grievances related to cash shortages on
the front end, etc. Thus, QWL has been focused on increasing morale
and team spirit as opposed to increasing worker input to the labor
process and control over conditions of work.
What has interferred with morale most are the issues of work as
signment, hours and schedules. Since these are management rights,
they have been defined as inappropriate for QWL discussions. There
is increasing awareness that QWL has been impeded by the inability
to deal with the issues which are most important to the workers.

Conclusions
Certain chainwide patterns affected the relationships between
workers' characteristics (age, gender) and the workers' experience.
Departments varied in their power, opportunity for acquiring knowl-
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edge and opportunities for teamwork. The power, knowledge, skills,
expectations, success, and career patterns of workers were the result
of both their gender and their hiring dates (in the company cycle of
rise and decline). Their personal household economic vulnerability
was closely related to age (stage in family cycle). The A&P chain
had developed patterns of recruiting through families, paternalistic
protection of women and the sponsorship of mobility for males iden
tified as worthy, all patterns which are difficult to change. More
over, assumptions made by A&P that women were less interested in
careers and were mostly supplementing income are contradicted by
the large number of self-supporting single women, single parents
and women with husbands who were laid off, disabled and unem
ployed.
When A&P shut down and the stores reopened as Super Fresh or
as O&O, the traditional patterns of employment and careers did not
go back to what they had been. Many jobs were saved, but many
workers had hard adjustments to make in the new settings. Not only
did the workers take wage and benefit cuts, they also lost many of
the sources of security and mobility they had had. First, while we
did not focus on them in this study, a number of former A&P work
ers did not find jobs in the new setting and went elsewhere. Second,
only a small, select group were able and willing to risk becoming
worker/owners. Third, while some full-time elites retained status in
Super Fresh, many more former A&P workers had their hours re
duced, as the chain adopted more flexible schedulings and staffing.
Rapidly, four of the major career patterns we identified became al
most extinct, while a previously uncommon pattern—the part-time
supplement to a different full-time job—became preferred by man
agers. A strong internal labor market was broken up in favor of a
more external, unstable labor market.
The old patterns left a legacy that influences the innovations in
the O&O and Super Fresh stores. In both the O&O and the Super
Fresh stores, the traditional social organization of the store (the sta
tus, power and potential for knowledge of different departments and
positions) still underlies social process in the new stores and inter
feres with the implementation of change. Moreover, traditional views
of age and gender still create stereotypes.
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The process of recruiting differed for all stores, influencing the
number of people with pre-existing ties and experience working to
gether. This is true not only among the four Super Fresh stores, but
also between the two worker-owned stores. The proportion of expe
rienced, knowledgeable core workers (former department heads, as
sistant managers, and the like from the grocery or meat department)
to less knowledgeable, less integrated workers (front end, night
crew, produce) also varied from store to store. Finally, stores dif
fered according to their manager's style and the unique events and
crises they experienced.
It is important to note that both O&O stores are formed around a
core of self-selected, experienced, and knowledgeable supermarket
workers and had very small numbers of former part-timers or frontend women. It is questionable whether the stores could have suc
ceeded without the experience of former meat and grocery managers.
This is of great interest to the future of worker ownership in this
industry.
In both types of stores, the innovators' goals of involving workers
in decisionmaking of extending equality of influence and of changing
workers' views of their rights and roles has not been fully realized.
In the Super Fresh stores, this can be directly traced to dissatisfac
tion with hours as well as positions, and to perceived possibilities of
advancement. Although formal mobility was limited in the O&O
stores too, there was greater flexibility in the design of jobs. In the
worker-owned stores in contrast to Super Fresh, hours were not a
problem, but department status remained an obstacle to some extent.
For all stores, the relative status and social centrality of one's depart
ment played a big role in predicting involvement and knowledge.
However, in contrast to the Super Fresh stores, there was no problem
of perpetual part-time status or hour cutbacks among owners in the
worker-owned stores, since any owner who wished full-time work
could have it. Moreover, those outside the leadership circle learned
much more about storewide operations and diverse departments and
functions than their counterparts in Super Fresh.
One major consequence of worker ownership has been the devel
opment of a storewide perspective and the dissemination of cross-
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training, skills and knowledge across department lines. This level of
understanding of "the business' in Super Fresh existed only among
the store leaders, who are the rare full-time department heads or
shop stewards who serve on the store planning boards.
The two innovations are extremely different in their organizational
functioning and labor strategy, and this difference affects participativeness. In Super Fresh, the primary problems in implementing
QWL stem from the elimination of decisions about labor strategy
and deployment of resources from the QWL process. In the workerowned stores, these decisions are made by the worker/owners. The
differences between the QWL and non-QWL stores are clearly the
result of differences in previous social ties, leadership styles, worker
characteristics and whether workers were winners or losers in the
new store. These differences affect the degree to which worker par
ticipation is successful. Success can be viewed in terms of whether
meetings are held at all, the degree to which workers know about
and attend them, and whether they are limited to store elites. Other
issues include whether meetings are limited to airing complaints and
resolving disputes or whether they provide workers with information
about store operations and encourage innovations from below.
In the months following our interviews, we continued to maintain
communication with the stores. While the four Super Fresh stores
continued to be very different from each other, the two O&O stores
seemed to be becoming more alike. In spite of their differences in
size, process of formation, patterns of board and store meetings,
leadership styles, experiences with hired managers and other crises
and events, they have developed similarities in functioning. Both
have been led by former meat managers and have centralized power
in their boards of directors.
Compared to the Super Fresh stores, the dispersion of knowledge
and the frequency of participation is much greater in both O&O
stores, and the range of issues continues to be broad. Even the nonowners (mostly part-timers) in the O&O stores who have previously
worked in chains report that these are improved workplaces. They
see a flattened hierarchy, a less sharply defined division of labor, and
feel that they are trusted and given more responsibility. 3
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We must remember that the O&O owners were not drawn by the
ideology of worker ownership. They were would-be entrepreneurs,
people who needed full-time jobs, and those strongly disaffected by
A&R In cooperating to make the stores work, they have established
the necessary mechanisms for collective decisionmaking.
As a result of their experiences, they are now poised between be
ing a group which is clearly committed to the ideology of worker
ownership and democratic workplaces and a group of dominant store
elites who are partners in small business. The important factors in
their transition are not limited to previous experience with formal
decisionmaking. The ability to cross-train those in low status posi
tions, to impart a store-wide perspective on operations, and to make
the division of labor more flexible and the hierarchy flatter has prob
ably played a major role. The diversification of day-to-day work has,
in turn, had a major impact on participation. This process has been
absent in the Super Fresh stores, where daily work, access to knowl
edge, and autonomy have improved for the elite but deteriorated for
the rest of the former A&P workforce.

NOTES
1. In the Super Fresh stores, these are called assistant director and director while workers are
referred to as associates. The new nomenclature is intended to reduce the perception of hier
archy.
2. Recently A&P lost an EEOC suit regarding discrimination of women and is obligated to
pay significant compensation. We note that in all new Super Fresh stores (56 as of 1986) there
is only one woman store director.
3. Preliminary reports from interviews with non-owners conducted by Simon and Granrose
(unpublished document).

_________ 6 _________
Outcomes for Workers in
Worker-Owned, QWL, and Non-QWL
Supermarkets

In the previous chapter, the social processes involved in changing
from A&P to new types of organizations were discussed. This chap
ter will answer questions such as: "How did the workers themselves
make out in the job-saving efforts at the O&O and Super Fresh
stores?" "What happened to the former A&P workers who became
worker/owners through a buyout and those who became Super Fresh
employees?" "How were they doing financially?" "What degree of
sacrifice was imposed on them by the shutdown and subsequent
events?" "Did their job security and working conditions improve?"
"Was power redistributed to them in meaningful ways through
worker ownership and the effective implementation of QWL?"
"Which was better for workers: getting some influence in decisionmaking through QWL or accepting the responsibility of ownership?"
"What happened to their satisfaction with their jobs, lives, and eco
nomic status?" While these are not easy questions to answer, they
are among the most important questions of all for present and future
worker/owners.
To identify what happened to the workers, we surveyed former
A&P workers at the six stores described in chapter 5: the two
worker-owned stores (O&Os), the two Super Fresh stores that effec
tively implemented QWL, and the two Super Fresh stores that had
not fully implemented QWL. The distinction between QWL and
non-QWL stores was based on shop stewards' responses, as well as
the in-person interviews discussed in chapter 5.
This survey information differs in method of data collection from
that of chapter 5, which used open-ended interviews to examine the
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actual social processes in each store. The worker outcomes in this
chapter are drawn from outcome measures derived from a precoded
instrument. The information elicited independently by each method
strongly corroborates the other.
To clarify the dynamics which can answer the questions posed for
this chapter, we use the framework developed in chapter 2. First, we
describe mean differences in characteristics, attitudes, perceptions,
and results between workers in the three work settings. Then we use
statistical modeling to identify the relative importance of factors that
played a role in bringing about workers' outcomes.

The Worker Model
Figure 6.1 illustrates the parts of the larger model examined in
this chapter. The primary difference between this model and the one
presented in chapter 2 is that we omitted some factors—the role of
unions, the business environment, and store characteristics—because
theoretically these factors have their primary impact on store out
comes, not on individuals. Since the performance of the organization
should directly influence worker outcomes, however, we included
store economic outcomes.
We hypothesized that store participativeness would be a function
of the skills, characteristics, and resources of its workers, of the for
mal structure of the store (QWL or worker ownership) and of con
sultant advice and help. We also proposed that participativeness
would influence store functioning, including the labor strategy the
store adopts, the extent to which it trains workers, the informal ways
that workers interact, and worker motivation and effort. Finally, we
expected that store functioning, store economic success, and worker
characteristics would determine workers' financial outcomes. In ad
dition, we expected these factors plus participativeness to influence
workers' satisfaction with their jobs and lives.
The next sections describe the sample, how we measured and operationalized these theoretical constructs, and the similarities and
mean differences among the three groups. Tests of statistically sig-

Figure 6.1. Research Model
Inputs

Organizational Processes

Outcomes

Worker characteristics
demographics
ed./experience
extent of layoff

Participativeness
range of issues:
long/short term
overall participation

Worker outcomes
income/hours
bonus/profit share
satisfaction

Store type
worker-owned
QWL
non-QWL

Store functions
use of part-timers
effort/effectiveness
training
absenteeism/turnover

Store outcomes
productivity
profit
labor costs
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nificant differences involved analyses of variance (ANOVA) and
least significant difference (LSD) multiple range tests for comparing
mean scores of groups of unequal size, p=.05. These mean differ
ences may be due to many factors, not just store type, however, so
caution should be used in interpreting the results. A clear explana
tion of causal relationships will appear in the subsequent section on
model testing.

The Sample
As indicated in chapter 3, two years after the A&P shutdown, we
asked former A&P workers in six stores—two O&Os, two QWL Su
per Fresh, and two non-QWL Super Fresh—to fill out questionnaires
about their experience, training, perceptions, attitudes, satisfaction,
household situations, and economic outcomes. Workers sampled
were those interviewed for chapter 5. Table 6.1 shows the distribu
tion of responses.
Table 6.1
______Questionnaire Survey Responses by Store Type______
Store
type______________N sampled_______N responded
O&O—————————————————25——————————————
QWL Super Fresh
Non-QWL Super Fresh
TOTALS

48
49

46
43

122

111

Because our focus was on job-saving strategies in response to the
Philadelphia A&P shutdown, our sample was representative of
former A&P workers now employed in O&O and Super Fresh stores.
The sample does not represent all workers in these stores. In partic
ular, it does not include the following: (1) part-time workers at the
worker-owned stores who were not owners, though very few of these
were former A&P workers; (2) those Super Fresh workers who had
never worked for A&P—about half of the workers in these stores—
working mostly part time. Because part-time workers played a big
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part in Super Fresh and responded in different ways, we report the
results of full-time and part-time workers, separately.

Mean Differences Among the Groups
Worker Characteristics
We expected that the simultaneous establishment of the O&O and
Super Fresh stores in the wake of the A&P shutdown would result in
little variation in worker characteristics, because all of the workers
in our sample were long-term A&P employees. Even so, selfselection was operating in O&O stores and selective recruitment oc
curred in Super Fresh. As we have already seen in chapter 5, there is
reason to believe that the worker/owners were a special group, and
that recruitment differed between QWL stores and non-QWL stores.
To explore variations in motivations, resources, and expectations
that might occur because of these selection processes, we looked at
demographic characteristics, job experience, and personal values.
Demographic Characteristics and Job Experience
O&O and Super Fresh workers were fairly similar in cultural
background, family situation, and job experience (see table 6.2).
They were primarily high school-educated, married, white, middleaged and mid-career, with many years of supermarket experience be
hind them. In Super Fresh stores, however, part-time workers said
they knew how to do fewer jobs and generally had fewer years of
experience than full-timers.
One apparent difference was that fewer women were worker/own
ers. Previous research indicates that while women whose pay pro
vided a substantial part of family income were very interested in
becoming worker/owners, they sometimes did not have the financial
resources to do so. Women contributing less than one-third of house
hold support were less likely to choose worker ownership in the
A&P shutdown and were more likely to be part-time workers (Granrose and Hochner 1985). But, among full-time workers, O&Os had
a higher proportion of women than did Super Fresh stores. Many
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Table 6.2
Mean Differences in Worker Characteristics
Store type
Worker characteristics
QWL
O&O
(N=24)
Full time
(N=20)
(N = 22)
Part time
(N=2)
41.84
Age
41.52
27.3b'c
% Female
47.8a
FT
20.8
30.0
PT
77.3
00.0
64.4
%Married
77.3
57. lc
%Catholic
45.5C
91.1a'c
%White
100.0b
1.98
2.48
# of dependents
FT
2.37d
2.35d
1.50a'd
5.00b'c'd
PT
Years of education
12.98
12.86
12.96d
FT
12.55d
11.95a'd
16.00b'c'd
PT
Yrs. seniority in markets
17.30
18.59
20.92d
FT
18.75
13.36d
17.00
PT
7.24C
# Jobs know how to do
8.73C
FT
9.29d
8.55
10.50C
PT
5.00d
Months of layoff
3.89
5.68
2.44
5.83d
FT
3.00b'°'d
PT
5.75a
Values 1
4.65
4.82
Accomplishment
4.39
4.59
Growth
4.45
Co-worker relations
4.67
4.50
4.04C
Pay and fringe benefits
4.14
Worker ownership or QWL
3.89
4.74
4.82
Job security
4.15
4.50
Independence
3.87
3.14
Promotions
4.00b>c
Relations with boss
4.76a
1.5 = Extremely Important, 1 = Moderately Important.
a. Sig. dif. from O&O;
b. Sig. dif. from QWL;
c. Sig. dif. from non-QWL;
d. Sig. dif. between PT/FT in same store type;
p=.05.

Non-QWL
(N=14)
(N = 29)
43.36
60.5a
21.4
79.3
76.2
71.4a'b
100.0b
1.76
2.46d
1.43a'd
12.28
12.28
11.96a
18.67
24.07d
16.07d
5.39a'b
9.28d
3.52a'd
5.90
2.54d
7.46a'd
4.63
4.52
4.61
4.56a
3.62
4.78
4.22
3.57
4.51a
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Super Fresh employees were part-time cashiers, a heavily femaledominated job. As discussed in chapter 5, this gender-based internal
labor market kept women in dead-end jobs and resulted in a larger
overall proportion of females in Super Fresh stores.
The most striking difference among the three types of stores was
that 90 percent of the O&O worker/owners had full-time jobs com
pared to half of the QWL workers and less than a third of the nonQWL workers. This is not surprising, since the desire for full-time
work was one of the primary reasons for choosing O&O reported in
the interviews.

Personal Values
Values may be important in determining worker results because of
their role in forming expectations. Several significant differences
emerged among the groups in their evaluation of their relationship to
the bosses and of their economic rewards.
Worker/owners placed lower importance on good relations with
their bosses than did Super Fresh workers. As predicted by many
theorists (e.g., Webb and Webb 1920), worker/owners were some
times unclear about how to resolve the relationship duality of being
owners who hire the store manager and workers subordinate to the
manager. The new roles in a hierarchy subject to democratic decisionmaking may have reduced the usual emphasis on getting along
with the supervisor. Eliminating the need for protection from bump
ing and for sponsorship by supervisors, which used to occur in A&P,
also has changed this relationship.
Workers in non-QWL stores were more likely to value economic
rewards than worker/owners. Participativeness, or the lack of it, may
affect workers' evaluation of tradeoffs between job satisfaction and
economic outcomes. Or part-time workers with low incomes could
now be placing a particularly high value on economic rewards. All
workers in both stores took a $2/hour cut in wages compared to their
former A&P jobs, so some concern about financial welfare was ex
pected for all workers. Because many part-time workers formerly
worked full time, this double loss created financial difficulties for
many of these workers.
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Store Participativeness

In accordance with our multidimensional definition of participativeness, we looked at a number of measures of this construct:
(1) the perceived degree of overall worker control in the store;
(2) the perceived distribution of influence within the store hierarchy;
(3) the perceived involvement of workers in decisionmaking on a
range of issues; and (4) the perceived extent of participation, that is,
how many workers frequently participate.
Perceived Degree of Overall Worker Control
We asked two general questions, "How much are workers' opin
ions taken into account in the store?" "How much say or influence
do workers have on what goes on in the store?" Worker/owners' av
erage responses were equal to the average responses of QWL Super
Fresh workers. However, part-time Super Fresh workers, particularly
in non-QWL stores, perceived less overall worker control compared
to full-timers. (See table 6.3)
Perceived Hierarchical Influence Distribution
We asked workers a set of questions derived from those Tannenbaum (1968) made popular: "How much say or influence 'did' and
'should' each level of the store hierarchy have in what goes on in the
store?" (See figure 6.2.) There was no difference between QWL and
O&O workers' perceptions of the actual influence hierarchy, but
non-QWL workers, especially part-timers again, reported less influ
ence for every level except for managers.
With respect to the desired distribution of influence, it appeared
that QWL was especially effective in raising workers' desires for
control of work at all levels of the supermarket hierarchy. These as
pirations may have colored their perceptions of what was actually
happening in these stores and how satisfied it made them feel.
Perceived Worker Involvement in a Variety of Issues
We asked workers about the degree of worker involvement in nine
decision areas. Three were decisions regularly made on a daily basis:
task assignments, work schedule, and working conditions. Four were
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Table 6.3
Mean Differences in Participativeness
Store type
Participativeness
O&O
QWL
Non-QWL
(N = 20)
(N = 24)
Full time
(N=14)
(N = 2)
Part time
(N = 22)
(N = 29)
7.14
7.44C
Degree of worker control1
6.37b
7.05
FT
7.96d
7.23d
6.86c'd
5.96b'd
8.00
PT
Range of issues
14.09b'c
10.73a'c
8.07a'b
In daily decisions2
14.10
13.30d
FT
13.00d
14.00b'c
8.04a'c>d
5.69a'b'd
PT
In intermediate decisions
3.77b'c
2.04a
Hiring workers
1.84a
FT
3.85
3.50d
3.00d
PT
4.00
2.04d
2.11d
3.91b'c
2.02a
1.58a
Selecting department heads
4.45b>c
3.36a'd
3.42a
FT
5.00
2.86
PT
2.25d
3.86b-c
2.59a'c
1.67a'b
Beginning training
4.17c'd
3.14a'b
4.25C
FT
4.00
PT
3.14d
2.78
3.59C
2.85
Changing vendors
2.09a
FT
3.50
3.54d
3.71d
PT
4.50
2.09d
827b,c
2.91a
2.67a
In long-term decisions3
8.40b>c
3.64a'd
3.21a
FT
7.00b>c
2.21a'd
2.59C
PT
Extent of participation
5.00a-b
55.00C
35.00C
% who often participate
a. Sig. different from O&O;
b. Sig. different from QWL;
c. Sig. different from non-QWL;
d. Sig. difference between FT/PT workers in same store type:
p=.05.
Multi item scales were:
1. Sum of 2 items, How much worker's opinions are taken into account
when decisions are made in the store, 1 = none, 5 = a great deal; How
much say workers have in what goes on in the store, 1 = very little say,
5 = very much say.
2. Sum of 3 six point items for influence in tasks, choice of hours, and
working conditions, 1 = 1 am not involved, 6 = 1 can decide on my own.
3. Sum of 2 six point items (as in 2 above) for influence in capital invest
ments and shutting the store.
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Figure 6.2
Amount of Influence
Non QWL
QWL

o&o
...A""•-A

"*

Store Mgrs.

Depart Heads

Hierarchial Level

Perceived Influence Gradients
for Non-QWL, QWL amd O&O Stores
Manager Survey

Amount of Influence
6

Non QWL
QWL
——-*——O&O
-——&,_.^

Store Mgrs.

Depart. Heads

Hierarchial Level

Ideal Influence Gradients
for Non-QWL,QWL and O&O Stores
Manager Survey

Outcomes for Workers

171

Figure 6.2 (continued)
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Figure 6.2 (continued)
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decisions with an intermediate time focus: hiring and firing workers,
selecting department heads, initiating training programs, and chang
ing vendors. Two were strategic or long-term decisions: making cap
ital investments and shutting down the store.
One of the biggest differences one would expect, based on formal
store type, was the range of issues in which workers could be in
volved. As anticipated, worker/owners experienced the most involve
ment and non-QWL workers, especially part-timers, experienced the
least involvement in every kind of decision. Super Fresh part-time
workers felt disenfranchised from all decisions, whether they worked
in a QWL store or not. In fact, the longer the time period covered by
the implications of the decision, the more involvement O&O worker
owners reported, compared to others.
In issues surrounding daily work, among full-timers, Super Fresh
workers' perceptions equaled the worker/owners'. In long-term deci
sions, however, worker/owners reported and desired considerably
more influence. This occurred because long-term decisions, particu
larly important for workers who had experienced a series of retail
shutdowns in their city, were outside the jurisdiction of labormanagement committees in the Super Fresh QWL program.
Percent Participating Often

According to the shop stewards, the O&Os had the largest per
centage of workers who often participated in decisionmaking in their
stores, QWL stores had slightly fewer, with a third participating of
ten, and non-QWL stores trailed far behind, with about 5 percent
participating often. The assessment agrees with the picture of partic
ipation developed in chapter 5.
In summary, while many people participated in the worker-owned
stores, full-time Super Fresh and full-time O&O workers perceived
equal levels of worker control over daily store life. The major differ
ence was that worker/owners also controlled long-term decisionmak
ing.

Store Functioning
Our theoretical framework implies that participativeness should
affect how stores function and, in turn, influence worker outcomes.
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We examined several aspects of store operational practices, includ
ing the labor strategy adopted (full time vs. part time), the number
of innovations in work methods, how many new skills workers
learned formally or informally, and perceived worker motivation and
effectiveness, as well as perceived results of the new forms of decisionmaking. We took the assessments of labor strategy and innova
tions from the store manager survey; all other measures came from
the worker survey.
Labor Strategy, Training, and Motivation
We expected that worker-owned and worker-controlled stores
would deploy human resources in ways more favorable to workers
and would make more effective use of those resources. This point
will be further elaborated in chapter 7. The O&O stores adopted the
labor strategy of providing full-time jobs for owners who desire them
and for some nonowners as well. This strategy, in contrast to the
Super Fresh part-time strategy, was accompanied by low turnover
and absenteeism rates (see table 6.4).
For our measure of training, we combined workers' responses
about how many training programs they had attended, and how many
new jobs and new skills they had learned in the new setting. Not
only did the O&O worker/owners make greater use of consultants for
training workers in business practices, but they learned more jobs
and skills than Super Fresh workers. This confirms the interview
data about cross-training and job flexibility discussed in chapter 5.
Specifically, they reported having learned significantly more inter
personal and group skills, more willingness to speak up at meetings,
greater confidence, more knowledge about teamwork, and a greater
ability to listen to others' opinions. They also reported feeling signif
icantly more responsible for their work. Ironically, despite greater
opportunities for full-time jobs and for learning new skills, worker/
owners did not feel more motivated, effective, or innovative.
QWL Super Fresh workers reported greater gains than O&O
worker/owners in confidence and in learning about supervising and
influencing others. One interpretation of this may be that while
QWL store planning board members, who had limited responsibility
and authority over store survival, had time to think about and discuss
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Table 6.4
Mean Differences in Store Functioning
Store type
Store Functioning
QWL
O&O
Labor strategies
20.00b'c
23.00a>c
Av. hrs./week part time
6.50a'c
Absenteeism (Weekly)
2.00b
176.50a'c
Turnover (Annual)
8.00b
Operations
Innovations1
10.50C
10.00C
9.50b>c
Training2
6.07a
968b,c,d
FT
6.09a
6.00b>c'd
PT
6.05a
Individual effort & effectiveness3
6.43
7.27
FT
7.39d
7.50
PT
5.38d
5.00
of
consequences
Perceived
decisionmaking
6.49
7.24
New effort & effectiveness4
FT
7.36d
7.47
PT
5.40d
5.00
Improved interactions5
17.36C
16.73
21.26a'c'd
FT
17.20b
12.39d
12.00
PT
Slower decisionmaking6
3.36
2.76
3.40
FT
3.09
2.33
3.00
PT
a. Sig. dif. from O&O;
b. Sig. dif. from QWL;
c. Sig. dif. from non-QWL;
d. Sig. dif. between FT/PT in same store type;
p=.05.
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Non-QWL
16.50a'b
2.50b
25.50b
11.50a'b
4.12a
5.00a
3.68a
6.02
8.08d
5.10d
6.12
7.86d
5.24d
13.88b
15.33b
13.09
2.97
3.17
2.86

1. Sum of 3 items; innovations in jobs, procedures and equipment.
2. Sum of 3 items; How much job-related training received since began
working there, 1 = none, 5 = a great deal; plus count of # new jobs and
# new skills learned since shutdown.
3. Sum of 2 items; How often it is true that working hard leads to high
productivity and doing the job well, 1= never, 5 = almost always.
4. Sum of 2 items; Extent opportunity to contribute to decisionmaking in
fluences extra effort and effectiveness on the job, l=none at all, 5 = a
great deal.
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5. Sum of 5 items; Consequences which occurred because of system of
DM: greater acceptance and quality of decisions, higher trust of man
ager, more open disagreement, disagreement more easily resolved;
1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes.
6. Takes longer to make decisions because of system of decisionmaking.
1 = definitely not, 5 = definitely yes.

store process, the daily pressures at the O&O stores led to a situation
where events required decisions so rapidly, the same level of consid
eration could not be given.
Perceived Influence of Participation on Store Functions
We asked workers whether worker ownership or QWL
(1) improved aspects of informal interactions in their stores, such as
the acceptance or quality of decisionmaking, trust between manager
and workers, open communication of differences, and conflict reso
lution; (2) slowed down decisionmaking; and (3) improved overall
motivation and effectiveness. Surprisingly, there were almost no dif
ferences among worker/owners, QWL, and, non-QWL workers in
these perceptions. However, full-time QWL Super Fresh workers re
ported more improvement in interactions than any other group of
full- or part-timers. And compared to full-timers in their stores, parttime Super Fresh workers perceived the least improvement in moti
vation and effectiveness as a result of the new decisionmaking
systems.
In summary, O&O worker/owners got more training, while QWL
Super Fresh workers got less training, and had higher turnover and
absenteeism. Full-time Super Fresh workers believed interpersonal
interactions had improved as a consequence of QWL, but most other
worker perceptions of store functioning did not differ among the
store types.

Store Outcomes
Both theoretically and practically, one would expect that workers'
welfare would be influenced by the success or failure of the stores in
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which they worked (see table 6.5). The Super Fresh stores in which
we interviewed and surveyed former A&P workers were slightly
larger and had been more profitable in 1981 than the O&O stores.
Even so, 1983 O&O labor costs were lower and profits higher than
these Super Fresh stores.
Table 6.5
Mean Differences in Store Characteristics and Store Outcomes
Store type
QWL
O&O
Non-QWL
(N=2)
(N=2)
(N = 2)
Store characteristics
28000a'c
18500b>c
5000a'b
# Square feet
115a>c
42b,c
117a,b
# Employees
44.6b'c
16.9a
14. la
% Full-time workers
7.50b'c
1.00a
2.50a
Union and consultants1
Store economic outcomes
.09a
.08a
.05b'c
Profit 19812
.08a
.08a
.10b)C
Profit 1983
.14
.14
.16
Unit labor costs 198 12
.lla
.lla
.09b'c
Unit labor costs 1983
a. Sig. dif. from O&O;
b. Sig. dif. from QWL;
c. Sig. dif. from non QWL;
p=.05.
1. Sum of number of times 6 possible kinds of help were received from 7
possible sources.
2. Per $ of sales.

These store outcomes will be more completely considered in the fol
lowing chapter.

Worker Outcomes
What were the effects of the job-saving efforts through worker
ownership and participation in decisions? We focused on four areas
of impact on individuals: (1) financial benefits from job income and
bonuses; (2) perceived economic well-being, including comparisons
with their pre-shutdown situations; (3) job satisfaction; and (4) life
satisfaction.
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Financial Outcomes
Although the worker-owned stores reported greater profitability,
success or failure of an individual store does not insure the same
result for workers. Because union contracts fix wage rates for each
position, differences in job income correspond either to differences
in position or to differences in number of hours worked.
As can be seen in table 6.6, O&O worker/owners clearly came out
ahead of non-QWL Super Fresh workers in average job income, pri
marily because all but two worker/owners were full-time, compared
to less than a third of the non-QWL workers. But compared to fulltime Super Fresh workers, full-time worker/owners received slightly
lower job incomes, even though they worked more hours. Why this
discrepancy? First, the worker/owners contributed "sweat equity"—
several unpaid hours of work per week. Second, at the O&Os, there
were more full-time women working in lower paid positions and
there were fewer highly paid meatcutters. While meatcutter wages
were the highest of any position in the O&O stores, Super Fresh
meatcutter wages were higher still. Third, our sample may not ade
quately represent the true average job income of O&O worker/own
ers because fewer of them responded to questions about their
income.
Though wages might be the total job income in conventional su
permarket jobs, the innovations at O&O and Super Fresh added a
bonus form of gainsharing to the pay package. With respect to bo
nuses, however, comparing O&O worker/owners and Super Fresh
workers was difficult because different distribution rules existed and
because worker/owners were more reluctant to report incomes and
bonuses.
At Super Fresh, bonuses represented a portion of store revenues,
but they were tied to store labor costs. As labor costs went down,
bonuses went up; the exact formula was determined by the union
contract. Full-time workers in QWL stores obtained higher bonuses
than their counterparts in non-QWL stores, and of course part-timers
got smaller bonuses than full-time workers in both types of stores.
Not only was the O&O bonus formula different, tied to profits
rather than costs, but according to their loan agreements, O&O
worker/owners were not supposed to vote themselves a dividend until

Table 6.6
Mean Differences in Outcomes for Workers
Store type
QWL
Non-QWL
Worker outcomes
O&O
Full time
(N = 20)
(N = 24)
(N=14)
Part time
(N = 2)
(N = 22)
(N = 29)
Financial
14,413C
Job income
$19,183a
17,039
$19,513b'c'd 22,687a'd
24,560a'd
FT
$13,572b'c'd 9,822a'd
9,514a'd
PT
44.86b>c
Hours/Week
30.78a
26.81a
46.65b'c'd
40.46a'd
42.28a'd
FT
27.00c>d
20.23a'd
19.34a'd
PT
$309.37b'c
2,010.05a'c
l,144.90a>b
Bonus
$309.37b'c 2,599. 14a'd l,514.61 a'd
FT
PT
1,247. 7 ld
966.89d
Economic well-being
Satisfaction with pay1
3.32
3.13
3.19
3.40
Satisfaction with economic1
3.59
3.62
situation
Postshutdown changes in budget2
17.74
14.95a
18.95C
FT
18.84
20.13d
16.14
21.00b'c
14.84a'd
PT
14.28a
Satisfaction
Job satisfaction, overall1
4.27
4.22
3.95
3.28b'c
with supervision
4.32a
3.95a
3.14b'c
with co-workers
4.17a
3.90a
with job security
3.91C
3.26
3.00a
2.68a'b
3.73C
with system of decisionmaking
3.39C
2.91
with promotions
3.49C
2.72b
3.50
3.58
with growth
3.25
3.82
with accomplishment
4.19
3.83
3.45
3.75
with independence
3.52
4.04
4.44
4.40
Life satisfaction, overall1
3.04b'c
4.27a
4.47a
with leisure
4.14C
4.53
4.80a
with family
4.04b'c
4.53a
4.50a
with health
with career
4.09
3.81
3.93
4.36
with self
4.44
4.48
1. l = Very dissatisfied, 5 = very satisfied.
2. Sum of 7 items, how savings compare with preshutdown. l=much
worse, 5 = much better; how much owed compared to preshutdown,
a. Sig. dif. from O&O;
b. Sig. dif. from QWL;
c. Sig. dif. from non-QWL;
d. Sig. dif. between PT/FT in same store type; p = .05.
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l=much more, 5 = much less; how food, clothing, transportation, lei
sure, and housing budget were affected, l = less in budget, 5 = more in
budget.

after their start-up debt was retired. However, both O&Os apparently
voted year-end bonuses anyway, since a few workers from each store
reported receiving one. The reported bonuses were within the range
of Super Fresh bonuses, but many workers simply reported a zero or
left this question blank. The figures for mean bonuses among
worker/owners thus do not accurately reflect the actual bonuses re
ceived, since some workers reporting "0" or a blank probably re
ceived a bonus but were aware of the legal prohibitions so did not
answer the question accurately.
The O&O worker/owners did have another economic benefit, not
captured by these data, in the growth of equity accumulating through
the $5,000 share each contributed to become an owner. A percent of
profits was distributed to each shareholder's account, based on the
number of hours worked, but the owner was not free to withdraw
this money until he or she left the store or until the debt was retired.
With the information we had available, we could not calculate the
dollar value of this equity growth. Nevertheless, in future studies of
other organizations, the equity growth value ought not be ignored
when considering the comprehensive financial benefits to worker/
owners.
Perceived Economic Welfare
Although we were unable to capture the dollar total of pay, bonus,
and equity for worker/owners, we could compare perceptions of eco
nomic well-being. First, we asked workers how satisfied they were
with their pay and fringe benefits, and with their overall economic
situation. On both measures, all three groups of workers were
equally satisfied. This satisfaction was associated with higher per
sonal cost, however, since many Super Fresh workers were managing
to maintain their standard of living only by holding down second
jobs or by relying on other family members' incomes. Household
incomes ranged from $2,000 to $90,000, but the average annual
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household incomes did not differ between full-time and part-time
workers.
Second, we used a series of questions asking workers to compare
their current situation to their situation before the A&P shutdown.
When we asked workers whether they had more or less savings,
debt, or money in their budget for food, clothing, transportation,
leisure, or housing since the shutdown, O&O workers believed they
were significantly better off compared to before the shutdown than
did the non-QWL workers. Part-time Super Fresh workers reported
the greatest loss. Worker/owners also reported a greater ability to
engage in discretionary purchases, such as buying a car, paying for a
wedding, going on vacation, retiring, and paying for leisure activi
ties. Though Super Fresh workers generally felt able to get by over
all, they recognized that they pinched more pennies now than before
the shutdown.
Job Satisfaction
We asked workers to rate how satisfied they were with their jobs
overall and with each of eight aspects of their jobs, in addition to
their pay satisfaction mentioned above. Overall job satisfaction and a
sum of the nine separate satisfaction questions (overall job satisfac
tion plus the other eight aspects) showed no significant differences.
Considering each nonfinancial aspect of satisfaction separately,
however, differences did emerge. Worker/owners were much more
satisfied with their job security and worker ownership system than
non-QWL Super Fresh workers were with their job security and with
QWL. On no aspect, however, were worker/owners more satisfied
than QWL workers. In fact, worker/owners were much less satisfied
with supervision and co-workers than Super Fresh workers. Com
ments made during the interviews suggested that the dissatisfaction
with supervision arose from unclear expectations of the boss's power
and identity resulting from role conflict between the manager, board
members, and members at large and from perceiving supervision as
too lax. Some worker/owners reported wanting a clearer chain of
command. Dissatisfaction with co-workers came from unresolved
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differences of opinion over store decisions and also from some work
ers feeling excluded from decisionmaking cliques in the stores.
Full-time QWL workers were more satisfied than other workers
with promotions and job opportunities. This is curious because these
workers actually lost their long-held, interstore transfer right, which
was the primary route for promotion to the top in the old A&P.
However, particular store managers singled out many of the older,
male elite workers and called them back to work at Super Fresh,
frequently as department heads. In our interviews, Super Fresh
workers expressed the hope that the retail chain would succeed, and
that new stores would be opened to which they would be transferred
because they were known as good workers. In Spring 1986, Super
Fresh did announce openings of several new Philadelphia-area stores.
Perhaps a few workers will achieve their dream, but some later dis
illusionment among workers not chosen for new stores would not be
surprising.
Part-time QWL workers were not as satisfied with their promotion
opportunities as other workers. They were also less satisfied with
their pay, with QWL, and with their job security. In sum, they had a
fairly realistic assessment of their situation. Why then did they re
port a high level of overall satisfaction? It may be due to the high
proportion of part-time workers who were females and to the famil
iar finding that women report higher job satisfaction than men, even
under poorer working conditions. Also, as the interviews show,
some of these women were satisfied to simply provide supplemen
tary household income and wanted to have part-time jobs to fit their
homemaking schedules.
Life Satisfaction
We also asked workers several questions about satisfaction with
their lives. In addition to general life satisfaction, they rated satisfac
tion with their families, leisure, career, health, and self-esteem.
They responded as they had when we asked about their jobs: in over
all life satisfaction there were no differences, but in particular as
pects of their lives, differences appeared. Worker/owners expressed
the heavy toll of working extra hours, learning how to run a super-
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market, and being responsible for the business through lower ratings
of satisfaction with leisure, family, and health.
Both innovations had affected workers' lives away from the work
place. There is much worker testimony from the interview data
about the time demands of worker-ownership. One older worker
said, "The store owns me." He had hoped for a more relaxed prere
tirement period. For workers with dependent children or sick family
members, the time demands were most difficult. Several casual re
marks were made about spousal pressure to become less involved
with the store. Those worker/owners who had second jobs, serious
hobbies or were active in voluntary organizations found these activ
ities incompatible with the demands of worker-ownership.
Some might believe that those who became worker/owners were
more critical, less satisfied people in general—less satisfied with
A&P and with most aspects of their lives. Worker/owners were not
dissatisfied with everything, however. Their economic situations and
their careers pleased them, but their concern was the heavy price
paid in other parts of their lives—a complaint expressed by many
entrepreneurs in the early years after opening a new business.
The new work structure affected Super Fresh workers very differ
ently. Formerly, elite A&P workers tended to work overtime; those
same workers, now in new Super Fresh, full-time leadership posi
tions, were not working any more than in the past. Since few parttime workers participated in QWL, they felt no excessive time
demands. Many spoke of the extra time they had with nothing to do
as a result of cutbacks in hours. The major noneconomic effect of
working in Super Fresh was clearly the loss of vacation time. The
reduction to a single week vacation was severely felt by workers who
had had up to a month's vacation in the past and who owned homes
and businesses in vacation areas.

Theoretical Model Testing
The previous sections of this chapter described mean differences
in worker characteristics, perceived organizational processes, and
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worker outcomes among the three groups—O&O worker/owners,
QWL, and non-QWL Super Fresh workers. Such descriptive results
cannot tell us much about which factors were most important or in
fluential in contributing to these differences, however, and they do
not tell us whether these differences arose from working in a partic
ular store type or from some other factor.
To determine how much support we had for our hypotheses, we
tested them through simultaneous equation modeling, using a ThreeStage Least Squares (3SLS) technique. Our theoretical model posited
one-way causal relationships, i.e., it was recursive. However, to al
low for the possibility of unspecified interactions among the depen
dent variables or feedback loops, we chose the 3SLS technique. The
remaining statistical tables of this chapter report, for each set of de
pendent variables in the model, the unstandardized model coeffi
cients for each independent variable. The magnitude or absolute
value of these coefficients is not meaningful because of the arbitrary
scale values they represent. The direction of effect (positive or neg
ative) and the significance of the coefficient are of key importance.
They express the direction and existence of a relationship between
independent and dependent variables as specified in the model. Un
like single equation regression models, summary statistics such as
R2 are not relevant in simultaneous equation models. The simulta
neous equations for the model are as follows:
(Eq. 6.1) store participativeness = f(Worker Characteristics, Store
Type, Consultants).
In (Eq. 6. la), store participativeness is measured by the degree of
worker control.
In (Eq. 6.1b), store participativeness is measured by the degree of
worker participation in daily decisions.
In (Eq. 6.1c), store participativeness is measured by the degree of
worker participation in long-term decisions.
(Eq. 6.2) worker outcomes = f(Worker Characteristics, Store Partic
ipativeness, Store Functioning, Store Economic Outcomes).
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For each worker outcome, we estimated a model comprising four
simultaneous equations. 1 The first three equations, of the form of
equations (6. la), (6.1b), and (6.1c) estimated three measures of per
ceived participativeness. The fourth equation, of the form of equa
tion (6.2), included the three estimations of perceived
participativeness derived from equations 6.1, as well as nonestimated variables which measured aspects of worker characteristics,
store functioning, and store outcomes.
Analysis of each worker outcome included essentially the same set
of model variables:
A. Worker Characteristics. We used education, total su
permarket seniority, number of jobs known, depart
ment head status and months of layoff in all equations
of the form (6.1). Education, sex, number of depen
dents and years of seniority were included in equa
tions of the form (6.2).
Worker Attitudes and Beliefs. For all analyses except
the two concerning job income and weekly hours, we
also included in equation (6.2) three worker attitudes
and perceptions characteristics: satisfaction with su
pervision, satisfaction with co-workers, and a measure
of perceived economic gain since the A&P shutdown. 2
We included the satisfaction measures to represent
some aspects of manager selection and self-selection
processes in recruitment to particular stores, which
loomed as so important in the worker interviews (see
chapter 5). In addition, we expected that worker atti
tudes about their outcomes would be affected by the
degree of sacrifice endured or gains accrued since the
A&P shutdown.
B. Store Type. 3 Two dummy variables, ownership and
QWL, were used in all forms of equation (6.1).
C. Consultants. The sum of the number of times several
kinds of consulting was received was included in all
equations of the form (6.1).
D. Participativeness. We used the three measures: the
degree of worker involvement in daily decisions, the
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degree of worker involvement in long-term decisions,
and the perceived degree of overall worker control.4
E. Store Functioning. We used average weekly part-timer
hours in the store,5 weekly store absenteeism,6 and
measures of training, motivation, and informal pro
cesses in all forms of equations (6.2).7 We could not
use another apparently important measure of labor
strategy, namely, the percentage of full-time workers
in the store, because it was too highly correlated with
store type, as well as with worker involvement in
long-term decisions.
We estimated the model with and without two addi
tional measures of informal store functioning included
in equation 6.2. The first was a sum of five perceived
interpersonal consequences of the system of store decisionmaking (worker ownership or QWL). These con
sequences included greater acceptance and better
quality of decisions, higher trust of managers, more
open disagreement, and disagreements more easily re
solved. The second, a single-item measure from the
same set of questions which did not load on the same
factor as the others, is the perceived slowness of decisionmaking. Using these variables reduced the sample
size by about six or seven people, and reduced the de
grees of freedom. In a few cases these variables had a
significant effect.
F. Store Economic Outcomes. Though both unit labor
costs and profits for the current year were considered,
the small sample size dictated that only one store fi
nancial measure be used. Profit was our choice. We
expected that workers in more profitable stores might
benefit, financially or otherwise.
The worker outcomes examined included the economic outcomes
of job income, hours worked per week, satisfaction with pay and
fringe benefits, and satisfaction with overall economic situation. Job
satisfaction measures included satisfaction with job overall, with job
security, and with the system of decisionmaking. Life satisfaction
aspects examined were satisfaction with life overall, and with family,
leisure, and health. We decided to use the two satisfaction items as
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separate dependent measures rather than summing them into multiitem scales for two reasons. First, mean differences were found be
tween worker/owners, QWL, and non-QWL workers for individual
satisfaction items. Second, variables in which we were interested
might have had opposite effects on different aspects of satisfaction
and cancel each other out, resulting in no significant effect on over
all measures, if a summed scale was used.
Participativeness
We used three multiple-item measures of participativeness as de
pendent variables for equation (6.1): degree of worker involvement
in daily decisions, degree of worker involvement in long-term deci
sions, and perceived degree of overall worker control. This means
that every time the model was calculated, four equations were in
cluded, three estimating participativeness and one for a worker out
come. Because we earlier noted differences within the stores
between full- and part-time workers, we tested our model separately
for the sample as a whole and for full-time workers.
Worker Characteristics
Our theoretical model and our interview data (see chapter 5) sug
gested that individual workers with different backgrounds and previ
ous experience might have different perceptions of store
participativeness. Therefore, we examined the effect on perceived
participativeness of a series of background variables. Differences
that arose from selection processes or self-selection, are captured
by including these demographic data. Differences due to experience
on the planning boards or boards of directors are also captured by
the inclusion of seniority and department head status, since board
membership in all store types tended to reflect these leadership char
acteristics.
Being male, married, and older predicted perceptions of greater
participativeness in preliminary regression analyses, but all of these
characteristics were highly correlated with the number of jobs
known, which we chose for inclusion in the simultaneous equation
model.
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Worker values also were related to perceptions of participativeness. While the small sample size precluded use of all of these vari
ables in the final model, initial single equation regression analyses
found that those who valued good relations with their co-workers
and boss, who liked job security, and who valued independence were
likely to perceive more participativeness, regardless of where they
were working.
Several worker characteristics had a significant effect on partici
pativeness. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 only illustrate results for equations of
the form (6.1) for the model run which had the largest N. They are
representative of the effects found regardless of the worker outcome
used in equation (6.2). The first table presents results for all work
ers, the second for full-time workers only.
Table 6.7
Representative Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for
Predictors of Perceived Participativeness Among All Workers
(Equation 6.1)
Perceived participativeness
Daily
Degree of
Long-term
decisions
decisions
worker control
(N=89)
(N=89)
(N = 89)
Coefficients Coefficients
Input
Coefficients
Worker characteristics:
0.606***
0.156***
1.408***
Yrs. of education
0.047**
Yrs. seniority
0.016
0.006
0.276***
0.114***
# of jobs known
0.052
3.813***
0.926**
Department head1
0.165
-0.155**
0.037
Mo. of layoff
0.045
Store type
3.269**
4.655***
Worker-owned2
0.261
QWL2
-0.595
-0.321
0.548
Unions & consultants
0.045
Consulting3
0.040
-0.043
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
1. Dummy coded, l=dept. head, 0 = nondepartment head.
2. Dummy coded against non-QWL.
3. Sum of the # of times 6 kinds of assistance were received from 7
sources.
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Generally, workers' perceptions of power in the store reflect their
experience, skills, and status. Within each store type, those with
more education perceived more participativeness. In addition, those
with more seniority and knowledge of more jobs perceived more
overall worker control. In daily decisions, those workers who knew
more jobs or were department heads perceived more participativeness while those with longer layoffs perceived less. Department
heads also had stronger perceptions of involvement in long-term de
cisions.
Table 6.8
Representative Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for
Predictors of Perceived Participativeness Among Full-Time Workers
(Equation 6.1)
Perceived participativeness
Long-term
Degree of
Daily decisions
decisions
worker control
(N=46)
(N=46)
(N=46)
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients

Input
Worker characteristics:
0.760***
0.438***
Yrs. of education
-0.027
Yrs. seniority
-0.002
0.063
0.057
0.239***
# of jobs known
0.090
0.065
2.356***
1.499**
Department head1
0.266
0.255***
Mo. of layoff
0.171
0.083
Store type
3.261***
Worker-owned2
0.467
-0.131
QWL2
-1.101
-0.296
0.336
Unions & consultants
Consulting3
0.112
-0.003
-0.057
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
1. Dummy coded, l=dept. head, 0 = nondepartment head.
2. Dummy coded against non-QWL.
3. Sum of the # of times 6 kinds of assistance were received from
sources.

Store Type
As we expected, the formal worker ownership structure did influ
ence participativeness (see tables 6.7 and 6.8). Controlling forworker characteristics and consulting received, worker/owners per-
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ceived greater participativeness in daily and long-term decisions (for
full-time workers, worker ownership increased perceptions of in
volvement in long-term decisions only).
Surprisingly, perceived overall worker control was not higher
among worker/owners, other things being equal. Comments made in
the interviews suggested that before the shutdown, A&P corporate
activities had limited what workers could do in the stores. After
workers became owners, however, they still saw their choices as con
strained, but the constraints were more general: "That's how things
are in business."
Compared to working in a non-QWL store, working in a QWL
store had no influence on perceptions of any dimension of participa
tiveness. Since worker characteristics did have an influence, this
suggests that store staffing patterns, not QWL, truly differentiated
QWL and non-QWL stores from each other.
Consultants
Consultant help, which was measured by store managers' reports
of the number of different kinds of help received from each of a
variety of sources, did not predict worker perceptions of participa
tiveness.
In summary, our model found incomplete confirmation of the ef
fect of input factors on participativeness. The formal structure of
worker ownership, as set up in the O&Os, has been translated into
organizational participative processes, particularly on long-term is
sues. Super Fresh's QWL program seems not to have such an effect,
though it may seem effective (i.e., when one only looks at mean
differences) because staffing and self-selection processes recruited
senior workers into the stores we studied, and having more experi
ence and education consistently had a positive effect on workers'
perceptions of participativeness.

Worker Outcomes
According to our model, worker characteristics, participativeness,
store functioning, and store outcomes should either directly or indi
rectly influence worker outcomes. In the following sections we re-
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port the results for each group of outcome variables [equation 6.2]—
economic outcomes, job satisfaction and life satisfaction. When
these results were computed, three equations of the form (6.1) were
included in the system of simultaneous equations, but a description
of these parameters will not be repeated for every outcome reported
here.

Economic Outcomes
We looked at four measures of individual economic outcomes: su
permarket job income for the year preceding the survey; usual
weekly hours of work; satisfaction with pay and benefits; and satis
faction with one's overall economic situation. The results of equa
tion 6.2 model analyses for economic outcomes are shown in tables
6.9 and 6.10.
Few of the variables significantly predicted workers' 1984 job in
come and hours. Worker involvement in daily decisions had a posi
tive effect on income and hours worked, whereas involvement in
long-term decisions increased only hours worked. Among full-time
workers, perceptions of more overall worker control were related to
higher individual income. Seniority, as one would expect, led to in
creased weekly hours. For full-time workers, however, women
earned less than men, presumably because of the sex-based internal
labor market which usually gave men the higher paying positions.
Surprisingly, store functioning variables tended to be poor predic
tors of income and hours. Store profit similarly had no significant
impact. The only effect of store functioning on worker job income
was that workers believing themselves harder working and more ef
fective were among the lowest paid. Although conventional wisdom
suggests that effective workers should be reaping the benefits of their
work, the opposite was true in this case if the workers' perceptions
are accurate. Our worker interviews suggested that women, particu
larly deli clerks and meat wrappers, were highly motivated and be
lieved they were effective in their jobs, yet were in relatively lowpaying positions.
We found a number of unexpected relationships for workers' sat
isfaction with economic outcomes. Those who were satisfied with

Table 6.9
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of Economic Outcomes Among All Workers
(Equation 6.2)
Satisfaction
with
Satisfaction
1984 personal
overall
with
income from
economic
Weekly
pay &
supermarket
situation
benefits
hours
job
(N = 82)
(N = 82)
(N = 89)
(N=85)
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients
Worker characteristics
Demographics
-0.014
0.121
0.825
384.70
Yrs. of education
1.007***
-1.440
0.703
-896.45
Sex
-0.136
0.045
0.575
132.12
# of dependents
0.282***
0.011
0.022
138.21
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
0.283*
0.219
Satisfaction with supervision
O I Asfc:fc
0
.339**
** nr
\j 244**
O
Satisfaction with co-workers
n HAH*
n rm
f^nmrmmtive* /»r*r»nr»mir» rtaine ctru
->Q

r.liii*«-l/-»iir»i

Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and effectiveness
Training
Increased effort

Store economic outcomes

1065.89***
-264.69
1279.66
10.55
-134.29
-825.55*
-22.14
169.98

1.374***
1.565***
0.259
-0.103
-0.641
0.271
-0.013

1983 Profit
-33.387
-10.503
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes on tables 6.1 to 6.6 and in the text.
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.

-0.021
0.087
0.119

0.120
-0.196
0.195

0.105
-0.220***
-0.150
0.034
-0.021

-0.008
-0.054
0.065
0.034
-0.103

-29.969*

8.843
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Table 6.10
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of
Economic Outcomes Among Full-Time Workers
(Equation 6.2)
Satisfaction
1984 personal
Satisfaction with overall
income from
economic
with pay
supermarket
situation
and benefits
job
(N=45)
(N=45)
(N=46)
Coefficients Coefficients
Coefficients
Worker characteristics
Demographics
-0.091
Yrs. of education
0.181
698.06
0.580
-2554.12*
Sex
0.690
-0.144
0.206
167.30
# of dependents
0.022
25.81
0.028
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with
-0.115
-0.073
supervision
Satisfaction with
0.518**
0.047
co-workers
Comparative economic
0.042
0.003
gains since shutdown
Participativeness
Daily decisions
0.224
0.243
186.92
-0.205*
0.081
-520.34
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker
2999.55***
control
0.147
-0.229
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of
part-timers
-457.24
-0.035
0.129
269.40
0.071
Absenteeism (weekly)
-0.078
Perceived effort and
-0.376**
effectiveness
-0.004
-513.29
26.72
0.017
Training
0.000
-0.132*
0.124
267.43
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
-38.122
19.854
65.859
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes to tables 6.1 to 6.6.
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
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their co-workers were satisfied with their pay and benefits; those
who worked in stores with lower profitability and higher absentee
ism, and those full-timers who perceived they were less effective,
were also more satisfied with their pay. Not surprisingly, since pay
and benefits were regulated by the union contract and not affected by
either form of participation, participativeness had no effect.
Workers' satisfaction with overall economic situation is somewhat
different. Women, those satisfied with their supervisor, and those
who made postshutdown gains were more satisfied; those who per
ceived more participation in long-term decisionmaking, who were
less satisfied with their co-workers, and who were working harder—
that is, primarily the O&O workers—were less satisfied with their
overall economic situation.
With respect to the low impact of participativeness and store func
tioning on economic outcomes, these findings are surprising. First,
we expected any effect of participativeness, especially in long-term
decisionmaking which is highest for worker/owners, to be positive.
Second, we expected participativeness to positively influence work
ers' satisfaction with economic outcomes, but to influence worker
financial outcomes only indirectly through store functioning and
store profits. However, participativeness seems to affect worker out
comes directly in our tests, and we shall see more of this effect be
low when we discuss other worker outcome measures.
How can we explain these apparent anomalies? First, perhaps
worker/owners had very high expectations of prosperity; they may
have wanted to be in an even better position than they found them
selves. Second, the actual causality may run opposite to that pictured
in our model; that is, those with higher incomes and more hours
perceive higher worker participativeness, perhaps because they gen
eralize from their own power in the stores. After all, full-time work
ers had higher mean levels of perceived participativeness and,
because of their schedules if nothing else, were more available to
participate. Also meatcutters, who were very powerful, received
higher wages.
Third, some stores with high levels of participativeness may have
maintained a labor strategy of high wages and high average weekly
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hours for former A&P workers. While this would be expected to
show up in store functioning, we could not use percent of full-time
workers as a measure of this strategy in the worker model because it
was too highly correlated with store type. The measure of labor
strategy we used, average weekly part-timer hours in the store, nei
ther affirms nor rules out this third alternative. Our interview find
ings (see chapter 5), support this third explanation by showing that
some very participative Super Fresh managers hand picked former
employees and made certain they received good positions. Thus, la
bor strategy is probably quite important even if measures included in
the worker model had few significant effects. The high correlation of
store type with percent of full-timers indicates store type may indeed
be identical to labor strategy.
Job Satisfaction
We looked at overall job satisfaction and two other specific as
pects of job satisfaction, job security, and decisionmaking. A com
prehensive set of predictors of job satisfaction was not included in
this analysis because, unlike many other studies, our purpose was
not to predict as much of the variance in job satisfaction as possible.
Rather, we were trying to find out whether the specific innovations
in formal structure—worker ownership or QWL—led to store pro
cesses which affected job satisfaction. Predictors of job satisfaction
not differing by store type were assumed to be distributed similarly
in each store and assumed not to have significant interaction effects
with store type that would necessitate their inclusion in this system
of equations. This assumption remains to be tested in future studies.
Results of the analyses for equation (6.2) for these outcomes are
shown in tables 6.11 and 6.12.
It is often claimed that if people participate in decisions which
affect them, they will be more satisfied with the results. This expec
tation was modestly confirmed. The degree of worker control had a
barely significant effect on overall job satisfaction among fulltimers, but not when their results were combined with those of the
part-timers. Worker involvement in long-term decisions also posi-
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lively affected individual satisfaction with decisionmaking and job
security.
Table 6.11
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of
_____Job Satisfaction Among All Workers (Equation 6.2)_____
Satisfaction
with
Satisfaction Satisfaction
system
with job
with job
of
security
decisionmaking
overall
(N = 82)
(N=82)
(N=74)
Coefficients Coefficients
Coefficients
Worker characteristics
Demographics
Yrs. of education
0.090
0.019
0.041
0.423
0.053
Sex
-0.480
# of dependents
-0.127
0.057
0.015
0.042**
Yrs. of seniority
0.014
0.014
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with
supervision
0.109
0.260
0.275
Satisfaction with
0.227**
0.415***
0.480***
co-workers
Comparative economic
gains since shutdown
0.033*
0.026
0.013
Participativeness
-0.010
Daily decisions
0.011
-0.019
0.266**
0.272**
Long-term decisions
0.047
Degree of worker control
0.151
0.011
-0.104
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of
part-timers
0.022
0.061
0.217*
-0.032
-0.045
Absenteeism (weekly)
-0.087
Perceived effort and
-0.063
-0.041
effectiveness
-0.049
0.013
0.038
Training
0.014
-0.108
Increased effort
0.067
-0.027
Store economic outcomes
-24.294*
-25.151*
1983 Profit
3.410
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes of tables 6. 1 to 6.6.
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
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Table 6.12
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of Job
Satisfaction Among Full-Time Workers (Equation 6.2)
Satisfaction
with
Satisfaction Satisfaction
system
of
with job
with job
overall
decisionmaking
security
(N = 43)
(N=45)
(N=45)
Coefficients
Coefficients Coefficients
Worker characteristics
Demographics
0.262**
Yrs. of education
0.160
0.067
Sex
-0.471
-0.027
0.381
-0.019
# of dependents
0.038
-0.049
-0.055**
Yrs. of seniority
0.010
0.012
Attitudes and beliefs
Satisfaction with
0.294
0.422
0.013
supervision
0.445*
0.304
Satisfaction with
0.023
co-workers
Comparative economic
-0.005
-0.005
0.026
gains since shutdown
Participativeness
-0.158
-0.023
0.113
Daily decisions
0.433***
0.404***
Long-term decisions
0.008
-0.006
0.297*
Degree of worker control
0.121
Store functioning
0.201**
0.153*
-0.002
Avg. weekly hours of
part-timers
-0.079
-0.062
Absenteeism (weekly)
-0.145
Perceived effort and
-0.139
-0.264
-0.143
effectiveness
-0.015
Training
0.004
-0.040
0.043
0.027
Increased effort
0.059
Store economic outcomes
-50.017**
-38.627
-6.949
1983 Profit
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes of table 6.1 to 6.6.
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.
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Contrary to our hypotheses, few store functioning variables had
any effect on overall job satisfaction. Those who reported them
selves to be more hard-working and more effective full-time workers
were less satisfied with their job security. These same workers were
also less satisfied with their pay and fringe benefits. This may indi
cate some complacency on the part of more senior workers, or some
particularly motivated workers may be in positions of low pay and
low job security.
When differences in worker characteristics and levels of participativeness and store functioning are controlled, the most profitable
stores had workers least satisfied with decisionmaking and job secu
rity. Were workers unaware of how well or how poorly their stores
were doing in comparison with others and thus using some unrealis
tic standard for comparison? Or were the most profitable stores
somehow dissatisfying to work in? We do not have the data to
choose between these alternative explanations.
Participativeness had some interesting effects on life satisfaction
(see tables 6.13 and 6.14). In contrast to the negative effects worker
control had on some aspects of job satisfaction, we found that the
degree of overall worker control had a positive effect on overall life
satisfaction and on satisfaction with family and health. For full-time
workers, worker involvement in daily decisions positively affected
their overall life satisfaction and satisfaction with health. More
worker involvement in long-term decisions meant less satisfaction
with leisure, however. Most likely, worker/owners have been too
busy to enjoy themselves outside of work.
Store functioning variables affected life satisfaction in some odd
ways. Those believing themselves more effective and seeing im
proved interpersonal interactions in the new work setting were less
likely to be satisfied with their lives overall, and with their family
life. Perhaps these were also the people who invested more of their
time trying to make their stores successful, and they suffered from it.
Also, those working in stores with higher absenteeism were more
satisfied with their lives. When coupled with the negative impact of
worker involvement in long-term decisions, these findings indicate
that work interfered with nonwork aspects of worker/owners' lives.

Table 6.13
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters for Predictors of Life Satisfaction Among All Workers
(Equation 6.2)
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
with
with
with
with life
health
leisure
family
overall
(N = 82)
(N = 81)
(N = 82)
(N=82)
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients
Worker characteristics
Demographics
-0.179**
-0.141**
0.046
-0.047
Yrs. of education
0.615*
0.534
0.573*
0.573*
Sex
-0.170*
-0.227***
-0.082
-0.060
# of dependents
-0.030*
-0.007
-0.032
-0.024
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
0.107
-0.033
0.028
0.070
Satisfaction with supervision
0.195*
0.214*
0.135
0.124
Satisfaction with co-workers
0.023
-0.005
0.008
0.011
shutdown
since
Comparative economic gains

Participativeness
0.049
Daily decisions
-0.154
Long-term decisions
0.699***
Degree of worker control
Store functioning
-0.057
Avg. weekly hours of part-timers
0.027
Absenteeism (weekly)
0.046
Perceived effort and effectiveness
0.011
Training
-0.106*
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
23.953**
1983 Profit
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes of table 6.1 to 6.6.
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test.

0.009
-0.172
0.748***

0.040
-0.348**
0.331

-0.001
-0.104
0.701***

-0.093*
0.000
0.068*
0.012
-0.117*

-0.059
0.055
0.124
-0.032
-0.060

-0.060
0.048
-0.002
0.002
-0.058

24.269*

18.499

27.478**

Table 6.14
Three-Stage Least Squares Model Parameters of Life Satisfaction Among FulI-Time Workers (Equation 6.2)
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
Satisfaction
with
with
with
with life
leisure
health
family
overall
(N = 45)
(N=45)
(N=45)
(N=45)
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients
Coefficients
Worker characteristics
Demographics
-0.235*
-0.114
-0.079
-0.157
Yrs. of education
-0.127
0.201
0.223
0.009
Sex
-0.182*
-0.095
0.005
-0.059
# of dependents
0.008
0.006
0.020
-0.006
Yrs. of seniority
Attitudes and beliefs
0.165
0.243
-0.070
0.098
Satisfaction with supervision
0.101
-0.016
0.251
0.074
Satisfaction with co-workers
-0.016
-0.017
-0.000
-0.016
Comparative economic gains since shutdown

Participativeness
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
Degree of worker control
Store functioning
Avg. weekly hours of part-timers
Absenteeism (weekly)
Perceived effort and effectiveness
Training
Increased effort
Store economic outcomes
1983 Profit
NOTE: Variables are defined in footnotes of table 6.1
*p<.l; **p<.05; ***p<.01; two-tailed t-test

0.275**
0.064
0.429**

0.213
-0.109
0.432*

0.234
-0.318**
0.158

0.321*
-0.034
0.263

0.064
0.154*
0.068
0.019
0.075

-0.123
0.070
0.084
0.002
-0.153

-0.114
0.177
0.164
-0.052
-0.104

-0.051
0.164
-0.101
-0.034
-0.018

19.495
to 6.6.

20.152

27.096

18.075
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Conclusion
Contrary to extreme claims that worker ownership is a failure or
that it is a panacea, the findings of our analyses suggest that the men
and women who bought out their stores managed to devise a wellrun decisionmaking system that pleased them and managed to be
satisfied with their job security. They also paid a substantial price,
however: they reported more conflict with co-workers and supervi
sors, longer work hours, less leisure time, and poorer health.
As we expected, the formal structure of worker ownership worked
to increase worker involvement in long-term decisions. Worker/own
ers have used this power to adopt store labor strategies preserving
full-time jobs for all owners, including cashiers and others in lowpaying jobs. They also used cross-training of workers to increase
then- flexibility and provide growth and career opportunities.
Worker ownership, through the cooperative system of decisionmaking, has had a more modest impact on other aspects of store
functioning. While some worker/owners claimed to be working
harder and more effectively, others did not. The worker/owners' av
erage estimates of motivation did not differ from workers in Super
Fresh. We found a similar lack of difference in levels of trust, con
flict, and acceptance of decisions.
The Super Fresh alternative, which also saved many workers'
jobs, promised increased worker involvement in decisions, though
these were limited to daily matters, and a bonus share of profits if
workers helped keep labor costs low. Super Fresh adopted a dual
labor force strategy with a small core of full-time workers and a
larger group of lower-paid part-time workers, however; thus most of
the jobs saved were part time.
This strategy had a different impact on full-time and part-time Su
per Fresh workers. Full-time Super Fresh workers felt workers had
as much control overall and in daily matters as did worker/owners,
they earned larger job incomes than worker/owners, and they were as
satisfied as worker/owners with their economic situations, jobs, and
lives outside of the job. They did not have a say in intermediate and
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long-term decisions in their stores, however. The QWL program it
self was not crucial in obtaining benefits for Super Fresh workers.
The full-time workers got their influence in store decisions through
their own human capital attributes—seniority, education, job knowl
edge, and department head status.
The large group of part-timers (85 percent) at Super Fresh bore
the primary costs of the Super Fresh method of job-saving. Com
pared to full-time Super Fresh workers and all worker/owners, these
part-timers made less than half the income and reported a postshutdown loss of economic welfare and lower satisfaction with QWL,
pay, promotions, and job security. A small number of women gained
family satisfaction from their part-time schedules, but they were not
so many or so satisfied that they could raise the average satisfaction
levels of their stores.
In theoretical terms, the results supported many of our hypothe
ses, but a few results were surprising. Worker ownership and worker
experience did increase perceived participation, but QWL had few
effects on worker outcomes. Differences in store functioning had a
limited impact on worker outcomes. The full-time labor strategy
adopted by the O&Os positively affected workers' hours and income,
but other changes in informal interactions in the stores were modest
and had little impact on worker outcomes.
Participativeness, which we expected to have an indirect effect
through store functioning, had instead repeated substantial direct ef
fects on worker outcomes. While limitations of our measurement of
store functioning may be a partial explanation, this is unlikely to
account for every effect. We did expect participativeness to affect
worker satisfaction. More worker participation increased some per
ceptions of job quality and earning power, but was costly to workers
in diminishing some aspects of job and life satisfaction.
Curiously, these results give some indication that the supermarkets
did not always reward workers for their efforts and effectiveness.
Workers who perceived themselves to be hard-working and effective
were less satisfied with their pay, benefits, and job security. Workers
in more profitable stores had less satisfaction with their job security,
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and their form of decisionmaking. Either there are inequalities, in
which effective workers are not well-rewarded, or else high expecta
tions of effective workers have led to dissatisfaction with rewards
given.
Chapters 5 & 6 have presented outcomes from the workers' point
of view. The next chapter will look at the differential economic out
comes for the stores themselves among the three types of organiza
tions.

NOTES
1. We had many possible measures for each of the constructs in these equations. Therefore,
we had to reduce the data considerably through preliminary analyses before we could precisely
define the actual equation model to test. We used two primary techniques for this task. First,
we factor analyzed all attitudinal and perceptual measures of each construct. If we could iden
tify clear, meaningful factors, we used summary scales of the measures comprising the factors.
Our general rule was to look for measures which had loadings on one factor over .4 and less
than .2 on all other factors. Items to be summed had to have a similar factor structure for
workers, managers, and shop stewards before we would consider them as summed scales.
These factor analyses are available from the authors.
Second, we used correlation and multiple regression techniques to identify suitable measures
of the constructs, (a) We eliminated from further analyses variables reported in the descriptive
results above which neither significantly related to other model variables nor were clearly
important in theory, (b) We selected variables representing our theoretical constructs but
which were not highly correlated with each other. However, even potential multicollinearity
problems did not eliminate some variables, because we used them in separate alternative ver
sions of the model.
2. Because these variables were measured in the same way and were physically located near
the other satisfaction questions in the questionnaire, any significant effects on satisfaction out
comes may be the result of measurement bias. In spite of this, it seemed important to include
them so that the influence of other variables in the model could be determined, net of these
worker characteristics.
3. Store type is represented by two dummy-coded variables, O&O and QWL. Non-QWL is
the omitted category with which comparisons are made.
4. The simultaneous equation model estimates each of the three participativeness measures
described earlier (equation 6.1) and then enters these estimated values variables in the worker
outcomes equation (equation 6.2).
5. This measure came from the store managers' survey.
6. Employee turnover in the store was too highly correlated with average weekly part-timer
hours in the store to be used in the same equation. However, absenteeism could be included.
The measure of absenteeism also came from the store managers' survey.
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7. Training was a sum of the number of new jobs and new skills learned since the shutdown,
plus a five-point rating of how much training workers said they received in their new stores.
Perceived worker effort and effectiveness (motivation) was measured through a sum of two
items asking for workers' estimates on a five-point scale of the degree to which they believed
that working hard leads to high productivity and to doing one's job well.

Economic Performance of
Worker-Owned, QWL and Non-QWL
Supermarkets

The O&O buyout of two A&P stores, and the conversion of most
of the Philadelphia-region A&P stores to Super Fresh stores with
varying degrees of worker participation, presented a unique oppor
tunity to examine and compare the economic performance of workerowned firms with that of conventionally-owned firms with and
without QWL. The common history of these stores as part of the
failing A&P chain, their common location within the Philadelphia
metropolitan area, the common experiences of most of the full-time
and many of the part-time workers as former A&P employees, and
the coverage of workers in all of the stores by similar union contracts
means that the major dimensions along which these stores vary are
type of ownership and extent of worker participation. Differences in
industry, geographic location, general economic climate, experience
of workers and unionization, which ordinarily confound the interpre
tation of the effects of worker ownership and worker participation on
economic performance, are absent in this case study. Thus, this
study of the O&O and Super Fresh stores two years after the A&P
shutdown is an exceptional opportunity to test the model, developed
in chapter 2, of the way economic outcomes for individual stores are
affected by the type of store (worker-owned, Super Fresh with QWL
or Super Fresh without QWL), the extent of store participativeness,
and the effect of participativeness on store functioning.
This chapter analyzes the economic performance, measured in
terms of profitability, productivity, and unit labor costs, of each of
the three types of stores in our sample. In the next section we ana
lyze the theoretical issues involved in comparing the economic per209
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formance of worker-owned and traditional firms. This is followed by
a descriptive section detailing important differences and similarities
among the three store types. This section also compares the percep
tions of shop stewards and store directors or managers regarding how
the store is functioning and how participative it is. Finally, the
model described in chapter 2 is tested. The empirical work reported
here provides considerable support for that model.

Theoretical Issues
One of the persistent questions concerning such workplace inno
vations as worker participation is their effect on the economic per
formance of the enterprises in which they are introduced. Proponents
of worker participation in managerial decisionmaking through
worker ownership or quality of worklife programs argue that these
practices increase productivity and profit. Giving workers scope to
utilize the knowledge they have acquired about the firm's production
process, customer requirements, regulatory environment or business
climate, according to this view, increases sales, reduces waste and
inefficiency and increases the flexibility with which workers can be
assigned to jobs. The resulting productivity gains support increases
in wages as well as profits while holding unit labor costs down
(Levin 1984). In contrast, critics of worker participation support the
traditional hierarchical organization of the firm in which decisionmaking and authority are centralized at higher levels of the bureau
cracy. They argue that close supervision and control of the work
process as well as the ability to lay off workers or reduce their hours
of work are essential to achieving productivity targets and to holding
down costs.
Differences in Objectives
Discussion of the contribution of worker participation to the fi
nancial success of an enterprise is further complicated when firms
owned by their workforce are considered. The objective of a tradi-

Economic Performance

211

tional firm is to maximize profit, so profitability is an appropriate
measure of its financial success. Worker-owned firms, however, have
multiple goals. Like their more traditionally-managed competitors,
they must operate successfully in the market if they are to continue
to exist. Whether profit maximizing or not, they must nevertheless
be profitable if they are to generate internal funds for investment and
expansion. Moreover, profit is the standard which suppliers and
banks, themselves organized as traditional firms, apply in determin
ing the credit-worthiness of worker-owned firms. Profitability, there
fore, remains an important goal even in cooperative enterprises.
At the same time, worker-owned firms do not single-mindedly
pursue the objective of maximum profits. Such firms also have a
strong commitment to providing employment security, full-time
wages and the hours of work desired (usually full time) to worker/
owners. High and steady worker income ranks with profits as a goal
of such enterprises (Berman 1967).
Furthermore, the distinction made in traditional firms between
"variable labor"—ordinary workers whose numbers and/or hours
are increased during periods of high demand and reduced during pe
riods of slack—and "overhead labor"—managerial and professional
employees who are viewed by the firm as a quasi-fixed cost of doing
business—is not a meaningful distinction in the case of workerowned firms. Here, the entire worker/owner labor force must be
viewed as a quasi-fixed cost to the firm, to be spread over as large a
sales volume as possible. Thus, sales volume looms as a much more
important variable for worker-owned firms, than for comparable tra
ditional enterprises.
While worker-owned firms may be less likely, except under ex
treme circumstances, to reduce the hours of work of worker/owners,
they do have greater control over employee compensation than is the
case for conventional firms. Even where wage rates are bargained
uniformly by a union representing both worker/owners and employ
ees in traditional firms, worker-owned firms have some flexibility
with respect to compensation. Worker/owners can vote themselves
small or zero bonuses, and they can vote to provide "sweat equity"
in the form of unpaid hours of work above their scheduled full-time
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paid hours. In contrast to traditional firms, worker-owned firms are
more likely to vary compensation rather than hours of work to
achieve higher profits and productivity, should this prove necessary.
They are reluctant to do this, however, since full-time wages and
high income for worker/owners is an important objective of these
firms.
Both conventional firms and worker-owned firms have strong in
centives to increase productivity and reduce unit labor costs. Rising
productivity leads, in general, to higher profits. It also makes possi
ble wage increases without increases in unit labor costs. Of course,
the distribution between wages and profits of the gains from making
the enterprise more productive are likely to differ in traditional and
in worker-owned firms. Traditional firms are responsible to share
holders, and have an incentive to hold down wages while capturing
increases in productivity in the form of higher profits. In contrast,
worker-owned firms, whose shareholders are also their workforce,
desire to raise worker incomes, subject to the need to sustain a sat
isfactory level of profits.
These differences have important implications for the kinds of
strategies which worker-owned and conventional firms adopt to hold
down unit labor costs. The concept of unit labor costs refers to pay
roll costs per unit of output. It can easily be shown that payroll costs
per unit of output are equivalent to the average wage paid to workers
divided by the average product (or output per employee hour) of
labor. 1 Traditional firms may find reducing the average wage an at
tractive strategy for holding down unit labor costs. They can pursue
this strategy by hiring large numbers of part-time workers for dead
end jobs at lower wages, saving on training and fringe benefit costs
as well. Or they can encourage high turnover so that a large propor
tion of the labor force is employed at entry level wages. Reducing
average wages may appear less costly or less risky than pursuing the
alternative strategy of making workers more productive. This alter
native strategy might include instituting training programs to in
crease skill levels and allow greater flexibility in the assignment of
tasks, providing opportunities to increase product knowledge and
better meet customer desires, or encouraging and rewarding effort
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and hard work. Other productivity-enhancing alternatives might in
clude valuing the knowledge of experienced workers and providing
ways in which this knowledge can be heard and acted upon, under
taking investment in modern technology and implementing technol
ogy and work processes so as to enhance rather than reduce worker
skills. In general, productivity can be increased by encouraging con
tinuous on-the-job learning experiences for the firm's workforce.
Worker-owned firms, with their commitment to full-time hours
and wages for worker/owners, have little leeway for reducing average
wages. Like those Japanese firms with a commitment to lifetime em
ployment, they must concentrate on raising productivity if they are
to remain competitive. With a high wage, high seniority, mostly fulltime labor force, the impetus for achieving productivity gains is es
pecially high in worker-owned businesses.
Important differences in the behavior of worker-owned and tradi
tional firms are suggested by this analysis. They can be expected to
differ in their use of full-time employees, in the hours of work of
part-time employees, in the amount of turnover, in the number of
training programs and the opportunities for learning new jobs and
new skills that they provide, in the rewards they provide for hard
work and effort, and in the extent to which they encourage worker
participation in a wide range of decisions. These differences, which
may be quite acute in comparisons between worker-owned and con
ventionally managed firms, may be ameliorated when traditional
firms adopt quality of worklife (QWL) programs which provide
workers with training and with some opportunities to participate in
decisions. Traditionally-managed firms that implement QWL do so
in order to achieve the productivity gains made possible by increas
ing the knowledge and skills of workers and by utilizing the knowl
edge of workers through worker participation in decisions. In this
respect, they resemble worker-owned firms. QWL firms differ from
worker-owned firms, however, in that they continue to be owned by
shareholders and to pursue the objective of profit maximization.
In light of the emphasis on productivity growth through skill de
velopment and participation in worker-owned stores, it is possible
that such firms have increased productivity and achieved lower costs
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despite higher worker hours and wages. As a result, the "high"
profits of worker-owned firms need not fall below the "maximum"
profits of traditional firms.

Similarities and Differences Among Worker-Owned, QWL and
Non-QWL Stores
Unlike the previous two chapters, this one is not limited to six
intensively studied stores. It is based on a sample of 25 stores—2
O&O stores and 23 Super Fresh stores. Questionnaires were distrib
uted to each store manager as well as to the UFCW local 1357
(clerks) shop steward and the UFCW local 56 (meatcutters) shop
steward at each Philadelphia store and the UFCW local 27 shop
stewards (clerks) in the two stores outside of Philadelphia. The anal
ysis in this chapter is based on data obtained from these question
naires. In addition, 1981 financial data for all of the stores prior to
the A&P shutdown, and for the Super Fresh stores in 1982 and 1983,
were obtained from A&P corporate headquarters. Financial data for
the O&O stores came from the manager's questionnaire and from
published sources.
We characterized the 23 Super Fresh stores as QWL or non-QWL
on the basis of the assessment by the shop steward of the extent to
which a formal QWL program was in place in his or her store.
For the four Super Fresh stores studied in depth, the judgment of
the researchers coincided squarely with the evaluation of the shop
stewards regarding implementation of QWL (see chapter 5). This in
creases our confidence in the shop stewards' evaluation of QWL in
the larger sample of stores. Shop stewards were asked to rate, on a
scale of 1 to 5, both the extent to which a formal QWL program had
been implemented in their stores and the extent to which workers
were encouraged to attend store QWL meetings. Stores which scored
3 or better on both of these scales were classified as having a QWL
program in operation; all others were classified as non-QWL stores.
Based on this classification scheme, our sample consists of 13 QWL
stores and 10 non-QWL stores, in addition to the two O&O stores.
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Note that this refers only to whether a formal QWL program was
implemented and not to the effectiveness of the program in involving
workers in decisionmaking.
Table 7.1 reports mean values by store type for the variables
which the model (see chapter 2) hypothesizes will affect the eco
nomic performance of the stores—worker characteristics, use of
consultants, union support, store participativeness, store functioning
and store characteristics. Questions about participativeness, as well
as those concerned with such aspects of store functioning as inter
personal processes, slowness of decisionmaking, number of training
programs and amount of peer training, were asked of both store man
agers and shop stewards. Many of these same questions were also
asked of the workers in the six stores where workers were inter
viewed. In all, the shop steward and manager questionnaires had 57
questions in common while the manager, shop steward and worker
questionnaires had 54 questions in common.
The UFCW local 1357 and 27 shop stewards, who represent ev
eryone in the store except the meatcutters, are generally more knowl
edgeable about store conditions and returned more complete
questionnaires than the UFCW local 56 shop stewards. We have,
therefore, used the responses of the UFCW local 1357 or 27 shop
stewards in this analysis except for the four stores where only the
UFCW local 56 shop steward responded. An analysis of the re
sponses of the shop stewards by union local indicates that there are
no significant differences between them in their assessments of par
ticipativeness and store functioning.
Analysis of the responses of the shop stewards and workers to
questions about participation and store functioning in the six stores
in which workers were interviewed indicates that the shop stewards'
views are largely representative of those of the workers in their
stores. Their views of participation are slightly less enthusiastic than
those of other full-time workers, but more positive than those of
part-time workers who had less opportunity to participate.
Moreover, in the 13 QWL stores, analysis of the responses of
managers and shop stewards indicates that the two groups share very
similar perceptions of participation and its effects. Only in the
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Table 7.1
Comparison of Mean Values By Store Type
Variable
O&O
(N=2)
Worker characteristics
Percent female
42.41
5.47
Percent nonwhite
Percent high school graduate
94.12
Consultants and union
13.00b'c
Consultants1
2.50b
Union support
Store participativeness
Manager's perceptions
7.00b'c
Decisions about daily tasks2
2.00b>c
Long-term decisions3
Perceived overall degree
of worker control4
8.50
65.00b>c
Frequency of participation
—
Amount of say mangers have
Amount of say dept. heads have
5.00
Shop steward's perceptions
9.50
Decisions about daily tasks
10.00b'c
Long-term decisions
Perceived overall degree
7.00
of worker control
30.00
Frequency of participation
4.50
Amount of say managers have
3.50
Amount of say dept. heads have
Store functioning
42.00b*c
Number of employees
44.59b'c
Pet. full time
8.00
Turnover (per year)
2.00
Absenteeism (per week)
20.00
Avg. weekly hours part time
44.00
Pet. at top pay
13.00
Pet. at bottom pay
49.71
Pet. can do more than 1 job
Innovations5
10.00
Manager's perceptions
22.00b>c
Interpersonal interactions6
2.00b'c
Slowness of decisionmaking7

QWL
(N=13)

Non-QWL
(N = 10)

39.03
21.19
77.12

38.95
5.50
82.88

2.75a
4.77a

2.71 a
4.00

8.15a
3.23a

9.40a
2.30a

6.69
23.00a
4.61
4.15

8.40
23.33a
4.60
4.60

8.15C
3.00a

5.30b
2.60a

6.69
22.78
4.69
4.00C

4.67
12.86
4.30
2.89b

96.61 a
16.45a
58.38
6.31
18.46
32.62
20.77
45.06
8.00C

93.00a
17.17a
22.56
4.40
17.30
40.25
25.11
61.20
11.10b

19.31 a
3.08a

21.67a
3.10a
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Table 7.1 (con't)
O&O
# of training programs since
0.00
reopening
5.00b
Amt. of peer training
Manager's say over hiring
6.00
Shop steward's perceptions
18.00b'c
Interpersonal interactions
4.50C
Slowness of decisionmaking
# of training programs since
1.50
reopening
1.50b'c
Amt. of peer training
6.50
Increased effort8
Perceived effort and
8.00
effectiveness9
4.50C
Implementation of participation
Workers encouraged to attend
4.50C
meetings
Worker satisfaction with
3.00b>c
participation
Store characteristics
18.50
Size in square feet (000)
6.00
Number of competitors
4337.80b
1981 sales volume (000)
5.31
1981 profit (cents per $ of sales)
1.45
1981 labor productivity
1981 unit labor costs (cents
15.67
per $ of sales)
5.00
Ease of obtaining credit
Store economic outcomes
6731.40
1983 sales volume (000)
53.18b'c
Pet. sales growth 1981-83
1983 value added (cents per
21.18
$ of sales)
10.39
1983 profit (cents per $ of sales)
2.32C
1983 labor productivity
1983 unit labor costs (cents
9.15b'c
per $ of sales)
a. Significantly different from O&O;
b. Significantly different from QWL;

Variable

QWL
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Non-QWL

5.85
3.62a
5.54

6.22
4.30a
5.80

19.92a'c
3.15C

11.44a'b
1.75a'b

3.00
3.33a
6.77

2.20
2.90a
6.00

7.46
3.58C

6.89
140a,b

4.54C

2.60a'b

2.66a

3.50a

22.08
3.46
8293.603
5.88
1.64
14.51
4.09
9687.20
17.65a

23.67
3.90
7556.18
6.44
1.55
14.96
4.75
9050.60
19.41 a

19.61
6.92
1.78

18.42
5.11
1.59

11.16a

11.673
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c. Significantly different from non-QWL;
p=.05.
Multi-item scales:
1. Sum of the number of times 6 kinds of assistance were received from 7
sources.
2. Sum of 3 six-point items for influence in tasks, choice of hours, work
ing conditions (1 =1 am not involved, 6 = 1 can decide on my own).
3. Sum of 2 six-point items for influence in capital investment and shutting
the store (1 =1 am not involved, 6 = 1 can decide on my own).
4. Sum of 2 items, How much worker's opinions are taken into account
when decisions are made in the store (l=none, 5 = a great deal) and
How much say workers have in what goes on in the store (1 = very little
say, 5 = very much say).
5. Sum of 3 items, innovations in jobs, procedures and equipment.
6. Sum of 5 items, consequences which occurred because of new system of
decisionmaking: greater acceptance and better quality of decisions,
higher trust of manager, more open disagreement, disagreements more
easily resolved (1= definitely not, 5 = definitely yes).
7. Takes longer to make decisions because of the new system of decisionmaking (1= definitely not, 5 = definitely yes).
8. Sum of 2 items, How often it is true that working hard leads to high
productivity, to doing the job well (1 = never, 5 = almost always).
9. Sum of 2 items, Extent to which the opportunity to contribute to deci
sionmaking influences extra effort, extra effectiveness on the job
(1 = none at all, 5 = a great deal).

non-QWL stores did we find that managers and shop stewards dif
fered widely in their perceptions of virtually every aspect of partic
ipation and store functioning about which both were asked.
Compared to the shop stewards, managers of the non-QWL stores
reported extremely optimistic views of the percentage of workers
who participate often in store QWL meetings, of the participation of
workers in decisions about daily tasks, of the overall degree of
worker control, of the number of training programs in the store and
the amount of peer training, and of improvements in interpersonal
processes within the store as a result of the QWL program.
In non-QWL stores, managers, but not shop stewards, reported
values for these measures as high as, or even higher than, values
reported by managers in the QWL stores. Our interpretation of this
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discrepancy is that managers in non-QWL stores exaggerated when
answering questions concerning participation and the effects of
QWL on store functioning in order to impress Super Fresh corporate
management which favors QWL and has encouraged store managers
to implement it. For this reason, and in light of the close correspon
dence between the views of shop stewards and managers in the QWL
stores as well as between the responses of shop stewards and work
ers in the six stores where both were interviewed, we have elected to
use the shop stewards' perceptions rather than store managers' re
sponses regarding store participativeness and its effects on store
functioning in testing our model. Factual data from the managers'
survey has been utilized in the analysis.

Store Economic Outcomes
Average values, by store type, for the measures of economic per
formance are reported in table 7.1. Significant differences (p=.05)
were identified using ANOVAs and LSD multiple range tests for
comparison of means of groups of different size. As predicted by our
theoretical analysis, the O&O stores with their much larger propor
tion of full-time workers and with more workers at the top of the pay
scale appear to have pursued sales growth more aggressively than the
Super Fresh stores in order to spread these high, quasi-fixed labor
costs over a larger volume of sales. Our results show that sales
growth at the O&O stores was significantly higher than at either type
of Super Fresh store. Sales revenues at the O&O stores increased on
average by 53 percent between 1981 and 1983, while sales at the
Super Fresh stores increased by 18 percent for the QWL and 19 per
cent for the non-QWL stores.
All three types of stores actively attempted to increase productiv
ity, reduce unit labor costs and increase profit in order to reverse the
poor performance of the former A&P stores, become economically
viable and protect the jobs of workers. Productivity, in this analysis,
is defined as value added per dollar of payroll, where value added is
the gross margin or difference between sales revenue and the cost of
goods sold. The productivity measure preferred by economists is
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value added per employee hour, but 7 store managers failed to report
total employee hours for their stores. A comparison of value added
per dollar of payroll with value added per employee hour for the 18
stores for which both measures of productivity are available shows
that the two measures are highly correlated, with a correlation coef
ficient of .824. Thus value added per dollar of payroll, which is
available for all 25 stores, is a good alternative measure of produc
tivity.
Unit labor costs are, conceptually, very closely related to produc
tivity, especially as we have defined it above. Unit labor costs are
defined in the usual manner as payroll costs per dollar of sales, and
are inversely correlated with profit. For this sample, the correlation
between profit and unit labor costs is —.752.
A comparison of 1983 average values for labor productivity and
unit labor costs with 1981 average values indicates improvement for
the O&O stores as well as for both QWL and non-QWL Super Fresh
stores in comparison with the performance of the former A&P stores
at these locations. However, the improvements were most marked for
the O&O stores. These worker-owned stores, which had been among
the poorest performing A&P stores, had significantly lower unit la
bor costs in 1983 than either the QWL or non-QWL Super Fresh
stores, despite the fact that they employ a larger proportion of fulltime, highly paid workers. In 1983, unit labor costs in the workerowned stores averaged a little more than 9 cents per dollar of sales,
which compared favorably with the Super Fresh stores, whose unit
labor costs averaged between 11 and 12 cents per dollar of sales.
This was achieved despite the fact that more than 44 percent of O&O
workers were full-time employees, compared with only 16 to 17 per
cent full-time employees at Super Fresh. Moreover, the O&O stores
had 44 percent of workers at the top of the pay scale, compared with
33 percent at the QWL stores and 40 percent at the non-QWL
stores—and fewer workers at the bottom of the pay scale—13 per
cent compared with 21 percent at the QWL stores and 25 percent at
the non-QWL stores. Part of the explanation for this may lie in the
improvement in labor productivity achieved by the O&O stores, in-
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creasing from 1.45 to 2.32 between 1981 and 1983. Smaller im
provements were achieved by the Super Fresh stores, from 1.64 to
1.78 for the QWL stores and from 1.55 to 1.59 for the non-QWL
stores.
Value added per dollar of sales is another interesting indicator of
economic performance. It shows the gross margin, or difference, be
tween sales revenue and cost of goods sold as a percent of sales.
Higher values on this measure indicate either a higher profit margin,
perhaps as a result of improvements in dealing with wholesalers, or a
reduction in wastage due to spoilage, stocking inappropriate mer
chandise, shoplifting or employee pilfering. Higher value added is
generally associated with higher profit independent of the effect of
unit labor costs on profit. In this sample, the correlation between
value added per dollar of sales and the rate of profit is .973. Value
added averaged 21 cents per dollar of sales for the O&O stores, 20
cents per dollar of sales for the QWL stores and 18 cents per dollar
of sales for the non-QWL stores. These differences, however, are not
statistically significant.
The rate of profit in the retail food industry is reported per dollar
of sales rather than as a return on assets. We were unable to obtain
data on either the assets or fixed costs of the stores in our sample.
Accordingly, the rate of profit in this analysis was computed by tak
ing sales revenue less cost of goods less operating expenses less pay
roll and then dividing by sales revenue. Multiplying by 100, we ob
tained a rate of profit expressed in cents per dollar of sales. It should
be understood that this is a gross profit measure which includes
some fixed costs such as rent that would have to be subtracted in
order to obtain a purer measure of net profit. The rate of profit for
the O&O stores averaged over 10 cents per dollar of sales in 1983.
This was double the rate of profit in the non-QWL stores, which
averaged just over 5 cents per dollar of sales, and was above the
average profit rate of 7 cents per dollar of sales for the QWL stores.
Despite these large differences by store type in the average rate of
profit, however, the differences were not statistically significant.
This was due to the very large variation in the rate of profit among
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individual Super Fresh stores, both QWL and non-QWL. Differences
in store functioning that contributed to these variations in the profit
rate are examined below as part of the model testing.
Thus, the multiple objectives pursued by the O&O stores—
providing full-time employment at high wages to a large proportion
of the labor force as well as earning an acceptable rate of profit—
did not cause profitability to suffer in comparison to Super Fresh
stores, where the emphasis was on profit maximization.
The model developed in chapter 2 hypothesizes that worker char
acteristics, store type, help from consultants, formal organization of
the store and union support will influence a store's participativeness.
Store participativeness, hi turn, is expected to affect store function
ing—both the kind of labor strategy the firm adopts and the infor
mal processes that go on within the store. Finally, store functioning
and store characteristics are expected to influence the store's eco
nomic performance—its profit, productivity and unit labor costs.
Mean values for variables in each of these categories are also re
ported in table 7.1.
Mean values are reported by store type, however the role of store
type in affecting store economic outcomes cannot be inferred from
the mean values. Caution must be exercised in interpreting these
mean values. They are merely descriptive and neither confirm nor
disconfirm hypothesized causal relationships. Those are tested be
low, in a later section of this chapter.

Worker Characteristics
The O&O stores employed a higher proportion of female workers
and a higher proportion of high school graduates while the QWL
stores had the highest proportion of nonwhite employees. None of
these differences is significant, however, because of the wide varia
tion among individual stores in each category.

Consultants and Union
The O&O stores received significantly more different kinds of
consultant help from a variety of sources than either QWL or non-
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QWL Super Fresh stores. Help from consultants is measured by a
variable that reports the number of different types and sources of
consulting the store received. Union support for participation was
measured by a single five-point item on the shop steward's question
naire that asked how much the union supported worker ownership
(for the O&O stores) or QWL (for the Super Fresh stores). The
O&O stores reported significantly lower union support. This surpris
ing outcome results from the reduced role of the union in the O&O
stores, where grievances and other differences are more likely to be
resolved through informal processes established through participa
tion in decisionmaking by worker/owners. In contrast, the union has
an important, formally designated, and time-consuming role to play
in the QWL program.

Store Participativeness
Shop stewards and store managers were asked to evaluate worker
participation in their stores. The extent to which workers participate
in decisionmaking within the stores can be measured along several
dimensions, including the overall extent of worker control, the range
of decisions in which workers participate, and the intensity of the
participation. The overall influence of workers on decisionmaking,
which we have termed "degree of overall worker control," combines
the responses to the questions, "How much are workers' opinions
taken into account?" and "How much 'say' or influence do workers
have on what goes on in the store?" It is measured on a scale of 2 to
10. Both managers and shop stewards rated the degree of overall
worker control higher on average at the O&O stores, but the differ
ence was not statistically significant.
The range of decisions over which workers have control is another
important aspect of participation. Shop stewards at the O&O and
QWL stores rated workers as having significantly more control over
decisions relating to daily work—schedule, working conditions and
tasks—in comparison with the rating by shop stewards at non-QWL
stores. Shop stewards rated workers at O&O stores as having signif
icantly more control over such long-term decisions as capital invest-
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ments or shutdowns than workers at either QWL or non-QWL Super
Fresh stores. Managers at the non-QWL stores, however, rated their
workers significantly higher than other workers were rated in control
over decisions about daily work; and managers at O&O stores rated
their workers significantly lower than managers at Super Fresh stores
in control over long-term decisions. The shop stewards' perceptions
of the range of issues over which workers have control in each type
of store closely parallel those of the workers themselves (compare
table 7.1 and table 6.2 in chapter 6).
Workers at O&O stores were more likely than other workers to
participate often in decisionmaking. When asked to give the percent
distribution of workers who participate often, sometimes, rarely or
never, managers at O&O stores reported that 65 percent of workers
participate "often," compared with 23 percent at both QWL and
non-QWL Super Fresh stores. Shop stewards estimate the proportion
who participate "often" more conservatively. According to the shop
stewards, 30 percent of O&O workers, 23 percent of QWL workers
and 13 percent of non-QWL workers participate "often."
The distribution of power in the hierarchy, measured by how much
"say" or influence managers (also called store directors) and depart
ment heads have, is another indicator of store participativeness (see
figures 6.1 and 6.2). O&O managers did not answer this question
about themselves; they rated the influence of department heads as
very high (a score of 5 on a scale of 1 to 5). Managers at both QWL
and non-QWL stores rated both themselves and department heads as
influential in decisionmaking (scores of approximately 4.6 out of 5).
Shop stewards at the O&O stores rated the amount of influence
managers have as high (4.5) and that of department heads as some
what lower (3.5). These ratings probably reflect the fact that the
managers at both of the O&O stores are also owners and have a very
influential position as a result. Shop stewards at the Super Fresh
stores gave high ratings to the amount of influence managers have at
both QWL and non-QWL stores. As would be expected if QWL
were effective, department heads at QWL stores were rated as sig
nificantly more influential than department heads at non-QWL
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stores. This is because QWL gives a large, formal role to department
heads, as part of the store planning board, in influencing decisions.

Store Functioning
Under store functioning, we examined the strategies stores adopt
in training and deploying workers, as well as the nature of informal
store processes. Our hypothesis, tested later in this chapter, is that
store participativeness influences both of these aspects of store func
tioning. More participative stores are expected to do better in meet
ing worker requirements for hours of work, to provide more training
and to be more innovative. They are also expected to encourage peer
training. In addition, participation is expected to have a positive ef
fect on what we have termed interpersonal processes—the quality of
decisionmaking and the willingness of people to accept decisions,
the degree of trust between manager and workers, the discussion and
resolution of disagreements or conflicts, as well as how much people
know about what is going on. More worker participation may, how
ever, slow down the decisionmaking process. It is via these changes
in store functioning that greater store participativeness is expected to
translate into higher productivity and profit.
Labor Strategies
The effects of participation and the QWL program at Super Fresh
have been distorted by a labor contract that works at cross purposes
to some of the goals of participation as discussed in chapters 4 and
5. The contract established a two-tier wage system paying new em
ployees substantially less than former A&P workers, and it devel
oped a bonus plan in which workers in stores that hold down unit
labor costs receive a share of the store's profits, distributed among
workers according to the number of hours worked.
The result is that managers at some of the QWL stores, with the
participation and support of the department heads who make up
most of the full-time workers, have adopted a labor strategy that
penalizes the rest of the store's labor force. They have attempted to
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keep unit labor costs low by holding down the number of full-time
workers and by encouraging turnover so that more workers will be at
the bottom of the pay scale. The large number of part-time employ
ees in these stores are disenfranchised from effective participation in
the QWL program and in decisionmaking. This labor strategy is
even harsher in its treatment of new employees than the strategy
adopted at many of the non-QWL stores, though former A&P work
ers, who are prominent among full-time workers in these stores, may
have benefited from QWL.
These approaches to labor strategy show up clearly in table 7.1.
The O&O stores, as noted above, have a higher percentage of fulltime workers and a higher percentage at the top of the pay scale.
Non-QWL stores have, on average, a slightly larger percentage of
full-time workers and a larger percentage of workers at the top of the
pay scale than QWL stores. Part-time workers at the O&O stores
average more weekly hours (20 compared with 18 and 17 at QWL
and non-QWL stores), and a smaller percentage of O&O workers are
at the bottom of the pay scale (13 percent compared with 21 and 25
percent respectively). Turnover and absenteeism are also highest, on
average, for the QWL stores and lowest for the O&Os. Averages can
be misleading, however. There was wide variation in the perfor
mance of QWL stores on all aspects of labor strategy, and mean
differences by store type, while large, were usually not significant.
Non-QWL stores had more workers who could be assigned to
more than one job and had introduced more innovations in job de
sign and ways of doing things, according to the managers, than other
stores. These questions were not asked of the shop stewards. Again,
the very positive responses of managers at non-QWL stores to these
and other questions appear to reflect their overly optimistic view of
events in their stores.

Informal Store Processes
Managers at non-QWL stores rated the positive effects of partici
pation on the quality of decisionmaking, trust, conflict resolution

Economic Performance

227

and other interpersonal processes nearly twice as high as did shop
stewards at those same stores. They also gave higher ratings to the
amount of peer training than did shop stewards and reported signif
icantly more slowing down of the speed of decisionmaking as a re
sult of QWL. Managers at O&O stores gave significantly higher
ratings to the positive effects of participation on interpersonal inter
actions and reported that participation slowed down decisionmaking
to a lesser extent than Super Fresh managers at either QWL or nonQWL stores. The O&O shop stewards' rating of the effect on inter
personal interactions, while not significantly different from the
managers' perceptions, were somewhat lower. This may account for
the fact that the QWL stores scored significantly higher than the
other two store types, and the non-QWL stores scored significantly
lower in the shop stewards' ratings of effect of participation on in
terpersonal interactions. O&O shop stewards also reported the great
est slow down of decisionmaking, and non-QWL shop stewards the
least, as a result of participation.
Both managers and shop stewards reported fewer training pro
grams at the O&O stores since reopening. This is because these
stores (and some of the QWL stores as well) had many training pro
grams prior to reopening and, unfortunately, we did not ask ques
tions on the survey that allowed this training to be captured. We do
know from the personal interviews that workers remember little from
the programs and claim to have learned most of what they know
about operations and governance after the stores opened.
The shop stewards were also asked about the effects of participa
tion on worker motivation. There were no significant differences
among the stores in perceptions that extra effort makes a difference,
or in the perception that participation in decisionmaking makes extra
effort and hard work effective in increasing productivity. Our mea
sure of extra effort is based on two items: how often it is true that
working hard leads to high productivity or to doing the job well. Our
measure of perceived effectiveness comes from the two items: extent
to which the opportunity to contribute to decisionmaking influences
extra effort or extra effectiveness on the job.
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Store Characteristics

The O&O stores, on average, are somewhat smaller, have more
competitors, and obtain credit more easily than the Super Fresh
stores, though none of these differences are significant. As A&P
stores in 1981, the O&O stores had had the poorest economic per
formance while the QWL stores had, on average, the best.

Testing the Model
The model developed in chapter 2 hypothesizes that worker par
ticipation in decisionmaking within stores depends on worker char
acteristics, type of formal store structure (i.e., worker-owned,
conventional ownership with QWL, conventional ownership without
full implementation of QWL) and union and consultant support in
implementing participation. Store functioning—both the informal
processes that go on within stores and the strategies which stores
adopt with respect to the training and deployment of workers—is
hypothesized to depend on store participativeness and the business
environment. Finally, the model hypothesizes that store economic
outcomes are affected by store functioning and store characteristics.
The model to be tested is described by the following system of
equations:
(Eq. 7.1) participativeness = f(Worker Characteristics, Store Type,
Union Support, Consultant Help).
(Eq. 7.2) store functioning = f(Participativeness, Business Environ
ment).

(Eq. 7.3) store economic outcomes = f(Store Functioning, Store
Characteristics).
Participation is measured by overall extent of worker control or,
alternatively, by degree of involvement in a range of decisions. In
the latter case, two participation equations are estimated, one for
participation in daily decisions and one for participation in longterm decisions.
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A large number of store functioning variables are available in our
data set. They include labor strategy variables such as percent offulltime workers, average weekly hours of part-time workers, percent at
the bottom of the pay scale and amount of peer training. They also
include variables that measure informal store processes—whether
workers are making a greater effort, whether they believe that work
ing harder gets results, whether interpersonal interactions have im
proved, whether participation has slowed decisionmaking, whether
workers are satisfied with participation.
Store economic outcomes are measured by profit, productivity,
and unit labor costs. A separate version of the model is estimated for
each of these outcomes.

Methodological Issues
The theoretical model underlying this study is essentially recur
sive, however we have estimated the system of equations using
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) to allow for the possibility of un
specified interactions among the dependent variables.
The small size of our sample—data for 25 stores—affected the
way we tested the model. As table 7.1 shows, there are many possi
ble measures in our data set for each of the variables in the model.
The small sample size precludes use of more than a few of these in
any particular test of the model. We have, therefore, tested alterna
tive versions of the theoretical model using different measures of
participation and of store functioning. One version used involvement
in a range of decisions—decisions about daily tasks and long-term
decisions—as the measure of participation. A second version of the
model used the overall degree of worker control as the measure of
participation.
In the case of store functioning, fidelity to the theoretical model
led us to include one measure of informal store processes and one
measure of labor strategy in each variant of the model. The results
for 10 such pairs of store functioning variables are reported in tables
7.3 through 7.12. These variants of the model are tested first using
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degree of involvement in a range of decisions in which workers par
ticipate as the measure of participation and then using overall degree
of worker control. We report results, in all, for 20 variants of the
model, each run three times with profit, productivity and unit labor
costs entered separately as the dependent variable in the store eco
nomic outcome equation.
Each of the structural equations in the model is identified. Thus,
using Three-Stage Least Squares to estimate the coefficients yields
estimates that are both consistent and asymptotically efficient. That
is, we have used the available data as efficiently as possible and
have obtained consistent estimates of the coefficients. The signs of
the coefficients are, in general, as hypothesized in the theoretical
model. The small size of the sample suggests the importance of ex
ercising caution in interpreting tests of hypotheses, however. While
the test statistics are distributed asymptotically normal (0,1), very
little is known about their actual distribution when the sample size is
small and the number of observations, as in this study, is in the
range of 10 to 25. We think that the large t-statistics on many of the
key model variables, frequently greater than 3 and sometimes even
greater than 4, create a strong presumption that the true coefficients
of these variables are not zero and that these variables do have the
effects hypothesized in the model.
Even recognizing the limitations of the small sample size, it seems
reasonable to conclude, as we do in the next section of this chapter,
that the data provide support for the hypotheses regarding the influ
ence of ownership and participation on the economic performance of
stores. Certainly, the model warrants further and more conclusive
testing with a larger number of firms.
Results of the Model Testing
The participation equations were estimated as part of the system
of equations in each of the 20 versions of the model reported here.
Half of the model variants employ two equations for range of decisionmaking—participation in decisions about daily tasks, participa-
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tion in long-term decisions—as the participation variables; half
employ a single equation for overall degree of worker control. On
the basis of a preliminary regression analysis that included such vari
ables as race, sex and seniority, we selected the percentage of high
school graduates in a store as the most appropriate measure of
worker characteristics for inclusion in the participation equations.
Store type is measured in these equations by two dummy variables,
one for QWL and one for worker-owned, with non-QWL as the
omitted category. Consultant help counts the number of different
kinds and different sources of consulting the store received. Union
support had to be omitted from the analysis because several shop
stewards did not answer this question.
Participation Equations
As described above, we estimated many variations of the basic
model and each of the participation equations appears in 20 model
runs. The results of the model testing for the version using involve
ment in a range of decisions (daily and long-term decisions) as the
measures of participativeness are reported in the two left-hand col
umns of each table (7.2 to 7.12); results for the alternative version,
which uses degree of overall worker control, are reported in the two
right-hand columns of each table.
Table 7.2 reports typical coefficient estimators and t-statistics for
the variables in the participation equations (Eq. 7.1). They are re
ported for the version of the model in which store functioning is
measured by percent full time and increased effort (N of stores =
23), and in which profit is the dependent variable in the economic
outcome equation. Estimates of the coefficients may vary in other
model specifications, but variables with large t-statistics had such
t-values in all model runs. The small number of observations makes
us cautious about drawing inferences.
The high t-value for the education variable in each of the partici
pation equations suggests that the proportion of high school gradu
ates in a store increases worker participation in decisions about daily
tasks and in decisions with long-term implications and also increases
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the perceived overall degree of worker control. That is, the worker
characteristic variable of education has a positive effect on all mea
sures of participation.
Worker ownership appears to increase worker involvement in
long-term decisions compared with traditionally-owned and
managed-stores, but, surprisingly, it does not increase participation
in decisions about daily tasks nor does it increase the degree of over
all worker control. Workers in stores with formal QWL programs
may participate more in decisions about daily tasks and may have a
greater degree of overall worker control than those in stores without
such QWL programs, but the evidence is inconclusive. This finding
is probably an artifact of the small number of O&O stores and the
wide variation in participativeness for the QWL stores.
Another explanation for the unexpected finding about the effect of
worker ownership is that the structures of formal decisionmaking in
the worker-owned stores tend to be reserved for long-term decisions.
Worker/owners may be very autonomous in their daily tasks, as the
discussion in chapter 5 indicates. They may not report high degrees
of worker control because they make their decisions informally and
not in structured meetings.
Store Functioning Equations
Tables 7.3 through 7.12 report the effects of participation in deci
sionmaking on store functioning (top half of each table) and the ef
fects of store functioning on each of the store economic outcomes
(bottom half of each table). The hypothesis that worker participation
in decisionmaking affects store functioning receives some support in
this analysis.
With respect to measures of labor strategy, greater participation in
long-term decisionmaking increases the percentage of full-time
workers in a store (tables 7.3 to 7.9), but it does not affect the av
erage number of hours worked by part-time employees (tables 7.10
to 7.12) or the percent of workers at the bottom of the pay scale
(table 7.12). Regardless of store type, greater involvement in daily-
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decisions does lead to higher average work hours for part-time work
ers (tables 7.10 to 7.12), but does not affect the proportion of fulltime workers (tables 7.3 to 7.9). Contrary to our hypothesis,
however, greater worker participation in daily decisions is associated
with a higher percentage of workers at the bottom of the pay scale
(table 7.12). This apparent paradox may result from the fact that in
those Super Fresh stores where former A&P workers are favored in
their hours, managers have attempted to hold down costs by hiring a
larger number of low-paid new workers in part-time jobs. The older
workers, with longer or full-time hours, who participate in daily de
cisions may not object to this management strategy.
The third measure of participativeness, perceived degree of overall
worker control, affects store labor strategy as well, regardless of
store type. Greater perceived overall worker control in a store leads
to a larger proportion of full-time workers (tables 7.3 to 7.9) and
leads to a higher average number of hours worked by part-timers
(tables 7.10 to 7.12). It also appears to increase the proportion of
employees at the bottom of the pay scale (table 7.12).
While many of these results tend to confirm the model, one can
not rule out reverse causation. In other words, the presence of
former A&P workers who have more full-time positions or part-time
positions with more hours may itself lead to greater perceived overall
worker control.
With respect to other aspects of store functioning, those having to
do with internal store processes, the hypothesis that greater partici
pation in long-term decisions would be a positive influence was not
confirmed in the analyses (tables 7.3 to 7.12). Other measures of
participativeness did act in accordance with our hypotheses, how
ever. Both involvement in daily decisions and perceived overall
worker control appear to improve the quality of interpersonal inter
actions (tables 7.3 and 7.11), to lead to greater effort (tables 7.4 and
7.10), to strengthen the perception that participation makes working
hard more effective (table 7.5), to lead to more innovation (table
7.8), and to increase the amount of peer training (table 7.9). Partic
ipativeness also appears to slow decisionmaking (table 7.6). In addi-
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tion, greater perceived overall worker control increases satisfaction
with participation (table 7.7).
Measures of the business environment, such as the availability of
credit, did not appear from our preliminary statistical work to affect
store functioning. Thus, these measures are not included in the final
analysis.

Store Economic Outcomes
There appears to be support for the hypothesis that participativeness—particularly as measured by involvement in decisions about
daily tasks and by overall worker control—improves store function
ing, which in turn improves the economic performance of stores.
Each of the store economic outcomes is estimated in each variant
of the model as a function of two store functioning variables and the
number of competitors (Eq. 7.3). Other measures of store character
istics and the business environment, including availability of credit,
floor area of store in square feet, and 1981 sales volume, were in
cluded in other analyses of the model. None had high t-values in any
of the versions of the model, however, and the analyses are not re
ported here. The results from (Eq. 7.3) are found in the bottom
halves of tables 7.3 to 7.12.
Unit labor costs are measured in the usual way as payroll per dol
lar of sales, but productivity is measured in this analysis by value
added per dollar of payroll rather than per hour of work. As a result,
increases in productivity as measured here need not reduce unit labor
costs. It is still true for our measures of profit, productivity, and unit
labor costs that an increase in productivity, other things equal, in
creases profit while an increase in unit labor costs reduces profit.
Thus developments within supermarkets that have the effect of in
creasing unit labor costs may nevertheless increase profit if they have
a sufficiently positive effect on productivity. Conversely, store poli
cies designed to reduce unit labor costs may actually reduce profit if
they have a sufficiently negative effect on productivity.
The effects of store functioning—labor strategies and informal
store processes—on productivity, labor costs and profit are possibly
the most important of our results. Table 7.3 examines the joint ef-
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fects of the proportion of full-time workers and interpersonal inter
actions. We find that a larger proportion of full-time workers neither
increases unit labor costs nor raises productivity, and hence it has no
effect on profit. Improved interpersonal interactions raises unit labor
costs, but it also increases productivity. The net effect on profit, if
any, is probably positive.
Table 7.4 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time
workers and productivity-enhancing effort. Again, the percent of
full-time workers does not affect labor costs, productivity or profit.
An environment in which increased effort pays off does appear to
increase costs, but it also increases productivity. As a result, profit is
neither increased nor reduced.
Table 7.5 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time
workers and of effective effort through worker participation in decisionmaking. Again, percent full time has no effect on labor costs,
productivity and profit, while increased effort and effectiveness
raised both labor costs and productivity. The joint effect leaves profit
unaffected.
Table 7.6 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time
workers and any slowdown in decisionmaking that occurs. The ef
fects of full-time work are the same as before. Slower decisionmak
ing raises labor costs, but the decisions are apparently better
decisions. Productivity is higher where decisionmaking is slower and
the net effect on profit, if any, is positive.
Table 7.7 examines the joint effects of the proportion of full-time
workers and satisfaction with participation. Again, proportion full
time has no effect. Unit labor costs are higher in stores in which
workers are perceived as more satisfied with participation. Produc
tivity in such stores is, if anything, higher and profit is not affected.
Proportion full time is combined with innovativeness of the store
in table 7.8. Again proportion full time has no effect while greater
innovativeness increases both labor costs and productivity and has no
effect on profit.
Table 7.9 examines the joint effect of the proportion of full-time
workers and the amount of peer training. As with the other store
process variables, peer training increases both labor costs and pro-
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ductivity but has no effect on profit. Proportion full time, as usual,
has no effect on labor costs and profit though it may have a positive
effect on productivity. This suggests the possibility of an interaction
between the proportion of full-time workers and the amount of peer
training, which affects productivity.
Table 7.10 examines the joint effect of average hours for part-time
workers and of productivity-enhancing effort. Consistent with the re
sults reported in table 7.4, increasing the hours of part-time workers
does not increase labor costs or productivity and has no effect on
profit. It is surprising that increased effort in this analysis also has
no effect on labor costs, productivity or profit.
Table 7.11 examines the joint effect of average hours of part-time
workers and interpersonal interactions. Consistent with table 7.3, the
result of improved interpersonal interactions is to raise productivity
and profit. However, the result of increasing the hours of part-time
workers obtained here is somewhat anomalous in light of the find
ings in model runs reported in earlier tables. Unit labor costs are
increased, productivity is unaffected and profit, if anything, may be
reduced.

Discussion
Though small sample size requires that caution be exercised in
drawing conclusions, we interpret these results as providing strong
support for several of our central hypotheses. We cannot confirm an
independent role for the influence of worker ownership on store
functioning, however. This may well be a statistical artifact due to
the fact that only two of the stores are worker-owned.
The unique effect of worker ownership on the operation of super
markets occurs mainly through its effects on the goals of workerowned firms. In addition to high profits, these include full-time
hours at high wages for worker/owners. Our analysis indicates that
these latter goals have been accomplished without increasing unit la
bor costs or reducing profit in comparison with firms with a higher
proportion of part-time workers or a higher proportion of workers at
the bottom of the pay scale.
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Greater participation in decisions about daily tasks and a higher
overall degree of worker control, whether as a result of worker own
ership or a QWL program, improves the effectiveness of informal
store processes. More effective store processes—improved interper
sonal interactions, increased effort, increased effectiveness, more
peer training, more innovativeness, greater satisfaction with partici
pation and even the slowing down of decisionmaking as workers par
ticipate—all appear to contribute to greater productivity. Thus,
despite the higher labor costs associated with more effective store
processes, profit does not appear to be reduced. If anything, im
proved interpersonal interactions and slower decisionmaking as a re
sult of participation may increase profit.
Findings with respect to labor strategies are somewhat surprising.
A higher percentage of full-time workers and, with the possible ex
ception of one of the model runs, increasing the hours of part-time
workers do not appear to increase labor costs. A higher proportion at
the bottom of the pay scale does not appear to reduce them. Further,
having more full-time workers or fewer workers at the bottom of
the pay scale does not appear to raise productivity, while the pro
ductivity effect of more hours for part-time workers is ambiguous.
The effects of these variables on profit are weaker but in the same
direction as their effects on productivity. That is, increasing the
hours of work of part-timers does not reduce, and may even in
crease, profit; while having many low-paid workers does not in
crease, and may reduce, profit.
An important implication of this finding is that if Super Fresh bo
nuses were tied to increases in productivity or profit, rather than to
reductions in unit labor costs, then: impacts might be very different.
Stores have been rewarded for reducing labor costs without taking
into consideration the strategies employed to achieve this end and
the effect of such strategies on productivity. It is likely that bonuses
have gone to some stores which would not have received them if
profit, rather than unit labor costs, had been the criterion of eco
nomic performance. The bonus provision of the contract distorted
the incentives for both managers and full-time workers, and resulted
in incorrect decisions in some stores regarding how the store should
function.
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Nevertheless, punitive labor strategies engaged in by some man
agers—reducing the percentage of full-time workers, reducing the
hours of part-timers, encouraging high turnover so that many work
ers earn entry level wages—are not particularly successful strategies
for reducing unit labor costs. They are even less effective in raising
profit. Yet these are the usual justifications for such strategies.
The profit of firms that provide a greater proportion of full-time
jobs, more hours for part-timers, fewer jobs at the bottom of the pay
scale, greater participation for workers in decisions about daily
tasks, and higher overall worker control does not suffer in compari
son with the profit of firms that adopt more punitive labor strategies
and more authoritarian management techniques.
In general, improvements in the quality of jobs do appear to raise
unit labor costs. However, these improvements in the quality of work
also make it possible for workers to do their jobs better and have a
positive effect on productivity. As a result, profit is not jeopardized
when better jobs and working conditions are provided, despite the
increase in unit labor costs. Profit does not appear to be lower in
stores in which the quality of jobs is better. Improving interpersonal
interactions and slowing down decisions through participation in decisionmaking may actually increase profit.
These conclusions challenge the conventional wisdom among
managers about strategies for increasing profit. In our sample of
stores, so-called cost-cutting labor strategies did not reduce unit la
bor costs or raise profit. And participative management and more
effective store processes raised unit labor costs but, because of their
positive effect on productivity, did not reduce profit. These results of
our analysis, which must be viewed as tentative until they are repli
cated in other studies in which the sample of firms is larger, raise
serious questions about the wisdom of managerial decisions adopted
by many service sector firms today as they attempt to become more
competitive and to increase profitability.
To see these store outcomes in a broader perspective, we need to
integrate them with the results reported in previous chapters. The
following final chapter presents this integration and the policy impli
cations which we draw from this experience.
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NOTE
1. Payroll, or the wage bill, is the product of the average wage (w) and total employee hours
(N). It can be written wN while output can be written Q. Then unit labor costs can be ex
pressed as ULC = wN/Q. Q/N is output per employee hour or average product. It follows that
unit labor costs equal the average wage divided by the average product of labor.
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Table 7.2
Participation in Decisionmaking
Overall control
Involvement
(N=24)
(N = 23)
Equation
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Participation1 (Eq. 7.1)
Involvement in decisions—
daily tasks*
6.799
7.226
% high school graduates
2.583
2.810
QWL store type2
1.043
2.360
O&O store type2
-0.193
-0.033
Consultants
Involvement in decisions—
long term
7.203
3.024
% high school graduates
0.536
0.227
QWL store type
7.258
6.682
type
O&O store
0.655
0.043
Consultants
Degree of overall
worker control
7.658
6.028
% high school graduates
2.314
1.728
QWL store type2
0.958
1.486
O&O store type2
0.407
0.051
Consultants
*In reading this and subsequent tables, note that the dependent variable in a
particular model equation is printed flush with the left hand margin while
the independent variables for the equation are indented under it. Thus, in
the first equation reported here, "Involvement in decisions, daily tasks" is
the dependent variable and the "percent of high school graduates" em
ployed in the store has a positive effect on this measure of participativeness.
1. All measures of participation reported in this and subsequent tables
were derived from shop stewards' responses.
2. Both measures of store type are dummy coded against the omitted type,
non-QWL.
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Table 7.3
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and
Interpersonal Interactions as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree
Including overall
of involvement
worker control
(N = 21)
(N = 22)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Percent full time
1.363
0.009
Daily decisions
3.046
0.041
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
0.030
8.374
Interpersonal interactions
5.175
Daily decisions
2.090
0.701
0.594
Long-term decisions
2.839
Overall worker control
16.154
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
0.473
0.800
1.730
Percent full time
0.210
3.519
Interpersonal interactions 0.076
4.264
0.081
0.363
0.026
0.051
# of competitors
0.664
Unit labor costs
-0.001
0.789
0.109
Percent full time
-0.009
3.125
Interpersonal interactions 0.005
0.005
4.391
0.671
0.003
0.004
# of competitors
1.283
Profit
-0.001
-0.000
-0.062
Percent full time
-0.376
2.358
Interpersonal interactions 0.003
0.004
2.828
0.146
0.001
# of competitors
0.002
0.304
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.4
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time
and Increased Effort as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree
Including overall
of involvement
worker control
(N=22)
(N = 24)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7 .2)
Percent full time
0.008
1.301
Daily decisions
3.620
0.041
Long-term decisions
0.032
Overall worker control
9.217
Increased effort
5.724
0.880
Daily decisions
-0.179
-0.053
Long-term decisions
Overall worker control
13.972
1.061
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
0.924
1.754
0.292
0.514
Percent full time
3.084
3.904
0.232
0.207
Increased effort
0.108
0.009
0.027
# of competitors
0.339
Unit labor costs
-0.045
-0.390
-0.199
-1.872
Percent full time
4.481
0.018
0.021
Increased effort
5.881
-0.127
-0.001
0.003
0.639
# of competitors
Profit
0.772
0.098
0.068
Percent full time
0.563
1. 417
0.006
0.007
1.762
Increased effort
0.001
0.159
0.001
# of competitors
0.165
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.

Economic Performance

243

Table 7.5
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and
Perceived Effort and Effectiveness as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree
Including overall
of involvement
worker control
(N = 22)
(N = 23)
Equation
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Store functioning (Eq. 7,.2)
Percent full time
Daily decisions
0.008
Long-term decisions
0.040
Overall worker control
Perceived effort and
effectiveness
Daily decisions
1.024
Long-term decisions
-0.061
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
Percent full time
1.851
Effort and effectiveness 0.180
# of competitors
0.001
Unit labor costs

1.412
3.560

5.204
-0.162

1.177
4.037
0.021

0.032

8.960

1.190

17.455

0.843
0.215
-0.006

0.531
4.763
-0.090

-0.052
-0.520
Percent full time
-0.213
-2.116
Effort and effectiveness 0.016
5.458
0.019
6.705
# of competitors
-0.000
0.095
0.002
0.638
Profit
0.108
0.896
0.106
Percent full time
0.873
1.696
Effort and effectiveness 0.006
0.007
-1.993
-0.000
-0.051
-0.002
# of competitors
-0.341
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.6
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and Slowness
of Decisionmaking as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree
Including overall
worker control
of involvement
(N = 21)
(N = 22)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Percent full time
1.280
Daily decisions
0.008
3.424
Long-term decisions
0.040
0.032
Overall worker control
Slowness of decisionmaking
3.747
Daily decisions
1.299
Long-term decisions
0.195
1.298
Overall worker control
0.478
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
-1.110
-0.407 -2.518
Percent full time
3.592
0.653
Slow decisionmaking
0.608
0.042
0.579
0.074
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
-0.041
Percent full time
-0.232 -0.256
Slow decisionmaking
0.036
3.235
0.044
0.002
0.553
0.006
# of competitors
Profit
-0.104
Percent full time
-0.596 -0.144
Slow decisionmaking
0.027
2.527
0.029
# of competitors
0.002
0.301
0.002
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table

8.628

13.946

-1.163
4.773
1.025
-1.898
5.091
1.688
-0.943
3.060
0.418
7.2.
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Table 7.7
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and
Satisfaction With Participation as Measures of Store Functioning
Including overall
Including degree
worker control
of involvement
(N = 20)
(N = 18)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Percent full time
1.263
0.006
Daily decisions
4.608
0.040
Long-term decisions
0.030
8.002
Overall worker control
Satisfaction with
participation
2.403
0.324
Daily decisions
0.738
—0.202
Long-term decisions
0.512
7.003
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
3.202
0.831
2.091
Percent full time
1.574
Satisfaction with
0.329
2.175
0.397
2.277
participation
0.034
0.201
0.020
0.380
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
-0.160
-1.114
-0.162
-1.536
Percent full time
Satisfaction with
0.049
4.914
0.051
6.290
participation
-0.584 - 0.001
-0.003
-0.221
# of competitors
Profit
0.272
0.853
0.153
1.660
Percent full time
Satisfaction with
-0.099
-0.001
0.534
0.007
participation
0.004
0.319
0.002
0.506
# of competitors
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.8
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and
Innovations as Measures of Store Functioning
Including overall
Including degree
worker control
of involvement
(N = 24)
(N=23)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7 .2)
Percent full time
1.527
0.009
Daily decisions
0.039
Long-term decisions
3.484
9.359
0.033
Overall worker control
Innovations
3.458
1.171
Daily decisions
0.152
0.234
Long-term decisions
1.001
1.480
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
2.321
3.451
1.204
1.908
Percent full time
2.766
0.090
3.492
0.118
Innovations
0.633
0.041
0.712
0.046
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
-1.549
-0.150
-1.991
-0.169
Percent full time
0.014
7.451
0.014
6.904
Innovations
0.002
1.312
0.004
0.572
# of competitors
Profit
0.161
2.442
0.297
1.271
Percent full time
0.002
-0.181
-0.000
0.631
Innovations
0.003
0.002
0.548
# of competitors
0.279
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.9
System of Equations* that Includes Percent Full Time and
Amount of Peer Training as Measures of Store Functioning
Including degree
Including overall
of involvement
worker control
(N = 23)
(N = 23)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7 .2)
Percent full time
Daily decisions
0.008
1.359
Long-term decisions
0.041
3.618
Overall worker control
0.032
8.854
Peer training
Daily decisions
0.543
7.246
-0.304
Long-term decisions
-2.121
Overall worker control
0.500
13.111
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
Percent full time
3.623
2.497
3.558
2.458
0.302
3.864
Peer training
0.285
3.769
0.019
# of competitors
0.468
0.278
0.033
Unit labor costs
0.781
0.090
1.169
Percent full time
0.058
0.028
6.421
Peer training
6.744
0.027
# of competitors
0.002
0.502
1.164
0.003
Profit
0.170
1.555
Percent full time
0.175
1.560
0.009
1.496
Peer training
0.008
1.398
# of competitors
0.001
0.150
0.001
0.172
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.10
System of Equations* that Includes Average Hours Worked
Part Time and Increased Effort as Measures of Store Functioning
Including overall
Including degree
worker control
of involvement
(N = 22)
(N = 22)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Avg. hours PT
6.349
2.331
Daily decisions
0.177
0. 124
Long-term decisions
13.336
2.954
Overall worker control
Increased effort
5.813
0.891
Daily decisions
Long-term decisions
-0.292
-0.086
Overall worker control
13.943
1.059
7.3)
Economic outcome (Eq.
Productivity
1.809
0.146
1.611
0.153
Avg. hours PT
-0.762
-0.193
-0.643
-0.189
Increased effort
1.063
0.083
0.514
0.045
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
0.001
0.004
0.167
1.099
Avg. hours PT
0.808
0.015
0.149
0.002
Increased effort
-0.398
-0.002
0.236
0.001
# of competitors
Profit
0.007
-0.818
-0.006
1.052
Avg. hours PT
-0.395
-0.009
-0.602
-0.013
Increased effort
0.003
0.731
0.005
0.437
# of competitors
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Table 7.11
System of Equations* that Includes Average Hours Worked Part
Time and Interpersonal Interactions as Measures of Store Functioning
Including overall
Including degree
worker control
of involvement
(N = 22)
(N = 21)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7.2)
Avg. hours PT
6.097
2.310
Daily decisions
0.443
0.565
Long-term decisions
2.983
Overall worker control
Interpersonal interactions
5.220
2.069
Daily decisions
0.770
0.638
Long-term decisions
2.837
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
-0.298 -0.023
-0.010
Avg. hours PT
0.106
2.841
Interpersonal interactions 0.102
0.661
0.074
0.037
# of competitors
Unit labor costs
4.745
0.006
0.007
Avg. hours PT
-0.000
-0.913
-0.001
interactions
Interpersonal
0.003
0.001
0.606
# of competitors
Profit
-0.006
-2.125
-0.006
Avg. hours PT
0.009
3.292
Interpersonal interactions 0.010
0.329
0.003
0.002
# of competitors
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table

12.230

16.149

-0.637
2.949
1.362
3.625
-0.101
1.544
-2.100
3.196
0.730
7.2.
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Table 7.12
System of Equations* that Includes Average Hours Worked
Part Time and Percent at the Bottom of the Pay Scale as Measures
of Store Functioning
Including overall
Including degree
worker control
of involvement
(N = 23)
(N=22)
Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Equation
Store functioning (Eq. 7 .2)
Avg. hours PT
2.299
6.592
Daily decisions
0.115
0.172
Long-term decisions
13.496
2.885
Overall worker control
Percent at bottom pay
3.039
3.652
Daily decisions
-0.478
-0.742
Long-term decisions
5.809
3.133
Overall worker control
Economic outcome (Eq. 7.3)
Productivity
4.972
0.152
1.153
3.712
Avg. hours PT
-2.795
-0.063
-1.779
Percent at bottom pay -0.054
0.026
# of competitors
1.185
0.059
0.513
Unit labor costs
1.361
0.002
1.682
0.004
Avg. hours PT
0.002
2.219
0.003
1.220
Percent at bottom pay
0.000
0.877
0.002
0.053
# of competitors
Profit
0.009
2.546
3.810
0.010
Avg. hours PT
-1.912
-0.006
Percent at bottom pay -0.005
-3.260
0.002
0.002
0.402
0.589
# of competitors
*System also includes participation equations as reported in table 7.2.
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Conclusions and Implications

The preceding three chapters presented data from semistructured
interviews with former A&P workers who took jobs in the O&O
worker buyouts and in the Super Fresh supermarkets, from a survey
questionnaire filled out by those workers, and from surveys of shop
stewards and managers in their stores. These data provided material
for analyses of individual and store processes and outcomes utilizing
the theoretical model presented in chapter 2. In this final chapter, we
summarize and discuss the findings and draw some conclusions with
respect to both that model and policies that might be considered by
those interested in job-saving efforts, quality of worklife programs,
employee ownership, and related subjects.
The Philadelphia A&P shutdowns and subsequent openings of two
job-saving efforts provided a unique opportunity for research. Be
cause the industry, geographic location, previous economic environ
ment, and labor force were common to all stores, we could focus
specifically on the relationships among ownership, participation,
store functioning, and outcomes. In addition, our use of different
methods—surveys and interviews—to look at some of the same
phenomena helped to interpret the findings. The consistency of re
sults from these methods gave us confidence in the findings, despite
the small sample size.
Though the setting was favorable for research, it had limitations
as well. First, with workers in only six stores studied intensively, an
overall total of 25 stores for which data on store-level processes and
outcomes were collected, and only two of this total being worker
buyouts, the sample size requires caution about statistical inferences.
Second, the sample of workers focused on those in the new set
tings who had formerly been A&P employees and whose jobs were
251
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in some way saved. We cannot say much about the effectiveness of
the job-saving efforts for those employees who had not experienced
the shutdown.
While the Super Fresh supermarket chain or the unions can claim
that thousands of jobs were saved which otherwise might have been
lost, they cannot claim that thousands of former A&P workers had
their working lives and economic fortunes fully restored from the
brink of deprivation. Many of those now working for Super Fresh,
even at the time of our interviews and surveys, were new to the
stores. In an abstract sense, many jobs were saved, but in a real
sense most former A&P workers experienced sacrifices. We concen
trated on those who had gone through the shutdown so that we could
see what happened to the people in these stores, not just what hap
pened to change the stores' functioning.
Third, the study is limited by the very setting that enabled it. That
is, the uniqueness of some of the circumstances may reduce the
chances that lessons from such bold workplace experiments could be
applied elsewhere. Similarly, the controls afforded by the setting
over several aspects of potential variation, such as geography, prod
uct market, workforce characteristics, and most particularly the fo
cus on one industry, supermarkets, also create potential limits to the
generalizability of the findings to other industries, locales, work
forces, etc.
With these limits in mind, however, we see much of general inter
est and importance here. Some of the findings were as hypothesized
and some were unexpected. Before we go on to summarize the find
ings of chapters 5,6, and 7, we should briefly discuss the hypothe
ses tested.

Summary of the Theoretical Framework
To understand the potentially wide variation in outcomes in
employee-owned and participatory organizations, we developed a
multivariate framework. In this framework, we did not assume that
outcomes are the direct results of employee ownership and worker
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participation. Instead, we posited that outcomes are largely func
tions of organizational processes, which are in turn largely functions
of basic input features.
For a graphic representation of the theoretical model, see chapter
2. The framework is also summarized in equation form in chapter 2.
Basic input features are the basic raw ingredients needed to begin
employee-owned and participative organizations. They include
worker characteristics, organization type, the role of consultants and
unions, the business environment, and organizational characteristics.
Organizational processes start to play a role once operations be
gin. These include the governance of organizational decisionmaking
(participativeness) and specific managerial decisions made concern
ing the deployment of resources (organizational functioning and la
bor strategy). We hypothesized that these processes play a vital role
in translating plans into actions. Participative processes should make
employee-owned and participative organizations do things differently
from conventional firms.
According to our hypotheses, organizational outcomes, such as vi
ability, productivity, and profitability are influenced by organiza
tional functioning and labor strategy, as well as by the business
environment and organizational characteristics. Furthermore, organi
zational outcomes should directly influence worker outcomes, such
as worker income, job security, job and life satisfaction, and family
well-being. Worker outcomes should also be independently affected
by labor strategy and resource deployment, by the degree of partici
pativeness and by workers' characteristics.

Summary of Findings
To understand the data, we used two statistical methods. First, we
looked at the simple mean differences among the three store types—
worker-owned, conventional with QWL, and conventional without
QWL. These differences told a great deal about the functioning of
the stores and their success or failure. Second, we also tried to look
at the causal relationships using complex simultaneous-equation
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modeling. Although we can develop a certain number of conclusions
and assertions based on the mean differences among the store types,
we felt the need to be more careful in asserting causality; hence the
model testing. To a great degree, the mean differences confirm the
model hypotheses, but the model testing sometimes confirmed and
sometimes contradicted our expectations.

Mean Differences
Store Economic Outcomes
Overall, according to the mean differences, the worker buyouts
were successful and effective at saving some jobs. In chapter 7, we
found that, compared to the Super Fresh stores, the worker-owned
O&O stores had a higher proportion of full-time workers and of
workers at the top of the pay scale, better sales growth, and more
improvement in labor productivity and unit labor costs when com
pared with the old A&P performance. The worker-owned stores,
which had been among the poorest performing A&P stores, had sig
nificantly lower unit labor costs in 1983 than either the QWL or nonQWL Super Fresh stores, despite the fact that they employed a larger
proportion of full-time, highly-paid workers. Productivity was also
significantly higher in the O&O stores. Moreover, O&O profit mar
gins had improved from lower to higher than those at Super Fresh
stores, though that result was not statistically significant.
Worker Characteristics
How did the worker-owned stores achieve these results? To some
degree, their success was a function of the special group of former
A&P workers that made up their labor forces. In addition, as chapter
5 revealed, staffing patterns of both the O&O and Super Fresh stores
affected the implementation of the new systems of worker participa
tion in decisionmaking.
Store Type
The importance of the formal store governance structure was man
ifested by the rights worker/owners had under their company by-laws

Conclusions and Implications

255

compared to rights Super Fresh workers had under the labor agree
ment. Worker/owners got several things that Super Fresh workers did
not—potential returns on their investments in ownership shares, au
tonomy on the job, self-determination in training, and democratic
participation in the entire range of decisionmaking.
In those Super Fresh stores in which QWL programs were fully
implemented (more than half in our sample), workers acquired some
involvement in decisions through departmental, store, and regional
meetings, but their involvement was constrained and limited to
short-term decisions. In the other half of Super Fresh stores in the
sample, QWL had hardly been implemented. Perhaps some aspects
of the QWL program had been put in place in these stores, but few
workers were involved.

Participativeness
There was considerable variation in worker involvement among
the store types. O&O worker/owners perceived their stores higher
than did Super Fresh workers in almost all aspects of participativeness, except, oddly, for the perceived degree of overall worker con
trol. These differences were significant when we compared all the
workers in the stores, but full-time workers at Super Fresh tended to
be quite similar to the worker/owners in participation in daily deci
sions and most intermediate ones. Of course, comparatively fewer
Super Fresh workers had full-time jobs. And part-time workers, who
made up a larger proportion of the workforce at Super Fresh (both in
QWL and non-QWL stores), were lower in perceived overall worker
control and involvement in daily decisions compared to full-time
workers.
All Super Fresh workers, however, reported significantly less
worker involvement in long-term decisions than O&O worker/own
ers. At the non-QWL Super Fresh stores, part-time workers rated
worker involvement in long-term decisions even lower than fulltimers.
Workers at the QWL stores reported more worker involvement in
daily decisions than their counterparts in the non-QWL stores. In
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long-term decisions and most intermediate decisions, however, both
QWL and non-QWL workers reported low worker involvement.
Store Functioning and Labor Strategy
The worker-owned O&Os and the Super Fresh stores also differed
in their deployment of labor and other resources. The O&O stores
adopted a labor strategy that relied on full-time employment, while
the Super Fresh chain relied heavily on part-time workers. The O&O
stores had more full-time workers, higher average hours for parttimers, and a smaller percentage of low-paid workers. Turnover and
absenteeism were highest for the QWL Super Fresh stores and lowest
for the O&Os; however, these differences were usually not statisti
cally significant. The O&O stores emphasized job training for work
ers significantly more than did Super Fresh. In general, Super Fresh
reduced the number of full-time positions, gave part-time jobs with
continual reductions in hours per week to most of the former A&P
workers, and supplemented these former A&P workers with inexpe
rienced young workers, who were given low wages and part-time
jobs.
With respect to other aspects of store functioning, there were
fewer differences among the store types. A few findings did, how
ever, point to impacts of worker participation on store operations. In
fact, perceptions by workers and shop stewards showed that partici
pation at the QWL Super Fresh stores had significantly more impact
on operational practices than in either the O&O stores or the nonQWL stores, though the O&Os were a not-too-distant second. Par
ticipation had the effect of slowing down decisionmaking more in the
O&Os than the other stores, however.
Worker Outcomes
The main advantage of the O&Os seemed to be that worker/own
ers worked more hours per week on average. The average annual
supermarket income reported by individual worker/owners equalled
that reported by QWL workers, but full-time QWL workers reported
earning more money from their supermarket jobs in 1983 than fulltime O&O worker/owners. Part-time workers at Super Fresh lost out
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economically, with lower incomes arising from shorter hours and
lower-paying positions. An indication that QWL and the labor con
tract at Super Fresh did indeed work is that QWL workers earned
higher bonuses than non-QWL workers. Worker/owners gave them
selves bonuses of a size we could not determine and also gained the
potential accumulated return (unmeasured here) on the share values
of their investments in the stores. Neither the bonuses nor the share
appreciation was reflected in their reported annual income.
Worker/owners tended to be satisfied or dissatisfied with different
aspects of their jobs compared to QWL and non-QWL workers. For
instance, worker/owners were less satisfied with supervision and
with co-workers than both QWL and non-QWL Super Fresh work
ers, but they were more satisfied than non-QWL workers with their
job security and their system of decisionmaking. On overall job sat
isfaction, all three groups tended to score equally. QWL and nonQWL workers tended to be equally satisfied with most aspects of
their jobs and lives off the job, however workers/owners were con
siderably less satisfied with aspects of their lives off the job, partic
ularly with their health, leisure, and family lives.

Simultaneous-Equation Model Testing
In order to go beyond the simple comparisons of mean scores for
the different store types, we sought a more precise test of the theo
retical framework, through simultaneous-equation modeling, as pre
sented in chapters 6 and 7. First, we looked at which basic input
features affected participation. The results indicate that worker char
acteristics influenced several aspects of participativeness, with
workers' educational level, skills, experience, and level of responsi
bility having the most impact.
Store type was also a significant influence. Worker ownership was
a key input to workers' involvement in long-term decisions. Compar
ing all former A&P workers, worker ownership was associated with
perceptions of greater worker involvement in daily decisions, as
well. Among full-time workers, however, neither worker ownership
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nor QWL programs seemed associated with perceptions of higher
daily decision involvement.
Comparing shop stewards' perceptions of worker participation in
their stores, both worker ownership and QWL seem to increase
workers' involvement in daily decisions, but the effect does not ap
pear to be significant. This is probably due to the small number of
O&Os in the sample and the wide variation in participativeness
among the QWL stores.
Second, with respect to store functioning and labor strategies, the
results of the simultaneous equations confirmed what the mean dif
ferences and the more qualitative interview data indicated. That is,
more worker involvement changes the way labor and time are used,
favoring processes that make the organization more cooperative and
efficient through the use of more experienced and loyal full-time
workers with higher hourly wage rates. Stores that had more worker
involvement in long-term decisions (characteristic of worker-owned
stores) also had more full-time workers. Stores with more worker
involvement in daily decisions had higher average hours for parttimers, more low-paid workers, better interpersonal processes as a
result of either QWL or worker ownership, slower decisionmaking,
more peer training, higher levels of worker motivation, and more
innovations in work processes. Stores with more perceived overall
worker control (characteristic of stores with better-educated labor
forces) were similar to those with daily decision involvement.
Third, what really accounted for the economic results stores
achieved? The labor and resource deployment strategy employed in
the O&O and Super Fresh stores had interesting and, to conventional
wisdom, unexpected effects. The strategies favoring more full-time
workers and more hours for part-timers tended not to increase labor
costs and they may have even increased productivity. However, hir
ing more low-paid workers did not reduce labor costs and did reduce
productivity. In general, the common strategy many managers adopt
of trying to slash labor costs to increase profits, tended not to work
here. Investing in human resources did not endanger profitability.
Furthermore, while improvements in store functioning which re
sulted from worker participation tended to increase labor costs as a
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proportion of sales revenue, they also increased productivity. As a
result, these changes usually did not reduce profits. In other words,
increases in unit labor costs may have been offset by increases in
productivity. The bottom line for the store was the same, though of
course for workers it makes a big difference to have full-time work,
more part-time hours, or more involvement.
Fourth, worker outcomes—including economic outcomes, job sat
isfaction, and life satisfaction—tended to be influenced most
strongly by worker characteristics, participativeness, and store prof
itability. In general, the more skilled and harmonious the group that
was assembled to staff the store, the more overall worker control and
involvement in long-term decisions they had, and the more profitable
the stores, the better the workers' life satisfaction. On the other
hand, higher store profits in 1983 meant less job income and lower
satisfaction with pay and benefits. Why? Perhaps this occurred be
cause the worker-owned stores tended to have higher profits, but did
not pay the worker/owners as well as full-time workers at QWL Su
per Fresh stores. Another likely reason might be the rather high ex
pectation some workers, probably worker/owners, seemed to have of
rapid riches.

Discussion
A great number of the findings were in line with the hypotheses
and the model, particularly on the economic performance of the
worker-owned stores, their degree of worker participation, some as
pects of their internal functioning, and their labor strategy. Simi
larly, the QWL Super Fresh stores scored better than the non-QWL
stores on workers' involvement in daily decisions and on a few areas
of store functioning, but these differences were not reflected in store
outcomes.
Many of the results of the model testing also tended to confirm
the hypotheses. Worker ownership tended to increase worker in
volvement in daily and long-term decisions; higher levels of partici
pativeness predicted some improvement in aspects of store
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functioning and also led to a labor strategy relying on full-time
workers; finally, improved store functioning tended to predict im
proved productivity, even while it increased labor costs.
Some of the findings were not as expected in the theoretical
framework, however. The worker-owned stores were not superior to
QWL stores in profits or productivity. According to shop steward
perceptions, the O&O stores did not differ from QWL stores in
worker involvement in daily decisions. In job income, O&O workers
were equal to Super Fresh workers, but full-time O&O workers were
actually worse off in job income even though they worked longer
weekly hours than full-time Super Fresh workers. O&O workers
were also equal or lower on most measures of satisfaction, especially
satisfaction with leisure and health.
Similarly, unexpected findings cropped up in the model testing.
At the store level of analysis, while long-term decision involvement
led to a full-tune labor strategy, it did not affect measures of store
functioning. Surprisingly, improved store functioning led to in
creased labor costs and did not help profits. Labor strategy did not
affect profit, productivity, or labor costs. At the worker level of anal
ysis, measures of participation had surprising effects on job income
and work hours per week, while more worker involvement in longterm decisions led to lower satisfaction with leisure.
Despite Ae surprises, there was considerable support for the the
oretical model, particularly in looking at the store level results. That
different labor strategies adopted by the stores did not ultimately af
fect store outcomes is certainly noteworthy. It means that perhaps
several ways exist to make stores profitable. Choosing a way that
maximizes worker input, relies on full-time workers, and improves
intragroup relationships in the store does not reduce the emphasis on
viability and success.
Certainly, the multiple objectives of worker-owned enterprises—
including steady, high-paying employment as well as profit—did not
of necessity sacrifice conventional objectives of efficiency and effec
tiveness. On the contrary, the ability to raise productivity and effi
ciency allowed them to meet several goals simultaneously.
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Individual worker/owners did benefit from the job-saving efforts,
but not in as clear a fashion as the theoretical framework suggested.
Yet even though worker/owners were not earning as much as fulltime Super Fresh workers, they were much more likely to be full
time, and they had other unmeasured financial benefits. We were not
able to measure the increase in value of their ownership shares.
Also, worker/owners mostly did not reveal to us their bonuses and
many even would not reveal their job incomes.
The seemingly surprising finding on worker/owners' lack of psy
chological benefits in their new situation is very much in line with
the mixed findings in the literature reported in chapter 2. Quite pos
sibly, the increased time demands (reflected in work hours) and the
entrepreneurial responsibilities they were feeling for the first time
are part of the price they pay—the "sweat equity" investment—for
becoming owners. Apparently, the strain of becoming a worker/
owner was considerable. Perhaps this strain derived in part from
higher initial expectations, from self-comparisons with friends and
relatives who had full-time jobs at Super Fresh, and from the unex
pected burdens of worker ownership.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that O&O worker/owners were not
attracted to worker ownership for ideological reasons, and despite
the fact that many social and power relationships established in the
old A&P system persisted, the O&O workers established effective
mechanisms for collective decisionmaking. On the other hand, the
QWL program at Super Fresh had limited effects on participation,
store functioning, labor strategy, and outcomes, both for workers and
for stores. Where QWL did improve store functioning, it improved
productivity, increased labor costs, and did not endanger profits.
As discussed in chapter 5 the primary problems at Super Fresh in
increasing worker involvement stem from the limits placed by the
labor contract and by the autonomy of the management in staffing
and operational decisions. In the worker-owned stores, these deci
sions are made by the worker/owners. The Super Fresh union con
tract created pressures for management to hire few full-time workers,
reduce part-timer hours, and encourage turnover. Workers' resent-
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ment over management's unilateral rights, combined with bad feel
ings about wage and benefit concessions, made QWL unpopular,
while increases in the number of part-timers not only made their
involvement in QWL impossible, but also led to hostility between
full-timers and part-timers.
Where QWL seemed to work best was in providing gripe sessions.
Attendance at QWL meetings dropped off, however, when they were
held on workers' own time, not paid time. In non-QWL stores, the
system did not spread beyond the planning board members, who are
department heads, often the only full-time workers. Apparently store
managers did not see QWL as a human resource investment for all
workers.
Improvements in the quality of work—more full-time jobs, more
hours of work for part-timers, more peer training, improved interper
sonal interactions, more worker satisfaction with participation, and a
better atmosphere for increased effort and effectiveness—tended to
raise labor costs as a proportion of sales. These improvements also
made it possible for workers to do their jobs better and to have a
positive effect on productivity, however. As a result, profit was not
jeopardized when better jobs and working condition were provided,
despite higher labor costs.
We may conclude that, at least for individual workers, worker
ownership was not only a viable way to save jobs, but also gave the
average worker a chance at a full-time job with a future. Joint labormanagement concessions also worked to save jobs, but at Super
Fresh resulted in benefits for a minority of workers, those who got
full-time jobs. Both worker ownership and worker participation were
effective in making firms profitable and saving jobs, but it may be
necessary to combine them to ensure their full benefits to workers
and firms.

Broader Issues in Worker Ownership and Participation
To the degree that the O&O stores are representative of worker
buyouts—in the initial feasibility of their survival, in the use of an
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experienced and motivated workforce, in the establishment of egali
tarian structures of ownership and participation, in the key involve
ment of the workers' union—then worker buyouts are indeed a good
and effective method of saving jobs. The O&O example shows,
moreover, that it was possible even in a competitive environment to
save jobs in a way that simultaneously ensured the quality of work
and the effectiveness of the firm.
Ownership brought the incentive to increase profits, while partic
ipation provided the means to deploy labor and other resources to
accomplish workers' goals. Rather than cut their own earnings,
worker/owners opted to enhance organizational functioning through
means which increase revenues and labor productivity. Such choices
may lead to some burdens typical of entrepreneurship: harder work,
worrisome responsibilities, and less time with family. Worker/own
ers hoped that along with these hardships went the rewards they
would share.
The establishment of worker participation and bonuses for cutting
costs saved jobs at Super Fresh and enhanced the firms' effective
ness. Thousands of jobs (mostly part-time) were saved, labor costs
declined, and store profitability increased. Furthermore, as the find
ings indicate, QWL has been a positive factor where implemented,
even despite worker unhappiness over wage, benefit, and work-rule
concessions.
Some observers, like Bernstein (1976), argue that participation is
most important, not ownership. Worker ownership, they say, may
not even be needed. What they advocate is setting up worker partic
ipation programs that assure workers a return on their involvement,
not on their capital. Ellerman (1982) argues that ownership is simply
a bundle of rights that can be arranged in different ways. Thus, the
active (to control the business) and passive (to receive the profits)
ownership rights can be, and are, split up in various ways in various
business forms (Perry and Davis 1985). In employee-owned firms,
participation may not accompany ownership or may even be aban
doned as worker-owned firms "degenerate" (Russell 1985). It is the
right to participate in control that assumes theoretical and practical
importance.
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On the other hand, participative structures may be incomplete and
may degenerate without worker ownership. Workers may have nei
ther the incentive nor the means to control key decisions. Fully im
plemented QWL at Super Fresh has not been more profitable than
either worker ownership at the O&Os or non-QWL at other Super
Fresh stores. Furthermore, the incentive to continue it seems dimin
ished. At Super Fresh, worker participation through QWL has been
imperfectly implemented. Perhaps QWL and financial incentives
could be combined to better advantage, if the bonus were tied to
profits or productivity and not to labor costs. Still, it is doubtful that
control over long-term decisionmaking would be ceded to workers
without some substantial degree of employee ownership.
Employee ownership as a structure, however, even combined with
substantial worker participation as in the O&Os, is no guarantee of
success. Workers' characteristics and the social composition of the
stores, i.e., the processes of recruitment, self-selection, and staffing,
were major ingredients that contributed both to participativeness in
the stores and to their outcomes. Similarly, at Super Fresh, the abil
ity of store directors to pick their workforce contributed greatly to
the success or failure to implement QWL. Participative structures
seem to require workers who are experienced, committed, and loyal
to co-workers and to store goals.
Besides worker characteristics, however, other factors which we
did not observe but only heard about may have affected the way
worker ownership came to be practiced. For instance, in the O&O
stores, the need to operate and compete in a business environment
influenced worker/owners' choices and behavior. The new worker/
owners may have been experienced and largely elite workers in their
former lives with A&P, but they were novices at running businesses,
and especially in running democratic workplaces, which A&P had
never been. The stores became very dependent on the IGA, the sup
ply, warehousing, and advertising group to which they and other
nonchain stores belonged. IGA gave them financial help and busi
ness advice, which they readily adopted. IGA's conventional ap
proach to supermarket operations made sense, but it often drove the
notion of running a different, democratic cooperative from conscious
awareness.
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Such ideological hegemony may be an important contributing fac
tor to so-called degeneration, which is of such great concern to theo
rists. To develop worker-owned businesses with the inherent goal
structure the O&Os have demonstrated, worker/owners and potential
worker/owners need more training in dealing with the business envi
ronment. They need to be prepared for potential contradictions be
tween economic democracy in the firm and the need for approval
from conventional firms who supply them, support them, or com
pete with them.
In Philadelphia, the development of a critical mass of successful
worker-owned supermarkets may give the O&Os the ability to co-opt
and influence the business environment. A third store, not named
O&O, was opened by one of the groups of worker/owners (see chap
ter 4). A fourth store, also an O&O, was opened in 1985 in an innercity neighborhood of Philadelphia with support from the city, UFCW
local 1357, and community organizations. PACE, the main consult
ant to the original O&Os, was a prime mover in the development of
the fourth store. In addition, PACE oversaw the conversion of two
more supermarkets in the suburbs from private ownership to reopen
ing as O&O stores. The main supplier to IGA has taken increased
interest in the O&O model and worked closely with PACE to de
velop these suburban stores. Soon, PACE hopes, the increased pen
etration of O&Os in the grocery market will encourage closer ties
among the O&Os, which could lead not only to increased market
clout, but also to mutual reinforcement of their internal cooperative
structures. Besides, with a number of O&Os operating, a training
ground for new worker/owners will be available. With these develop
ments, perhaps the worker-owned stores can have a more general
acceptance in the business environment as well as impact on the con
sciousness of other managers and workers.

Implications
Before drawing out lessons from these findings for other jobsaving situations, there are some questions to answer. Was the set
ting unique and not replicable elsewhere? One of the favorable
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conditions here was the unusual flexibility of the union leadership in
accepting unconventional and innovative solutions. Similarly, trying
two job-saving strategies at once may have spurred both the worker/
owners and the Super Fresh management to greater efforts or to
adopt new ideas. While two simultaneous methods might be unusual,
the level of local union support was not unlike that found elsewhere,
e.g., at the Rath Packing or Hyatt-Clark worker buyouts and at many
plants trying QWL programs in the early 1980s.
Were the conditions faced in the A&P shutdown typical of shut
downs? Many of the Philadelphia-area A&P stores threatened with
shutdown in 1982 would, in fact, have been viable with few changes
in any case. Nevertheless, A&P's corporate strategy, which shut
down entire regions, was not an overreaction to the 1981-82 reces
sion; it was a long-term response to chronic decline in A&P's posi
tion in the national supermarket industry. Besides, current economic
restructuring has closed many potentially profitable plants in many
industries.
Perhaps the most atypical feature of the A&P shutdown is its in
dustry. Supermarkets are small, have localized customer bases, and
are not interdependent. Many shutdowns, especially the wellpublicized ones, in which worker buyouts have been considered have
been in large, complex firms involved in national markets. Perhaps
buyouts are more appropriate in industries more similar to supermar
kets and less appropriate to so-called typical industrial shutdown sit
uations.
To what degree are our results skewed by self-selection of a group
of about 40 workers into the worker-owned stores? Without question,
this was a special group. It seems that without the Super Fresh op
tion for many workers, there would likely have been more worker
buyouts, given the 600 workers who initially made pledges to be
come worker/owners. Perhaps many of these might-have-been worker
buyouts would have had less success than the O&Os.
We have to remember several facts, however. First, A&P stores
converted into O&Os were among the lower performers before the
shutdown, so the odds were against them, even with a special group
to run them. Second, worker/owners generally did not differ demographically from other former A&P workers.
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Third, the Super Fresh workers and stores in the samples were
largely picked by Super Fresh management. Presumably we were
comparing the O&O workers and stores to the best of Super Fresh.
At the least, the four Super Fresh stores studied intensively were to
some extent showcases. While self-selection operated at the O&O
stores, the entire research situation was somewhat skewed, and there
is little reason to believe it to be worse for the O&Os.
Fourth, and most important, the simultaneous-equation modeling
took into account worker characteristics. They were, in statistical
terms, held constant when we looked at the impacts of other factors.
In fact, the theoretical framework considers self-selection and staff
ing as key contributors to the success or failure of employee owner
ship and worker participation programs.
In the final analysis, we must be cautious, particularly about the
small size of our sample, both of workers and of stores. Twenty-two
worker/owner respondents and two worker-owned stores limit our
ability to make strong generalizations, regardless of our high degree
of confidence that the findings accurately describe these job-saving
experiments in the Philadelphia area.
Similarly, the observations cover primarily the 1982-84 period.
Changes may have taken place since then or may take place in the
future which would call the framework and findings into question.
We hope that it will be possible to check out these possibilities em
pirically. Perhaps even more important, however, would be for the
hypotheses to be tested elsewhere, under other circumstances.

Theoretical Implications
The findings have a number of implications for employee owner
ship and worker participation. First, the importance of worker char
acteristics leads us to conclude that successful and effective buyouts
and participation programs do not occur in a vacuum. That is, the
effectiveness of employee ownership and involvement depend to a
great degree on the education and previous work experience of the
workers who use them.
Second, to be truly effective, forms of worker participation, such
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as QWL programs, should involve genuine redistribution of power.
The constraints under which worker involvement is placed in many
organizations may become self-defeating and may lead researchers,
managers, and workers to the conclusion that it does not work or is
not worth the effort. Worker participation programs apparently need
to be consistent with other human resource programs in regard to
practices such as staffing, scheduling, and economic incentives.
Third, labor strategies and ways of operating, such as investing in
workers, hiring higher quality labor, and combining incentives to
motivate greater efforts, need more attention. They may be the key
link from employee ownership and worker participation to outcomes.
Fourth, the attempt by worker-owned and participatory firms
to achieve multiple objectives may explain why these firms some
times do not appear as profitable as might be hoped for them. Per
haps they are focused on other objectives, such as high pay or secure
employment.
Fifth, multiple measures and multiple methods may be necessary
to give a comprehensive and consistent picture of organization effec
tiveness.
Finally, we have to take account of the entrepreneurial headaches
involved in worker buyouts and to take into account worker/owners'
expectations of reward. It may be more difficult and frustrating to
own and manage within a group. These constraints may be felt by
workers on a daily basis, while the rewards may be less frequent.

Pragmatic Implications
How does the O&O case compare to other examples, particularly
the well-publicized failures? Specifically, why did worker buyouts at
firms such as Rath Packing and Hyatt Clark Industries (HCI) fail
while the O&Os succeeded?
At least three factors may be involved. One factor may be man
agement style and structure. The larger the firm, the more important
is a competent and cooperative management staff, something work
ers at both Rath and HCI feel was lacking (Redmon, Mueller, and
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Daniels 1985; May 1985). At the O&Os, though worker/owners
tended to lack direct management experience, the managers hired
from outside were easier to monitor because of the smallness and
flat hierarchy of supermarkets.
Second, a good part of the answer might lie in factors outside the
scope of this single-industry study, in the nature of the industries and
product markets in which these firms operate. As Clarke (1984, p.
124) points out, "the producer co-operative form seems uniquely
suited for small-scale, service-based, labour-intensive industries such
as agriculture, crafts, retailing, printing, construction, media and the
arts." To become successful worker buyouts, supermarkets, with a
local selling area and a relatively inelastic demand for their products,
would have an advantage over companies in more capital-intensive
industries with national product markets dominated by huge corpo
rations, such as meatpacking (Rath) and engine bearings (HCI). An
interesting exception to this rule, however, is Weirton Steel, which
was bought out in 1983 and has since become one of the few profit
able major steel companies in the United States.
Third, the other opportunities laid off A&P workers had, both in
Super Fresh and in the large metropolitan economy, afforded both
job-saving experiments the leeway for selective staffing. The O&Os
and Super Fresh might not function as well if staffed with workers
inexperienced in performing the basic job functions of workers in the
industry. In fact, a study of the new O&O store started from the
ground up in Philadelphia indicates some of the difficulties (Granrose, Simon, and Coker 1986). Not only does an inexperienced
workforce complicate the start-up process, but it may also threaten
the viability of the firm in its initial operations.
Nevertheless, saving the jobs of experienced workers has potential
drawbacks for some groups of workers, particularly women and mi
norities. In these supermarkets, staffing new, participative ventures
meant excluding those who were traditionally excluded from the
elite. In industries with strong, white-male-dominated internal labor
markets, this could perpetuate discriminatory practices in what are
supposed to be democratic structures.
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Union Involvement

O&O and Super Fresh might not exist were it not for the union's
extraordinary initiative. UFCW local 1357 took swift action to put
forth a plan for worker buyouts. Still, it took from February until
October for the first O&O store to open. It seems imperative for
union leadership to consider the buyout option well before the real
threat of a plant shutdown is announced. Local 1357 had already
done some feasibility studies when A&P announced the closing. The
union put forth its buyout proposal with some confidence that it
would be accepted by workers and could succeed.
The union may have been better prepared for worker buyouts than
for the concessionary agreement which set up Super Fresh. The
union leadership may have been prepared for wage, benefit, and
work-rule givebacks, but did not accurately predict how the bonus
fund would affect workers.
Tying worker bonuses to reductions in labor costs tended to under
mine some of the positive effects of QWL. Cost-cutting led manage
ment to emphasize part-time work. Worker solidarity, always fragile
in an industry in which part-time workers were historically a large
part of the workforce, was further undermined. Besides, saving parttime jobs did not effectively meet the long-term needs of the major
ity of former A&P workers. Those who received part-time jobs at
Super Fresh were, in effect, displaced from their jobs anyway.
To counter these effects, perhaps bonuses should be directly tied
to productivity improvements or to profits. Similarly, saving fewer
full-time jobs may be preferable to saving more part-time jobs for
making worker participation work better.

Management Strategy
Management, in order to save jobs and restore or improve profit
ability, can consider several alternatives to plant shutdowns. Reduc
ing unit labor cost may be an obvious choice, is directly under
management's control, and is clearly calculable on a spreadsheet.
This strategy may also reduce productivity and ultimately not im
prove profits, however.
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Managers may want to reconsider labor's demand for guaranteed
job security. Treating labor as a quasi-fixed cost instead of a totally
variable cost may not put management in a straight jacket. Organi
zations that innovate in the deployment of human resources can be
come more effective, but it may take substantial amounts of
employee ownership and worker participation to motivate managers
to look at employees this way in the American context. Changing
corporate strategy from its focus on restructuring and financial ma
nipulation for improving balance sheet performance to a focus on
human resources could prove very difficult.
Public Policy
The findings of this study may be useful in shaping aspects of
public policy with respect to job-saving. First, keeping the workforce
of threatened firms together may provide the skills needed to effect a
turnaround or a worker buyout. How can that be done? Federal and
local government can help by mandating advance notice by compa
nies of impending shutdown. Six months advance notice seems mini
mal to establish buyouts, and even innovative labor-management
agreements take time to negotiate. Similarly, government-mandated
or government-provided severance benefits would not only give laid
off workers more time to establish a worker buyout but would also
enable them to make the necessary personal investments that could
leverage other sources of capital needed to run businesses.
Second, government officials trying to save jobs should consider
the quality of the jobs saved. Can the jobs saved provide steady em
ployment and income to support families?
Third, incentive for the establishment of worker participation as a
way of meeting both workers' and firms' goals might be considered
as part of federal and local government loan and technical assistance
programs for reversing industrial decline, saving jobs, and promoting
employee ownership. Current federal policies concerning employee
ownership focus on tax treatment for ESOPs and stock distribution
for employee/owners. Presumably, these policies reflect the assump
tion that stock ownership is somehow by itself a motivator of greater
performance in the organization and that employees need only be
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spurred to greater efforts and loyalty by a new form of compensa
tion, namely the benefit program known as ESOP. Worker participa
tion in decisions, particularly those crucial to the firm's long-term
future and direction, may also enhance the effectiveness of employee
ownership for meeting economic and social goals. Public policy can
encourage employee-owned firms to give active as well as passive
ownership rights to employees.
A Practical Caveat
As a by-product of this research, we found out something we had
not explicitly set out to study. It seemed that the more success the
worker/owners had with their O&O stores, the less willing they were
to accept advice from outside the store. PACE, though it had been a
prime mover in setting up the stores and training the worker/owners,
found its advice less and less sought after. This insular tendency ex
tended to this research project, in that there was less cooperation in
giving out store financial information in one of the O&Os and a
lower response rate to the interviews and survey questionnaires by
worker/owners than by the groups of Super Fresh workers.
Very likely, part of this self-imposed seclusion stems from the
new proprietary feelings stirring in the O&O worker/owners about
what is now their own enterprise. In any case, it seems an indication
of workers taking to heart an important implication of worker con
trol. Researchers and technical assistance providers should take note
of this phenomenon and be sensitive to attitudinal and class differ
ences in their work with worker/owners.
Overall Implications
We started in chapter 1 discussing worker buyouts to save jobs in
the context of experimentation to find new ways to work, and in an
eqonomy undergoing rapid structural change. The 1982 Philadelphiaarea A&P shutdown spawned a unique set of responses, which by
their exceptional natures focus attention on crucial issues about sav
ing jobs and restructuring workplaces.
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The O&O stores, while precious few in number, show that worker
buyouts can be effective for job-saving. In fact, they may even have
some advantages over other methods, at least to the extent that the
Super Fresh stores, with their QWL programs, can represent other
methods. That is, the O&O stores seem genuinely to have saved jobs
of good quality which will likely last for the long term. Super Fresh
saved a larger number of lower-quality jobs, but these jobs will not
necessarily be filled by former A&P workers over the long term.
Both innovative responses to the shutdown opened up new sources
of organizational effectiveness through worker participation and
management flexibility. In both cases, this effectiveness came to
some degree at the workers' expense. While the O&O worker/owners
made sacrifices, they could consider them as investments or sweat
equity. Nevertheless, they traded new responsibilities and worries
for the opportunity to share greater control over their fates and for
tunes.
Even in its newspaper display ads, Super Fresh used the theme of
workers making an "investment" to create the new entity. (These
ads successfully fooled many Philadelphians into believing that Su
per Fresh is employee-owned, rather than an A&P subsidiary.) But
the Super Fresh workers' "investment" of wage and benefit conces
sions, along with reduced hours for part-time workers, earned profits
for the stores, in which only a relative few workers shared indirectly.
Super Fresh workers are still heard to grumble about recent improve
ments to their stores as having been financed by the 20 percent wage
cut they had to take in order to keep then- jobs.
Aside from workers' sacrifices, the key element in both job-saving
innovations was increased worker involvement in decisions. Do these
examples mean that in saving jobs there should be a restructuring of
responsibilities in the workplace and a greater emphasis on human
resources and the quality of working life? A report of a recent study
of the economic performance of employee-owned firms stated, "Par
ticipation is the key" (NCEO 1986). Compared to a matched sample
of 164 conventional companies, a sample of 30 employee-owned
firms not only performed better, but job-level worker participation
was the explanatory factor most consistently significant. Similarly, a
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study of 43 General Motors plants found significant impacts on eco
nomic performance from worker participation through QWL pro
grams (Katz 1985). That is, all other things equal, improved plant
economic performance was predicted by improved labor-management
relations at the plant, which in turn resulted from greater levels of
worker involvement in the QWL programs. Neither study focused on
job-saving efforts, however.
Of course, the O&O and Super Fresh job-saving innovations
emerged from a particular situation, so we cannot make too strong a
case about their generalizability to other circumstances. But both
O&O and Super Fresh have been successful and profitable concepts.
It would seem to be a good idea to consider the sources of their
success—particularly the contribution of employee ownership and
worker participation—in other job-saving situations.
After all, the A&P shutdown was really neither peculiar nor un
representative. The O&O buyouts and the establishment of Super
Fresh with its QWL programs, though geographically circumscribed,
are part of broader trends reshaping the economy and the place of
workers in firms. The A&P shutdown came about from many of the
common circumstances in which corporations and workers find
themselves in this society. Rapid structural change and shifting cor
porate strategies result in economic dislocation.
In this new economic context of the past decade, the rediscovery
of employee ownership as a worker response to dislocation has not
come about from nostalgic longing for a failed anticapitalist strategy.
Nor has involvement of workers in workplace decisionmaking
stemmed solely from modern personnel textbook prescriptions for
maintaining or creating "union free" environments. Worker buyouts
are not inherently inefficient, isolated, economically marginal, or
anachronistic sidetracks for labor or management. In fact, the O&O
worker/owners and, especially, their union and technical consultants
took advantage of the accumulated knowledge of past failures and of
theoretical controversies. Moreover, the union put itself in a position
to demand management concessions in Super Fresh when it was
called upon to concede cuts in wages and benefits.
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Both the O&O stores and Super Fresh are examples of forms of
economic democracy, in that they involve workers in decisionmaking
and, to some, extent, in control of their workplaces. This particular
case illustrates the possibility of unions working innovatively with
management in workplace restructuring and of unions taking initia
tive rather than passively accepting management demands for con
cessions or joint problemsolving. In general, however, such
innovations require some significant changes in the behavior and
thinking of both managers and unions.
Whether economic democracy is something workers themselves
want will be determined by how attractive examples like the O&O
stores are to them. Perhaps they will wait until a crisis, such as a
plant shutdown, presents them with an opportunity. We have tried to
present the facts clearly and fairly. It will be up to other victims of
plant closings to build upon these lessons to improve their outcomes
in their particular circumstances.

Appendix A
Excerpts From Agreement Between UFCW 1357
and Roslyn O&O (1982-1985)
Article XXHI
The following is intended to explain the O and O concept of cooperative
enterprise and is not subject to the arbitration provisions of this agreement
for any reason whatsoever.
Employer is structured as a worker cooperative. Under this structure each
shareholder must be a worker. Upon voluntary or involuntary termination of
employment of a shareholder, his or her share is deemed transferred back to
the corporation. Each shareholder is entitled to one, and only one, share.
Major decisions affecting large numbers of workers, large expenditures of
money, or impacting on the corporation for a long period of time are made
by the worker-owners on a one worker/one vote basis. Other corporate deci
sions are made by the Board of Directors, a twelve member body, composed
of nine workers-owners and three community representatives, all elected by
the entire body of worker-owners on a one worker/one vote basis.
The fee for purchasing a share of the corporation's stock is $5,000 and re
mains constant throughout the corporate existence. Profits and losses are
allocated, in fixed percentages, to an unindividuated collective account, and
to internal capital accounts provided for each shareholder. A portion of the
profit distributed to the individual shareholder is based on a percentage of his
or her capital investment. The remainder is based on his or her labor participa
tion; that is, his or her hours worked as a percentage of total hours worked
during the relevant period.
In order to meet outstanding debt obligations during the terms of this Agree
ment, profit allocations to each worker-owner will equal approximately $1,000
per year. As the profitability of the corporation increases, the profit alloca
tion to each worker-owner increases accordingly.
Article XXVII
Subsection 3
3. Employer agrees to encourage certain other supermarket entities with the
characteristics listed below, created during the term of this Agreement, to join
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with it in coalition bargaining with the Union and to utilize this Agreement
as a guidepost in its effort to reach agreement with the Union:
a. A worker cooperative structure in which:
(1) All owners are workers;
(2) Each worker-owner has one and only one share;
(3) Upon voluntary or involuntary termination of employment, the
share is deemed transferred back to the corporation;
(4) Corporate decision-making is on a one worker-owner/one vote
basis;
(5) A portion of profit distribution is based on patronage defined as
labor participation.
b. Acceptance into membership of O&O Supermarket, Inc., a second-level
cooperative which has supermarket worker cooperative members and
which provides a variety of business and other support services to them
and/or receipt of financial or other technical assistance from O and O
Investment Fund, Inc., a non-profit Pennsylvania Corporation providing
assistance to worker cooperatives in certain industries including the super
market industry.

Appendix B
Excerpts from Roslyn O&O Supermarket, Inc.
Cooperative Handbook & Cooperative Charter (1982)
We the Worker-Owners are a group of dedicated supermarket workers, in
tent on altering the workplace to gain high productivity and profitability levels,
and to provide better service to the consumer. At the same time, we will be
operating within an organizational structure which serves to perpetuate a much
more personally satisfying, fulfilling atmosphere in which to work.
We expect to achieve this by having all our members actively involved in
all aspects of the business. This will include sharing in decision-making, helping
to determine store policy, having an input in operations, and generally con
tributing to all areas of our business. By following our cooperative philosophy,
we will treat each other with more respect and trust, thereby assuring a
workplace with less pressure and bringing out the full potential of all our
members. We expect to expand on this ideal to include the consumer, no longer
treating the customer only as a dollar sign but as an individual.
We will treat the customers fairly, with the courtesy and respect for which
they are entitled. Since our establishment is part of the community, it will also
become our goal to work within the communityin order to learn its needs and
to do whatever is within our power to help meet these needs.
We ask all our members to contribute a membership fee in order to receive
a voting share in the corporation. Upon achieving membership, all members
will be entitled to work in our business, take active part in its operation, share
in the profits or losses, and have access to all information, both financial and
operational. The share received will be symbolic of their membership and can
not be transferred or sold. This voting share will revert back to the cooperative
upon a worker owner's termination of their job, for any reason.
To achieve a better working environment, we will have no outside supervi
sion and the manager's duties and responsibilities will be outlined. There will
be no breakdown of jobs into simple tasks, no narrow job classifications with
restrictive detailed procedures, and finally no formal controls. We will rely
strictly on the trust, experience, and knowledge of all members to perform
their duties promptly, productively, and with the best interest of the cooperative.
As one fares so does the other.
Philosophically, cooperative members want all major decisions made on the
basis of consensus, which mandates general agreement by the group members.
We want all profits and losses to be equally shared and the format for distribu
tion to be self-determined as set up in the By-Laws. We would like to see trust
among all members. TOGETHERNESS TO GET THE JOB DONE. Corn279
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munications will be open among all members at all times in order to alleviate
problems and reach better decisions. We demand that there be respect for all
members and their opinions; that all members treat each other with appropriate
courtesy at all times. There will be a sharing of knowledge and ideas in all
job classifications in order to utilize the ability of all members to the fullest
extent.
In order to attain greater knowledge, we want all members to be able to
receive all information concerning the business. This includes ordering, func
tions of other jobs, and information about all financial data (i.e., costs of goods,
suppliers' costs, sales volume, and profits). We want all interested members
to have the ability to train for any position in the operation of the store, and
to have time allocated in which to gain this training.
To reach a higher degree of profitability in our enterprise, we will have
store meetings as often as needed in order to keep all members properly in
formed. We expect to have input by all members in the conservation of costsbags, care of equipment, and promptness on the job—in order to minimize
the cost of operations. We will also make retraining available whenever
necessary in any position to make a member more productive and/or satisfied.
Workers will have less restrictive job descriptions to alleviate boredom and
make full use of individual skills.
As a group, we expect to conduct ourselves with courtesy, friendliness, and
professionalism in order to gain confidence and respect from our customers
and the business community. We understand the importance of good conduct
in our enterprise, which will mean achieving a better working place and a
stimulation of business.
Internally, it is the objective of our group to improve the marketplace con
ditions in order to make our jobs more rewarding and have a more pleasant
atmosphere in which to perform our duties.
Externally, the intent of this organization will be to achieve, for the first
time, a truly community-oriented store. Lower and fair pricing, group dis
counts, and hiring within the community when non-member positions become
available will all help to benefit the economics of the community. We hope
to respond to the needs of the community and to participate in efforts to upgrade
conditions wherever possible, whatever form that takes. We intend to not just
make the workplace, but also the community, a better place to live.
The Worker Cooperative Defined
A worker cooperative—the legal and organizational structure used for our
supermarket—is a firm controlled and operated by the members who work
in it. It is a self-governing corporation, characterized by a corporate legal struc
ture with a cooperative set of by-laws. The by-laws assign certain rights to
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cooperative members, based on their functional work role within the store.
To become a member of the cooperative a person is required to make a finan
cial contribution—in this case $5,000.00 as a fee for cooperative membership.
(The store manager is not a member of the cooperative and is not required
to make any financial contribution.)
In general, the rights attached to cooperative membership are as follows:
• One worker — one vote. This allows members an equal voice in the elec
tion of the Board of Directors and in determination of major decisions
affecting the cooperative.
• Profit-sharing. Members will receive patronage dividends, based on the
number of hours worked, as specified by the by-laws.
Within the cooperative structure, all members share in the decision-making
process, as well as share in the profits; decisions will be made in a democratic
way, on the basis of consensus (general agreement by all group members),
that is compatible with worker ownership functions.
The cooperative structure positively impacts on four areas of concern for
a retail business: business operations, the worker, the consumer, and the com
munity. First, the business itself benefits through the active participation and
involvement, on all operational levels, of those maintaining the store on a dai
ly basis. Through a sharing of information and expertise, worker-owners are
able to respond quickly to problems which affect the ability of a store to be
successful. The flexibility of members in terms of allocation of tasks and each
member's knowledge of multiple jobs enable members to meet changing staff
ing needs, thereby better meeting the business' need to adequately service the
customer.
Second, by reopening a store, a primary consumer need is kept in the
neighborhood. As a group who realizes the importance of neighborhoodoriented service, store personnel cater to a specific need by supplying pro
ducts common to the consumer group(s). The consumer, by always being in
contact with an owner at any level of store operations, benefits from more
individualized service and a quick response to problems or criticisms. By vir
tue of the increased interaction of owner and customer, the business can ad
dress changing store requirements, customer requests, and be more on-target
with respect to policy-making.
Third, the cooperative structure benefits the worker by giving people more
control over their workplace. It allows a forum for an individual's expression
of ideas, concerns, and/or problems and also provides for operational input
regarding business planning. The cooperative structure serves the workers'
interests as well as those of the business, through the understanding that the
workers are the business; when people have control over their work environ
ment personal productivity, quality of work life, and profits to be gained from
the business increase.
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The fourth and final area to be served by the cooperative is that of the
community-at-large. Cooperatives provide an alternative means of maintain
ing an area's prosperity: the cooperative provides jobs and services, and in
this way helps keep neighborhoods intact. Loss of business services negative
ly affects an area's prosperity and its ability to attract new business and the
subsequent influx of jobs, people, and money.

Responsibilities of a Worker in a Worker Cooperative
The responsibilities of the individual worker in a traditional workplace in
clude job performance, neat appearance, and promptness. In a worker
cooperative store these responsibilities remain the same, but are expanded to
include the increased participation that the cooperative model demands. It is
not just important for the individual to perform his duties well, but also to
try and gain as much knowledge as possible of the entire operation so that
better decisions can be made concerning the business as a whole. Neat ap
pearance is necessary now, not just to please an employer, but also to please
the customer. It becomes important to be prompt because (s)he now realizes
that when someone has to cover for him/her, it costs the organization produc
tivity and money; this now means that it costs him/her personally.
In order for our system to work, all workers, members and non-members
alike, must cooperate with each other. Since the goals are the same, it becomes
necessary to be as agreeable, courteous, and respectful as possible to one
another.
It is the responsibility of an individual that if he/she 'sees something in the
operation of the business which isn't right, it should be brought to the atten
tion of the group in order to bring about change that will (a) make operations
more profitable, or (b) improve working conditions.

Responsibilities of an Owner in a Worker Cooperative
In a worker cooperative grocery store a member has basically the same
responsibilities of a conventional market owner; for instance, (s)he has to
negotiate a contract with the union, deal with the suppliers, and work with
other service agents. An owner must make up company policy, oversee the
hiring, firing, and performance of workers, and protect the future of the
business through intelligent business planning and formulation of long-range
cash flow projections. Further, any decisions for renovations or major changes
in the store are made by the owner.
In a worker cooperative these areas are dealt with collectively by all members
in one of two ways. They can either decide to deal with every aspect of the
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business as a full group, or to form separate committees, each with a specific
task. The committees would then present their recommendations to the entire
group to be collectively approved; this cooperative will utilize the second pro
cess, by committee, to conduct their business affairs.
An owner in a conventional business usually has total control over working
conditions and personnel policies. In a worker cooperative, while a member
will have input into all areas, no one person or body will have unilateral
decision-making authority.
As a part-owner in the cooperative there will be times when ease and com
fort of the working place might have to give way to the realities of business
needs. It is important to remember that there will be times when a member's
business nature will have to show precedent over his/her working nature.
The Worker Cooperative Function
The worker cooperative functions on a basis which relates closely to a cor
porate structure, with the exception that cooperative members have input at
all levels of the system. For example, the traditional corporate structure is
illustrated by the following diagram:
SHAREHOLDERS

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

MANAGEMENT

WORKERS
The above reflects an organization in which decision-making comes from the
top and flows down through each level. The cooperative structure, illustrated
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by the diagram below, allows for information and decision-making authority
to flow in both directions:

SHAREHOLDERS

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

MANAGEMENT

WORKERS
While each level has designated areas of authority and tasks, members and
non-members alike have the ability to make input into the system. This allows
any group/person to address any other group/person, at designated times, on
specific issues; mis promotes both the free exchange of ideas, concerns, or
problems, and the democratic decision-making process. The primary princi
ple underlying the cooperative model is that each member has the ability to
participate, as fully as possible, within their workplace.
In a worker cooperative structure, shareholding is conducted on an equal
basis; one member holds one share and is entitled to one vote. In this way,
power is equally distributed throughout the membership. Upon termination,
a member's share immediately reverts back to the cooperative; members are
unable to sell or otherwise transfer their share to any other party.

Governance
The membership elects the Board of Directors as a representative govern
ing body, with the primary function of setting and implementing short-term
policies for the cooperative. The board is composed of nine (9) members and
three (3) non-members. Within the board there are four offices; that of Presi
dent, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Each officer, along with two
other board members, is responsible for specific committee tasks: President—
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Executive Committee; Vice-President—Governance Committee; SecretaryEducation Committee; Treasurer—Financial Committee. The board president
presides at all meetings concerning the cooperative including, but not limited
to: the annual General Assembly, monthly board meetings, and special meetings
called on an as-needed basis. The members, non-members, and management
are directly accountable to the policies set by the Board of Directors, which
is in turn accountable to the entire membership.
In a worker cooperative, decision-making authority is allocated among three
governing bodies: (1) the General Assembly of Members, (2) the Board of
Directors, and (3) the Manager.
Governance
General Guidelines

Membership Decision-Making Authority
Membership review will be required before any of the following matters
may be finalized:
(1) Amendments to the articles of incorporation (and initial ratification).
(2) Enlarging the Board of Directors.
(3) Merger or dissolution of the corporation.
(4) Election of directors.
(5) Changes in long or short term goals.
(6) The yearly business plan.
(7) Hiring and firing policies.
(8) Expansion or remodeling of physical plant.
(9) Initiation, modification, or termination of affiliation with suppliers.
(10) Purchase or sale of substantial assets.
(11) Further decision-making authority is established by the Time Line, Money
Line, and Member Line.

Board Decision-Making Authority
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Set yearly goals and policies necessary for their implementation.
Select manager, define duties, set salary.
Evalute performance of manager.
Control finances.
Approve all personnel policies. (In the case of hiring, firing, and lay-off
policies, membership approval is also necessary.)
(6) Further decision-making authority is established by the Time Line, Money
Line, and Member Line.
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Management Decision-Making Authority
The Manager is responsible for day-to-day operational decisions for the
cooperative, as defined by the Board of Directors. Further decision-making
authority is established by the Time Line, Money Line, and Member Line.
Time Line
Manager
1 day
Decides

1 year

Board
Decides

Members

3 years

Decide

Money Line
Manager
$1

$3,000.00
Decides

Board

Members

Decides

Decide

$10,000.00

Member Line
1 Member

Manager
Decides

Board

Members

7 Members

50% of Members
Decides Decide

Articles of Incorporation
Article m
The Treatment of Net Worth and Net Income
1. NET WORTH - There shall be an INDIVIDUAL INTERNAL CAPITAL
ACCOUNT in the name of each member and one COLLECTIVE INTER
NAL CAPITAL ACCOUNT that in unindividuated. The sum of the balances
of the individual accounts plus the balance in the collective account shall equal
the Net Worth (=Assets minus Liabilities) of the cooperative.
The membership fee, whether paid in cash or payroll deductions, shall be
the initial balance in each member's account. Any gifts or grants to the
cooperative shall be credited to the collective account.
The individual capital accounts shall accrue interest at the highest rate not
to exceed 12 percent, as determined by the Board of Directors.

Appendix C
Excerpts From Agreement (1982)
between
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ("A&P")
and
The United Foods & Commercial Workers Union
Locals No. 56 & 1357 ("UNION")
WHEREAS, A&P found it necessary to close its Philadelphia and Scranton
Divisions due to business and economic reasons, and
WHEREAS, A&P closed or otherwise disposed of its stores and warehouses
in these divisions, and
WHEREAS, those employees in the Union were terminated when the stores
closed by the rules of seniority, and
WHEREAS, those stores transferred to other divisions could be closed due
to the resulting detrimental impact of those stores closed, and
WHEREAS, the employees in these stores who are members of the Union
face termination.
NOW, THEREFORE, the company and the Union agree to:
1. Through their joint efforts strive to reopen as many closed stores as possi
ble, on a guaranteed profitable basis offering eventual re-employment to former
A&P employees presently on layoff of December, 1981.
2. Apply this understanding to the employees of all existing operating stores
within the jurisdiction of the Union so as to preserve the jobs of such employees
which it is agreed are seriously jeopardized by economic circumstances affect
ing A&P.
3. A&P will establish a new subsidiary which will have separate and in
dependent management and which will be charged only for its own manage
ment services (not for the management services generally charged to divisions
of A&P). However, non-management overhead, such as overhead related to
accounting and MIS services, will be charged to the new subsidiary.
4. The new subsidiary referred to in "3" above will in turn establish sub
sidiaries or other separate entities, for each store to be reopened, or for each
operating store to be operated, all pursuant to the terms of this understanding.
Each such store will be a separate enterprise.
12. Create a mechanism providing for the purchase of the New Entity Store
in the following instances:
A. A store owned by the new Entity is to be closed and transferred to
a third party.
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B. The A&P employees of a store located within the jurisdiction of the
Union do not elect to affiliate with the New Entity; and as a result thereof,
the store is to be closed and transferred to a third party.
C. The New Entity elects to franchise the store or to enter into a joint
venture.
If an event set forth in item 1 above occurs, then the employees of the store
to be closed (the "Affected Employees") or the Employee Association
("Pace") shall have the right to purchase said store at a fair price (the "Fair
Price"). The mechanism for determination of the Fair Price shall be the sub
ject to further negotiations between the parties. The option to purchase may
be exercised only within the ninety (90) day period commencing upon the date
that the Fair Price shall have been determined.
ADDENDUM
Employees Incentive and Investment Fund
4. The amount of Employer contribution for each store shall be one percent
(1 %) of the store's total sales for the contract year, subject to adjustments as
follows: If the store's labor rate for the corresponding period is below nine
percent (9%), the contribution rate shall be adjusted upward by one-twentieth
of a percentage point (.05 %) for each full one-tenth of a percentage point (0.1%)
reduction below nine percent (9%). If the store's labor rate for the correspond
ing period is above ten percent (10%), the contribution rate shall be adjusted
downward by one-twentieth of a percentage point (0.05%) for each full onetenth of a percentage point (0.1 %) increase above ten percent (10%). For ex
ample, if the labor rate is 8.3%, the contribution rate is 1.35%; if the labor
rate is 11.1%, the contribution rate is 0.45%. Under no circumstances shall
the Fund be required to reimburse the Employer based on the store's labor rate.

Appendix D
Excerpts From Agreement Between Super Fresh and UFCW 1357 and 56
(1982-1985)
ARTICLE VI
Union Activities
6.1 It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that the Union shall have
the opportunity to investigate and resolve problems, to discuss problems with
the Employer in an effort to reach a resolution, and to communicate with its
members during the term of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
Seniority
8.2 Seniority for all employees shall be based upon continuous service from
the last employment date with Employer within the store location. All new
employees shall be on probation for a trial period of sixty (60) days, except
as provided in Article XXII, Section 22.2, after which they shall be placed
on the seniority roster and their seniority shall date from date of hire.
ARTICLE IX
Employees Incentive and Investment Fund
9.1 The Employer shall contribute to an Employee Incentive and Invest
ment Fund, which shall be established in accordance with the specifications
set forth on the Addendum hereto.
9.2 The establishment and maintenance of the Employee Incentive and In
vestment Fund shall be conditional upon the approval of the Internal Revenue
Service or a court of competent jurisdiction, if applicable, that the plan and
any accompanying trust are exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue
Code, and the Employer's obligation to contribute shall be conditional upon
the deducibility of such contributions for income tax purposes.
9.3 In the event that, for any reason, the Fund cannot receive the continu
ing approval of the IRS with respect to the deductibility as an item of business
expense of the employer contribution thereunder, the amount of the employer
contribution for the period of which such contribution is required under this
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Agreement shall be paid directly to the employees in cash, as an employee
benefit, by a formula to be mutually determined by the Employer and the Union.

ARTICLE XHI
Quality of Work Life
13.1 The Union and the Employer agree to utilize a Quality of Work Life
(QWL) structure to provide a mutual basis for problem solving. It is further
agreed to utilize outside (neutral) sources to provide guidance and advice to
increase the effectiveness of this program. Such QWL program shall be im
plemented with the opening of the store.
The resulting QWL program will not become involved in disputes covered
under the Grievance & Arbitration Procedure and will not conflict with any
terms or conditions of this collective bargaining agreement and will not reduce
any rights or privileges of the employee or Employer.

Appendix £
Excerpts from Quality of Work Life for United Food
& Commercial Workers Local 56 and Local 1357
with Super Fresh Food Markets (1982)

III. Organizational Design
6. Overview
Super Fresh will be organized as a two/three level structure. The first
level will be that of the corporation itself, which will incorporate five
different dimensions:
- Output Units (stores)
- Input Units (service functions)
- Environmental Unit (marketing/advocacy)
- Planning Boards (policy making bodies)
- Management Support System (control)
The second level will be the internal structure of the store itself, which
will be organized along the same concept as the corporation, having the
five dimensions as does the larger system.
- Output Units (departments)
- Input Units (front end; receiving)
- Environmental Unit (local business development and advocacy)
- Planning Boards (policy making bodies)
- Management Support System (control)
As Super Fresh increases the number of stores it operates, a three level
structure will be created that groups the stores into regional units.
6.1 Output Units. Achievement of the organizational ends and objectives
(outputs) will be the responsibility of the output units (stores) of the
system. The other units are created in order to facilitate the operation
of these units. These units will be self-sufficient and autonomous to the
degree that the integrity of the whole system is not compromised.
6.2 Input Units. Inputs are the services required to support the output units.
Because of economies of scale, technology and geographic dispersion
inputs can best be realized at the corporate level. These units will also
be semi-autonomous.
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6.3 Environmental Units. The interaction of the system with its environ
ment is facilitated by the environmental units. The two main functions
of these units are marketing and advocacy, that is, attracting the
customers, making contact with the external stakeholders and advocating
their point of view within the system.
6.4 Planning Board. Planning is a process that provides the overall coor
dinating and integrating funtion for the input, output and environmental
units. Planning boards are the main policy making body of the organiza
tion and at all levels serve as the vehicle for the participative manage
ment style of Super Fresh. This enables the information, judgments and
concerns of subordinates to influence the decisions that affect them. One
of the key functions of the planning boards is to constantly re-assess the
progress the corporation, store, or department is making toward its goals
(via feedback from the management support system) and to chart new
objectives when necessary. Planning at the store level is directed to those
matters affecting the store. Planning affecting more than one store is
done at the corporate level.
6.5 Management Support System. The management support system is
responsible for the comparison of the actual outcomes versus expected
outcomes based on the plans and policies set by the planning boards.
This provides the means for learning and adaptation.
7
Components of the System
7.1 Stores (Output units)
7.1.1 The stores will produce the outputs of Super Fresh. Therefore,
those activities which are directly compatible with the mission
of the "whole," and are necessary for the production of out
puts will be considered in this dimension.
7.1.2 Each store will be responsible for the management of its
resources and will have an organizational structure very similar
to the larger system of which it is a part.
7.1.3 Each store will operate as a semi-autonomous performance
center. Financial contributions of each store to Super Fresh will
reflect sales minus direct costs and will not have corporate in
direct costs charged against it.
7.1.4 Each store will be allowed to retain a percentage of its con
tributions above a minimum level determined by the corporate
planning board. These funds will be used for internal develop
ment and local business development by the store consistent with
corporate board policies.
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7.1.5

Each store will be responsible for making those decisions which
affect only its operations. Decisions which impact on the other
stores and the corporation as a whole will be made at the cor
porate level with participation from the Store Director.
7.1.6 Each Store Director will report directly to the Office of the
President of Super Fresh.
7.1.7 Each store and department will have a planning board of its own.
7.1.8 At the store level each output department will be headed by a
manager who reports directly to the Store Director. These out
put departments will be as follows:
- Grocery
- Meat
- Produce
- Deli/Bakery
7.1.9 The Store Director will be responsible for general store orien
tation for all new associates. This orientation will be assessed
by the department managers.
7.1.10 The Store Directors in conjunction with department managers
will develop departmental cross familiarization programs which
will be assessed by the Store Director and those who participate
in the program.

7.4 Planning Boards
7.4.1 There will be planning boards at all levels, including the cor
poration as a whole, support service units, marketing units, and
stores.
7.4.2 In general, each board will consist of (1) the manager of the
unit whose board it is, (2) his/her immediate superior,
(3) his/her immediate subordinates, and (4) representatives of
the associates on higher level boards. The specific membership
will be identified in sections 7.4.11 through 7.4.15.7.4.3 The planning boards will be engaged in continuous interactive
planning and reserch to redesign the system as needed.
7.4.4 The planning boards will be policy making bodies and not mere
ly advisory committees, however executive decisions will be
left to the respective managers.
7.4.5 Organizational strategies, policies and procedure will be for
mulated by the planning boards.
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7.4.6

The planning boards will explicitly specify the objective and
consequences of the plans and policies designed by the board.
These objectives and their attainment will be assessed on a
regular basis by the management support system.
7.4.7 The planning boards will utilize the information generated by
all the units.
7.4.8 Decisions will be made by a consensus of the board members.
If consensus cannot be reached as to a course of action, the board
will resolve the differences by research and experimentation
done by special project committees.
7.4.9 Those holding management positions will be appointed by their
immediate higher level manager, however they will have to
maintain the confidence of their respective planning boards.
7.4.10 The corporate planning board will make available through
Human Resources information and sources on internal and ex
ternal training on the operation of the food retailing business
and its environment. This information will be available to all
associates.
7.4.11 At the corporate level the board will meet on a regular basis
and will have the following members:

- The President of Super Fresh

- The Director of each store
- Representatives of associates-at-large selected by store plan
ning boards
- The Support Service and the Marketing Unit Directors
- The Presidents of the two Unions
- The responsible manager of A&P or his/her representative
- External stakeholders, if the issue warrants it.
7.4.12 When the number of stores increases the corporate board will
be divided into sub-corporate boards, meeting regionally. No
more than fifteen stores will be included in a sub-corporate
board. The sub-corporate board will have the following
members:
- The Vice-President of Retail Operations (representing the
President) and his/her assistants (who may function as regional
managers)
- The Director of each store (maximum 15)
- An associate from each of the stores to be chosen by each
store planning board on a rotational basis.
- The Support Services and the Marketing Unit Directors
- The representatives of the two Unions' management
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7.4.13 Coordination of the sub-corporate boards will be done in a
special meeting of the corporate planning board at which time
an overall corporate plan will be formulated. The following will
attend:
- The President
- The Vice-President of Retail Operations and his/her regional
assistants
- One Store Director and one associate from each region se
lected by the sub-corporate planning board on a rotational
basis
- Support Services and Marketing Directors
- The Presidents of each of the two Unions or their repre
sentatives
- A responsible manager of A&P or his/her representatives
7.4.14 At a store level the board will meet on a regular basis and will
have the following members:
- The Store Director and his/her assistants
- The Manager of each department and an associate to be
chosen by the department planning board
- Grocery
- Meat
- Produce
- Deli/Bakery
- The Front End Manager and a cashier
- The representatives of the two Unions
- A representative of the President of Super Fresh
7.4.15 At the department level the board will meet on a regular basis
and will include all the associates of that department.
8.2 Incentive Systems
8.2.1 Each store will contribute a percentage of its sales depending
upon total labor cost percentage to an associate investment/in
centive fund. The decisions regarding allocation, investment and
disbursement of this fund are the right of the associates. The
Unions will facilitate the forming of an advisory committee to
make these decisions (outside the Super Fresh QWL effort).
8.2.2 Super Fresh will establish a management incentive fund in which
each Store Director will participate. The incentive will be paid
based on performance in the following areas:
- Sales
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- Employee satisfaction
- Store contribution
8.3 Hiring
8.3.1 Former A&P employees will be given preference in hiring at
the store level. Placement of these individuals will be done by
a hiring committee made up of:
- Director of Human Resources
- The Vice-Presidents of the two Unions
- The store Director will be consulted on the list of Depart
ment Managers being considered for his store. This procedure
will operate as long as there is a list of former A&P or Super
Fresh employees.

Appendix F
[Worker Survey]
Social Innovations at Work Project of Temple University
Study of Philadelphia Supermarkets in Transition
Please answer the following questions either by circling the number most
closely corresponding to your personal opinion or situation or by filling in
any blanks. Remember, the answers you give will be kept completely con
fidential. No individual responses will be given to anyone in the store, the
union, or anywhere else. A summary of the combined responses of everyone
who returns a questionnaire will be available after the study is completed but
these will be average answers of the group as a whole, NOT your personal
response.
DO NOT WRITE
IN THIS
COLUMN
CARD #1
COLUMN #1
ID 1-10

I. JOB EXPERIENCE
1. What is your current position?
1. ASSISTANT MANAGER
2. FROZEN FOOD DEPARTMENT MANAGER
3. DELI DEPARTMENT MANAGER
4. PRODUCE DEPARTMENT MANAGER
5. DAIRY DEPARTMENT MANAGER
6. GROCERY DEPARTMENT MANAGER

7. OFFICER PERSONNEL

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

FROZEN FOOD CLERK
DELI CLERK
PRODUCE CLERK
DAIRY CLERK
GROCERY CLERK

16. MEAT CUTTER

17. MEAT WRAPPER

8. HEAD CASHIER

18. RECEIVER

9. CASHIER
10. NIGHT CREW

19. OTHER:
____________
(please identify)

11

2. On average, how many hours per week do you work in this store?
___________ HOURS PER WEEK

12-13

3. How long have you worked at this job in this store?
_____ YEARS and _____ MONTHS

14-15
16-17

4. How many years have you worked in any kind of supermarket,
not counting interruptions like child bearing or military service
but counting your current job?
________ YEARS IN ALL

18-19

H. TRAINING
5. How many years of schooling have you had? (High school
graduation =12; college graduation=16)
_______ YEARS
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20-21
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6. How much job-related training have you received since you
started working here?
12345
NONE
A GREAT DEAL

22

7. Please circle a "YES" response beside every job you know how to perform.
NO YES
a. Assistant Manager................................... 1
2
b. Frozen Food Department Manager...................... 1
2
c. Deli Department Manager............................. 1
2
d. Produce Department Manager.......................... 1
2
e. Dairy Department Manager............................ 1
2
f. Grocery Department Manager.......................... 1
2
g. Office Personnel..................................... 1
2
h. Head Cashier....................................... 1
2
i. Cashier............................................
1
2
j. Night Crew......................................... 1
2
k. Frozen Food Clerk................................... 1
2
1. Deli Clerk.......................................... 1
2
m. Produce Clerk....................................... 1
2
n. Dairy Clerk......................................... 1
2
o. Grocery Clerk....................................... 1
2
p. Meat Cutter......................................... 1
2
q. Meat Wrapper...................................... 1
2
r. Receiver...........................................
1
2
s. Other___________________________

(Please Identify)

1

2

8. How many new jobs have you learned since coming to work here?
________# NEW JOBS LEARNED
9. Other than whole new jobs, how many new skills have you learned since
coming to work here? (For example: pricing, advertising, display,
scheduling, buying, bookkeeping, supervising, staffing, etc.)
______# NEW SKILLS
10. How much have you learned about each of the following things since
coming to work here?
NOTHING
A GREAT DEAL
a. Confidence in handling problems
that arise in the store
12345
b. Willingness to speak up in
meetings
12345
c. How to work on a team
-12345
d. How to influence others
12345
e. Feeling responsible for your work 1
2
3
4
5
f. How to supervise others
12345
g. How to listen to others' opinions 12345

23
24

25-26

27
28
29
30
31
32
33
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HI. PARTICIPATION
11. How much are workers' opinions taken into account when decisions are
made in your store?
12345
NONE
A GREAT DEAL

34

12. How mucy "say" or influence do each of the following have on what
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE
VERY MUCH
'SAY"
"SAY"
a. Workers as a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director
(for O&O—Store Manager)
d. Corporate Planning Board
(for O&O—Board of Directors)

12345
12345

35
36

12345

37

12345

38

13. How much "say" or influence SHOULD each of the following have on what
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE
VERY MUCH
"SAY"
"SAY"
a. Worker as a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director
(for O&O—Store Manager)
d. Corporate Planning Board
(for O&O—Board of Directors)

12345
12345

39
40

12345

41

12345

42

14. How much involvement do you have in each of the following kinds
of decisions?
MY
OPINION
I AM INIS
I SHARE I CAN
I AM
FORMED I CAN
TAKEN EQUALLY DECIDE
NOT IN- BEFORE- GIVE MY INTO
IN DEON MY
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT CISIONS
OWN
a. Improvement in
working
conditions
1
2
3
4
5
6 43
b. Appointment of a
new department
head
1
2
3
4
5
6 44
c. Hiring new
employees
1
2
3
4
5
6 45
d. Making a major
capital investment
1
2
3
4
5
6 46
e. Having more
training programs
during work time
1
2
3
4
5
6 47
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f.

Assigning tasks
that have to
be done
g- Changing the
vendors or
displays
h. Their working
hours
i. Shutting down
the store

1

2

3

4

5

6 48

1

2

3

4

5

6 49

1

2

3

4

5

6 50

1

2

3

4

5

6 51

15. How much involvement DO YOU WANT in each of the following
kinds of decisions?
I WANT
MY
I WANT
OPINION I WANT I WANT
TO BE
IN
I DON'T
I WANT TO BE TO SHARE TO DE
WANT TO FORMED TO GIVE TAKEN EQUALLY CIDE
IN
BE IN
INTO
ON MY
BEFORE
MY
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN
a. Improvement in
working
4
3
6 52
5
conditions
1
2
b. Appointment of
a new department
5
6 53
4
3
1
2
head
c. Hiring new
6 54
4
1
2
3
5
employees
d. Making a major
capital investment
4
1
2
3
5
6 55
e. Having more
training programs
during work time
4
1
2
3
5
6 56
f. Assigning tasks
that have to
4
be done
1
2
3
5
6 57
g- Changing the
vendors or
2
4
displays
1
3
5
6 58
h. Their working
4
2
hours
1
3
5
6 59
i. Shutting down
2
4
the store
1
3
5
6 60
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16. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making
influence the amount of extra effort you put into your job?
12345
NONE AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL

61

17. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making
influence how effectively you are able to do your job?
12345
NONE AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL

62

18. How much extra effort do you actually put into doing a good job?
12345
NONE AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL

63

19. How often is it true for you personally that working hard leads
to high productivity?
12345
NEVER
ALMOST ALWAYS

64

20. How often is it true for you personally that working hard leads
to doing your job well?
12345
NEVER
ALMOST ALWAYS

65

IV. STORE FUNCTIONING
21. Which of these consequences have occurred because of your
QWL (for O&O—O&O) system of decision making?
DEFINITELY NOT
DEFINITELY YES
a. People know more
about what goes
on here
1
2
3
4
5
66
b. People are more
willing to accept
decisions
1
2
3
4
5
67
c. The quality of
decisions has
increased
1
2
3
4
5
68
d. It takes longer to
make decisions
1
2
3
4
5
69
e. There is more trust
between the manager
and the employees
1
2
3
4
5
70
f. Disagreements are
talked about more
openly
1
2
3
4
5
71
g. Disagreements are
more easily resolved
1
2
3
4
5
72
Card #77-78-79
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V. VALUES AND SATISFACTION
23. Here is a list of things a person could have on his or her
job. How important is each of the following to you?
MODERATELY
IMPORTANT
a. A feeling of
1
accomplishment
3
2
b. Personal growth
2
1
and development
3
c. Having a good
relationship
2
1
with co-workers
3
d. Pay and fringe
1
benefits
3
2
e. QWL (For O&O2
1
Worker Ownership
3
2
1
f. Job security
3
1
2
g- Independence
3
h. Getting a promotion
1
or a better job
3
2
i. Having a good
relationship with
3
2
1
your boss

CARD #2
COLUMN #
ID 1-10

EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT
4

5

11

4

5

12

4

5

13

4

5

14

4
4
4

5
5
5

15
16
17

4

5

18

4

5

19

24. How satisfied are you with each of the following aspects of your job?
VERY
VERY
DISSATISFIED
SATISFIED
a. The feeling of
accomplishment it
gives you
b. The amount of
personal growth
1
it offers
5
4
2
3
c. Your relationship
1
with co-workers
5
4
3
2
d. Your pay and
1
4
3
2
fringe benefits
5
e. QWL (For O&O2
1
Worker Ownership)
5
4
3
4
2
1
f. Your job security
5
3
4
2
1
g. Your independence
5
3
h. Your change to get
promoted or a
1
better job
4
2
5
3
i. Your relationship
with your boss
4
2
1
5
3

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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25. How satisfied are you with each of the following aspects of your life?
VERY
VERY
DISSATISFIED
SATISFIED
5
2
ife
a. Your family life
4
3
1
life
5
4
3
2
1
b. Your leisure life
arall
c. Your job, overall
5
4
3
2
1
5
d. Your career
4
3
2
1
e. Your feelings about
1
pers<on
yourself
5
4
3
2
ic
f. Your economic
situation
5
4
3
2
1
1
g. Your life, ii general
5
4
3
2
h. Your health
5
4
3
2
1
JATION
VI. HOUSEHOLD SITUATION
26. What is your mariital status?
2
1
3
MARRIED
SINGLE
SEPARATED
YFARS
27. What is your age?
?

1 . WHITE

4
DIVORCED

5
WIDOWED

3. OTHER

2. BLACK

3
JEWISH

33
34
35
36

37
38-39

1. FEMALE 2. MALE

ion?
30. What is your religion?
2
1
3TE STANT
CATHOLIC

29
30
31
32

40
41

4
OTHER

31. Do you:
1. OWN YOUR OWN HOUSE FREE AND CLEAR?
2. OWN YOUR OWN HOUSE, MORTGAGED?
3. RENT?
4. LIVE WITH RELATIVES/PAY SOME ROOM AND BOARD?
5. LIVE WITH RELATIVES/PAY NOTHING?

42
43

32. What is the total number of people living in your household?
______ PEOPLE

44-45

33. How many of these people are under 18? ______

46-47

34. How many people are economically dependent upon you for at least
some of their support? (Count both those living in your household
and those living elsewhere.)
______ TOTAL DEPENDENTS

48-49

35. What is your usual hourly wage for this job?
______ DOLLARS PER HOUR

50-51

36. What is your total annual income from this job? (Not counting
your bonus.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR

52-56
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37. What was the amount of your most recent bonus?
_______ DOLLARS

57-61

38. What is the total annual income for everyone in your household
combined? (Include any other income you have.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR

62-67

39. What was your total personal income on your A&P (or previous) job?
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR

68-72

40. How many months were you laid off altogether since A&P
announced its shutdown in March of 1982?
______ MONTHS

73-74

41. As far as savings are concerned, how are your savings now
compared to before the shutdown?
12345
MUCH BETTER
THE SAME
MUCH WORSE

75

42. As far as debt is concerned, how much do you owe now compared
to before the shutdown?
12345
MUCH LESS
MUCH MORE

76
Card #77-78-79
CARD#3
COLUMN #
ID 1-10

43. During the past two years, did changes in your financial situation make
it harder or easier for your family to do any of the following things?
EASIER
SAME
HARDER
5
4
3
2
1
a. Buying a house
12345
b. Having a wedding, etc.
12345
c. Buying a car
12345
d. Paying school tuition
5
4
3
2
1
e. Having a baby
5
4
3
2
1
f. Retiring
g. Buying a stereo, boat or
5
4
3
2
1
other leisure purchase
h. Keeping something you
5
4
3
2
1
were making payments on
5
4
3
2
1
i. Having a vacation
5
4
3
2
1
j. Moving out on own
44. How have any changes in your income affected your day to day
LESS IN
SAME
BUDGET
3
2
1
a. For food........
3
2
b. For clothing.....
1
2
1
3
c. For transportation,
3
2
1
d. For leisure......
2
3
e. For housing......
1

budget?
MORE IN
BUDGET
4
5
4
5
4
5
4
5
4
5

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24
25
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45. Have changes in your income led you to seek extra income in any new
ways such as the following:
NO
YES
a. Working another job........................... 1
2
b. Having someone else in your family work........ 1
2
c. Getting money from friends/relatives.............. 1
2
d. Doing services (i.e., fixing things)................ 1
2
e. Bartering or trading for things.................. 1
2
f. Selling things................................. 1
2
g. Other_________________________ 1
2
(Please Specify)

26
27
28
29
30
31
32

[Questions 46-51 appeared only on the Super Fresh Survey]
46. At Super Fresh, how much are you getting out of work compared to A&P?
12345
MUCH LESS
THE SAME
MUCH MORE

33

47. At Super Fresh, how much control do you have over your life
compared to A&P?
12345
MUCH LESS
THE SAME
MUCH MORE

34

48. Did you ever go to the following meetings?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Store (operation or QWL)
QWL Training
Corporate Planning Board
Regional Planning Board

NO
1
1
1
1

YES
2
2
2
2

35
36
37
38

1
NO

2
YES

50

49. What is QWL?
50. Are there separate QWL & operations meetings?

Card #77-78-79
51. How are QWL issues different from operations issues?
Thank you for your participation. Please seal your questionnaire in the envelope provided and
return it as directed. If you have a question, call Dr. Judith Goode, 787-7773.

Appendix G
Social Innovations at Work Project of Temple University
Study of Philadelphia Supermarket Transition
Shop Steward Information
Please answer the following questions either by circling the number most
closely corresponding to your situation or by filling in any blanks. Remember,
the answers you give will be kept completely confidential. No individual
responses will be given to anyone in the store, the union, or anywhere else.
A summary of the combined responses will be available after the study is com
pleted but these will be average answers of the group as a whole, NOT your
personal response.
DO NOT WRITE
IN THIS
COLUMN
CARD #1
COLUMN #1
ID 1-10
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. What is your current position?
1. ASSISTANT MANAGER
2. FROZEN FOOD DEPARTMENT MANAGER
3. DELI DEPARTMENT MANAGER
4. PRODUCE DEPARTMENT MANAGER
5. DAIRY DEPARTMENT MANAGER
6. GROCERY DEPARTMENT MANAGER
7. OFFICER PERSONNEL
8. HEAD CASHIER
9. CASHIER
10. NIGHT CREW

11. FROZEN FOOD CLERK
12. DELI CLERK

13. PRODUCE CLERK
14. DAIRY CLERK
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

GROCERY CLERK
MEAT CUTTER
MEAT WRAPPER
RECEIVER
OTHER:
11-12
(please identify)

2. On average, how many hours per week do you work in this store?
__________ HOURS PER WEEK
3. How long have you worked at this job in this store?
_____ YEARS and _____ MONTHS

13-14
15-19

4. How many years have you worked in any kind of supermarket,
not counting interruptions like child bearing or military service
but counting your current job?
________ YEARS IN ALL

20-21

5. How many years of schooling have you had? (High school
graduation =12; college graduation =16)
________YEARS

22-23
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308
6. What is your marital status?
123
45
SINGLE MARRIED SEPARATED DIVORCED WIDOWED
7. What is your age? ______ YEARS

24
25-26

8. What is your race? 1. WHITE 2. BLACK 3. OTHER

27

9. What is your sex? 1. FEMALE 2. MALE

28

10. What is your religion?
1
234
CATHOLIC PROTESTANT JEWISH OTHER

29

11. How many months were you laid off altogether since A&P announced
its shut down in March of 1982?
______ MONTHS

30-31

12. What is your total annual income from this job? (Not counting
your bonus.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR

32-36

13. What was the amount of your most recent bonus?
______ DOLLARS

37-41

14. What is the total annual income for everyone in your household
combined? (Include any other income you have.)
______ DOLLARS PER YEAR

42-47

15. How many people are economically dependent upon you for at
least some of their support? (Count both those living in your
household and those living elsewhere.)
______ TOTAL DEPENDENTS

48-49

H. PARTICIPATION

16. How much are workers' opinions taken into account when decisions are
made in your store?
12345
NONE
A GREAT DEAL

50

17. How much "say" or influence do each of the following have on what
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE
VERY MUCH
"SAY"
"SAY"
a. Workers as a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director
(For O&O—Store Manager)
d. Corporate Planning Board
(For O&O-Board of Directors)

12345
12345

52
53

12345

54

12345

55
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18. How much "say" or influence SHOULD each of the following have on what
goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE

a. Worker as a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director
(For O&O—Store Manager)
d. Corporate Planning Board
(For O&O-Board of Directors)

VERY MUCH

"SAY"
"SAY"
12345
12345

56
57

12345

58

12345

59

19. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making
influence the amount of extra effort workers in this store put into their jobs?
12345
NONE AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL
20. How much does the opportunity to contribute to decision making
influence how effectively workers in this store are able to do their jobs?
12345
NONE AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL

61

21. How much extra effort do workers in this store actually put into
doing a good job?
12345
NONE AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL

62

22. How often is it true for workers in this store that working hard leads
to high productivity?
12345
NEVER
ALMOST ALWAYS

63

60

23. How often is it true for workers in this store that working hard leads
to high productivity?
12345
NEVER
ALMOST ALWAYS

64

24. How often is it true for workers in this store that working hard leads
to doing their job well?
12345
NEVER
ALMOST ALWAYS

65

25. Which of these consequences have occurred because of your
QWL (For O&O—O&O) system of decision making?
DEFINITELY NOT
DEFINITELY YES
a. People know more about
what goes on here
1
2
3
4
5
b. People are more willing
to accept decisions
1
2
3
4
5
c. The quality of decisions
has increased
1
2
3
4
5
d. It takes longer to make
decisions
1
2
3
4
5

66
67
68
69
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e. There is more trust between
the manager and the
employees
f. Disagreements are talked
about more openly
g. Disagreements are more
easily resolved

1

2

3

4

5

70

1

2

3

4

5

71

1

2

3

4

5
72
CODE #77-80
CARD #2
COLUMN #
ID # 1-10

26. How much involvement do workers have in each of the following
kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY
THEY
OPINIONS THEY
THEY
ARE
ARE IN- THEY
ARE
SHARE DECIDE
NOT
FORMED GIVE
TAKEN EQUALLY
ON
INBEFORE- THEIR
INTO
IN
THEIR
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN
a. Improvement in
working conditions
1
2
3
4
5
611
b. Appointment of a
new department head
1
2
3
4
5
6
12
c. Hiring new
employees
1
2
3
4
5
6
13
d. Making a major
capital investment
1
2
3
4
5
614
e. Having more training
programs during
work time
1
2
3
4
5
6
15
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done
1
2
3
4
5
6
16
g. Changing the ven
dors or displays
1
2
3
4
5
6
17
h. Their working hours
1
2
3
4
5
6
18
i. Shutting down the
store
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
27. What percent of workers actually participate in decision making in the store?
VERY OFTEN PARTICIPATE
_____%
OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATE
_____ %
RARELY PARTICIPATE
_____%
NEVER PARTICIPATE
_____%
100%

20-21
22-23
24-25
26-27
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28. How much involvement do department heads have in each of the following
kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY
OPINIONS THEY
THEY
THEY
SHARE DECIDE
ARE
ARE IN- THEY
ARE
ON
TAKEN EQUALLY
FORMED OWE
NOT
THEIR
IN
INTO
BEFORE- THEIR
INVOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN
a. Improvement in
28
6
5
4
3
2
1
working conditions
b. Appointment of a
29
6
5
4
3
2
1
new department head
c. Hiring new
30
6
5
4
3
2
1
employees
d. Making a major
631
5
4
3
2
1
capital investment
e. Having more training
programs during
32
6
5
4
3
2
1
work time
f. Assigning tasks that
33
6
5
4
3
2
1
have to be done
g. Changing the ven
34
6
5
4
3
2
1
dors or displays
35
6
5
4
3
2
1
h. Their working hours
i. Shutting down the
36
6
5
4
3
2
1
store
29. How much involvement do store directors have in each of the following
kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY
OPINIONS THEY
THEY
THEY
SHARE DECIDE
ARE
ARE IN- THEY
ARE
ON
TAKEN EQUALLY
NOT FORMED GIVE
THEIR
IN
INTO
BEFORE- THEIR
INVOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN
a. Improvement in
37
6
5
4
3
2
1
working conditions
b. Appointment of a
638
5
4
3
2
1
new department head
c. Hiring new
39
6
5
4
3
2
1
employees
d. Making a major
40
6
5
4
3
2
1
capital investment
e. Having more training
programs during
41
6
5
4
3
2
1
work time
f. Assigning tasks that
42
6
5
4
3
2
1
have to be done
g. Changing the ven
43
6
5
4
3
2
1
dors or displays

312
h. Their working hours
i. Shutting down the
store

1

2

3

4

5

6

44

1

2

3

4

5

6

45

HI. TRAINING
30. How many job-related training programs have occurred here since the A&P shutdown?
12345
46
A GREAT DEAL
NONE
31. To what extent are workers encouraged to train each other on the job?
12345
A GREAT DEAL
NONE
32. How much have workers been trained in each of the following things
since the A&P shutdown?
A GREAT
NONE
a. Confidence in handling problems
4
3
2
1
that arise in the store
4
3
2
1
b. Willingness to speak up in meetings
4
3
2
1
c. How to work on a team
4
3
2
1
d. How to influence others
4
3
2
1
e. Feeling responsible for their work
4
3
2
1
f. How to supervise others
4
3
2
1
g. How to listen to others' opinions
4
3
2
1
h. How to perform a new job
i. How to perform new skills for their
same job (advertising, pricing,
4
3
2
1
scheduling, etc.)
j. How QWL (for O&O-Worker
4
3
2
1
Ownership) works

47

DEAL
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

5

56

5

57

33. To what extent has the union been supportive of QWL? (For O&O—
Worker Ownership)
12345
A GREAT DEAL
NOT AT ALL
34. (#34-39—Not asked at O&O) To what extent have workers been encouraged
to go to each of the following kinds of meetings?
ALWAYS
NEVER
5
4
3
2
1
a. Store operational meetings
5
4
3
2
1
b. Store QWL meetings
5
4
3
2
1
c. QWL training meetings
5
4
3
2
1
d. Corporate Planning Board
5
4
3
2
1
e. Regional Planning Board

59
60
61
62
63

35. In your estimation, to what extent has QWL been implemented in your store?
12345
A GREAT DEAL
NONE AT ALL

64
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36. How satisfied are the workers with QWL as it is practices in your store?
12345
VERY SATISFIED
VERY DISSATISFIED

65

37. What is QWL?
38. How is QWL different from operations?
39. Are there separate QWL and Operations meetings?
1
2
NO
YES
If so, what goes on at each?
Thank you for your participation. Please seal your questionnaire in the envelope provided and
return it as directed. If you have a question, call Dr. Judith Goode, 787-7773.

Appendix H
Social Innovations at Work Project of Temple University
Study of Philadelphia Supermarkets in Transition
Store Director (For O&O Manager) Information
Please answer the following questions either by circling the number most
closely corresponding to your situation or by filling in any blanks. Remember,
the answers you give will be kept completely confidential. No individual
responses will be given to anyone in the store, the union, or anywhere else.
A summary of the combined responses will be available after the study is com
pleted but these will be average answers of the group as a whole, NOT your
personal response.
DO NOT WRITE
IN THIS
COLUMN
CARD #1
COLUMN #1
ID 1-10
I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMPLOYEES IN YOUR STORE
1. What is the total number of people employed in this store?
______ TOTAL # OF EMPLOYEES

11-12

2. How many of these employees are Full Time?
______ FULL TIMERS

13-14

3. How many are Part Time?
_______ PART TIMERS

15-16

4. On average, how many hours per week do your Full Timers work?
______ HOURS/WEEK FT

17-18

5. On average, how many hours per week do your Part Timers work?
______ HOURS/WEEK PT

19-20

6. How many employees quit, were fired, retired or died during the past year?
______ # TURNED OVER

21-22

7. In an average week, how many employees are absent?
______ # ABSENT

23-24

8. How many of your employees have supervisory responsibilities?
______ # SUPERVISORS

25-26

9. How many of your employees (Full and Part Time) are female?
______ # FEMALES

27-28

10. How many of your employees are non-white?
______ # NON-WHITE
315

29-30

316
11. How many of your employees have at least a high school diploma or GED?
_____ # H.S. GRADUATES

31-32

12. What percent of your workers are at the top of the pay scale?
______ %

33-34

13. How much are they paid per hour?
$______ HOUR
14. What percent of your workers are at the bottom of the pay scale?
______ %
15. How much are they paid per hour?
$______ HOUR
16. How many employees can you schedule for more than one job?
______ EMPLOYEES
17. How many training programs have been run for your employees
during the past year?
______ # TRAINING PROGRAMS
18. To what extent are workers encouraged to train each other on the job?
12345
NONE
A GREAT DEAL
19. What is the average seniority of workers in your store?
______ YEARS SENIORITY

35-39
40-41
42-46
47-48
49-50

51
52-53

H. CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR STORE
20. How many square feet of selling area do you have?
______ THOUSAND SQUARE FEET
21. How many other food stores compete with you in the neighborhood
you serve?
_____ # COMPETITORS
22. How easy is it for you to obtain credit for the store?
12345
VERY DIFFICULT
VERY EASY

54-56

57-58
59

m. PARTICIPATION
23. How much are workers' opinions taken into account when decisions
are made in your store?
12345
NOT AT ALL
A GREAT DEAL

60
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24. How much "say" or influence DO each of the following have on
what goes on in the store?
VERY LITTLE
VERY MUCH
"SAY"
"SAY"
a. Workers as a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director (For O&O—
Store Manager)
d. Corporate Planning Board (For
O&O—Board of Directors)
15. How much "say" or influence S
what goes on in the store?

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

61
62

1

2

3

4

5

63

1

2

3

4

5

64

f/LD each of the following have on
VERY LITTLE
"SAY"

a. Workers are a group
b. Department heads
c. Store Director (For O&O—
Store Manager)
d. Corporate Planning Board (For
O&O—Board of Directors)

1
1

2
2

VERY MUCH
"SAY"
3
3

4
4

5
5

65
66
67

1

26. How much involvement do you have in each of the following
of decisions?
MY
OPINION
I AM
I AM INIS
NOT
FORMED I CAN
TAKEN
IN
BEFORE
INBEFORE- GIVE MY INTO
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT
a. Improvement in
1
4
working conditions
2
3
b. Appoint of a new
1
4
department head
2
3
c. Hiring new
1
4
employees
2
3
d. Making a major
capital investment
1
2
3
4
e. Having more training
programs during
4
1
2
3
work time
f. Assigning tasks that
4
have to be done
1
2
3
g. Changing the ven
1
2
3
4
dors or displays
3
4
h. Their working hours
1
2
i. Shutting down the
4
1
2
3
store

68
kinds

I SHARE I CAN
EQUALLY DECIDE
IN
ON MY
DECISIONS OWN
5

6

69

5

6

70

5

6

71

5

6

72

5

6

73

5

6

74

5
5

6
6

75
76

5

6
77
CODE #78-80
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CARD #2
COLUMN #
ID# 1-10
27. How much involvement do department heads have in each of the
following kinds of decisions?
THEIR
THEY
OPINIONS THEY
THEY
THEY
ARE IN
THEY
ARE
SHARE DECIDE
ARE
FORMED GIVE
TAKEN EQUALLY
ON
NOT
IN
BEFORE THEIR
INTO
IN
THEIR
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN
a. Improvement in
3
working conditions
2
4
5
6
1
b. Appointment of a
4
new department head
1
2
3
5
6
c. Hiring new
employees
1
3
4
6
2
5
d. Making a major
capital investment
1
2
4
5
6
3
e. Having more training
programs during
work time
4
1
2
3
5
6
f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done
4
6
1
2
3
5
g- Changing the ven
1
2
4
dors or displays
3
5
6
4
h. Their working hours
1
2
3
5
6
i. Shutting down the
4
store
1
2
3
5
6

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

28. How much involvement do workers have in each of the following kinds
of decisions?
THEIR
THEY
OPINIONS THEY
THEY
THEY
ARE
ARE IN
THEY
ARE
SHARE DECIDE
FORMED GIVE
NOT
TAKEN EQUALLY
ON
IN
INTO
BEFORE THEIR
IN
THEIR
VOLVED HAND OPINION ACCOUNT DECISIONS OWN
a. Improvement in
1
2
4
working conditions
3
5
6
20
b. Appointment of a
4
1
2
3
new department head
5
21
6
c. Hiring new
2
3
4
employees
1
5
6
22
d. Making a major
capital investment
2
3
4
5
1
23
6
e. Having more training
programs during
2
4
work time
3
5
24
1
6
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f. Assigning tasks that
have to be done
g. Changing the ven
dors or displays
h. Their working hours
i. Shutting down the
store

1

2

3

4

5

6

25

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

6
6

26
27

1

2

3

4

5

6

28

29. What percent of your workers ACTUALLY participate in decision making
in the store?
VERY OFTEN PARTICIPATE
OCCASIONALLY PARTICIPATE
RARELY PARTICIPATE
NEVER PARTICIPATE

_____%
_____%
_____%
_____%

29-30
31-32
33-34
35-36

100%
30. Which of these consequences have occurred because of your QWL
(For O&O—O&O) system of decision making?
DEFINITELY NOT
DEFINITELY YES
a. People know more about
what goes on here
1
2
3
4
5
b. People are more willing to
accept decisions
1
2
3
4
5
c. The quality of decisions has
increased
1
2
3
4
5
d. It takes longer to make
decisions
1
2
3
4
5
e. There is more trust between
the manager and the
employees
1
2
3
4
5
f. Disagreements are talked
about more openly
1
2
3
4
5
g. Disagreements are more
easily resolved
1
2
3
4
5

37
38
39
40
41
42
43

IV. INNOVATIONS
31. To what extent have jobs or duties that people perform changed since 1982?
12345
NO CHANGE
A GREAT DEAL
OF CHANGE

44

32. To what extent have new methods for doing things in a supermarket
been used in this store since 1982?
12345
NONE
A GREAT DEAL

45

33. To what extent have new kinds of supermarket equipment been used
in this store since 1982?
12345
NONE
A GREAT DEAL

46
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V. STORE FINANCIAL INFORMATION
Please base the first four answers to each question on figures from the most recent four quarters.
That is, the data should include October 1, 1983 to September 31, 1984. Remember all of this
data will be kept confidential and is intended to help you.
July 1,
Aprill,
Jan. 1,
Oct. 1,
1984 to
1984 to
1984 to
1983 to
Sept. 31,
June 30,
March 31,
Dec. 31,
1984
1984
1984
1983
34. What was your sales
$ _____ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
volume?
35. What was the total cost of
$ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
goods sold?
36. What was your store's net
$ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ _______
income?
37. What were your operating
$______$______$______$______
expenses?
38. What was your total payroll
$ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
expenditure?
39. What was your total cash
$ _____ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
flow?
40. What was the total value of
$ ______ $ ______ $ ______ $ ______
your assets?
41 How much did you spend
on capital improvements? $ ______ $ _______ $ ______ $ ______
42. What was the average
TOTAL # of employee
$ ______ $ ______ $ _____ $ ______
hours worker per week?
44. If your business should slump temporarily, how likely is it that you would do each of the
following things? Please circle 1 number for each statement then go back and rank order
the top 10 things you would do: l=the first and 10=the last.
EXTREMELY
EXTREMELY
RANK
LIKELY
UNLIKELY
ORDER
______ a. Reduce hours of full time
11
5
4
3
2
1
workers
_____ b. Reduce hours of part time
12
5
4
3
2
1
workers
_____ c. Reduce the # of full time
13
5
4
3
2
1
workers
_____ d. Reduce the # of part time
14
5
4
3
2
1
workers
15
12345
_____ e. Bargain to reduce wages
16
5
4
3
2
1
_____ f. Change product mix
17
12345
_____ g. Reduce advertising/specials
18
5
4
3
2
1
_____ h. Increase advertising/specials
19
12345
_____ i. Reduce coupons
20
5
4
3
2
1
_____ j. Draw from savings/checking
21
5
4
3
2
1
_____ k. Sell liquid assets
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_____ 1. Borrow from the bank
_____ m. Reduce wages of owners
_____ n. Other ____________
identify
_____ o. Other ___________
identify

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

22
23
24

1

2

3

4

5

25

DID YOU REMEMBER TO RANK YOUR TOP 10?

28-47

VI. CONSULTING
45. Since March 1982, have you ever had a consultant assist you or your employees in im
proving your store operations?
1
2
NO
YES
If so, how many hours of consulting time did you receive from each of the following sources
in each topic area?
JOB
STORE
OR
GROUP OPERATSKILLQWL PROCESS ING
TRAIN- TRAIN- TRAIN- PRAC- FINANING
ING
ING
TICES
CIAL
LEGAL OTHER
a. A&P
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
b. PACE
(Sherman Kreiner
Andy Lamas)
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
c. GREY AREAS
(Jay Guben &
Merry Guben)
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
d. IGA
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
e. PALM
(John Good)
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
f. UFCW 1357 _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
g. UFCW 56
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
h. OTHER
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
i. OTHER
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
j. OTHER
_____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____ _____
(Please specify)
46. How much have workers learned about each of the following things
since the A&P shutdown?
NOTHING
A GREAT DEAL
a. Confidence in handling problems
that arise in the store
12345
b. Willingness to speak up in
meetings
12345
c. How to work on a team
12345
d. How to influence others
12345
e. Feeling responsible for their work
12345
f. How to supervise others
12345
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g. How to listen to others' opinions
h. How to perform a new job
i. How to perform new skills for
their same job (advertising, pric
ing, scheduling, etc.)
j. How QWL (For O&O—Worker
Ownership) works

1234
12345
12345
12345

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION. PLEASE SEAL YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE IN
THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED AND MAIL. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, CALL DR.
JUDITH GOODE, 787-7773.

Appendix I
Mean Differences on Major Study Variables Among Store
Managers, Shop Stewards, Full-Time Workers, and Part-Time Workers
In the Six Stores Studied Intensively

Study variables

Mean responses of
___________1__________ Significant
Store
Shop Full-time Part-time differences
managers stewards workers workers (p <.05)

Workers' Opinions Considered1

4.04

3.23

3.53

2.32

a,b,c,d,f

Perceived Degree of Influence:2
Workers as a Group
Department Heads
Store Managers
Board

3.54
4.42
4.65
4.46

2.76
3.60
4.54
4.24

3.09
4.17
4.69
4.38

2.24
3.50
4.3
4.09

a,b,d,e
a,b
d
-

Worker Involvement in: 3
Improving Work Conditions
Appointing Department Head
Hiring Workers
Making Major Capital Investment
Having More Work Training
Assigning Daily Tasks
Changing Vendors or Display
Setting Working Hours
Shutting Down the Store

3.72
1.92
1.84
1.28
1.14
2.40
2.36
2.40
1.48

3.04
1.96
1.65
1.54
1.25
1.92
3.00
2.15
1.79

4.09
3.10
3.22
2.47
1.67
5.14
3.57
4.21
2.64

2.19
1.26
1.30
1.25
1.19
3.02
1.75
1.77
1.30

a,b,d,e,f
b,c,d,e,f
b,c,e
b,c,e
b,d,e
b,c,e,f
b,c,e
b,c,e
b,c,e

3.40

3.75

2.51

a,d,e,f

3.28
3.12
2.88

3.60
3.56
3.22

2.55
2.45
2.64

b,d,f
a,b,d,f
b

3.32

3.65

2.61

a,b,c,d,f

3.48

4.07

2.75

a,b,d,f

3.52

3.60

2.48

b,d,f

3.76

3.55

2.57

b,d,f

Consequences of QWL (Worker Ownership): 4
4.24
People Know More
People Are More Willing to
Accept Decisions
3.80
4.08
Quality of Decision Increased
Takes Longer to Make Decisions 3.00
More Trust Between Manager
4.44
and Worker
Disagreements Are Talked About
4.28
More Openly
Disagreements Are More Easily
4.12
Resolved
Workers Encouraged to Attend
3.76
Store QWL Meetings5

LEGEND: a=Store Managers vs. Shop Stewards. b=Full-Time vs. Part-Time
Workers. c=Store Managers vs. Full-Time Workers. d=Store Managers vs. Part-Time
Workers. e=Shop Stewards vs. Full-Time Workers. f=Shop Stewards vs. Part-Time Workers.
NOTES:
1. Responses range from 1 Not At All to 5 A Great Deal.
2. Responses range from 1 Very Little Say to 5 Very Much Say.
3. Responses range from 1 Not Involved to 5 Own Decision.
4. Responses range from 1 Definitely Not to 5 Definitely Yes.
5. Responses range from 1 Never to 5 Always.
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Appendix J
Comparison of Mean Responses Between Stores Where Interviews
Were Held and Stores Where No Interviews Were Held
Store managers responses in QWL stores
Interviewed

Non-interviewed

Stores
(n=2)

Stores
(n=ll)

f-value

2-tail P

4.50
5.00
4.50
5.00

2.73
4.00
4.64
4.27

2.81
5.24
0.26
3.07

0.11
0.00
0.84
0.01

4.50
5.00
4.00
4.00

3.45
4.27
4.82
4.27

1.82
3.07
1.49
0.27

0.21
0.01
0.17
0.83

Actual Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board

Union stewards responses in QWL stores
Interviewed

Non-interviewed

Stores
(n=2)

Stores
(n=ll)

f-value

2-tail P

3.50
4.50
5.00
4.50

3.09
3.91
4.64
4.18

0.27
1.00
1.79
0.55

0.84
0.42
0.10
0.64

4.00
4.50
5.00
4.50

3.91
4.45
4.82
4.00

0.09
0.08
1.00
0.83

0.94
0.94
0.34
0.49

Actual Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board
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Appendix J (continued)
Store managers responses in non-QWL stores

Actual Say:

Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board

Interviewed

Non-interviewed

Stores
(n=2)

Stores
(n=8)

f-value

2-tail P

4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50

4.00
4.63
4.64
4.38

0.73
0.22
0.22
0.21

0.52
0.85
0.85
0.85

4.50
4.50
4.50
4.50

4.38
4.63
4.63
3.75

0.22
0.23
0.23
1.03

0.85
0.85
0.85
0.36

Ideal Say:
Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board

Union stewards responses in non-QWL stores

Actual Say:

Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board

Ideal Say:

Workers
Department head
Store manager
Corporate board

Interviewed

Non-interviewed

(n=2)

(n=7)

l-value

2-tail P

2.50
3.00
4.00
5.00

1.86
2.86
4.38
3.86

1.06
0.13
0.37
1.80

0.34
0.92
0.78
0.12

4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00

4.29
4.43
4.50
4.14

0.79
1.44
1.87
0.35

0.46
0.20
0.10
0.74
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